Ce rapport fait une comparaison entre les niveaux de revenus, de dépenses, du solde budgétaire et de la dette nette de l’Ontario et des autres provinces canadiennes sur la base des statistiques de finances publiques canadiennes (SFP) de Statistique Canada.

Les informations financières sont examinées pour l’exercice 2022- 2023 et sont dénommées 2022 dans l’ensemble du rapport.

Dans ce rapport, les auteurs présentent des options pour développer l’actionnariat salarié. Une de celle-ci est l’exonération de l’impôt sur les plus-values lors de la vente d’entreprises classiques à des fonds d’actionnariat salarié qui s’applique si la fiducie acquiert la majorité des parts de l’entreprise. 

We generally take for granted that everyone has the right to a say—and certainly a vote—in what our governments do. But in the workplaces that rule many of our waking hours, these democratic rights are largely absent.

In a time of extreme inequality, deteriorating social cohesion and reduced trust in our institutions, why shouldn’t workers have more control over the firms they work in? Enabling employees to take more ownership and control in their working lives is a promising antidote.

With advocacy from a broad coalition of supporters—including many business owners—the federal government has tabled legislation to create a new Employee Ownership Trust legal structure that makes it easier for business owners to sell firms to their employees.

However, to tap the full potential of employee ownership, a much broader suite of policies is needed. This report examines what an ambitious public policy agenda would look like to unleash the promise of democratic employee ownership in Canada.

Ce document présente les faits saillants du Budget fédéral 2024 recensés par la CFFP. 
Voici 17 faits saillants qui ressortent de l’analyse effectuée par l’équipe de la Chaire à la suite de la lecture du Budget fédéral 2024 présenté le 16 avril 2024 :

1. Croissance économique de 1,1 % en 2023 suivie d’une croissance moindre en 2024 à 0,7 %
2. Retour anticipé de l’inflation dans la fourchette cible de la Banque du Canada en 2024
3. Le déficit serait de 40 G$ en 2023-2024, respectant un des trois ancrages budgétaires
4. Aucun retour à l’équilibre budgétaire prévu au cadre financier, le solde en 2028-2029 étant négatif de 20 G$
5. 57,9 G$ de nouvelles initiatives dans le Budget 2024 d’ici 2028-2029, mais un coût net de 10,3 G$, une fois pris en compte les mesures aux revenus et l’évolution depuis la Mise à jour économique 2023
6. En 2024-2025, la croissance des revenus est plus élevée que prévu lors de la Mise à jour économique 2023
7. Les charges de programmes pour les cinq prochaines années sont significativement plus importantes que ce qui était prévu dans la Mise à jour économique 2023
8. Mesuré en pourcentage des revenus fiscaux, le poids du service de la dette atteindrait 11 % des revenus budgétaires en 2028-2029, un poids équivalent à celui du début des années 2010
9. Le ratio dette-PIB atteindrait 42,1 % en 2023-2024 et redescendrait à 39 % en 2028-2029
10. Augmentation du taux d’inclusion des gains en capital de 50 à 66,7 %, mais taux inchangé sur le 1er 250 000 $ de gain pour les particuliers
11. Hausse du retrait maximal autorisé de 35 000 $ à 60 000 $ dans le cadre du régime d’accession à la propriété (RAP)
12. Introduction de la Prestation canadienne pour personnes handicapées
13. Mise en place de la première phase du régime national d’assurance-médicament
14. Instauration de l’inscription automatique au REEE pour des enfants admissibles au Bon d’étude canadien
15. Plusieurs mesures budgétaires pour répondre à la crise du logement dont la création du Fonds canadien pour les infrastructures liées au logement
16. Rehaussement des dépenses militaires en vue de les porter à 1,76 % du PIB en 2029-2030
17. Fiscalité internationale : confirmation par le gouvernement de l’engagement à l’égard du Pilier Un (convention multilatérale) et du Pilier Deux (impôt minimum mondial) et quant à l’intention d’appliquer la taxe sur les services numériques (TSN)

Ce mémoire reprend des réflexions présentées au gouvernement fédéral à diverses occasions et transmises également dans le cadre des consultations prébudgétaires 2024.
Certaines propositions peuvent contribuer à hausser les revenus du gouvernement (mesures ciblées touchant les contribuables à hauts revenus), d’autres visent à offrir un soutien supplémentaire à des groupes de population pour des objectifs de croissance économique de moyen et long terme (mesures ciblées en matière d’incitation au travail des aînés et mesures ciblées pour maximiser le bon d’études canadien) et enfin, d’autres visent une plus grande cohérence entre des véhicules d’épargne (mesures ciblées sous l’angle de la cohérence du CELIAPP avec les autres véhicules d’épargne).

Ce texte analyse les implications financières et réglementaires de la douane pour les entreprises canadiennes dans un contexte de mondialisation des chaînes d’approvisionnement.
Dans le contexte actuel de déploiement des chaînes d’approvisionnement, les entreprises jonglent avec une réalité commerciale plus internationale que jamais. L’autrice fait état des incidences financières et fiscales de la douane, dans la perspective des entreprises qui importent des marchandises au Canada dans le cadre de leurs activités. Elle détaille les informations requises sur l’origine des marchandises importées et explique le classement tarifaire et l’établissement de la valeur en douane, afin de déterminer le montant des droits de douane et celui des taxes à l’importation. L’autrice présente ensuite les incidences particulières de la réglementation douanière sur les entreprises multinationales. Une réflexion sur la gestion des questions douanières dans le cadre de la planification financière et fiscale des entreprises vient clore l’analyse.

Ce document indique que le Québec compte sur une hausse des transferts fédéraux pour résorber son déficit budgétaire croissant, mais que les contraintes financières du gouvernement fédéral compliquent la donne.

La hausse des dépenses, des déficits et de la dette du Canada pourrait compliquer les efforts du Québec qui souhaite voir s’accroître les transferts fédéraux pour résorber ses propres déficits. Ainsi, la récente détérioration de la situation financière du Québec rend d’autant plus critique la capacité du gouvernement fédéral d’assurer la croissance des transferts fédéraux à long terme.

Les dépenses fédérales pour l’exercice 2023-2024 dépassent de 70 milliards de dollars les prévisions de 2019, principalement en raison du financement de nouvelles initiatives comme les garderies et l’assurance dentaire. Cette augmentation, surpassant la croissance économique, représente 16 % du PIB, un niveau similaire à celui de 1992-1993, suscitant des préoccupations concernant l’endettement. Les provinces, y compris le Québec, pourraient être touchées par le manque de financement adéquat, en particulier pour les transferts en santé, alors que les coûts continuent d’augmenter.

Les nouveaux programmes sociaux fédéraux, comme les garderies et l’assurance dentaire, créent des incertitudes pour les provinces comme le Québec, notamment en ce qui concerne le partage des coûts et la compensation des services déjà financés. De plus, les besoins d’emprunt élevés du gouvernement fédéral pourraient accroître les coûts d’emprunt pour le Québec à long terme. Une approche prudente de la gestion des finances publiques fédérales est nécessaire pour atténuer ces risques et maintenir la stabilité financière.

Dans ce rapport, les auteurs traitent des budgets municipaux au Canada et jugent que ceux-ci sont confus et tardifs, ce qui décourage l’engagement et la participation éclairée des citoyens.

Municipal finances in Canada are confusing. The budgets that get most public attention are typically opaque, often late, and present a misleadingly dismal picture of city finances. Year-end audited financial statements are better, but are hard to compare with inconsistently presented budgets. This report card grades the fiscal transparency of 32 major Canadian municipalities from A to F. Better budgets would improve accountability for municipal taxes and services in Canada.

Ce document indique que l’accroissement de la population âgée va être fortement impactée par la capacité limitée des maisons de retraite et des établissements de soins de longue durée ainsi que par les contraintes budgétaires des gouvernements.

Across the country, more than $1 of every $4 of provincial government healthcare spending goes to caring for people over 75 years of age. Despite significant growth in total healthcare spending on seniors, per capita spending has declined in some provinces, showing that there is extremely limited fiscal capacity to increase spending per senior.

Gaps exist in current policies. Notably, seniors with below-median incomes and those who rent rather than own their homes face affordability challenges that are a potential barrier to accessing retirement homes and other support services. Further, there is unmet need for home care across Canada, which invests less in home and community care than other OECD countries.

Among the key recommendations: (i) provinces should invest in public home and community care while also considering mechanisms to expand the private provision of these services; (ii) Ontario and other provinces should consider similar policies to Quebec, which provides a refundable tax credit for senior renters to access retirement homes services and, more generally, use tax credits and other market mechanisms for increasing the supply of retirement home spaces; (iii) current capacity and fiscal constraints mean that expanding both publicly and privately funded options along the continuum of care will be necessary to ensure that seniors can maintain a high quality of life.

Dans ce texte, l’auteur conclut que le récent budget fédéral s’inscrit dans le respect des ancrages budgétaires, un interventionnisme accru et de nouvelles sources de revenus.

Ce texte aborde les enjeux de baisse de compétitivité fiscale au Canada pour l’année 2024, notamment en raison des hausses des taux d’imposition des particuliers.

In December 2015, Canada’s new Liberal government introduced changes to Canada’s personal income tax system. Among the changes for the 2016 tax year, the federal government added a new income tax bracket, raising the top tax rate from 29 to 33 percent on incomes over $200,000. This increase in the federal tax rate is layered on top of numerous recent provincial increases. Starting with Nova Scotia in 2010, through 2023 at least one Canadian government has increased the top personal income tax rate in every year except 2011, 2019, and 2023. Over this period, seven out of 10 provincial governments increased tax rates on upper-income earners. As a result, the combined federal and provincial top personal income tax rate has increased in every province since 2009. The largest tax hike has been in Newfoundland and Labrador, where the combined top rate increased by 10.3 percentage points (or 23.1 percent). This raised the province from one of the lowest combined top rates in Canada in 2009, up to the highest rate in the country in 2023. In Ontario, the combined top rate increased by 7.1 percentage points (or 15.3 percent); in Quebec it increased by 5.1 percentage points (or 10.6 percent). These increases have important consequences for Canada’s economy. In particular, high and increasing marginal tax rates—that is, the tax rate on the next dollar earned— discourage people from engaging in productive economic activity, ultimately hindering economic growth and prosperity. This occurs because marginal tax rates reduce the reward of earning more income and, in the case of personal income taxes, more labour income. There is general agreement in the economic literature on this point; the debate is about the magnitude of the effect. The federal and provincial increases to Canada’s marginal income tax rates from 2009 to 2023 have put the country at a greater competitive disadvantage for attracting and retaining skilled labour and, less directly, investment and entrepreneurs. Even before the changes, the country’s combined federal and provincial top marginal tax rates compared unfavourably to those in the United States and other industrialized countries. Out of 61 Canadian and US jurisdictions (including the provinces, states, and Washington, DC), Newfoundland and Labrador currently has the highest combined top statutory marginal rate (54.80 percent), followed by Nova Scotia (54.00 percent) and Ontario (53.53 percent). Nine Canadian provinces occupy the list of 10 jurisdictions with the highest top combined marginal income tax rates and all provinces are in the top 15. There is a total of 46 US jurisdictions with combined top tax rates that are lower than all Canadian provinces. The fact that Canada’s top tax rates are often applied to lower levels of income than is the case in other countries further erodes our tax competitiveness. To adjust for differences in income thresholds, we compare the combined statutory marginal tax rates at various income levels in Canadian dollars for each Canadian and US jurisdiction. At an income of CA$300,000, the highest threshold (with the exception of Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador) in which a Canadian combined top rate is applied, Canadians in every province face a higher marginal income tax rate than Americans in any US state. Results are the same at an income of CA$150,000 and Canada’s marginal tax rates are also uncompetitive at incomes of CA$75,000 and CA$50,000. Taken together, Canada’s personal income tax rates are decidedly uncompetitive compared to those in the United States. And, Canada also competes with other industrialized countries for highly skilled workers and investment. To measure the competitiveness of Canada’s top tax rates, the study compares the combined top statutory marginal income tax rates with rates in 38 industrialized countries. In 2022 (latest year of available international data) Canada had the 5th highest combined top tax rate out of 38 countries. The federal change to the top rate in 2016 has markedly worsened Canada’s competitive position. For instance, Canada had the 13th highest combined tax rate in 2014, before the changes in the federal top rate. Canadian governments have put the country in this uncompetitive position in part to raise more revenue as they grapple with persistent deficits and mounting debt. However, the tax increases are unlikely to raise as much revenue as governments expect since taxpayers—particularly upper-income earners—tend to change their behaviour in response to higher tax rates in ways that reduce the amount of tax they might pay. Federal and provincial governments would do well to consider reversing the trend towards higher marginal tax rates on upper-income earners, and lower personal income tax rates.

Ce texte discute des modifications des taux d’imposition personnels et corporatifs en Alberta depuis 2014, soulignant l’impact négatif des hausses d’impôts et proposant un retour à un système d’imposition unique à taux réduit pour améliorer l’attractivité économique de la province.

As recently as 2014, Alberta had a single 10 percent personal and corporate income tax rate. As a result, it had the lowest top statutory combined federal and provincial/state personal income tax rate and business income tax rate in North America. This was a powerful advantage that made Alberta an attractive place to start a business, work, and invest. In 2015, however, the provincial NDP government replaced the single personal income tax rate of 10 percent with a five-bracket system including a top marginal rate of 15 percent. It also increased Alberta’s 10 percent CIT rate to 12 percent. While the CIT rate has since been reduced to 8 percent, Alberta now has the 10th highest PIT rate in North America. It is important for the province to undo the personal income tax hikes, and return to a single rate PIT system at a lower rate of 8 percent to match the CIT rate. This would help restore Alberta’s position as a low tax jurisdiction with a top combined PIT rate among the 15 lowest in North America. Crucially, it would improve Alberta’s standing among energy jurisdictions, among which it competes for talent and investment. If these changes were introduced via a flat tax system, Alberta could improve tax efficiency, reduce administration and compliance costs, all while avoiding negative incentives for work, savings, and investment. Finally, reducing Alberta’s PIT system to a single rate of 8 percent would lead to tax savings for Albertans across income groups. For perspective, taxpayers affected by the changes would save $1,573, on average, in 2023.

Ce document indique que les États qui envisagent de réduire l’impôt foncier risquent de compromettre le financement de l’enseignement public. Les auteurs privilégient des recettes durables pour les écoles.

Critical debates over the role of state revenues in supporting people’s needs are playing out in statehouses nationwide, with serious implications for family well-being, economic opportunity, and support for vital public services ranging from quality schools to safe drinking water. As this year’s Tax Day approaches, here are five trends we’re watching across the states.

Dans ce document, les auteurs postulent que le Congrès devrait donner la priorité au financement de l’IRS afin de rendre l’outil numérique de déclarations d’impôts Direct Files accessible à tous.

Eligible taxpayers in 12 states can file their taxes this year directly with the IRS securely, quickly, and for free using Direct File, a new digital tax filing tool from the IRS. April 15 is the last day for most eligible filers to use IRS Direct File during this pilot year. The IRS launched Direct File as part of its strategic operating plan and modernization of the tax filing system using funds from the Inflation Reduction Act.

Ce document indique que, dans la mesure où le Premium Tax Credit n’est pas assorti d’une limite de revenu, la croissance des primes peut continuer à modifier les ménages éligibles et demandeurs, ce qui, à son tour, a une incidence directe sur les dépenses fédérales totales.

Individuals without access to subsidized health insurance coverage may be eligible for the premium tax credit (PTC), a federal subsidy that reduces an individual’s or family’s premium for qualified health plans offered through the health insurance exchanges established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). The dollar amount of the PTC varies for each individual (or family), based on a formula specified in statute. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2) and the enacted budget reconciliation measure commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA; P.L. 117-169) made temporary changes to the PTC’s eligibility criteria and subsidy formula. These temporary enhancements will expire at the end of tax year 2025. In February 2023, approximately 14.3 million individuals received advanced payments of the PTC.

Ce document indique que, bien que le Congrès dispose d’un pouvoir absolu en matière de fiscalité et qu’il puisse remplacer Chevron, en pratique il ne dispose peut-être pas actuellement de l’expertise nécessaire.

Individuals without access to subsidized health insurance coverage may be eligible for the premium tax credit (PTC), a federal subsidy that reduces an individual’s or family’s premium for qualified health plans offered through the health insurance exchanges established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). The dollar amount of the PTC varies for each individual (or family), based on a formula specified in statute. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA; P.L. 117-2) and the enacted budget reconciliation measure commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA; P.L. 117-169) made temporary changes to the PTC’s eligibility criteria and subsidy formula. These temporary enhancements will expire at the end of tax year 2025. In February 2023, approximately 14.3 million individuals received advanced payments of the PTC.

Ce rapport indique que la progressivité du système fiscal américain est grandement critiquée et que cette critique est fondée.

America’s tax system is just barely progressive, and not nearly as progressive as many suggest or as progressive as it could be. There is plenty of room for lawmakers to improve the progressivity of the tax code to combat economic, wealth, and racial inequality.

The share of all taxes (including federal, state, and local taxes) paid by the rich only slightly exceeds the share of total income they receive. In 2024, the share of all taxes paid by the richest 1 percent of Americans (23.9 percent) will be slightly higher than the share of all income going to this group (20.1 percent).

The share of all taxes paid by the poor is just slightly less than the share of income received by the poor. The poorest fifth of Americans will pay 1.5 percent of their income in taxes, a slightly lower share than their share of all income (2.6 percent).

The tax system would appear even less progressive if this analysis included asset appreciation (unrealized capital gains), which mostly flows to the wealthy. Economists consider unrealized capital gains to be income, but the tax code does not.

Ce rapport présente l’analyse du système fiscal californien avec un intérêt particulier pour la charge fiscale des familles. 

For families of modest means, California is not a high-tax state. California taxes are close to the national average for families in the bottom 80 percent of the income scale. For the bottom 40 percent of families, California taxes are lower than states like Florida and Texas.

The highest earners usually pay higher taxes in California than elsewhere. But rich Californians’ tax rates are not much different from the tax rates that low-income families in many states have long been accustomed to paying. Sixteen states tax their poorest residents at rates higher than what California applies to its richest. Florida, Tennessee, and Texas are among those 16 states.

California’s tax system is relatively flat overall, whereas most states have highly regressive taxes that ask less of the rich than of anyone else. California’s choice to have a less regressive system largely explains why California collects more tax revenue per capita than other states without especially high tax rates for low- and middle-income families.

Ce court article traite des taux d’imposition du gain en capital pour 2024 aux États-Unis.

When taxpayers sell their capital assets, like real property or their shares in a company, net earnings on those sales (capital gains) are generally subject to tax, and net losses on those sales (capital losses) can generally be deducted from income when calculating income tax liability. One major shortcoming of current policy, however, is that when calculating the capital gain from the sale of an asset, the original purchase price (tax basis) is expressed in nominal terms when subtracted from the selling price. Because no inflation adjustment is made to the original purchase price, capital gains taxes are applied to nominal, not real, increases in wealth, meaning taxpayers are taxed on what is typically a combination of real and fictitious income (although the tax code does provide a few accommodations, such as for qualifying sales of owner-occupied homes and properties transferred to an heir). In some cases, this lack of inflation indexing of the tax basis results in taxpayers paying taxes on what appears on paper to be a capital gain but, due to inflation, is, in real terms, a net loss.

Ce document discute des raisons pour lesquelles les subventions sont plus efficaces que les déductions fiscales correspondantes.

The federal government subsidizes charitable contributions for those taxpayers who have positive tax liability and itemize their deductions. However, especially since the passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, few taxpayers itemize, and those that do tend to have higher incomes – limiting the progressivity of the deduction. Replacing the charitable contribution deduction with a tax credit is one solution, but that would still only affect donors that file federal returns and owe taxes. This brief considers an alternative: matching grants to nonprofit organizations. A grant system would require neither that donors file returns nor owe taxes, and research also suggests that donors are more incentivized by grants than by equivalent deductions. Contributions to religious organizations pose one complication to this solution, but a carefully designed program could avoid them.

Ce rapport indique que, sans interventions politiques rapides et sans progrès dans les technologies émergentes, la croissance mondiale à moyen terme risque de demeurer en dessous de sa moyenne d’avant la pandémie.

Economic activity was surprisingly resilient through the global disinflation of 2022–23. As global inflation descended from its mid-2022 peak, economic activity grew steadily, defying warnings of stagflation and global recession. Growth in employment and incomes held steady, reflecting supportive demand developments–– including greater-than-expected government spending and household consumption—and a supply-side expan- sion amid, notably, an unanticipated boost to labor force participation. The unexpected economic resilience, despite significant central bank interest rate hikes aimed at restoring price stability, also reflects the ability of households in major advanced economies to draw on substantial savings accumulated during the pandemic. In addition, as Chapter 2 explains, changes in mortgage and housing markets over the prepandemic decade of low interest rates moderated the near-term impact of policy rate hikes. As inflation converges toward target levels and central banks pivot toward policy easing in many economies, a tightening of fiscal policies aimed curbing high government debt, with higher taxes and lower government spending, is expected to weigh on growth.

Dans ce rapport, les auteurs mettent de l’avant la nécessité de réorganiser l’architecture mondiale du financement, notamment en clarifiant les objectifs du financement du développement international.

Le financement international du développement est défié depuis quatre années par plusieurs crises internationales, notamment la pandémie de Covid-19 et la guerre en Ukraine. Celles-ci n’ont fait qu’exacerber les problèmes que rencontraient déjà de nombreux pays, notamment les plus pauvres et les plus vulnérables, pour assurer un financement durable de leur développement.

Ces crises ont révélé le besoin d’un profond renouvellement de l’architecture internationale du financement du développement. C’est dans ce but et afin de faire des propositions concrètes que la Ferdi a créé en 2022 une chaire sur ce thème, animée par un groupe de personnalités francophones indépendantes connues pour leur grande expérience et leur capacité à formuler des recommandations, groupe que j’ai eu l’hon- neur et le plaisir de présider.

Ce document discute du fait que le maintien du crédit universel représente un enjeu majeur pour le prochain gouvernement britannique.

2024 is a critical juncture for Universal Credit. ‘Managed migration’, the long-delayed process by which claimants of the soon-to-be-phased out ‘legacy’ benefits are moved onto Universal Credit, is picking up in earnest. And, with neither of the main parties wanting to scrap Universal Credit, whoever wins the election will be governing a ‘Universal Credit Britain’, as the final stage of what has been the biggest benefit reform in a generation is due to end with a system covering 7 million families by 2029.

The next government will need to understand how Universal Credit has radically restructured the benefit system, but also the country they will be governing. It is nearly 14 years since Universal Credit was first proposed, and over a decade since its first claimants. Universal Credit has seen big changes during this extended rollout, first with a series of real-terms cuts and more recently with changes to reward work, so we cannot rely on thinking from its introduction to understand the system we have. There have also been big changes in the country since Universal Credit was conceived – with record low levels of unemployment and increasing numbers of people who are inactive due to ill-health – some of which bring new challenges, and which must not be overlooked. This note therefore takes a step back to assess how the current Universal Credit system compares to the legacy benefit system it is replacing, and how changes in the country over the last decade have altered its impact.

Ce rapport examine les causes de la croissance significative des prix des loyers que le Royaume-Uni a connue au cours des deux dernières années ainsi que ce à quoi s’attendre pour l’avenir.

With many more families in the UK now renting, and renting for longer, the rising cost of doing so poses a significant challenge to living standards. This briefing note looks at what has been driving the rapid increases in rents over the past two years, and what that means for the future.

We find that earnings growth and a post-pandemic re-adjustment are key drivers of the rental price growth we’ve seen in recent years, with popular theories about the rise, including an ‘exodus’ of landlords from the private-rental sector, not supported by the evidence. While rental-price growth for new tenancies is set to continue to ease in the coming months, many renters will still see their housing costs rise over the coming years, as the high market rates we’ve seen filter through the private-rental sector. Against this backdrop, it’s crucial that the Government continues to support low-income renters by ensuring the Local Housing Allowance keeps pace with rents over the coming years.

Selon ce rapport, ISA (Individual Savings Account) constitue une politique coûteuse et inefficace pour la promotion de l’épargne, bénéficiant principalement aux hauts revenus.

Today marks the beginning of a new ISA (Individual Savings Account) year with savers able to squirrel away up to £20,000 over the next year, with the returns being completely tax free. This is the Government’s flagship policy to promote saving – with around 12 million adults benefiting in 2021-22. But while the policy is well intentioned – one-in-three working-age adults live in families with savings of less than the £1,000 – it is expensive and growing in cost.  The tax relief offered through ISAs is expected to cost the Treasury £6.7 billion in 2023-24, up from £4.9 billion in 2022-23.

Furthermore, ISAs are poorly targeted. Vastly more tax-relief is given to those on higher incomes as they are more likely to have an ISA and more likely to have substantial ISA savings. In 2018-20, 1-in-2 (54 per cent) working-age families in the top 10 per cent of the income distribution had an ISA, compared to less than 1-in-5 (18 per cent) in the bottom 10 per cent. Similarly, nearly half (48 per cent) of ISA holders with incomes over £150,000 had ISA savings exceeding £50,000, whereas the vast majority (65 per cent) of ISA holders with incomes less than £10,000 had savings of less than £5,000 in their ISA.

Finally, ISAs are also ineffective at raising long-term saving – for example, when the ISA allowance was increased between 2013-14 and 2014-15 this had no noticeable impact on aggregate household saving. Despite this, Government is doubling down on its existing approach to boosting savings by announcing that it intends to introduce a ‘UK ISA’, with an extra £5,000 of tax-free savings going to those investing in UK-based assets. This additional tax-free allowance will only benefit those that have more than £20,000 to save. In 2020-21, only 7 per cent of ISA holders (1.6 million people) maxed out their annual ISA allowance. Given the relatively small amount already saving £20,000 a year, the new UK ISA is unlikely to shift the dial on aggregate household saving.

Ce texte examine l’impact des modifications discrétionnaires de la fiscalité sur l’activité économique en Australie, concluant que les réductions d’impôts n’ont pas stimulé efficacement la production économique.

This paper examines the impact of discretionary tax changes on economic activity in Australia. I use written records such as Budget Report and Election Speeches to identify the revenue effect, timing and motivation of all major Commonwealth tax policy actions from 1975 to 2018. This approach allows me to isolate legislated tax changes that are taken for exogenous reasons. My main finding reveals that tax cuts are ineffective in stimulating economic output in Australia.

Dans ce rapport, les auteurs étudient comment les taux de rendement des actifs et passifs étrangers ont impacté différents groupes de pays au fil du temps, en compilant une base de données inédite couvrant le monde entier (216 économies) pour la période 1970-2022.

Over the past decades the world has experienced a process of financial integration and capital liberalisation that has permitted an increase in foreign capital accumulation, especially since the 1990s. Gross foreign assets and liabilities have become larger almost everywhere, but particularly in rich countries, and foreign wealth has reached around 2 times the size of the global GDP. The unequal distribution of this external wealth, with the top 20 % richest countries capturing more than 90% of total foreign wealth, poses constraints on the poorest countries.