Bulletin de veille du 8 février 2022
Québec/Canada
Selon les auteurs, une hausse des taxes à la consommation permet de réduire les impôts sur le revenu, ce qui augmente l’épargne, l’accumulation du capital et la production, avantageant du même coup le bien-être de ceux qui jouissent d’un revenu élevé par rapport à leur richesse.
Nous étudions les effets de quatre réformes fiscales à l’aide d’un modèle de cycle de vie avec générations chevauchantes et agents hétérogènes en présence de risque idiosyncratique pour les revenus du travail et du capital dans le cadre d’un système fiscal complexe. Le modèle réplique adéquatement les distributions empiriques conjointes du revenu, de la richesse et des paiements de taxes et d’impôts. Dans une économie où l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers est fortement progressif, un déplacement à impact neutre sur les revenus publics en provenance de l’impôt vers les taxes à la consommation augmente l’épargne et la production. Cette politique bénéficie particulièrement à ceux disposant d’un faible niveau de richesse par rapport à leur revenu. Plusieurs réformes augmentent le revenu agrégé, malgré de faibles hausses dans les inégalités
L’analyse indique qu’une part importante du coût de cette réduction de taux est dirigée vers un nombre limité de petites sociétés présentant un revenu imposable plus important et qu’une révision à la baisse du revenu imposable admissible à un taux d’imposition minoré permettrait de financer une réduction du taux d’imposition général des sociétés, ce qui entraînerait un effet favorable sur la croissance.
La déduction pour petite entreprise (DPE) est la seconde dépense fiscale la plus importante du régime d’imposition des sociétés du Québec. En 2021, la valeur de cet allègement d’impôt aurait généré un manque à gagner autour de 700 M$. Toutefois, la pertinence de cette mesure en regard de ses objectifs soulève des questions. L’OCDE a d’ailleurs suggéré au Canada à de multiples reprises de réviser le taux réduit d’imposition des sociétés, si ce n’est de l’abolir.
À l’aide de données récentes, fournies par le ministère des Finances du Québec dans le cadre des consultations des économistes universitaires menées en contexte du déficit budgétaire important et de la hausse de la dette causée par la pandémie de COVID-19, cette étude brosse un portrait de l’utilisation de la DPE au Québec et tente d’évaluer si des modifications de la mesure sont envisageables dans une perspective d’accroissement du potentiel économique du Québec.
L’analyse indique qu’une part importante du coût de cette réduction de taux est dirigée vers un nombre limité de petites sociétés présentant un revenu imposable plus important et qu’une révision à la baisse du revenu imposable admissible à un taux d’imposition minoré permettrait de financer une réduction du taux d’imposition général des sociétés, ce qui entraînerait un effet favorable sur la croissance.
Le cahier de recherche rappelle les principaux arguments avancés par ceux qui prônent une révision du dosage des impôts afin d’être plus favorables à la croissance économique et présente ensuite une recension d’études ayant mesuré les effets sur l’économie des modes d’imposition et des changements dans leur dosage.
Afin d’assurer leur bon fonctionnement et de répondre aux besoins de la population, les gouvernements recourent à la fiscalité en prélevant des impôts et des taxes sous diverses formes. Il est généralement reconnu que tous les impôts entraînent une distorsion économique et nuisent, d’une manière ou d’une autre, à l’efficience économique. Toutefois, la théorie économique indique que certains modes d’imposition sont plus dommageables que d’autres sous l’angle de la croissance économique.
Ainsi, pour un même niveau de services publics, est-ce qu’une révision de l’importance relative des modes d’imposition pourrait mener à une réduction des distorsions qui améliorerait la croissance économique?
Le présent cahier de recherche rappelle les principaux arguments avancés par ceux qui prônent une révision du dosage des impôts afin d’être plus favorables à la croissance économique et présente ensuite une recension d’études ayant mesuré les effets sur l’économie des modes d’imposition et des changements dans leur dosage.
Dans un monde où la croissance économique à moyen et long terme devrait ralentir, et où les besoins seront grandissants (transition démographique et transition environnementale), une révision de la manière de prélever les recettes fiscales au Québec devrait être considérée afin d’atténuer ce ralentissement de la croissance économique attendu et favoriser l’accroissement du potentiel économique du Québec.
Ce rapport fournit une estimation du coût des volets provinciaux et territoriaux du plan national de garde d’enfants annoncé dans le budget de 2021.
Le DPB a estimé que les volets provinciaux et territoriaux du plan pancanadien d’apprentissage et de garde des jeunes enfants représenteraient un coût net cumulatif de 26 439 millions de dollars d’ici fin 2025-2026.
Cette estimation a ensuite été comparée au financement décrit pour ce plan dans le budget de 2021.
Le coût brut serait de 28 283 millions de dollars, soit 1 083 millions de dollars de plus que les 27 200 millions de dollars prévus dans le budget de 2021 pour les volets provinciaux et territoriaux du plan pancanadien d’apprentissage et de garde des jeunes enfants.
En plus d’augmenter le nombre de places en garderie et de subventionner les frais de garde, le plan aurait une incidence sur les demandes de déduction pour frais de garde d’enfants (DFGE), les recettes tirées de l’impôt sur le revenu et les transferts de l’Allocation canadienne pour enfants (ACE). Cela entraînerait un recouvrement cumulatif des coûts de 1 844 millions de dollars d’ici la fin 2025-2026.
Les auteurs se penchent sur l’aspect économique de la contribution santé pour les non-vaccinés. Selon leurs calculs, l’incitatif financier approprié quant au coût de cette taxe, bien que difficile à calculer, est d’environ 1 500 $ par vaccination ou dose de rappel, annuellement.
A vaccine tax is less coercive and more socially efficient than a vaccine mandate. We estimate that a tax of $1,500 per vaccination or booster per year is needed to effectively encourage opponents to get their shots. This amount is large enough to be salient to vaccine-hesitant, yet small compared to penalties imposed on daily smokers and heavy drinkers – where the economic case for penalties is far weaker than it is for COVID-19.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à l’imposition des gains en capital au Canada. Selon eux, un système de taxation juste et équitable ferait en sorte que les gains en capital soient taxés comme toute autre source de revenus, soit à 100%, plutôt qu’à 50%. Néanmoins, ils suggèrent que l’imposition des gains en capital à 80% serait également acceptable puisque cela tiendrait mieux compte de l’inflation que la formule actuelle.
The current capital gains tax preferences cost $35 billion annually – with high-income families accruing most of the benefit. The recent passage of Bill C-208 exacerbates these issues. To fix these problems, the inclusion rate for capital gains should rise to 80 per cent from the current 50 per cent. Capital gains are part of the taxpayer’s comprehensive income and – in a fair and efficient tax system – they should be subject to taxation just like other income. But in Canada today, only 50 per cent of realized capital gains are included in taxable income — meaning the effective personal tax rate on these gains is only half that of other income.
Au Canada, les municipalités devraient être davantage transparentes dans la présentation de leurs budgets en exposant des informations plus intelligibles et à des moments plus opportuns ce qui, selon les auteurs, pourrait être atteint en adoptant les normes comptables du secteur public dans la confection de leurs budgets.
The budgets governments present around the beginning of their fiscal years and the financial statements they publish in their annual reports after their fiscal years have ended are critical tools for legislators and voters to hold them accountable. The transparency of these documents to non-experts has always mattered: they should let readers understand governments’ plans, see how results differed from these plans and assess governments’ future capacity to deliver services. The fiscal stresses of the COVID-19 crisis will make these attributes even more critical in the years ahead. This report assesses the quality of the budgets and annual reports of 31 major Canadian municipalities according to their usefulness for these purposes.
[…]The financial statements Canadian municipalities publish after year-end are typically well organized. They follow public sector accounting standards (PSAS) and present the key figures where users can easily find and identify them. While some of the municipalities we look at released their results late, and we have reservations about below-the-line adjustments that can cloud understanding of the municipality’s fiscal capacity, we generally award high scores for these municipalities’ financial statements.
By contrast, many municipalities’ budgets present readers with challenges. Most do not present PSAS-consistent figures that are easy to find, and many do not present them at all. Most of the 31 present separate operating and capital budgets, with the latter prepared on a cash basis. […]. Many budgets also separate tax- and rate supported activities, making totals for revenues and expenses even harder to calculate. Worse, municipal councillors often voted on budgets after the fiscal year started and money was already being spent.
[…]Our core recommendation is that municipal governments should present budgets using the same accounting standards and format that they use in their year-end financial statements. One key implication would be that municipal budgets would use accrual accounting with respect to capital, recording revenues and expenses as assets deliver their services. Provincial governments that impede the preparation of PSAS-consistent municipal budgets – for example, by mandating separate operating and capital budgets – should stop doing so.
[…]En termes de prospérité économique, selon des études de l’Ontario Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, recourant au PIB par habitant, l’Ontario traîne derrière les autres économies avoisinantes des Grands Lacs, l’écart s’étant creusé au cours de 20 dernières années.
The average income (as measured by per-person GDP) in Ontario is C$19,219 lower than the average in nearby U.S. states, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan, Canadian public policy think-tank.
“We examine the broadest measures of economic prosperity, which clearly show Ontario is significantly less prosperous than neighbouring U.S. states. What’s more, the gap keeps growing,” said Ben Eisen, senior fellow at the Fraser Institute and coauthor of Measuring Ontario’s Regional Prosperity Gap—2022 Update.
The study compares Ontario’s average income (again, as measured by per-person GDP, a common indicator of living standards) to the average income of eight U.S. states in the Great Lakes region (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin). The analysis also includes Quebec.
According to the study, in 2020 Ontario had the region’s second-lowest GDP per person (ahead of only Quebec) at C$58,793, well behind Michigan (over C$6,000 below Michigan), the lowest-ranking U.S. state and $19,219 per person below the regional average of C$78,012.
“Ontario is a wonderful place to live, but it’s important for policymakers not to be complacent about the large and growing prosperity gap we face relative to our neighbours. Closing the gap through faster economic growth can help generate higher wage growth for households and a higher standard of living overall,” Eisen said.
Afin d’apporter plus de prévisibilité et d’avoir une meilleure stabilité fiscale à long terme, l’Alberta devrait, entre autres actions décrites dans cet article, réintroduire l’Alberta Sustainability Fund et les contributions à l’Heritage Fund.
Rather than continuing to spend one-time, volatile resource revenues, Alberta should save a significant portion of resource revenues to re-establish and ensure long-term financial stability, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan, Canadian public policy think-tank.
[…]The analysis, based on provincial data from the fall of 2021, concluded that the province could fully fund a rainy-day account and balance its budget within 3 years through program spending reductions of 2.8 per cent annually for the next three years. Since the analysis, commodity prices have surged higher than the estimates used, which means an even larger windfall of resource revenue for the provincial government.
Moreover, such a plan would put the province in a position to re-establish mandatory contributions to the Heritage Fund by 2024/25.
The rainy-day account is actually based on the previously successful Alberta Sustainability Fund, which saved resource revenues during good times to ensure a stable amount of revenues for the provincial budget during bad times. The analysis estimates such a fund could be fully financed within two years, thus reducing volatility in the provincial budget and establishing a more stable fiscal framework.
[…]
États-Unis
- Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, « The Expanded Child Tax Credit for 2021: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) », 28 janvier 2022, 49 p.
- Julie M. Whittaker et Katelin P. Isaacs, «Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits: Permanent-Law Programs and the COVID-19 Pandemic Response », 22 p.
- Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, « How Do Marginal Income Tax Rates Work in 2021? », 31 janvier 2022, 3 p.
- Jane G. Gravelle, « The Exclusion of Capital Gains for Owner-Occupied Housing », 2 février 2022, 22 p.
Les auteurs s’intéressent au budget 2022-2023 de la Californie concernant le plan de dépenses en matière de plafonnement et d’échange. Ils recommandent à l’Assemblée législative d’envisager la possibilité d’utiliser une partie des revenus provenant du Fonds de réduction des gaz à effet de serre (Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund) afin de fournir du soutien financier aux ménages et aux entreprises, d’allouer des remises forfaitaires et de réduire d’autres taxes d’État ou les tarifs d’électricité au détail.
The Governor proposes a roughly $1 billion discretionary cap-and-trade expenditure plan. In our view, the Governor’s plan is based on conservative revenue assumptions. We think several hundred million dollars more could be available for discretionary expenditures in the budget. We will provide additional information later this spring after the results from next couple of quarterly cap-and-trade auctions are available. Of the proposed spending, the vast majority would go to existing programs, including incentives for zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) and programs to reduce local air pollution. The most significant new proposal—$30 million for mobile air quality monitoring—raises a variety of questions that the Legislature might want to explore in budget hearings this spring.
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux modifications proposées dans le budget 2022-23 de la Californie, aux États-Unis, en ce qui a trait à deux programmes qui fournissent un soutien du revenu aux personnes éligibles âgées de 65 ans ou plus étant aveugles ou handicapées. Ils soulignent le fait qu’en dépit des augmentations proposées pour l’année 2022, les niveaux de subvention pour les particuliers restent inférieurs au seuil de pauvreté fédéral.
This post summarizes the Governor’s budget assumptions and proposals related to the SSI/SSP program, including the Governor’s intent to increase SSP grants in 2023-24. The post also summarizes other SSI/SSP goals the Legislature could pursue relative to the intended 2023-24 SSP grant increase. The SSI/SSP program provides cash grants to low-income aged, blind, and disabled individuals. Grant levels for SSI/SSP are determined by both the federal government and the state. Specifically, the federal government pays for the SSI portion of the grant while the state pays the SSP portion of the grant. For 2022-23, the Governor’s budget proposes $3.1 billion from the General Fund for the state’s share of SSI/SSP—an increase of $226 million (8 percent) over estimated 2021-22 expenditures. This increase would bring total program funding to $10.3 billion ($3.1 billion from the General Fund and $7.2 billion federal funds) in 2022-23. The primary driver of this increase is the full-year cost impact of the 23.95 percent SSP grant increase that took effect on January 1, 2022.
Selon les auteurs, le budget 2022-2023 du gouverneur de la Californie propose une augmentation de 100 millions de dollars au Fonds pour promouvoir l’équité fiscale entre les tribunaux de première instance, alors que cette équité pourrait être promue par d’autres moyens plus prioritaires, tel que le financement pour combler les arriérés de la COVID-19.
In this brief, we provide an overview of the total amount of funding in the Governor’s proposed 2022-23 budget for the judicial branch as well as assess and make recommendations on four specific budget proposals. Trial Court Equity Funding. The Governor’s budget proposes a $100 million ongoing General Fund increase to promote fiscal equity among the trial courts. We find that it is currently unclear how the funding would be allocated, there are different ways to promote fiscal equity, and other priorities—such as funding to address COVID-19 backlogs—could also be considered. We recommend the Legislature ensure the amount of funding provided, as well as how the funding is allocated, reflects its funding priorities for trial court operations. Improvement and Modernization Fund (IMF). The IMF is a state special fund that has struggled to remain solvent in recent years. The Governor’s budget proposes provisional budget language authorizing the transfer of General Fund to the IMF if revenues are lower than expected. While the proposal helps prevent IMF insolvency in 2022-23, insolvency is possible in 2023-24. We recommend the Legislature approve the Governor’s proposal to maintain existing service levels in the budget year, but also take steps to permanently address the fund’s insolvency.
Le Département du Trésor ayant finalisé son règlement encadrant les State and Local Fiscal Recovery Fonds, soit le budget de 350 millions reçus par les gouvernements étatiques sous l’American Rescue Plan Act, l’auteur propose des postes budgétaires dans lesquels ces gouvernements pourraient dépenser les sommes afin de se remettre des incidences économiques causées par la Covid-19.
The Department of the Treasury has finalized its rule governing State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF), the $350 billion state and local governments received under the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). State policymakers should have three key takeaways:
- If states want to use the funds to replenish their unemployment compensation (UC) trust funds—and they should—then acting quickly may be to their advantage. If states lock in their plans before April, they are in the clear, but if they wait until after April 1, then accepting the funds will subject them to a maintenance of effort requirement on UC benefits through 2024.
- The list of allowable expenditures just got longer—a lot longer. Under the new rule, far more expenditures are permitted, the definition of retaining government employment levels has been expanded to include increasing government employment, and the definition of revenue loss has been expanded to cover some revenue gains.
- The Tax Mandate, which prohibits using fiscal recovery funds to facilitate state tax cuts directly or indirectly, is essentially unchanged, with Treasury largely ignoring comments about the difficulties arising from the provisions of the interim rule. Nevertheless, because most states are experiencing substantial revenue growth, they have broad latitude to cut taxes without implicating the mandate, which may yet be invalidated by pending litigation.
Cet article fait un survol des différentes nouvelles mesures mises en place récemment par chacun des États américains en matière d’imposition, que cela soit la collecte d’impôts ou les allègements fiscaux.
If 2021 was a big year for state tax reform, 2022 may give it a run for its money. With January now in the books, the 40 states which have convened their legislative sessions—six more will join them, while four states’ legislatures do not meet in odd-numbered years—already show a flurry of activity on taxes, with arrows almost invariably pointing toward tax reform and tax relief.
[…]Cet article fait état des délais administratifs engendrés dans le cadre du remboursement des impôts corporatifs aux États-Unis. En effet, bien que l’IRS soit théoriquement censé rembourser dans un délai de 90 jours, le rapport du Government Accountability Office (GAO), conclut que le délai est plutôt de 166 jours en moyenne et l’auteur propose donc des pistes de solution afin de faciliter et d’accélérer le processus de traitement.
During the pandemic, policymakers relied on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to administer business relief through the tax code. The emergency relief, including business tax refunds for net operating losses (NOLs), was intended to quickly help businesses that lost their source of income during the pandemic. A new report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) finds many businesses have yet to receive tax refunds they are due. Future business tax relief must be provided in a timely manner during the next downturn, because delayed tax relief is not much better than no relief at all.
International
Une évaluation des structures fiscales des pays de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes montre que le faible rendement des recettes fiscales s’explique principalement par de grandes lacunes dans la perception d’impôts sur le revenu, alors que la perception d’impôt sur les sociétés dépasse largement celle des pays de l’OCDE.
This study provides an overview of tax structures in LAC before the COVID-19 pandemic, compares it to OECD countries, and provides recommendations for growth-friendly and inclusive tax policy reforms. LAC countries collect significantly lower tax revenue relative to OECD countries and have tax structures that rely excessively on corporate-income taxes (CIT) while personal-income taxes (PIT) remain largely underutilized. LAC countries could strengthen their PIT to mobilize revenue and improve progressivity by addressing critical design flaws. Possible adverse growth effects could be mitigated by providing incentives to labor force participation and formalization (e.g., through earned-income tax credits). The ongoing global corporate income tax reforms present a great opportunity to reassess thoroughly the CIT in LAC. Specifically, reforms would need to focus on aligning CIT statutory rates with those of other regions—when assessed to be relatively high—to attract investment and alleviate profit shifting, and on broadening the corporate tax base. Value-added taxes (VAT) could be improved by tackling exemptions and reduced rates. Furthermore, while estimates of additional revenue from levying the VAT on the digital economy appear modest, taxing this sector as others in the economy is critical to avoid further tax base erosion.
Les auteurs présentent une analyse empirique de l’effet des découvertes de pétrole, de gaz et de minéraux sur la viabilité de la dette publique des pays. Selon eux, les politiques fiscales laxistes sont généralement identifiées comme étant l’un des principaux responsables de l’augmentation de la dette gouvernementale lors de grandes découvertes de pétrole et de gaz.
This paper investigates the dynamic impact of natural resource discoveries on government debt sustainability. We use a ‘natural experiment’ framework in which the timing of discoveries is treated as an exogenous source of within-country variation. We combine data on government debt, fiscal stress and debt distress episodes on a large panel of countries over 1970-2012, with a global repository of giant oil, gas, and mineral discoveries. We find strong and robust evidence of a ‘fiscal presource curse’, i.e., natural resources can jeopardize fiscal sustainability even before ‘the first drop of oil is pumped’. Specifically, we find that giant discoveries, mostly of oil and gas, lead to permanently higher government debt and, eventually, debt distress episodes, specially in countries with weaker political institutions and governance. This evidence suggest that the curse can be mitigated and even prevented by pursuing prudent fiscal policies and borrowing strategies, strengthening fiscal governance, and implementing transparent and robust fiscal frameworks for resource management.
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux facteurs qui permettent d’expliquer les baisses structurelles d’émission de carbone dans les 20 pays les plus pollueurs du monde. Selon eux, bien que de nombreuses baisses structurelles soient associées à des crises économiques ou des événements politiques majeurs, la taxe sur le carbone demeure un outil important afin d’atténuer les émissions, car elle permet de modifier directement les incitatifs économiques des entreprises et des ménages.
To reach the global net-zero goal, the level of carbon emissions has to fall substantially at speed rarely seen in history, highlighting the need to identify structural breaks in carbon emission patterns and understand forces that could bring about such breaks. In this paper, we identify and analyze structural breaks using machine learning methodologies. We find that downward trend shifts in carbon emissions since 1965 are rare, and most trend shifts are associated with non-climate structural factors (such as a change in the economic structure) rather than with climate policies. While we do not explicitly analyze the optimal mix between climate and non-climate policies, our findings highlight the importance of the non-climate policies in reducing carbon emissions. On the methodology front, our paper contributes to the climate toolbox by identifying country-specific structural breaks in emissions for top 20 emitters based on a user-friendly machine-learning tool and interpreting the results using a decomposition of carbon emission.
L’économie mondiale débute l’année 2022 dans une position plus faible que prévue en raison, entre autres, du nouveau variant Omicron. Plusieurs autres facteurs, tels que la dépréciation du taux de change et la hausse de l’inflation, amèneront les pays présentant un endettement significatif en devises à effectuer des concessions en matière de politiques monétaire et fiscale.
The global economy enters 2022 in a weaker position than previously expected. As the new Omicron COVID-19 variant spreads, countries have reimposed mobility restrictions. Rising energy prices and supply disruptions have resulted in higher and more broad-based inflation than anticipated, notably in the United States and many emerging market and developing economies. The ongoing retrenchment of China’s real estate sector and slower-than-expected recovery of private consumption also have limited growth prospects. Global growth is expected to moderate from 5.9 in 2021 to 4.4 percent in 2022—half a percentage point lower for 2022 than in the October World Economic Outlook (WEO), largely reflecting forecast markdowns in the two largest economies. A revised assumption removing the Build Back Better fiscal policy package from the baseline, earlier withdrawal of monetary accommodation, and continued supply shortages produced a downward 1.2 percentage-points revision for the United States. In China, pandemic-induced disruptions related to the zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy and protracted financial stress among property developers have induced a 0.8 percentage-point downgrade. Global growth is expected to slow to 3.8 percent in 2023. Although this is 0.2 percentage point higher than in the previous forecast, the upgrade largely reflects a mechanical pickup after current drags on growth dissipate in the second half of 2022. The forecast is conditional on adverse health outcomes declining to low levels in most countries by end-2022, assuming vaccination rates improve worldwide and therapies become more effective.
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux règles fiscales et aux conseils budgétaires gouvernementaux indépendants qui existent dans plus de 105 pays. Selon le résultat de leur analyse, les règles fiscales adoptées les plus courantes sont une combinaison de règles d’endettement et de limites opérationnelles sur les dépenses et le solde budgétaire.
Adoption of fiscal rules and fiscal councils continued to increase globally over the last decades based on two new global datasets. During the pandemic, fiscal frameworks were put to test. The widespread use of escape clauses was one of the novelties in this crisis, which helped provide policy room to respond to the health crisis. But the unprecedented fiscal actions have led to large and widespread deviations from deficit and debt limits. The evidence shows that fiscal rules, in general, have been flexible during crises but have not prevented a large and persistent buildup of debt over time. Experience shows that deviations from debt limits are very difficult to reverse. The paper also presents evidence on the benefits of a good track record in abiding by the rules. All these highlight the difficult policy choices ahead and need to further improve rules-based fiscal frameworks.
Les auteurs s’intéressent au lien qui existe entre le nombre de cas d’infection de COVID-19, l’espace budgétaire, le risque souverain et l’activité économique à travers le monde. Les résultats de leur analyse suggèrent que même si d’importants programmes fiscaux de soutien peuvent affecter négativement les finances publiques, lorsqu’ils sont combinés à des mesures de confinement reposant sur des tests intelligents plutôt que des confinements physiques, le risque souverain anticipé semble réduit.
This paper argues that the type of COVID-19 containment measures affects the trade-offs between infection cases, economic activity and sovereign risk. Using local projection methods and a year and a half of high-frequency daily data covering 44 advanced and emerging economies, we find that smart (e.g. testing) as opposed to physical (e.g. lockdown) measures appear to be best placed to tackle these trade-offs. Initial conditions also matter whereby containment measures can be less disruptive when public health response time is fast and public debt is low. We also construct a database of daily fiscal announcements for Euro area countries, and find that sovereign risk is improved under a combination of large support packages and smart measures.
Une étude portant sur la perception d’impôt sur le revenu personnel dans les économies avancées ainsi que dans les économies en développement à faible revenu semble démontrer qu’une stratégie réussie de mobilisation des recettes de ces dernières économies nécessite une approche globale, couvrant un plus large éventail d’impôts.
Personal Income Tax (PIT) is one of the key sources of revenues in Advanced Economies (AEs) but plays a much more limited role in Low-Income Developing Countries (LIDCs) and Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), both in terms of revenue and redistributive impact. Notwithstanding, this paper shows that LIDCs and EMEs increased their PIT-to-GDP revenue by 110 and 48 percent, respectively, during the 1990-2019 period, a marked improvement in the PIT revenue performance. We find that this rise was driven primarily by economic developments and to a lesser extent by changes in the design of PIT systems. We also find that LIDCs that improved their tax-to-GDP ratios relied on a broader set of tax instruments and not exclusively on the PIT, suggesting that a successful revenue mobilization strategy of developing countries requires a comprehensive approach covering a wider range of taxes. Finally, using a newly assembled dataset of PIT characteristics of 157 countries over the 2006-2018 period, we estimate a novel redistribution index of the PIT in LIDCs. We show that the contribution of the PIT to inequality reductions has been significant.
Ce rapport fait état de l’impact de l’augmentation, au Royaume-Uni, de l’âge d’éligibilité à la pension publique de 65 à 66 ans sur les décision en matière d’emploi
We study the effect of an increase in the UK state pension age from 65 to 66, a high level internationally, on labour market activity. Despite there being limited financial incentives to retire at the state pension age, we find large effects: the employment rate of 65-year-olds increased by 7.4 percentage points for men and 8.5 percentage points for women due to the reform. The employment response is driven disproportionately by full-time workers and self-employed men, and is larger for those with lower levels of education and those living in the most deprived areas of the country.
Ce court texte résume les changements apportés aux National Insurance contributions (NICs) en avril 2022 par le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
Last autumn the Government legislated for an increase in the rates of National Insurance contributions (NICs) in April 2022. This observation summarises some of the key facts about how NICs works and how much tax is due to rise in April.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à l’évitement et à l’évasion fiscale des contribuables bien nantis aux États-Unis. Selon les résultats de leur étude, la lutte contre l’évasion fiscale peut être un moyen efficace de percevoir davantage de recettes fiscales, d’augmenter la progressivité du système fiscal et de réduire les inégalités entre les mieux nantis et le reste de la population.
In recent years, governments in many rich countries have taken ambitious steps to crack down on tax evasion by the wealthy, notably by limiting the opportunities for evasion through undeclared offshore accounts (Johannesen and Zucman, 2014; Johannesen et al., 2020). Enhancing tax enforcement at the top of the wealth distribution may be desirable for at least three reasons. First, it has the potential to raise government revenue significantly as the wealthiest taxpayers account for a large fraction of total taxes. Second, it may help restore the progressivity of the tax system, which is currently being eroded by very high evasion rates at the top (Alstadsæter et al., 2019b). Third, it may mitigate the secular rise in inequality as top income and wealth shares continue to increase in many countries (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Fighting the illegal tax evasion of the wealthy, however, only contributes to these policy goals to the extent that it effectively raises their tax payments. This is not given even if enforcement is successful in the sense that it curbs tax evasion. As the wealthy are widely viewed to have ample opportunities for legal tax avoidance (Landier and Plantin, 2017), one may be concerned that they simply start avoiding more whenever enhanced enforcement compels them to evade less. This implies that the degree of substitution between evasion and avoidance at the top is a key parameter for guiding these enforcement policies. If substitution is low, cracking down on the evasion technologies used by the wealthy may be an attractive way to boost tax collection, increase the effective progressivity of the tax system, and reduce inequality. If substitution is high, the net benefits are likely to be small – or even negative if there are real resource costs of enforcement.
Au Royaume-Uni, l’OBR constate que le déficit budgétaire diminue fortement grâce à de fortes recettes fiscales.
Government borrowing in December 2021 was £16.8 billion, down £7.6 billion on December 2020. Year to date borrowing of £146.8 billion is down 46.8 per cent on the same period last year and is £13.0 billion below our October forecast profile. That undershoot reflects stronger than expected receipts (thanks largely to a more resilient labour market and strong business profits) more than offsetting higher than expected spending.
Le rapport de k’OCDE sur les pensions en Slovénie recommande de simplifier les règles en matière de pension et d’ajuster les taux d’accumulation si nécessaire pour stabiliser les niveaux de pension en moyenne, en faisant passer la période de référence des 24 meilleures années aux revenus de toute une vie. Il est essentiel d’accroître la transparence du financement des retraites.
This review provides policy recommendations on how to improve the Slovenian pension system, building on the OECD’s best practices in pension design. It details the Slovenian pension system and identifies its strengths and weaknesses based on cross‑country comparisons. The Slovenian pension system consists of a mandatory defined benefit pay‑as‑you‑go public scheme and supplementary private schemes. The review also describes the first layer of old‑age social protection in Slovenia and discusses possible ways to improve communication about pensions. The OECD Reviews of Pension Systems: Slovenia is the seventh in the pension review series.
Un guide émanant du Parlement de l’Australie brosse un portrait global des caractéristiques principales des paiements de soutien créés dans ce pays dans le but d’aider les personnes touchées par les décisions des gouvernements des États et des territoires, en lien avec le COVID-19.
The Australian Government created two new income support payments to assist individuals affected by state and territory government decisions relating to COVID-19: the COVID-19 Disaster Payment for those whose income was affected by state and territory government restrictions on movement or ‘lockdowns’ following COVID-19 outbreaks and the Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment for those directed to self-isolate or quarantine due to having COVID-19 or being a close contact of someone who does.The COVID-19 Disaster Payment is no longer available. Both payments are unusual as they are offered as National Recovery and Resilience Agency (NRRA) grant payments, unlike other income support or disaster payments paid under a legislative scheme such as the Social Security Act 1991.
Ce rapport discute des incidences, tant au niveau du bénéficiaire que du donateur, de l’augmentation des transferts de richesses intergénérationnels, la valeur totale de ceux-ci ayant augmentée de 30% entre 2007 et 2017, et des raisons sous-jacentes, dont notamment l’augmentation du prix des maisons.
Intergenerational wealth transfers – both gifts and inheritances – have increasingly become a major feature of UK economic life. These wealth transfers have major impacts on how people live their lives and the opportunities available to them. This report draws on a series of focus groups, a newly commissioned survey of UK adults, and statistical analysis to understand the effects wealth transfers have on the recipients and on those giving transfers.
Our findings highlight how important wealth transfers are in opening up opportunities for recipients in the housing market and improving financial resilience. But the benefits are not felt equally: high-income families are twice as likely to receive transfers as low-income families. Equally, those providing wealth to younger generations are also impacted, with increased saving and downsizing homes a common action taken by those hoping to give.
It is crucial for policy makers to understand the role intergenerational wealth transfers play in shaping the lives of families across the UK, especially as rising wealth levels and an ageing population are only going to increase the flow of the transfers in the coming decades.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Samuel Carbonneau
- Florence Lemire Jeune
- Jean-Nicolas Tremblay
- Camille Turgeon
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé