Bulletin de veille du 13 octobre 2026
Québec/Canada
Ce regard examine la règle relative aux profits insuffisamment imposés (RPII) du Pilier Deux et souligne que son application soulève d’importantes questions quant à sa compatibilité avec certains principes fondamentaux de la fiscalité internationale, notamment ceux liés au rattachement fiscal, à l’extraterritorialité et à la non-discrimination.
La Règle relative aux profits insuffisamment imposés (RPII), l’une des principales règles du régime de Pilier Deux, s’éloigne de certains principes traditionnellement reconnus en fiscalité internationale selon lesquels l’attribution d’un droit d’imposition à une juridiction repose sur l’existence d’un lien de rattachement suffisant, tel que la résidence du contribuable ou la source du revenu. Sur cette base, la comptabilité de la RPII avec certains principes du droit international coutumier et des conventions fiscales est contestée. Ce texte présente les grandes lignes du débat, notamment sur le caractère potentiellement extraterritorial et discriminatoire de la RPII. Il présente également certaines pistes de solution envisagées en réponse à ces préoccupations et met la RPII en contexte dans le système fiscal canadien.
Cet article souligne que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux canadiens devraient, à l’avenir, adopter des politiques budgétaires visant à réduire leur ratio dette-PIB après chaque crise, afin de préserver leur capacité d’emprunt advenant une nouvelle crise majeure.
Federal and provincial governments need the fiscal capacity to borrow heavily when major crises occur. Drawing on five premises about public debt, fiscal policy, and public behaviour, this Commentary argues that preserving the necessary fiscal capacity requires reducing debt-to-GDP ratios after crises; otherwise, repeated borrowing from progressively higher debt levels risks undermining investor confidence, raising borrowing costs, and eventually forcing governments into painful tax increases or spending cuts.
Canada’s combined federal-provincial net debt-to-GDP ratio is now roughly 74 percent, placing it in a zone of “fiscal complacency.” This report divides public debt into three illustrative zones: “fiscal prudence” below roughly 67 percent, “fiscal complacency” between roughly 67 and 95 percent, and “forced austerity” above roughly 95 percent. These boundaries are deliberately approximate, but the framework highlights the value of maintaining enough fiscal room to absorb a large future shock without triggering higher borrowing costs.
mic challenges require greater spending on priorities such as defence, trade infrastructure, and economic security, but much of this spending is likely to persist rather than representing a temporary crisis response. Governments should therefore not rely on continued borrowing or assume that favourable interest rates and economic growth will reduce debt burdens for them. Instead, they should review existing programs and reduce lower-priority spending to make room for higher-priority commitments, while working to bring debt ratios down and preserve fiscal capacity for the next crisis.
Ce rapport sur les dépenses fédérales consacrées aux peuples autochtones de la Colombie-Britannique montre que celles-ci ont augmenté beaucoup plus rapidement que l’ensemble des dépenses fédérales de programmes depuis 2015, sans amélioration significative du bien-être des collectivités des Premières Nations.
This study focuses on federal Indigenous spending. The analysis excludes federal spending on Indigenous lawsuits and settlements from 2015/16 onwards.
Indigenous spending by Ottawa increased consistently from 1969/70 to 2014/15 but thereafter increased at a higher rate. From 1969/70 to 2014/15, inflation-adjusted federal Indigenous spending increased, on average, 4.3 percent per year. From 2015/16 to 2024/25, average annual Indigenous spending increased 17.1 percent.
In inflation-adjusted dollars, federal Indigenous spending increased from $10.3 billion in 2014/15 to $40.8 billion in 2024/25.
For context, federal Indigenous spending increased over seven times more than overall federal spending (excluding interest costs) between 2015/16 and 2024/25. Federal Indigenous spending ranges from a low of $73 million in PEI to a high of $8.8 billion in Ontario.
In 2024/25, Ottawa spent approximately $6.3 billion on program benefits for Indigenous people in BC—an average expenditure of $20,306 per Indigenous person.
Statistics Canada’s Community Well-Being index gauges the socio-economic health of Canadian communities. Between 1981 and 2016, little changed in the gap between First Nations and other Canadian communities. There was some improvement between 2016 and 2021, but it was largely due to increases in the Canada Child Benefit (a general program for eligible Canadians) rather than any specific Indigenous program or spending.
The analysis also estimates spending on Indigenous people through three general federal programs: Old Age Security, the Guaranteed Income Supplement, and the Canada Child Benefit. In 2024, the cost of these programs for Indigenous people in BC was an estimated $644 million.
États-Unis
Ce rapport estime le nombre de familles immigrantes qui pourraient perdre leur admissibilité à quatre crédits d’impôt remboursables destinés à soutenir les familles à faible revenu aux États-Unis, si une nouvelle règle proposée par le Département du Trésor américain était adoptée.
The United States (U.S.) Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service proposed a new rule that would further restrict eligibility for the refundable portions of four tax credits, including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC), based on citizenship and immigration status. The rule would affect primarily lawfully present immigrants authorized to work in the United States and their family members, including their children, the vast majority of whom are U.S. citizens.
We estimate:
- Approximately 602,000 people, including 279,000 children, live in families that could lose eligibility for the EITC.
- Approximately 1,033,000 people, including 523,000 children, live in families that could lose eligibility for the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), the refundable portion of the federal CTC.
- Approximately 515,000 people, including 258,000 children, live in families that could lose eligibility for both the EITC and the ACTC.
The vast majority of children who would lose eligibility are U.S. citizens: Nearly 9 in 10 children losing eligibility for either or both credits are U.S. citizens.
Ce document montre que le nouveau régime à deux volets de déduction pour dons de bienfaisance, instauré aux États-Unis par la « One Big Beautiful Bill Act », complexifie le système fiscal et affaiblit globalement l’incitation à donner, au point que son effet net sur les dons pourrait être négatif.
Under 2025’s reconciliation law, commonly called the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), taxpayers now face two options for deducting charitable gifts: a modified benefit for those who itemize and a capped deduction for those who claim the standard deduction. Our concern is that this new hybrid “universal deduction,” which grants some form of charitable deduction to all taxable returns, is far from a “universal incentive.” In fact, Congress effectively gave some taxpayers a new tax incentive, left many others without one, and imposed a disincentive on some relative to former law. Along the way, it excluded from any incentive many of the most generous taxpayers, whose contribution levels indicate they would be most likely to increase their giving in response to an incentive. As a result, we find it reduced incentives for substantially more charitable contributions than it increased.
Beyond these economic incentives, it created a ceiling on the deduction for nonitemizers that likely will act as an “anchor,” or psychological disincentive, signaling that people should limit their contributions to that amount. Taxpayers may struggle to navigate this complex arrangement as they try to understand the incentives facing them. If taxpayers do not understand the incentives they face, they may simply ignore them—eliminating a major purpose of a deduction in the first place.
In contrast, a single universal deduction for all taxpayers, with deductions disallowed for contributions below a floor, would eliminate these disadvantages. It would provide a universal incentive available to all taxpayers, be easier to understand, and replace the “anchor” with a “springboard” effect. Regardless of the level of revenue loss Congress decides to accept for charitable deductions, it would yield more charitable contributions per dollar of revenue cost.
International
Cet article évalue la proposition de la Commission européenne pour le Cadre financier pluriannuel (CFP) 2028-2034 et conclut que l’UE devrait investir davantage dans la transition verte et numérique, dans l’innovation ainsi que dans le financement international de la lutte contre les changements climatiques.
Europe must invest substantially more in the green and digital transitions, innovation and international climate finance. This additional investment should be shared between the private sector, national budgets and the European Union budget. We estimate that the part of the investment gap best financed through the EU budget, because it relates to European public goods (EPGs), amounts to about 0.9 percent of EU gross national income (GNI) annually.
We assess the potential of the European Commission’s proposed 2028-2034 EU budget to close this gap. Because, under the proposal, EU countries would have flexibility in allocating funds, and the effectiveness of the budget’s financial instruments to mobilise private investment is uncertain, we develop three scenarios: (1) countries maintain current spending patterns; (2) all available funds are directed to the EPG gap; and (3) funds are allocated to the overall investment gap, regardless of whether investment qualifies as EPGs.
We find that the proposed budget would close only around 12 percent of the EPG gap in scenario (1) and 22 percent in scenario (2). In scenario (3), it could cover only four to eight percent of the total additional investment needs. Closing the entire EPG gap would require an EU budget that is 0.6 percent of GNI larger than proposed. EU countries should prioritise investments that advance Europe’s long-term objectives rather than preserve current spending patterns. Financial instruments cannot substitute for direct public investment. Research, climate mitigation and cross border infrastructure require sustained public funding. Better data, especially on defence, is also needed to assess EU-level investment needs.
Cet article analyse les régimes de pension de vieillesse mis en place au Danemark, aux Pays-Bas et en Suède. Il conclut notamment que ces régimes, qui s’éloignent du modèle traditionnel « pay-as-you-go », permettent d’assurer une bonne sécurité des revenus à la retraite tout en étant plus soutenables à long terme.
This paper examines whether the pension systems of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden outperform predominantly pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, and whether their development provides a replicable reform path for other European Union countries.
We find that Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have developed multi-pillar systems combining public pensions with large, prefunded components. These systems deliver comparatively high final-wage replacement rates and low old-age poverty, while limiting long-term fiscal pressures and supporting higher national savings, deeper capital markets and the supply of long-term risk capital. The experience of these three countries demonstrates that a substantial shift towards prefunded, predominantly defined-contribution pensions need not undermine retirement income security and can strengthen long-term fiscal sustainability.
However, other EU countries will struggle to replicate the historical transitions seen in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the three countries, prefunded pension assets accumulated gradually over decades, supported by favourable demographic and economic conditions and strong social-partner institutions. EU countries now facing rapidly ageing populations and strained PAYG systems no longer have such favourable time or circumstances. Rather than replicating this historical transition, countries with sufficiently sound fiscal positions could accelerate the shift towards prefunding, including through public debt-financed initial contributions to individual pension accounts of 20 percent to 25 percent of GDP. Such a kickstart would rapidly build meaningful pension assets, change savings incentives and help develop the institutional capacity required for sustainable prefunded pension systems.
Cette étude montre qu’à New York, les politiques favorisant le redéveloppement immobilier, notamment les incitatifs fiscaux, augmentent l’offre de logements, mais contribuent aussi à la hausse des loyers moyens en remplaçant des logements abordables par des unités plus coûteuses.
In mature cities, housing supply expands primarily through redevelopment of existing structures. We develop a forward-looking spatial equilibrium model in which developers choose whether, when, and how intensively to redevelop individual parcels. Calibrated to New York City, the model shows that policies that incentivize development raise average rents because new construction replaces lower-rent units with higher-rent ones. In a representative upzoning, supply rises 1.4 percent while average rent rises 1.3 percent. Tax incentives accelerate redevelopment while density bonuses increase height but often delay redevelopment. Affordability mandates crowd out market-rate construction, with incidence determined by the paired incentive.
Ce rapport analyse l’impôt sur le revenu des personnes physiques en France entre 2017 et 2024. Il souligne notamment que, sur cette période, les revenus fiscaux provenant de cet impôt ont progressé plus rapidement que l’inflation, mais que ses règles demeurent complexes et instables.
À la demande de la commission des finances de l’Assemblée nationale, le Conseil des prélèvements obligatoires (CPO) a étudié l’impôt sur le revenu des personnes physiques (IR) entre 2017 à 2024, et les réductions et crédits d’impôt qui viennent en limiter le rendement.
Le produit de l’impôt sur le revenu s’élevait en 2024 à 91,7 Md€ (3 % du PIB), contre 71,5 Md€ en 2017 (3,2%). Les revenus fiscaux ont progressé plus rapidement que l’inflation entre 2017 et 2024, mais leur dispersion s’est accentuée en raison de la croissance rapide des dividendes et plus-values mobilières réalisées, soumis à partir de 2018 au prélèvement forfaitaire unique (PFU). Le taux d’imposition moyen à l’impôt sur le revenu a diminué de 7 à 6,7 % du revenu fiscal, principalement du fait de la baisse de 14 à 11 % du taux de la première tranche de l’IR mise en œuvre en 2020. L’impôt sur le revenu reste fortement progressif, sauf pour les foyers fiscaux compris dans les trois derniers millièmes de revenus. L’imposition à l’IR est négative pour les foyers aux revenus les plus faibles et représente en moyenne 2% du revenu fiscal pour les ménages aux revenus intermédiaires.
Les règles qui régissent l’impôt sur revenu restent complexes et instables, notamment en raison des multiples dépenses fiscales (223 en 2025), ce qui conduit le CPO à préconiser d’une part la mise en place d’un cadre pluriannuel d’évolution des impôts des particuliers et d’autre part un renforcement du bornage dans le temps et de l’évaluation de ces dépenses fiscales. En dépit de systèmes d’information vieillissants, la gestion de l’impôt sur le revenu et son contrôle se sont modernisés, avec notamment l’instauration du prélèvement à la source en 2019 et le recours à des croisements de données dans la programmation du contrôle fiscal.
Ce document analyse les réponses de 175 pays au choc énergétique de 2026 et montre qu’une dette publique plus élevée est associée à un recours moindre aux mesures budgétaires de protection des ménages et des entreprises et à une plus grande transmission des hausses de prix.
This paper examines the determinants of policy responses to the 2026 energy shock using the newly constructed IMF Global Policy Tracker. The main analysis focuses on measures announced between end-February and early June, while preliminary data covering 175 countries through mid-September shed light on how responses evolved as energy prices began to normalize. The findings point to distinct drivers of policy composition and design. At average public debt levels, greater shock exposure is associated with a larger share of price pass-through measures. As debt rises, this association strengthens, while the relationship between exposure and fiscal shielding weakens. Monetary responses are driven mainly by pre-shock inflation developments, while financial-stabilization measures are more closely associated with reserve adequacy. Policy design—including targeting and temporariness—is shaped more by institutional capacity, inflation, and the political cycle than by shock exposure. The extended dataset shows a gradual shift away from fiscal shielding toward pass-through, demand- and inflation- management measures. Later announcements are more likely to identify beneficiaries but less likely to include explicit expiry dates or sunset provisions. The main findings broadly hold, although some become less statistically significant.
Cette note évalue le rendement budgétaire potentiel ainsi que l’impact sur le niveau de vie de trois mesures envisagées en France pour augmenter l’imposition des retraités.
Face à des déficits publics durablement élevés, des appels à « mettre à contribution » les retraités pour participer à l’effort de redressement sont régulièrement lancés. Trois instruments dominent le débat : la suppression de l’abattement de 10 % sur les pensions à l’impôt sur le revenu, la désindexation ou la sous-indexation des retraites, et l’alignement des taux de CSG appliqués aux pensions de retraite sur celui appliqué aux revenus d’activité. Cette note évalue, à l’aide du modèle de microsimulation TAXIPP, le rendement budgétaire de ces mesures et la façon dont l’effort se répartirait le long de la distribution des niveaux de vie.
Ce rapport décrit le système fiscal de l’Éthiopie et souligne que, malgré d’importantes réformes récentes ayant permis de redresser les recettes fiscales, le pays continue d’afficher un ratio impôts-PIB parmi les plus faibles d’Afrique subsaharienne, ce qui pose un défi majeur pour le financement du développement.
This report describes Ethiopia’s tax system, documents the level and composition of tax revenue, reviews recent reforms and benchmarks Ethiopia’s tax revenue collections against regional peer countries.
Key findings
Over the past decade or so, tax revenue collections (as a percentage of GDP) declined significantly before a recent partial reversal. Ethiopia’s tax-to-GDP ratio fell from 12.7% in 2014–15 to a low of 6.2% in 2023–24 – the largest relative decline recorded anywhere over this period (Nair et al., 2025). The decline was evident across every major tax category, even as the economy continued to grow. But in the last couple of years following the implementation of the reforms under the national medium-term revenue strategy (NMTRS), the tax-to-GDP ratio recovered to 7.8% in 2024–25 and is projected by the International Monetary Fund to reach around 9.5% in 2025–26 (International Monetary Fund, 2026b).
Direct taxes have become key revenue sources in recent years. Domestic direct taxes accounted for around 2.9% of GDP in 2023–24, ahead of indirect taxes (2.5% of GDP) and trade taxes (0.7% of GDP). A decade earlier, indirect taxes – value-added tax (VAT) in particular – were much more important revenue sources for the government.
Various tax reforms have been implemented in the last few years. These include the comprehensive VAT reform of 2024, the 2023 excise amendment extending the tax to new services such as internet and mobile services, the 2025 income tax amendment introducing important changes (such as the simplification of business income tax categories from three to two, the introduction of a minimum alternative tax and a digital services tax), a harmonised property tax legal framework in 2025, the introduction of a new social welfare levy on imports in 2022, and the phased implementation of preferential tariffs under the African Continental Free Trade Area.
Yet Ethiopia’s tax-to-GDP ratio remains low even by regional standards. Its tax-to-GDP ratio is comparable only to that of fragile states and a handful of resource-rich economies in the sub-Saharan Africa region, and well below regional peers such as Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. The gap is only partly explained by economic structure; it also reflects administrative gaps and, to a lesser extent, policy choices such as a VAT rate below the regional median and incomplete implementation of statutory fuel taxes.
Meeting the NMTRS target will require large and sustained improvements in tax collection. The NMTRS, adopted in October 2024 and covering 2024–25 to 2027–28, sets out tax policy and administration measures intended to broaden the tax base, improve compliance and raise the overall efficiency of the tax system, with a central target of an additional 6.9% of GDP in tax revenue by 2027–28 (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Revenue, 2024). This is an ambitious goal despite the 1.6 percentage points already added in 2024–25, the first year of the NMTRS. Closing the remaining gap will depend on continued political commitment, careful monitoring of the revenue impact of each reform and readiness to adjust course where reforms fall short.
Ce rapport examine les options de partage des recettes fiscales avec les autorités régionales en Angleterre et conclut qu’une plus grande affectation des recettes de l’impôt sur le revenu et des taxes foncières pourrait renforcer les incitations à la croissance économique, à condition d’être accompagnée de mécanismes adéquats de péréquation et de gestion des écarts régionaux.
Devolution has recently risen to the top of the political agenda, forming a key plank of the new Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s plans for boosting growth, improving public services, and changing how politics and policymaking are conducted in the UK, and England in particular. But perhaps the single biggest change currently in train was started by the last Chancellor Rachel Reeves in March: allocating a share of business rates and income tax revenues to English mayoral strategic authorities (MSAs), based on revenues collected from their areas. Mr Burnham has confirmed that a ‘roadmap’ setting out more detail on plans for such a system of ‘revenue assignment’ will be published alongside the Budget. This chapter considers the rationales for revenue assignment, and discusses the issues and options facing the government in designing the new system. Will it help boost growth and tackle regional inequality? Are income tax and business rates appropriate for assignment? What arrangements for redistribution and insurance should the government consider? And are MSAs the right tier of government to assign revenues to?
Ce document analyse comment les crédits d’impôt et les prestations d’invalidité influencent l’offre de travail et les salaires des femmes au Royaume-Uni et conclut que la réduction de la générosité des crédits d’impôt dans les années 2010 explique une part importante de la hausse du recours aux prestations d’invalidité.
Work experience has been found to be a key determinant of work and wages for educated women, but it seems to play a smaller role for the less educated. For them, welfare, tax credits and family composition matter more, and increasingly so does participation in disability programmes.
Here we document how labor supply, wages, health, and disability claims have evolved in the UK over the last three decades, and examine how reforms to tax credits, disability benefits and other welfare programs have changed work incentives over this period.
We then introduce these features into an empirical dynamic structural model of life-cycle labor supply, human capital and disability benefit application, in which human capital combines health capital, experience accumulated in work, and education.
Estimating the model on a panel of working-age women in the UK, we examine the interactions between experience capital and health capital in driving life-cycle earnings across different education groups.
Our results highlight the importance of interactions in the disability benefit, welfare and tax-credit systems for understanding the life cycle pattern of hours, employment, earnings, and disability claims, and for evaluating policy counterfactuals.
Cet article montre qu’en Allemagne, le non-respect de l’obligation de produire une déclaration de revenus peut accroître les recettes fiscales, puisque de nombreux contribuables qui ne déclarent pas leurs revenus renoncent à des remboursements d’impôt auxquels ils auraient eu droit.
This paper examines tax non-compliance among individuals in Germany who were legally required to file a tax return but failed to do so. Using administrative tax data and simulation-based analysis, we quantify the financial implications of non-compliance for approximately 1.5 million affected individuals. Findings suggest that over 690,000 non-filers would have been financially better off had they complied with their obligation to file a tax return. Tax revenue is about 100 million euros higher than it would be under full compliance. Using a control group of comparable compliers, a probit model indicates a statistically significant and positive relationship between (potential) gains from non-compliance and non-compliant behaviour. The study offers new evidence on non-filers based on large-scale administrative data rather than audits or surveys
Ce rapport examine la mise en œuvre du mécanisme d’ajustement carbone aux frontières de l’Union européenne et souligne que son efficacité dépendra de règles d’application robustes, d’une mesure fiable des émissions et d’un accompagnement adéquat des partenaires commerciaux afin de réduire les risques de fuite de carbone.
This report provides practical guidance and recommendations to advance the implementation of the European Union’s (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in Romania and other EU Member States. It is intended to support CBAM National Competent Authorities (NCAs), Customs Authorities, and other relevant government agencies and stakeholders in understanding the key features of CBAM, and in planning effective implementation, operational arrangements, and governance.
The report incorporates feedback from meetings held to inform its content. These included meetings with the Romanian NCA and Customs Authority, as well as the NCAs of other EU Member States participating in the Country Advisory Group for this project (Belgium, Czechia, France and Italy). It also includes feedback from the workshop on CBAM implementation, which took place in Bucharest in September 2025, and discussions that occurred during the roundtable on CBAM implementation, which was held in Bucharest in March 2026.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Simone Fluet-Gendron
- Yannick Pagé
- Raphaël Tremblay
Coordination et édition :
- Ariane Gaboury
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé
Note: L’intelligence artificielle générative a été utilisée dans la préparation de ce bulletin de veille.