Bulletin de veille du 16 juin 2026
Québec/Canada
Ce texte fait état de l’évolution du pouvoir d’achat pour six types de ménages à trois niveaux de revenus et ce pour trois périodes distinctes : 2019-2022, 2022-2025 puis 2025-2026, étant donné l’intérêt soutenu face à l’inflation au coût de la vie et au pouvoir d’achat.
Si l’inflation générale est revenue dans sa fourchette cible, la variation des prix de certaines catégories de biens et services, comme l’alimentation et le logement, est restée plus grande. Les tendances récentes continuent d’alimenter l’intérêt et une certaine inquiétude quant au pouvoir d’achat et au coût de la vie des ménages québécois. C’est dans ce contexte que la Chaire a souhaité faire état de l’évolution récente et probable du pouvoir d’achat pour divers types de ménages.
L’examen des mesures gouvernementales mises en place depuis 2021 — qu’elles soient temporaires ou permanentes — met en lumière leur rôle pour soit accroître le revenu disponible ou diminuer le coût de certains biens et services dans le soutien du revenu disponible face à la hausse du coût de la vie.
Pour analyser l’évolution du pouvoir d’achat, un indicateur de revenu disponible en dollars constants et sur la base d’un indice est construit pour 6 types de ménages et trois niveaux de revenus. La variation de cet indicateur est présentée pour trois périodes, 2019-2022, 2022-2025 et 2025-2026.
Le portrait global 2019-2026 indique une amélioration de la situation financière réelle pour tous les ménages. Cependant, la progression pour la période 2022-2025 demeure hétérogène. Les ménages à plus faible revenu ainsi que certaines configurations familiales ont bénéficié davantage des transferts fiscaux ponctuels, faisant en sorte qu’une fois que ces aides sont terminées, le pouvoir d’achat diminue. Cependant, pour 2025-2026, c’est une légère croissance du pouvoir d’achat qui est généralement anticipée.
Dans ce mémoire, l’équipe de la Chaire fait état d’angles d’intérêt à considérer pour le prochain budget fédéral.
L’équipe de la Chaire a, en respect du processus des consultations prébudgétaires fédéral 2026, déposé un court mémoire faisant état d’angles d’intérêt à considérer pour le prochain budget fédéral.
Une douzaine de recommandations ou réflexions y sont exposées, réparties sous quatre thèmes: Ancrages budgétaires, Certaines dépenses budgétaires, Réflexions fiscales et Fiscalité internationale.
Ce court texte s’intéresse à l’évolution des inégalités de revenus au Québec et du Canada en regardant diverses périodes se terminant avec les données le plus récentes. Puis, ce sont des données de revenu disponible publiées par Statistique Canada qui sont présentées et « déchiffrées » pour nuancer ou améliorer leur interprétation.
Ce court texte s’intéresse d’abord à deux indicateurs permettant de mesurer l’évolution des inégalités de revenus au Québec et au Canada, soit le coefficient et l’indice de Palma. Leur évolution, pour le Québec et le Canada dans son ensemble, est observée sur la base de 3 périodes, soit 1976-2024, 2000-2024 et 2019-2024.
Puis, des données de revenu disponible publiées par Statistique Canada sont présentées. On montre notamment l’importance du choix de l’année de départ pour nuancer l’interprétation de leur évolution. Puis, on présente les données par quintile pour le Québec sur la base du tableau de Statistique Canada, donc suivant des quintiles établis selon les seuils de revenu canadiens, et sur la base d’une extraction spéciale soit des quintiles établis d’après les seuils de revenus du Québec. Il y a alors des différences significatives quant aux constats qu’on peut tirer des résultats, d’où l’importance de porter attention à la juste compréhension de la construction des données publiées. À cet égard, Statistique Canada pourrait améliorer la présentation des données par quintile pour les provinces.
Ce rapport évalue la transparence et la responsabilité financière des municipalités canadiennes, concluant que des budgets souvent tardifs et difficiles à comprendre nuisent à la reddition de comptes et à la compréhension des finances publiques locales.
Canada’s cities provide infrastructure and services that affect the quality of Canadians’ lives and influence where people and businesses live, work and invest. Providing those services costs money, and the taxes and fees cities charge also affect quality of life and decisions about where to work and invest. Municipal governments should present financial information that is transparent, useful and timely. This report card covers the 2025 budgets and 2024 financial statements of 39 major Canadian municipalities. For the first time, it includes Charlottetown, Fredericton, Iqaluit, St. John’s, Victoria, Whitehorse and Yellowknife, which expands its coverage to all provincial and territorial capitals. Unfortunately, it shows that the financial information provided by many cities falls short. The problem lies least with their year-end financial statements. Although too many cities issue them late, these statements tend to be clear and informative, follow public sector accounting standards (PSAS) and get clean opinions from external auditors. Municipal budgets, however, typically present a fragmented view of operations and are not comparable with past results or with the financial statements the same municipality issues after year-end.
Ce document analyse le poids de la fiscalité dans le budget des ménages et conclu qu’en 2026, les Canadiens ont consacré en moyenne plus de cinq mois de revenus au paiement des impôts.
In 2026, the average Canadian family will earn $166,790 in income and pay an estimated $72,539 in total taxes (43.5 percent).
If the average Canadian family had to pay its taxes up front, it would have worked until June 8 to pay the total tax bill imposed on it by all three levels of government (federal, provincial, and local).
This means that Tax Freedom Day, the day in the year when the average Canadian family has earned enough money to pay the taxes imposed on it, falls on June 9.
Tax Freedom Day in 2026 arrives one day later than it did in 2025, when it fell on June 8.
Tax Freedom Day for each province varies according to the extent of the provincially levied tax burden. The earliest provincial Tax Freedom Day falls on May 20 in Saskatchewan, while the latest falls on June 27 in Quebec.
Canadians are right to be thinking about the tax implications of the $113.1 billion in projected federal and provincial government deficits in 2026. For this reason, we calculated a Balanced Budget Tax Freedom Day, the day on which average Canadians would start working for themselves if governments were obliged to cover current expenditures with current taxation. In 2026, the Balanced Budget Tax Freedom Day arrives on June 25.
Ce rapport analyse les mouvements migratoires interprovinciaux au Canada entre 1995 et 2024 et met en évidence les écarts persistants entre les provinces, lesquels peuvent avoir des répercussions importantes sur les recettes fiscales, la demande de services publics et la planification budgétaire des gouvernements.
Patterns of interprovincial migration indicate the relative attractiveness of a given province as a place to live and work and have significant economic and fiscal impacts upon both migrants and provinces across Canada.
This study examines interprovincial migration in Canada between 1995/96 and 2024/25 in total, by age group, and by province of origin or destination.
In total, Alberta (538,824) and British Columbia (214,883) experienced the largest absolute levels of net in-migration, while Quebec (255,988) and Ontario (168,166) experienced the most net out-migration. However, relative to their respective populations, Newfoundland & Labrador, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan experienced the largest levels of net out-migration.
Alberta and British Columbia were the only provinces to attract net in-migration across all age groups. Notably, Alberta was the top destination for younger migrants, attracting 192,329 net in-migrants aged 18 to 24 between 1995/96 and 2024/25.
The Atlantic provinces—except Nova Scotia—generally saw net out-migration of those younger than 44 years old, and net in-migration of those aged 45 and older. Newfoundland & Labrador in particular saw the equivalent of 97.3% of its 2025 population aged 18 to 24 leave (on net) over the past three decades.
Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia attracted net in-migrants from the majority of—in Alberta’s case all—other provinces during this period. Conversely, Newfoundland & Labrador saw migrants leave (on net) to every other province in Canada.
Generally, Alberta stands out as the most attractive destination for interprovincial migrants in recent decades, while Newfoundland & Labrador is the least attractive.
États-Unis
Ce rapport présente l’évolution récente du déficit budgétaire fédéral des États-Unis et montre que, malgré une hausse des recettes fiscales ayant réduit le déficit par rapport à l’année précédente, les finances publiques demeurent sous pression en raison du niveau élevé des dépenses gouvernementales.
The federal budget deficit totaled $1.2 trillion in the first eight months of fiscal year 2026, the Congressional Budget Office estimates. That amount is $116 billion less than the deficit recorded during the same period last fiscal year. Revenues rose by $174 billion (or 5 percent), and outlays increased by $57 billion (or 1 percent).
That comparison is affected by shifts in the timing of certain payments. Payments that otherwise would have been due on June 1, 2025, which fell on a weekend, were shifted into May of that year. If not for that shift, the deficit through May of fiscal year 2026 would have been $19 billion smaller than the shortfall for the same period in fiscal year 2025.
Ce rapport analyse les conséquences de la politique fiscale menée par l’administration Trump et le Congrès républicain au cours de la première année du second mandat, et constate que les Américains à revenu moyen paient en moyenne 900 $ de plus en impôts en 2026, tandis que le 1 % le plus riche bénéficie d’une réduction d’impôt d’au moins mille milliards de dollars sur dix ans, ce qui alourdira la dette fédérale de 4 600 milliards de dollars.
Trump-Republican tax policy in the first year of the president’s second term will: Increase taxes paid by middle-income Americans by an average of $900 in 2026; Cut taxes for the wealthiest 1 percent by a trillion dollars over the next 10 years; Result in large profitable corporations paying little or no corporate income tax; Cut taxes for foreign shareholders in U.S. businesses by $32 billion in 2026. The first year of President Trump’s second term has brought major changes in U.S. tax policy. The president, in concert with Congress, has dramatically increased tariff taxes, enacted large tax cuts that primarily benefit the well-off and corporations, dramatically curtailed IRS enforcement, and issued legally problematic regulations. These changes have had significant impacts on taxpayers.
TAX FOUNDATION. Jared Walczak, « Mid-Year Movers and the California Wealth Tax », 26 mai 2026, 17 p.
Ce document analyse les obstacles juridiques auxquels se heurte la proposition de taxe sur la richesse des milliardaires en Californie, en montrant que les contestations constitutionnelles et les risques de délocalisation fiscale pourraient limiter la capacité de l’État à mettre en œuvre une imposition du patrimoine réellement efficace.
When Mark Zuckerberg purchased a Florida mansion in February ahead of a planned relocation, many assumed that the move would come too late to avoid the California billionaire wealth tax, should it be adopted by voters in November. After all, the initiative seeks to tax any billionaire who was a California resident as of January 1, 2026. But Zuckerberg might know something that many do not: the residency and assessment provisions of the ballot initiative are highly vulnerable to legal challenge. Even if the measure itself is enacted and survives its inevitable litigation, departing sometime in 2026 could allow billionaires to avoid some or all exposure to the wealth tax.
This expectation, which has a sound legal basis, will almost certainly prompt an ongoing exodus of California billionaires as the November election approaches. Wealthy Californians who were unable to relocate on short notice last year may do so at greater leisure this year. And while no legal outcome is guaranteed, they would have good reason to believe that their departures could pay off.
The 2026 California Billionaire Tax Act would impose a one-time 5 percent tax on the global net worth of billionaires who were California residents as of January 1, 2026, with taxable wealth measured as of December 31, 2026.[1] Because it goes before the voters in November, the snapshot residency date would precede the adoption of the tax by more than ten months. The mere fact of retroactivity is not a legal bar to the tax, but the specifics of the proposed tax give mid-year movers good reason to believe the residency date would not survive legal scrutiny.
While the initiative’s drafters argue that the tax’s residency provisions are legally unassailable, the ballot language they drafted betrays far less confidence in their position. The initiative attempts to facilitate alternative apportionment mechanisms if default full-year apportionment is ruled unconstitutional, and requests judicial reformation of the residency and assessment date provisions (in lieu of invalidating the whole measure) if the courts reject those in the initiative. The drafters knew that in their attempt to lock billionaires into the tax base before many of them could realistically react to the proposal, they were relying on provisions that invited serious legal challenges. This paper explores those legal deficiencies and considers how residency challenges could play out.
Two particular legal arguments are worth highlighting: that the initiative retroactively establishes a wholly new tax rather than simply modifying an existing one; and that the tax is not apportioned for those who depart the state and even extends to post-departure wealth accumulation. The former challenges the validity of the January 1 residency date, while the latter argues against the December 31 valuation date and continued taxation after a taxpayer’s mid-year departure.
Ce rapport analyse les obstacles structurels qui freinent la croissance économique en Europe, en montrant que des systèmes fiscaux complexes et peu compétitifs limitent l’investissement et l’innovation, et en soulignant que des réformes axées sur la simplification et la réduction des distorsions pourraient renforcer la croissance à long terme.
In a more geopolitically hostile world, economic growth matters not only for individual opportunity but also as the foundation of governments’ ability to defend their values and interests in international conflict.
Too often, tax reform discussions focus on headline rates without considering the tax base and how specific taxes interact with the broader fiscal framework.
Tax Foundation’s International Tax Competitiveness Index (ITCI) provides a useful tool for evaluating the efficiency of tax systems and their support of long-term capital formation and growth.
Countries with more competitive overall tax systems (as measured by the ITCI) tend to perform better economically.
An improvement by one standard deviation in the corporate category score (14.3 points) translates into roughly 1 percentage point higher annual GDP per capita growth and a cumulative 2.29 percentage points over three years.
EU tax policy harmonization can support economic growth only if the harmonized policies reduce frictions between Member States and improve their systems compared to the national status quo.
Cet article analyse les effets du Family First Act aux États-Unis et montre que l’élargissement de plusieurs crédits d’impôt destinés aux enfants et aux femmes enceintes augmenterait le revenu après impôt de nombreuses familles tout en simplifiant certains programmes fiscaux.
Families benefit from multiple overlapping provisions in the tax code. Over the years, policymakers and analysts have proposed to consolidate and simplify these benefits, applying federal budget savings to a higher tax credit for young children.
The Family First Act (FFA), introduced in April 2025 by Rep. Blake Moore (R-UT) and Sen. Jim Banks (R-IN) continues this approach. Building on an idea outlined by former Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) in early 2021 and proposed in 2022 as the Family Security Act 2.0, the FFA would dramatically expand the child tax credit (CTC)—most significantly for children under age 6— and create a credit for pregnant mothers. To offset most of the cost, the bill would reduce, eliminate, or combine other benefits delivered through the tax system, many of which affect families with children.
TPC estimates that under the FFA, 62 percent of families with children would see an average increase in their after-tax income of about $2,100, largely driven by the CTC expansion. At the same time, changes to other benefits mean that 32 percent of families with children would see an average decrease in their after-tax income of about $1,700.
International
Ce document présente le résumé et recommandations suite à l’analyse de la situation budgétaire du Danemark en 2026 et souligne les défis de long terme liés au financement des dépenses publiques, à l’évolution démographique et à la soutenabilité des finances publiques, tout en évaluant les implications de différentes orientations de politique fiscale et budgétaire.
Chapter I comments on current economic policy, including fiscal policy and the ministries’ policy assessment criteria.
Chapter II presents a forecast for the Danish economy which, despite geopolitical uncertainty and rising energy prices, remains resilient, with the outlook being for subdued growth in the coming years. The Chairmanship assesses that there are currently no clear signs of imbalances in the Danish economy. The planned fiscal policy is assessed to be pro-cyclical.
Chapter III maps the extent to which firms have market power in parts of the Danish labour market. An increased degree of unionisation can increase wages and employment in firms with labour market power, thereby reducing the associated economic loss.
Chapter IV examines how highly paid foreign nationals working in Denmark under the Pay Limit Scheme affect the wages of their Danish colleagues as well as the public finances. The Pay Limit Scheme is targeted at foreign nationals from countries outside the EU/EEA who obtain a high-paying job in Denmark.
Ce document analyse comment la fragmentation administrative dans un pays à faible revenu alimente l’évasion fiscale des entreprises, en montrant que la multiplication des autorités fiscales réduit l’efficacité du contrôle, accroît les pertes de recettes publiques et limite la capacité de mobilisation fiscale.
We provide novel evidence on bureaucratic fragmentation and weak tax administrations as central enablers of low revenue mobilization in low-income countries. In collaboration with the municipal and national tax authorities in Kampala, Uganda, we cross-link previously siloed tax records for 155,000 firms and conduct a large-scale experiment with 60,000 firms. We document pervasive and selective tax evasion: only 14% of verifiably active firms comply with both government tiers. Cross-record linkage almost triples detectable non-compliance while offering increased enforcement efficiency. This coordination dividend is left untapped. Firms exploit the resulting loopholes through partial informality, re-registering under new identities, and strategic late payments. In a cross-authority field experiment, deterrence nudges, including messages signaling inter-authority coordination, fail to offer a light-touch alternative to addressing fragmentation directly. Our findings establish bureaucratic fragmentation as a distinct and costly source of passive waste in tax administration that existing approaches to revenue mobilization rarely address.
Ce rapport évalue la position budgétaire de l’Irlande en soulignant que la solidité apparente des finances publiques masque une vulnérabilité liée aux recettes exceptionnelles des multinationales, ce qui renforce la nécessité d’une gestion prudente et d’un cadre de politique budgétaire durable pour préserver la stabilité à moyen terme.
The economy continues to perform well but elevated energy prices are a risk to future growth. Ireland’s dependence on fossil fuels means energy costs are set to rise in 2026. Faster progress on renewables would have reduced this impact.
While the headline numbers look healthy, they mask growing weaknesses in the public finances. The State remains heavily reliant on corporation tax paid by a handful of foreign-owned multinationals. Excluding excess corporation tax, an underlying deficit of €11 billion (3% of GNI*) is forecast for this year.
The Government’s revised medium-term fiscal plan does not provide an appropriate guide for budgetary policy:
- The planned pace of net spending growth is faster than the sustainable growth rate of the economy. Ireland’s plan shows the fastest net spending growth in the EU. Actual net spending growth could be higher again, as spending overruns have become commonplace.
- Most corporation tax receipts are set to be spent rather than saved. Under the government’s plan, only €1 out of every €6 collected will be set aside, with the remaining €5 used for ongoing spending commitments.
- The Government plans to run modest surpluses in the years ahead. As a result, it will need to borrow to finance some of its planned contributions to its savings funds.
- The plan points to growing reliance on corporation tax and income tax for government revenue.
Ireland needs its own domestic fiscal rule, partly because the Medium-Term Fiscal and Structural Plan is not a good guide for budget decisions. This should be carefully designed and placed in legislation.
Ireland is missing an opportunity to prepare for future challenges. Population ageing and climate change will place significant pressure on the public finances. The more the Government saves now, when employment is at record levels, the easier it will be to meet these predictable future costs
Ce rapport évalue les prévisions économiques et budgétaires à un, deux et cinq ans de l’OBR pour l’exercice 2024-2025 au Royaume-Uni et constate que les chocs liés à la hausse des prix de l’énergie en 2022 et à l’inflation persistante expliquent une grande partie des écarts, avec un endettement public net atteignant 152 milliards de livres (5,2 % du PIB) en 2024-2025, soit nettement plus que prévu.
The Office for Budget Responsibility was created in 2010 to provide independent and authoritative analysis of the UK public finances. One of our core roles is to produce the Government’s official economic and fiscal forecasts which are published twice a year in our Economic and fiscal outlook (EFO). These uncertainties mean differences between outturns and forecasts are inevitable. We believe it is important to identify, understand, and learn from these differences and errors, and then to set out our plans for improving the way in which we forecast. We are therefore committed to transparent evaluation of our forecast performance. Our legislation requires the OBR to undertake, at least once a year, “an assessment of the accuracy of fiscal and economic forecasts previously prepared by it.” To meet this requirement, we produce this annual Forecast evaluation report (FER) which evaluates how successive forecasts have compared against outturn.
Ce rapport examine comment l’indexation du barème de l’impôt sur le revenu aurait modifié la charge fiscale des contribuables australiens, en montrant que l’absence d’indexation amplifie l’effet de progression à froid et entraîne, au fil du temps, une hausse implicite de l’impôt pour la majorité des ménages.
Despite excitement among some in the media about the benefits of indexing tax brackets to the rate of inflation, this paper shows Australians have been much better off without indexation.
Had indexation of personal income tax thresholds applied over the last 30 years a taxpayer on average weekly earnings would now be $147 a week worse off.
The average nurse would be $187 a week worse off with teachers and police worse off by $172 and $207 per week respectively.
Ce document analyse les deux réformes fiscales proposées dans le budget fédéral australien 2026-27 : suppression du rabais de 50 % sur les plus-values remplacée par une indexation du coût de base et un taux minimum de 30 %, et imposition minimale de 30 % sur les trusts discrétionnaires. Ces mesures, applicables à compter de 2027 et 2028, pourraient pénaliser les trusts testamentaires discrétionnaires utilisés à des fins légitimes de protection des bénéficiaires vulnérables, de continuité des entreprises familiales et de planification successorale, au-delà du seul fractionnement de revenus.
The 2026–27 Federal Budget has unsettled estate planning because it places two structural tax reforms beside a familiar succession-planning vehicle: the discretionary testamentary trust. From 1 July 2027, the first proposed measure would replace the 50 per cent CGT discount for individuals, trusts and partnerships with cost base indexation and a 30 per cent minimum tax on net capital gains. From 1 July 2028, the second would impose a 30 per cent minimum tax on discretionary trust taxable income, with non-refundable credits for non-corporate beneficiaries and specified exclusions. Those measures are proposed reforms, not enacted law. But Budget announcements can still affect present planning. Many executed wills contain discretionary testamentary trust clauses. If the will-maker is alive, the trust may not yet exist or hold property. On the Budget wording, those wills may sit outside any grandfathering for “discretionary testamentary trusts existing at announcement”. Estate plans settled years ago may therefore require review, because the tax assumptions attached to a future trust may no longer hold.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Carole Habib
- Kristine Javier
- Félix Musas
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé
- Ariane Gaboury
Note: L’intelligence artificielle générative a été utilisée dans la préparation de ce bulletin de veille.