Le Bilan de la fiscalité au Québec regroupe une série d’indicateurs importants en fiscalité et de données les plus récentes étalées sur près de cent graphiques et tableaux. L’édition 2025 trace le portrait de la situation de la fiscalité québécoise permettant ainsi de suivre son évolution et d’établir des comparaisons avec d’autres juridictions.

Le Bilan de la fiscalité au Québec – Édition 2025 débute par le Mot du titulaire suivi d’un résumé et se poursuit avec les sept sections suivantes :

1. Poids de la fiscalité

• En regard du poids de la fiscalité en pourcentage du PIB en 2023, l’insertion du Québec dans une comparaison avec les économies avancées de l’OCDE, le classait en 11^e position sur 32 (le rang 1 étant celui où le poids est le plus élevé).
• La comparaison avec les autres provinces montre que le Québec est toujours la province où le poids de la fiscalité est le plus élevé.

2. Manière de prélever

• Au Québec, dans une comparaison avec les économies avancées de l’OCDE pour l’année 2023, on note une importance plus grande de l’utilisation, en proportion du PIB, des impôts sur le revenu des particuliers, des impôts sur les salaires, des impôts sur le patrimoine et des impôts sur les bénéfices des sociétés.
• Pour les impôts sur la consommation et les cotisations sociales, en revanche, leurs poids sont moins élevés en 2023 qu’une majorité d’économies avancées de l’OCDE.
• Dans une comparaison avec les autres provinces, sauf pour les impôts sur les bénéfices des sociétés et les impôts sur le patrimoine (qui incluent les impôts fonciers), l’utilisation en proportion du PIB de toutes les autres sources de recettes fiscales est plus importante au Québec que pour le Canada sans le Québec.

3. Dépenses fiscales

• Les dépenses fiscales du gouvernement du Québec ont un poids global dans l’économie qui a connu une tendance à la hausse depuis le milieu des années 1990, malgré des variations pour certaines années.
• En 2023, plus de 68 % des dépenses fiscales du Québec sont liées au système d’imposition des particuliers.

4. Charge fiscale nette

• Même si les indicateurs du poids de la fiscalité au Québec montrent un poids des impôts sur le revenu en pourcentage du PIB assez élevé, l’analyse de la charge fiscale nette en comparaison avec les économies avancées de l’OCDE et les autres provinces, et ce à partir de cas types, apporte un éclairage plus nuancé en tenant compte non seulement des impôts sur le revenu, mais également des cotisations sociales payées et des prestations reçues.

5. Profil des contribuables québécois

• En 2021, année où les prestations COVID-19 ont culminé, 23,0 % des Québécois produisant une déclaration de revenus fédérale touchaient un revenu total inférieur à 20 000 $, une proportion encore fortement plus basse que celle de 2019 (28,6 %), l’année avant la pandémie de COVID-19.
• Les statistiques fiscales des sociétés présentées sont celles de l’année d’imposition 2019. Elles montrent notamment qu’un peu plus de 96 % de celles qui avaient produit une déclaration de revenus au Québec étaient de petites entreprises (actif de moins de 15 M$).

6. Progressivité

• Les indicateurs inclus dans cette section permettent de montrer que la progressivité est bien présente au Québec et, dans certains cas, qu’elle est plus importante que dans plusieurs autres juridictions.

7. Fiscalité et inégalités de revenus

• Trois indicateurs des inégalités sont brièvement abordés : le coefficient de Gini, l’indice de Palma et l’importance de la part des revenus accaparée par les contribuables à plus haut revenu.
• Il est possible de constater que, de manière générale, la fiscalité contribue à réduire les inégalités.

Ce texte présente, sous forme de faits saillants, les principales annonces fiscales faites ou mises en œuvre en 2024 par le gouvernement fédéral, le Québec et chacune des autres provinces du Canada.

On retrouve ainsi dans la section 1, les grandes lignes des principales annonces fiscales répertoriées, résumées par assiette d’imposition. Puis la section 2 les présente en ordre chronologique pour le fédéral, le Québec et pour les autres provinces en indiquant l’effet anticipé sur les recettes des administrations publiques.

Ce texte s’intéresse aux conséquences de la modification du taux d’imposition du gain en capital. Il est estimé que le changement causera une réduction du PIB de 90 milliards $, une baisse de 3 % du PIB réel par habitant et la suppression de 414 000 emplois sur une période de cinq ans. Une révision de l’imposition du gain en capital pourrait être envisagée dans le cadre d’une réforme globale de la fiscalité.

With Prime Minister Trudeau proroguing Parliament on January 6, plans to amend the Income Tax Act to increase the capital gains inclusion rate are now uncertain. While the government stated its intention to introduce the changes in its Ways and Means motion last September, legislation had not yet been introduced. When Parliament returns, Canadians cannot be certain that the amended capital gains tax measures will be passed, or simply be withdrawn altogether by a newly elected government. Meanwhile, tax planners and the affected individuals and corporations must await the outcome, even though the Canada Revenue Agency began administering the tax on June 25, 2024, after it was announced in the spring budget. At this time, taxpayers could be assessed interest and penalties if they do not comply with the proposed law. If the law is never passed, taxpayers will have to claim refunds. The provincial budgets reliant on the new revenues will be affected if the planned measure is ultimately withdrawn. It is now a chaotic process. Perhaps, the planned measure to increase the capital gains inclusion rate should never see the light of day when Parliament resumes after March 24, nor be revived thereafter by a new government. This E-Brief estimates that Canada’s capital stock would decrease by $127 billion; employment would decline by 414,000 jobs; GDP would fall by nearly $90 billion; and real per-capita GDP would decrease by 3 percent with most of the adjustment within five years. It would be better to evaluate the role of capital gains taxation as part of a broader tax reform.

Ce texte analyse les systèmes de retraite dans les pays de l’OCDE, mettant en lumière la pression fiscale croissante liée au vieillissement de la population, tout en examinant les réformes, telles que l’indexation automatique de l’âge de la retraite et le passage à des régimes de retraite financés par des épargnes privées, pour réduire le fardeau fiscal et assurer la viabilité des systèmes de retraite à long terme.

This study examines the retirement income systems of the developed and newly industrializing countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Tax-and-transfer, pay-as-you-go, government plans are the most prevalent means of providing retirement income to the elderly in OECD member states.

Other types of plans include open “funded” plans based on private savings, and nudge plans, in which governments require employers automatically enroll employees in private, occupational, defined-contribution plans and/or provide government matching contributions for employee/individual contributions to such plans.

From an economic perspective, these options are not created equal. Government retirement systems usually involve tax-and-spending burdens that can undermine economic vitality. And with demographic changes, those burdens in many cases will become more onerous, often accompanied by risky levels of government debt. Restraining benefit payments can avert, or minimize, future tax increases and additional borrowing. This is why many governments have raised normal retirement ages and reduced promised benefits. Such reforms limit the fiscal burden of government retirement plans.

Funded systems have several economic advantages, most notably because there do not create fiscal burdens. People save, and their savings are invested to create an asset portfolio that will, in time, generate income for their own retirement. Consequently, funded systems generate savings that finance additional business investment and boost long-term real GDP growth.

Conversely, tax-financed, pay-as-you-go government retirement plans diminish private savings and business investment and depress long-term real GDP growth because these plans are financed by taxes and borrowing

Cette étude compare les performances économiques des provinces de l’Atlantique au Canada et des États de la Nouvelle-Angleterre en examinant sept indicateurs clefs. Les résultats montrent que les États de la Nouvelle-Angleterre surpassent les provinces atlantiques dans tous les indicateurs étudiés, ce qui pourrait contribuer aux différences observées en termes de performance économique entre les deux régions.

Past research has shown that Atlantic Canada chronically underperforms compared to New England across several indicators of economic performance. This paper builds on that research by examining policy differences between the Atlantic Canada and New England regions that may be contributing to the gap in economic performance. More specifically, we generate an economic competitiveness “scorecard” to illustrate policy differences between the regions. We find that tax policy in Atlantic Canada puts its provinces at a competitive disadvantage compared to the New England states. Atlantic Canada’s marginal tax rates are higher on high-income and middle-income individuals. Sales taxes are a larger burden on Atlantic Canadians. Finally, top corporate tax rates and top capital gains tax rates are also higher in Atlantic Canada.

A similar story emerges in other areas beyond tax policy that affect competitiveness. Data from the Economic Freedom of North America report shows that the government has a larger role in Atlantic Canadian provincial economies than in New England states. We discuss evidence that shows that a larger government presence in the economy undermines competitiveness.We also show that Atlantic Canadian provinces all carry a greater debt burden than the New England states.

We summarize our results in an economic competitiveness scorecard that reviews the policy differences between the two regions. Taken as a whole, this scorecard demonstrates that there are many ways in which all of the New England states enjoy a policy competitiveness advantage over all of Canada’s Atlantic provinces.

Ce rapport analyse les avantages fiscaux liés aux enfants dans le système fiscal des États-Unis. Il révèle que le taux de réclamation de ces avantages par les contribuables qui y ont droit est élevé (95 à 97 %), mais qu’il est plus faible pour les enfants des ménages à faibles revenus et des communautés noires et hispaniques, ce qui  met en évidence des inégalités d’accès aux avantages fiscaux.

Tax benefits tied to children form a central component of the social safety net in the United States. To participate in these programs, taxpayers must claim a child on their tax return. We study the claiming of children on tax returns by drawing on health insurance information returns to establish the presence of children in the United States. We esti-mate that the vast majority of insured children (approximately 95 percent) and a significant majority (between 88 and 97 percent) of all U.S. children are claimed on tax returns. Un-claimed children are disproportionately concentrated in lower income households and are more likely to live in Black and Hispanic neighborhoods.

Dans ce court texte, l’auteur considère que la diminution du financement de l’Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pourrait être préjudiciable pour les contribuables à revenus moyens. De plus, le Congrès demanderait l’élimination du programme pilote Direct File, qui permettait aux contribuables de faire leur déclaration d’impôt gratuitement directement par le biais de l’IRS. 

As Congress negotiates a bill for federal funding during the lame-duck session, lawmakers would be wise to remember that stripping funds from the IRS costs more than it saves. On the table in the appropriations bill is a $20 billion recission of funds to the nation’s tax administration. While this may look like a spending cut, it will increase deficits by $46 billion due to a drop in the agency’s capacity to enforce taxes on wealthy individuals owed under existing federal law.

At the same time, Congressional Republicans are calling on the incoming Trump administration to end the popular program that allows taxpayers to file their returns for free directly through the IRS. This will ultimately lead to more costs for taxpayers as they pay private services such as Intuit or H&R Block to carry out paperwork that they are required by law to file each year.

Regular taxpayers benefit from a competent and well-funded IRS. Most people do their best to pay their taxes accurately and on time, and slashes to funding that leave the agency understaffed and underequipped only create headaches for compliant taxpayers. Until recently, the IRS was not given the funding and capacity to pursue the high-income taxpayers who have the most complex returns but who also account for a hugely disproportionate share of the tax avoidance, which unfairly shifted the agency’s scrutiny to everyone else.

The arguments against an improved IRS are motivated by private corporations worried about their profit margins and by anti-government activists seeking to undermine the public’s trust in the agency.

Dans ce court texte, l’auteur indique qu’aux États-Unis, le Tax Cuts and Jobs Act  (TCJA) a eu un impact majeur sur les impôts sur le revenu des particuliers, notamment par la diminution des taux marginaux d’imposition, l’élargissement de la déduction standard et la bonification du crédit d’impôt pour les enfants. D’autres mesures mises en place auraient pour effet d’augmenter l’impôt, notamment en éliminant certaines exemptions personnelles et déductions particulières pour les contribuables.

Next year, nearly all of the individual provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) will expire unless Congress acts. Congressional scorekeepers have estimated that fully extending the TCJA would cost $4.6 trillion over ten years. The Tax Policy Center has shown that, on average, all income groups would get a tax cut relative to current law, but higher-income households would receive a larger benefit.

But it is important for policymakers to understand more than the average impact of TCJA extensions, especially as they consider changes to specific provisions of the 2017 law. Below we unpack how extending each of the TCJA’s major provisions would affect taxpayers in different income groups. The key takeaway is that specific provisions of the TCJA have very different distributional effects depending on a household’s income level.
The TCJA was a sweeping piece of legislation that made major temporary changes to many individual tax provisions, including reducing marginal tax rates, expanding the standard deduction, expanding the child tax credit, modifying the alternative minimum tax (AMT), and introducing a new deduction for businesses organized as pass-through entities (199A). It raised taxes by repealing personal exemptions and limiting itemized deductions.

Figure 1 shows the net effect of extending the expiring TCJA provisions (left panel), further breaking down the average effect of provisions that reduce taxes and those that raise them (right panel).

The following figures show how these provisions contribute to the net change in taxes by income group, with positive changes (tax increases) on the right side of the vertical line and negative changes (tax cuts) on the left side and different provisions identified by color.

First, low- and middle-income households primarily benefit from the TCJA’s larger standard deduction and expanded child tax credit (Figure 2). These gains are partially offset by the loss of personal exemptions. Taken together, extending these provisions would reduce taxes for households in the bottom income quintile by an average of 0.5 percent of their after-tax income, the net effect of a 0.9 percent income boost offset by 0.4 percent reduction.

Figure 3 also highlights the effects of extending TCJA’s rate cuts, which provide significant benefits for middle- and upper-income taxpayers. For example, middle-income households receive a 1.2 percent boost in after-tax income from the TCJA extension. This net effect is a combination of tax cuts (totaling 2.8 percent of after-tax income relative to current law) from a higher standard deduction, larger child credit, and lower tax rates, that are offset by tax increases (of 1.6 percent of after-tax income), driven largely by the repeal of the personal exemptions.

Figure 4 shows the effects of TCJA’s rate cuts along with other provisions that mostly affect higher-income households, including the limits on itemized deductions, changes to the AMT, and the 20-percent pass-through income deduction (199A). The highest-income taxpayers would benefit the most overall from these extensions, seeing net tax cuts of 2 percent of after-tax income for those in the top quintile (2.5 percent for those in the top 1 percent).

The bottom line: the individual provisions of the TCJA involve a combination of gives and takes that affect households differently depending on their income and other characteristics. Unpacking the effect of extending these provisions offers insights about how the overall cost and impact on households would differ if policymakers consider changing the core structure of the TCJA.

Ce rapport montre que, depuis 2023, la croissance économique de la Mongolie a permis au pays d’atteindre le statut de revenu intermédiaire supérieur en 2024. Toutefois, des réformes fiscales sont nécessaires afin d’améliorer l’efficacité du système et mieux lutter contre la pauvreté et les inégalités de revenus.

Mongolia’s coal-driven economic growth since 2023 has elevated the country to upper-middle-income status (UMIC) in 2024. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth has remained robust, driven by mining and transport services, despite a sharp contraction in the agriculture sector. On the demand side, domestic demand was a key driver of growth, while the contribution of net exports to economic growth turned negative despite strong export performance. Boosted by increased income and trade-related revenues, the fiscal balance remained in surplus despite sustained high spending. In addition, Mongolia should consider reforms to its fiscal system to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency in tackling poverty and income inequality. The special chapter of this MEU summarizes the findings from a forthcoming World Bank analysis (commitment to equity) on the distributional impacts of the Mongolia’s fiscal system in chapter 2. This analysis reveals that while the fiscal system – encompassing both taxation and transfers – has a marginal effect on reducing poverty, it exhibits strong broad-based redistributive effects.

Cette publication explore les enjeux du secteur forestier dans la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, en se concentrant sur la gouvernance, les instruments fiscaux et le soutien international pour leur faire face.

Le Baromètre économique de la CEMAC est une publication semestrielle de la Banque mondiale qui présente un aperçu des évolutions récentes et des perspectives économiques de la région CEMAC, suivi d’un bref diagnostic de chacun des pays. Le Baromètre économique comprend également une section technique ciblée sur un thème d’importance régionale. Dans cette édition, le thème spécial traite des options de politiques économiques qui peuvent permettre aux pays de la CEMAC de faire face aux défis auxquels le secteur forestier est confronté, y compris la conception efficace d’instruments fiscaux, l’amélioration de la gouvernance forestière et le renforcement de l’appui financier et technique de la communauté internationale.

Ce texte évalue la transparence fiscale du Panama en analysant les lacunes de son système fiscal et propose des recommandations afin de se conformer aux standards internationaux.

An IMF team found that Panama has a cash-based system of budgeting and accounting that generates good information on many aspects of public finances. There are, however, many weaknesses in the system which diverge from the sound practices included in the Fund’s Fiscal Transparency Code. Panama’s ratings are lower than those of regional comparators, especially in the area of fiscal risks. The team developed high-priority recommendations to improve Panama’s fiscal transparency principles.

Cet article s’intéresse à la Hongrie, où l’articulation entre évasion fiscale et prestations sociales révèle un enjeu fiscal majeur : des entreprises et salariés ajustent leurs déclarations de revenus autour de la maternité pour maximiser les allocations, soulignant à la fois les risques d’évasion et le potentiel des politiques sociales pour encourager la formalisation de l’emploi.

This paper studies tax evasion and the contribution-benefit link in the context of maternity benefits in Hungary. Earnings and employment patterns suggest pre-pregnancy underreporting, followed by formalization of some earnings and employment during pregnancy to increase benefits. Reported earnings in small, domestic, and less productive firms bunch at the minimum wage before pregnancy and the benefit-maximizing threshold during pregnancy. Using a policy reform, the paper shows that the size of the reporting response tracks changing reporting incentives. Increases in pre-childbirth reported earnings are partially sticky after maternity leave. The results indicate that linking benefits to contributions can reduce tax evasion and improve formalization.

Ce billet montre que, en Angleterre, le règlement financier local pour 2025-2026 prévoit une augmentation de 3,8 % en termes réels du pouvoir de dépense des conseils municipaux, mais cette hausse masque des disparités significatives entre les régions, soulevant des questions sur l’équité et l’efficacité de la répartition des fonds publics. »

The government has published the provisional Local Government Finance Settlement for 2025–26, setting out funding allocations for English councils next year. This confirms an important shift in grant funding to councils serving more deprived areas first highlighted in a policy statement at the end of November, but we can now understand the implications for specific councils.

Ce texte discute du fait qu’alors que les engagements en faveur de la neutralité carbone se multiplient, les pratiques budgétaires vertes des pays de l’OCDE peinent à aligner dépenses publiques et objectifs climatiques, appelant à une refonte ambitieuse pour mesurer l’impact des politiques sur les émissions et garantir la durabilité fiscale.

Green budgeting can help governments ensure that their countries’ medium-term budget frameworks and annual budgets align with their international climate-related commitments, such as net zero emissions commitments, as well as national plans and strategies. However, to do so, green budgeting needs to go beyond mere green tagging. This paper discusses new instruments to better link budgets and results, the challenges involved in linking budget and emissions, and the steps needed to overcome them. Finally, it presents the next generation of practices that are being developed in some OECD countries.

Ce texte montre qu’au Royaume-Uni, le budget d’octobre 2024 marque un tournant majeur par des hausses d’impôts et des investissements publics. Toutefois, cette stratégie, bien que prometteuse pour les services publics, pose des défis pour les revenus disponibles des ménages et les standards de vie.

2025 will be a year with a bigger role for the state. Jeremy Hunt cut taxes in his last two Budgets and planned to pay for them with real-terms cuts to public spending in many areas. Rachel Reeves’s October Budget reversed these plans, pivoting to increasing spending on public services as a share of the economy next year, and then keeping it above current levels for the rest of the decade. In this New Year Outlook, we consider what this means for the UK economy and living standards in 2025.

Ce texte monte qu’alors que le Royaume-Uni fait face à une crise énergétique persistante, les réformes fiscales et les mesures financières pour alléger le fardeau des ménages vulnérables révèlent des insuffisances structurelles, soulignant l’urgence d’une politique publique plus équitable pour soutenir les foyers en difficulté.

As we move into the depths of winter, energy costs remain close to the top of the political agenda. But one vulnerable group – the 4 million UK households who pay for energy via pre-payment meters (PPMs) – remains overlooked in the national debate. High prices and the concentration of energy use in the winter months means that, on average, households with a PPM will need to spend more than 30 per cent of their income on energy costs during the winter months. As PPMs are concentrated among poorer families, this drain on family finances is unsustainable, leading to families sitting in cold, dark homes. Further, more than half of PPM households are in debt to their energy suppliers, and as these debt costs are recouped when meters are topped up, leaving less credit available for much-needed energy. Finally, PPM customers remain overlooked when it comes to the Government’s decarbonisation plans, raising questions on the extent to which they will be able to reap the rewards of cheaper energy that the net zero transition is expected to deliver.

Ce texte monte qu’en Nouvelle-Galles du Sud, les redevances sur le charbon, présentées comme essentielles au financement des services publics, ne représentent qu’une portion minime des revenus de l’État. D’ailleurs, les coûts environnementaux et sanitaires sont supportés par les contribuables. Ce texte soutient qu’une réforme fiscale est possible afin d’augmenter les revenus de ces redevances.

New South Wales is one of the largest coal exporters in the world. Coal companies and politicians frequently claim that coal royalties are very important for the NSW economy, funding essential services and infrastructure across the state. In reality, however, royalties paid by coal mining companies make up a trivial portion of the NSW budget. Over the last decade, they have averaged only 2.4% of NSW Government revenue, doing little to fund regional communities, schools, hospitals, teachers, and nurses.
The NSW Government is attempting to link coal royalty revenue directly to regional economic development in coal-producing regions. However, the Fund has not resulted in a single dollar spent on regional development and has a current balance of only $78 million.
Recent increases to royalty rates are expected to have an insignificant effect on total NSW Government revenue. By contrast, the extensive changes to royalty rates introduced by Queensland in 2022 demonstrate that it is possible for reforms to generate significant revenue growth for the public without changing the willingness of the mining industry to make investments. In addition to not receiving a fair return for use of their resources, the NSW public is being forced to bear the costs of environmental and health damages caused by coal mining. These come in the form of emissions costs, health costs, and the costs of rehabilitating coal mines. To date, NSW has not rehabilitated a single major open-cut coal mine. Security deposits held by the NSW Government are insufficient to cover the costs of rehabilitating all mines in NSW, leaving the cost to fall on the taxpayer.

Cette publication discute du fait que la Nouvelle-Galles du Sud bénéficie d’une situation fiscale robuste, malgré un affaiblissement de son secteur public dû à des années d’austérité. Face aux taux d’intérêt élevés et à la baisse des revenus réels, l’État se doit de soutenir l’économie par l’expansion des services publics, l’ajustement des salaires dans le secteur public et le soutien aux plus vulnérables. Ce texte avance que plusieurs moyens sont disponibles pour augmenter les recettes fiscales de l’État.

New South Wales has one of the most prosperous and productive economies in Australia, with a diverse base of economic activity and strong labour market. However, years of austerity have hollowed out its public sector, creating one of the proportionally smallest state public sectors in the country in terms of both economic activity and employment.

Despite the instrumental role the public sector played in navigating the state through the pandemic, weak wage growth and rising inflation have compounded the impacts of austerity, leading to significant reductions in public sector real wages. While the current government’s scrapping of the wage cap and implementation of public sector wage rises has undone some of this damage, most notably the October 2023 wage rises for public school teachers, more repair is needed.
The NSW government has a strong fiscal position with which to manage these challenges. NSW maintains nearly the highest credit rating in the country and relies on revenue bases that are both diverse and stable. Additionally, there is considerable evidence that, if needed, several options are available to increase state government revenue. As the state economy weakens in response to high interest rates and declining real incomes, the state government has the responsibility to contribute to support the economy and broader society, through expansion of public services, repair of public sector wages, and support for the most vulnerable.