L’édition 2024 du Panorama des finances publiques du Québec permet de constater que le gouvernement fédéral réussit, malgré un interventionnisme accru, à faire en sorte que l’ajout aux déficits soit plus limité et ainsi respecter les trois ancrages budgétaires fixés dans l’Énoncé économique de l’automne 2023. D’autre part on y décèle que les défis seront grands en vue d’éliminer le déficit structurel et rééquilibrer le budget du Québec.

L’édition 2024 du Panorama des finances publiques du Québec contient trois sections. Il est possible d’analyser la situation budgétaire du gouvernement fédéral, puis du gouvernement du Québec (section 1), ensuite de comparer le Québec avec les autres provinces, pour l’administration provinciale (section 2), et enfin d’effectuer une comparaison de la situation prévalant au Québec à celle des finances publiques des pays membres de l’OCDE, cette fois en considérant l’ensemble des administrations publiques transigeant avec les agents économiques présents dans une juridiction (section 3).

Les données réelles les plus récentes disponibles, le plus souvent 2022, sont utilisées pour les comparaisons et ont pour objectif de consolider dans un même document des informations de base sur les finances publiques du Québec. Une perspective historique est également présente dans plusieurs cas. Puis, s’ajoutent, lorsque disponibles, la présentation des données provisoires de 2023 ainsi que des prévisions fournies par les gouvernements fédéral, celui du Québec, par le l’OCDE et le FMI, permettant de constater ce qui est aujourd’hui anticipé à moyen terme en matière d’indicateurs de finances publiques.

Tout au long de cette édition, des encadrés permettent d’approfondir des notions ou encore de mettre à jour les résultats de certains cahiers de recherche publiés précédemment et portant sur les finances publiques québécoises. Ainsi l’on retrouve notamment une évaluation récente du déficit structurel et conjoncturel, une détermination de la soutenabilité des finances publiques de long terme basée sur les données les plus récentes et un calcul de l’écart de PIB réel par habitant Ontario-Québec.

Ce rapport estime les coûts liés aux allègements du droit d’accise sur l’alcool au Canada.

Dans le cadre d’une annonce faite le 9 mars 2024, le gouvernement a proposé deux mesures d’allègement du droit d’accise à l’intention des producteurs d’alcool1 . Ces mesures seront mises en place pour les exercices financiers 2024-2025 et 2025-2026. La première mesure visait à maintenir les hausses annuelles des taux du droit d’accise à 2 pour cent, au lieu d’imposer des augmentations annuelles liées au taux d’inflation2 . La deuxième mesure consistait à bonifier la réduction en coupant de moitié les taux du droit d’accise sur les 15 000 premiers hectolitres de bière qu’un fabricant brasse au Canada3 . Le DPB estime que ces mesures entraîneront un coût budgétaire de 393 millions de dollars sur 5 ans. Pour chaque année de cette estimation des coûts, les modifications à la politique ne réduiraient les recettes totales des droits d’accise sur l’alcool que d’environ 3 pour cent.

Dans cette publication, les auteurs constatent que les pénuries de main-d’œuvre s’atténuent, mais que des pressions persistent sur le marché de l’emploi, surtout en santé

Au premier trimestre de 2024, il y avait 153 000 postes vacants au Québec, un niveau qui s’approche rapidement de ce qui était observé à la veille de la pandémie (135 000 au quatrième trimestre de 2019). Après avoir connu une hausse marquée, le nombre de postes que les employeurs cherchent à pourvoir diminue constamment depuis le deuxième trimestre de 2022 (-36 %).

De la même manière, le ratio entre le nombre de chômeurs et le nombre de postes vacants était de 1,5 au premier trimestre de 2024, un chiffre qui se rapproche du niveau prépandémique (1,8) et qui est supérieur à celui du dernier trimestre de 2023.

Signe qu’il est encore difficile de combler certains postes, le rythme de croissance des salaires offerts pour les postes à pourvoir est aujourd’hui près de deux fois plus rapide (6,5 % en variation annuelle) qu’au dernier trimestre de 2019 (3,8 %).

Le secteur de la santé et assistance sociale, qui inclut également les services de garde, est celui qui est le plus aux prises avec des pénuries. Au premier trimestre de 2024, le secteur représente à lui seul 29 % de l’ensemble des postes à pourvoir. Il se distingue comme étant le seul secteur qui a vu ses postes vacants augmenter depuis un an.

Les prévisions économiques suggèrent que l’économie québécoise reprendra le chemin de la croissance dès la fin de l’année, ce qui pourrait faire croître les besoins d’embauche.

L’arrivée importante d’immigrants temporaires — travailleurs, étudiants et demandeurs d’asile — a également permis de combler de nombreux postes laissés vacants. Or, le gouvernement fédéral a annoncé en mars vouloir réduire la part des immigrants temporaires dans la population.

Ces phénomènes surviennent alors que le Québec continue de voir plus de travailleurs partir à la retraite qu’entrer sur le marché du travail.

Les données réelles les plus récentes disponibles, le plus souvent 2022, sont utilisées pour les comparaisons et ont pour objectif de consolider dans un même document des informations de base sur les finances publiques du Québec. Une perspective historique est également présente dans plusieurs cas. Puis, s’ajoutent, lorsque disponibles, la présentation des données provisoires de 2023 ainsi que des prévisions fournies par les gouvernements fédéral, celui du Québec, par le l’OCDE et le FMI, permettant de constater ce qui est aujourd’hui anticipé à moyen terme en matière d’indicateurs de finances publiques.

Tout au long de cette édition, des encadrés permettent d’approfondir des notions ou encore de mettre à jour les résultats de certains cahiers de recherche publiés précédemment et portant sur les finances publiques québécoises. Ainsi l’on retrouve notamment une évaluation récente du déficit structurel et conjoncturel, une détermination de la soutenabilité des finances publiques de long terme basée sur les données les plus récentes et un calcul de l’écart de PIB réel par habitant Ontario-Québec.

Ce document analyse les impacts négatifs de la taxe de vente provinciale de la Colombie-Britannique sur la compétitivité des entreprises et propose de la remplacer par une taxe sur la valeur ajoutée spécifiquement adaptée à la province pour améliorer la productivité et les salaires des travailleurs​.

British Columbia’s Provincial Sales Tax harms business competitiveness and investment by taxing some businesses inputs, especially machinery and equipment, distorting consumer choices by taxing most goods but relatively few consumer services, and imposing high compliance burdens on firms because of its complexity.

As a result of the Provincial Sales Tax, British Columbia has the highest marginal effective tax rate (METR) on all forms of investment (25.6%) in Canada.

Imposing taxes on machinery and equipment means less investment, lower labour productivity, slower economic growth (in part as a result of a slower adoption of new technologies) and ultimately lower wages and salaries for workers.

Replacing the Provincial Sales Tax with a Harmonized Sales Tax or made-in-BC Value Added Tax would reduce the taxation of business inputs, especially taxes on machinery and equipment.

Based on econometric estimates of the tax sensitivity of investment, eliminating the Provincial Sales Tax on machinery and equipment would increase the per-worker stock of capital by 6.5%.

The resulting increase in labour productivity would increase average hourly earning by between 1.1% and 2.7%, increasing annual income per worker by between $700 and $1,700.

When provinces, including British Columbia, switched from a Retail Sales Tax to a Harmonized Sales Tax, there were only modest overall increases in consumer prices, in part because the Harmonized Sales Tax eliminated most of the tax burden on business inputs. Reductions in income tax and enhanced sales-tax credits can shelter most households from a decline in real incomes and in the long-run livings standards can increase with faster growth in wage and salary incomes from improved business competitiveness and investment.

Ce document analyse les risques budgétaires auxquels l’Alberta est confrontée malgré les excédents projetés pour 2024/25-2026/27, mettant en évidence que des dépenses élevées pourraient entraîner un retour aux déficits si les revenus des ressources diminuent, et recommande une limitation plus stricte des dépenses pour stabiliser les finances provinciales​.

Despite projected surpluses from 2024/25–2026/27, Alberta is at risk of returning to a budget deficit, due to high spending, when relatively high resource revenue declines.

Premier Danielle Smith has recognized this risk and signalled that there would be a new approach to provincial finances that relies less heavily on resource revenue, which includes restraining spending by less than inflation and population growth. This “restraint,” however, should be considered within the context of the Smith government’s spending increases thus far.

Specifically, while real program spending is projected to decline annually over the next three years, the Smith government plans to spend $30.0 billion more from 2023/24–2026/27 than originally forecast in the 2022 mid-year plan, equivalent to an additional $6,037 per Albertan.

It’s also important to consider the spending plan within the context of the actual level required to stabilize provincial finances (i.e. the spending level that would align stable ongoing government revenue, rather than temporary windfalls). One reasonable way to estimate Alberta’s “stable” revenue is to calculate total revenue based on average resource revenue over the last two decades.

Aligning spending with stable revenue would require significantly more restraint than is shown in Budget 2024. Specifically, program spending would need to be lower by 10.1 percent in 2024/25, 8.7 percent in 2025/26, and 6.8 percent in 2026/27. Notably, if the Smith government simply held to its 2022 mid-year spending plan, spending would be aligned, and in fact, modestly lower than this alternative level that aligns with stable revenue.

Ce rapport analyse l’apport de la taxe sur les maisons de grande valeur dans la lutte contre les inégalités ainsi que les recettes en jeu pour les États l’ayant déjà adoptée.

A historically large share of the nation’s wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few, a reality glaring in the housing sector. High-value homes in many parts of the country have grown even more valuable over the past several years while people with low incomes, especially renters, face ever-growing challenges affording housing. Further, since systemic inequities have meant that wealthy people are overwhelmingly white, extreme wealth concentration reinforces the barriers that make it harder for people of color to make gains. One way states can build more broadly shared prosperity is by adopting a progressive tax on the sale of high-value homes — one type of so-called “mansion tax” — and using the revenue to support affordable housing and other investments.

Mansion tax revenue can help fund not just affordable housing but also schools, health care, roads, and other services and infrastructure critical to residents’ long-term future. And the taxes would make upside-down state and local tax systems — where the wealthy pay less as a share of income2 — fairer. States, for example, could target the top 5 or 10 percent of highest-value homes, whose owners are likely to be among those paying the lowest overall state and local tax rates as a share of income.

Ce rapport examine qui bénéficie des allègements fiscaux accordés aux entreprises ainsi que de l’évitement de l’impôt sur les sociétés selon certaines caractéristiques sociodémographiques.

The key findings of this report include the following:

• Corporate tax cuts and corporate tax avoidance worsen racial economic inequality. In the first year that a corporate tax break goes into effect, the 67 percent of U.S. households that are White receive a disproportionate 88 percent of the benefits that remain in the U.S. In contrast, Black and Hispanic households, comprising 12 percent and 9 percent of U.S households, respectively, each receive only 1 percent of the benefits that remain in the U.S.
• The ratio of white wealth to Black wealth and the ratio of white wealth to Hispanic wealth, which are both exceedingly high, would be a fourth lower today if not for disparities in ownership of corporate stocks.
• Corporate tax cuts and corporate tax avoidance worsen income inequality and provide very little benefit to low- and middle-income households. During the first year when a new corporate tax break is in effect, 58 percent of the benefits that remain in the U.S. go to the richest 5 percent of households who disproportionately own corporate stocks.
• Corporate tax cuts and corporate tax avoidance hurt all U.S. households. Because foreign investors own 40 percent of American stocks, U.S. households receive only 60 cents of every dollar in corporate tax reductions during the first year when a new corporate tax break is in effect.

Ce document discute des effets des taxes sur la richesse sur l’entrepreneuriat, l’innovation, et la croissance économique à long terme, en mettant en lumière les défis juridiques et économiques associés à leur mise en œuvre et leur administration.

Many developed countries have repealed their net wealth taxes in recent years. Among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only four currently impose one: Colombia, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. Countries have repealed their wealth taxes for a variety of reasons. They raise little revenue, create high administrative costs, and induce an outflow of wealthy individuals and their money. Many policymakers have also recognized that high taxes on capital and wealth damage economic growth. The flawed design of these taxes has created problems in countries that have implemented them. In 1997, the German Constitutional Court declared the wealth tax unconstitutional. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled in 2021 that the wealth tax violates European law regarding property rights and non-discrimination. In 2023, the regional governments of Madrid, Andalusia, and Galicia appealed the new “solidarity wealth tax” to the Spanish Constitutional Court. Wealth taxes generate double or even triple taxation. For safe investments like bonds or bank deposits, a wealth tax of 2 or 3 percent may confiscate all interest earnings, leaving no increase in savings over time. Additionally, if the individual’s wealth is not growing at a rate higher than the tax rate, the tax will ultimately reduce that individual’s wealth. In the case of Spain, the combination of personal capital income taxes and net wealth taxes results in marginal tax rates well above 100 percent. This means that the entire real return on investment is taxed away and, by saving, the real value of people’s wealth shrinks. Spain is the only country in the world that in addition to net wealth and capital gains taxes also levies taxes on capital transfers, a financial transaction tax, and one of the highest inheritance and gift taxes in Europe. Wealth taxes disincentivize entrepreneurship, leading to less innovation and less long-term growth. A wealth tax reduces wages, destroys jobs, and reduces the stock of capital. All income groups are worse off under a wealth tax due to decreased economic activity. Wealth taxes account for a very small share of tax revenues. In 2022, tax revenues from individual net wealth taxes ranged from 0.19 percent of GDP in Spain to 1.19 percent of GDP in Switzerland. As a share of total tax revenues, they ranged from 0.51 percent in Spain to 4.35 percent in Switzerland. Even a small increase in the wealth tax rate can lead to capital flight and wealthy individuals relocating to neighboring jurisdictions. For example, after a 1 percent increase in Norway’s wealth tax, many high-net-worth individuals left the country. In 2023, after Spain introduced a new “solidarity wealth tax,” Portugal extended its tax regime for nonresidents since more Spanish taxpayers were considering changing their tax residence. A global agreement on a net wealth tax is highly improbable since a critical number of countries would need to sign the agreement—including Switzerland, where taxpayers must approve any tax increases—making this proposal unfeasible. Additionally, wealth can move beyond borders to any country that is unwilling to sign the agreement.

Ce document analyse la structure complexe et les taux élevés des taxes sur les revenus et les entreprises dans la région de Portland, démontrant comment cette charge fiscale élevée impacte négativement les résidents et les entreprises locales, et mettant en évidence les défis pour la compétitivité économique de la région.

It’s no secret that the Portland area has high taxes. The region is known for the world’s largest bookstore, its breweries, a vibrant art scene, and the old PDX airport carpet, but decidedly not for its commitment to tax competitiveness. Portland residents face some of the highest taxes in the country. City, county, regional, and state taxes on individual and both net and gross business income combine to create a crushing tax wedge, yielding some of the highest marginal rates on wage income nationwide. And after factoring in the average net income effect of the Oregon Corporate Activity Tax (CAT), Portland easily has the nation’s highest marginal effective rates on both corporate and pass-through business income. Because this tax burden is spread across so many taxes—the Supportive Housing Services Tax at the Metro level, for instance, combined with the Business Net Income Tax imposed by Multnomah County and the Business License Tax levied in Portland, all atop Oregon’s state individual income tax and gross receiptsbased CAT—it can be difficult to appreciate the full burden. Unless you’re paying it.

Cette étude examine l’impact des règles fiscales vertes conçues pour protéger les dépenses liées au climat sur la dynamique de la dette. Les simulations montrent que ces règles peuvent entraîner une dette insoutenable si l’objectif de zéro émission nette repose principalement sur des instruments basés sur les dépenses. Une approche plus équilibrée, incluant la tarification du carbone, est recommandée pour intégrer de manière efficace les considérations climatiques dans la politique fiscale.

 This paper studies the impact of green fiscal rules – designed to protect climate-related spending –on debt dynamics. Simulations of green rules that exempt green spending from the rule limits for an emergingmarket economy illustrate that they can lead to unsustainable debt dynamics when the net zero emissions goal is pursued mostly using spending-based instruments (e.g., investment and subsidies). Or the rule would need to implicitly assume a large fiscal adjustment in the non-green budget, which would undermine its credibility. It will be needed to build broad public consensus for a more comprehensive fiscal strategy that tackles the difficult policy tradeoffs that will be required and takes into account long-term effects. A more appropriate mix of climate policies, including actively employing carbon pricing, should be pursued within the overall setting of fiscal and debt objectives. Developing ‘green’ medium-term fiscal frameworks would help to integrate climate change considerations into fiscal policy design in a more comprehensive manner.

Ce numéro spécial de Fiscal Studies s’intéresse aux changements du marché du travail et aux inégalités de revenus en Europe et en Amérique du Nord.

• Kelly Foley,  David A. Green et W. Craig Riddell, « Canadian inequality over the last 40 years: common and contrary variations on universal themes », p. 119-130.

The Gini coefficient for disposable income for Canada in 2019 was approximately the same level it was at in 1995. Underlying this flat recent long-term pattern is an increase in the level of market earnings inequality in the 1980s and 1990s that Canada shared with other countries followed by a continuing period of flatness in that measure as well. This trend interacted with changes in policy that have, at times, offset earnings inequality trends and at other times exacerbated them. In this paper, we describe these trends and the combination of market and policy forces that drove them. We conclude that explanations rooted in ongoing technology or globalisation forces are less relevant than explanations based on deeper structural changes in the labour market. Those changes affecting earnings inequality were ultimately fully offset by changes in the tax and transfer system as well as labour market policies such as the minimum wage.

• Jonathan Cribb, « Labour market and income inequalities in the United Kingdom, 1968–2021 », p. 131-142.

This paper examines trends in working-age labour market and disposable income inequalities in the United Kingdom from 1968 to 2021 using microdata harmonised with 16 other high-income countries. In the UK, the 1980s was a period of rising labour market inequalities and inequality in disposable incomes. Since the 1980s, changes have been more modest. Changing hours of work and changes in family structure have been important for understanding trends in individual and household earnings inequalities, respectively. Tax and benefit reforms have also played an important role in driving disposable income inequalities, with notable redistribution towards low-income households between 1997 and 2010. We also provide evidence on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK. Disposable income inequality fell slightly as increases in state benefits during the pandemic boosted incomes of poorer households.

• Barra Roantree et Michelle Barrett, « Income inequality in Ireland, 1987–2019 », p. 143-153.

Ireland has experienced rapid – if volatile – growth over the last three decades. While this performance looks less impressive when considered over a longer horizon and is better seen as belated convergence making up for lost time in the first 50 years of independence, this paper highlights an aspect of the Irish experience that does stand out as quite remarkable: how broad-based and inclusive growth in household disposable income was. Drawing on over three decades of harmonised household survey data, we first show that income inequality fell substantially over this period, the product of disposable income growth that was stronger at the bottom than the middle or top of the distribution. We then tentatively suggest some important factors that might have contributed towards the patterns of growth experienced – including tax and transfer reforms, a rise in two-earner couples and a fall in the average size of households – before concluding with some directions for future research.

• Bradley L. Hardy, Elizabeth Krause et James P. Ziliak, « Income inequality in the United States, 1975–2022 », p. 155-171. 

We examine trends in household disposable income inequality and potential mechanisms shaping inequality through changes to work, wages, earnings, marriage, and the tax and transfer system in the United States over the nearly five-decade period from 1975 to 2022. Overall after-tax and transfer income inequality increased more than 25 per cent since the mid-1970s, and by as much as 50 per cent when comparing the 90th and 10th percentiles. While there has been substantial upgrading in formal education credentials among both men and women – an inequality-reducing development – those with fewer credentials have increasingly been less likely to work and marry, each of which could result in higher inequality. The latter effects are exacerbated by those selecting into marriage and cohabitation being more likely to partner with those holding similar educational credentials and earning power. Moreover, the decline in work among the less skilled coincided with the transformation of the safety net to rewarding work. These demographic and policy changes have resulted in a pulling apart of the US income distribution.

• Søren Leth-Petersen et Johan Sæverud, « Inequality in Denmark, 1987–2021 », p. 173-185.

We investigate the progression of income inequality in Denmark over the years 1987–2021. During this time, we observe a consistent rise in inequality in household disposable income. This rise is influenced by shifts at both the high and low ends of the income spectrum, despite the fact that inequality in gross earnings remained unchanged up until 2008. The growing inequality in household disposable income coincides with various policy reforms aimed at enhancing incentives for employment. These changes include the reduction of the marginal tax rate on earned income and a decrease in the generosity of unemployment benefits and other forms of social assistance. At the same time, Denmark has experienced a noticeable increase in immigration, particularly from non-Western countries and Eastern Europe. Immigrants, who rely more heavily on social transfers, find themselves increasingly at the lower income levels. Our analysis underscores that while the policy reforms were designed to encourage employment, they have also led to heightened inequality in disposable income.

• Arizo Karimi, Charlotte Lucke et Mårten Palme, « Components of the evolution of income inequality in Sweden, 1990–2021 », p. 187-204

This paper documents how the inequality of household equivalent disposable income has changed in Sweden over the period 1990–2021. We find that income inequality has unambiguously increased. Measured by the Gini coefficient, inequality increased from around 0.19 to almost 0.3 by the end of 2020. We then analyse the backgrounds to this change by measuring the importance of changes in different components of the overall income distribution: the wage distribution; the distribution of hours of work; capital incomes; income differences between labour market participants and non-participants; income redistribution through income taxes and benefits; and, finally, the effect of increased immigration to Sweden.

• Patrick Bennett et Kjell Salvanes, « Changing patterns of inequality in Norway: the roles of gender, education, immigration and unions », p. 205-224.

We assess the evolution of inequality over time in Norway and the underlying factors which determine such changes. Inequality is low in Norway, and remains relatively unchanged from 1980 to 2019. However, these aggregate measures mask persistent inequalities across sex, education and immigrant status. Among men, inequality increases from 1980 while the opposite is true for women. Low-educated workers fare increasingly worse over time relative to middle- and high-educated workers. Despite this, the earnings of women lag behind those of lower-educated men and considerable gender gaps exist. While immigration increases considerably, immigration itself does not drive the rise in inequality among men. Decomposing the importance of unions for earnings reveals that the declining importance of unionisation for earnings among men in the bottom half of the distribution may be an important factor behind rising inequality.

• Tuuli Paukkeri, Terhi Ravaska et Marja Riihelä, « Examining inequalities: from labour markets to social outcomes in Finland », p. 225-241.

Finland is known for low income inequality by international comparison. In this paper we provide a long-run perspective on inequalities in Finland, and show that inequality is higher in the 21st century compared with many previous decades. We discuss the drivers of inequality in more detail, focusing on wages, earnings, employment and education, and also social outcomes such as partner-finding and family formation in the working-age population. The collective wage-setting system is a likely contributor to the relatively low and stable wage and earnings inequality among working indviduals. However, women fare worse in the labour market than men, despite having a higher education level on average. We also find that individuals who are out of work or have low education have a lower probability of finding a partner, indicating that social inequalities are linked with those in the labour market. Finally, we discuss the importance of redistribution as well as changes in tax legislation that have contributed to an increasing concentration of capital income, which has been an important factor in increasing households’ disposable income inequality.

• Luis Guirola, Laura Hospido et Andrea Weber, « Family and career: an analysis across Europe and North America », p. 243-257.

Using data on 17 countries in Europe and North America, we compare the career trajectories of mothers and fathers and of women and men without children across cohorts, and at different points of their life cycle. There is wide variation across countries in employment and earnings gaps at age 30. At age 50, however, the employment gap between mothers and non-mothers has closed in most countries. We also observe convergence in employment gaps between mothers and fathers by age 50, but these gaps do not fully close. Motherhood gaps in earnings also close by age 50 between mothers and non-mothers, particularly among the highly educated. But there is strong persistence in earnings gaps between mothers and fathers even among highly educated parents. The main reasons for the remaining gaps at later stages in the life cycle are part-time work among women and fatherhood premia as fathers’ earnings outperform non-fathers’ over their life cycle.

Ce rapport expose les perspectives budgétaires pour l’Australie pour l’année 2024-2025.

Beyond the budget 2024-25: Fiscal outlook and sustainability presents the 9th edition of the Parliamentary Budget Office’s (PBO’s) independent projections for the Australian Government’s fiscal position across the medium term (2028-29 to 2034-35). It also updates our analysis of long-term fiscal sustainability to 2067-68. For most of our long-term fiscal scenarios the debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio declines. This indicates that the budget remains sustainable if governments continue to take appropriate management action consistent with what has historically been done. This does not diminish the challenge of decision making. For revenue, there is a significant risk of a continued and increasing reliance on personal income taxes. As bracket creep has been operating as a primary mechanism for budget repair, future governments may not be able to provide personal income tax cuts as regularly as in the past. A faster-than-expected decline in excise, partly due to the impact of the take up of electric vehicles on fuel excise, will also present challenges to revenue. On the expense side of the budget, structural risks, such as the impact of ageing on health, disability programs, defence, and climate change, remain key sources of fiscal pressure. If future government decisions simply mirror those made over recent decades, particularly in infrastructure spending, other grants and government operational costs, future spending will be higher than forecast in the budget. Taken together, if personal income tax cuts were provided consistently (even if they did not fully compensate for bracket creep), while spending on grants and operating costs continued in line with recent historical trends, the budget would remain in deficit throughout the medium term and beyond. 

Dans cette analyse, l’OCDE appelle à des réforme fiscales et budgétaires ambitieuses visant à réduire la dette record des États-Unis.

L’OCDE rapporte une reprise économique robuste aux États-Unis malgré un resserrement monétaire pour contrôler une inflation élevée. Le PIB devrait croître de 2,5 % en 2023, augmentant à 2,6 % en 2024 avant de ralentir à 1,8 % en 2025, soutenu par la consommation et la solidité du marché du travail. L’inflation sous-jacente devrait passer de 4,1 % en 2023 à 2,6 % en 2024, puis à 2,1 % en 2025, avec une dette publique atteignant 122 % du PIB en 2023. Pour stabiliser cette dette, l’OCDE recommande des réformes fiscales et budgétaires dès 2025, visant à accroître la productivité, maintenir l’ouverture aux échanges internationaux, et renforcer la participation des femmes au marché du travail.

Dans cette étude, les auteurs constatent un déséquilibre intergénérationnel croissant entre les politiques fiscales et les prestations liées aux prestations publiques de retraite depuis 2010. 

This analysis examines the impact of spending, tax, and benefit decisions made since 2010 through the lens of intergenerational fairness. A significant increase in State Pension generosity has led to a £44 billion rise in spending, benefiting older age groups, while working-age households have faced benefit cuts. Despite recent National Insurance (NI) cuts offsetting some of these trends, households with children have been disadvantaged by tax and benefit changes since 2010.

Both main political parties are committed to personal tax increases and the continuation of benefits policies from the 2010s. These include freezes on Income Tax and personal NI thresholds, freezing Local Housing Allowance (LHA) and the benefit cap, continuing the two-child limit, and maintaining the triple lock for pensions, reinforcing the system’s favoring of pensioners.

Acknowledging this imbalance, both parties have proposed measures to support working-age households. The Conservatives have pledged further NI cuts for workers below pension age, although their proposed £12 billion welfare cuts would mostly affect working-age households. Labour has focused on work reform promises. Both parties aim to support home ownership and improve access to education and training, benefiting younger adults. The Conservatives have also proposed mandatory National Service, a policy favored by those aged 65 and older but unpopular among young adults. Addressing intergenerational fairness requires policies that move beyond age-specific measures and tackle the long-standing issue of weak economic growth that has reversed generational pay progression.

Dans cette analyse, les auteurs expliquent les enjeux relatifs aux allocations pour invalidité au Royaume-Uni, notamment qu’entre 2013 et 2023, il y a eu une augmentation de 89 % des dépenses réelles en termes d’allocations d’invalidité

The benefits bill is frequently the subject of intense political debate. But since the pandemic, working-age health-related benefits have moved centre-stage in these discussions, as policy makers aim to understand what sits behind the historical rise in claims, and to contain future pressures too. In this briefing note – part of our Election 2024 work but also the first from a new Resolution Foundation research programme examining how disability, ill-health and the economy intersect – we investigate trends in working-age disability and incapacity benefits, asking what really sits behind the numbers that are understandably causing concern in Britain today.

The analysis in this briefing note suggests that restricting eligibility for such benefits, without fully understanding the complex set of underlying drivers, is risky in the extreme, not least because those in receipt of such benefits are financially insecure. Instead, a serious strategy to control expenditure on working-age incapacity and disability benefits requires government to understand the complex range of drivers that determine this spend.

Dans cette analyse, les auteurs abordent la question des politiques relatives au logement dans le contexte des élections générales de 2024 au Royaume-Uni.

The housing offers from both main parties for the 2024 general election are similar in many respects, suggesting that the ‘penny has dropped’ when it comes to boosting housing supply, supporting would-be homeowners, and improving the energy efficiency of our country’s housing stock.

As well as a broad consensus forming around some housing policy areas, much of what both parties propose in their manifestos are essentially ‘continuity’ policies. The Labour Party proposes extending the existing Mortgage Guarantee Scheme; the Conservative Party has promised to make permanent the existing higher Stamp Duty threshold for first-time-buyers; and both have said they would introduce a Renters Reform Bill.

But both main parties are silent on additional funding to drive forward their housing priorities. There is no mention of boosting the Affordable Homes Programme in either manifesto, for example, nor any indication that Local Housing Allowance will be permanently repegged to local rents.

Ce document explore l’évolution des divisions sociales et électorales en France de 1994 à 2024, mettant en évidence les inégalités de richesse et l’impact de ces divisions sur les politiques fiscales et les préférences électorales.

Cette étude analyse la structure du vote au niveau communal observé lors des élections européennes menées en France de 1994 à 2024. Nous proposons également une comparaison avec la structure des clivages sociaux et électoraux étudiée à partir des scrutins législatifs, présidentiels et référendaires dans notre ouvrage Une histoire du conflit politique. Élections et inégalités sociales en France, 1789-2022 (Le Seuil, 2023). De façon générale, la structure du vote aux scrutins européens suit des évolutions relativement proches de celles observées lors des élections législatives et présidentielles au cours des trente dernières années. On constate toutefois plusieurs inflexions récentes importantes, en particulier lors du scrutin européen de 2024. Tout d’abord, la chute du bloc libéral central à moins de 15% des voix confirme la fragilité du système de tripartition, en lien avec la base sociale très étroite et socialement très privilégiée de ce bloc électoral. On observe par ailleurs lors des élections européennes de 2024 un processus d’embourgeoisement du bloc national-libéral (RN, LR, Reconquête), ce qui conforte la possibilité d’une rebipolarisation droite-gauche opposant une nouvelle forme d’union des droites (bloc national-libéral RN-LR-Reconquête) et d’union des gauches (bloc social-écologique PS-PCF-LFI-EELV). On constate cependant un approfondissement du clivage territorial entre le bloc de droite et le bloc de gauche lors du scrutin européen de 2024. Sur la base de l’expérience historique du 20e siècle, on peut considérer que le scénario de rebipolarisation gauche-droite ne pourra pleinement se réaliser que si le clivage social l’emporte beaucoup plus nettement sur le clivage territorial, ce qui exige que le bloc de gauche parvienne à reconquérir une proportion sensiblement plus importante qu’actuellement de l’électorat populaire des bourgs et des villages.