Bulletin de veille du 19 décembre 2023

Québec/Canada

Le DPB analyse l’impact de la motion M-87, déposée par le chef du NPD, qui aborde la question de l’augmentation du taux d’imposition des sociétés ainsi que la vulgarisation des ratios entre le salaire des PDG et le salaire médian des employés.

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La motion M-87, Augmentation du taux d’imposition des sociétés et divulgation du ratio entre le salaire du PDG comparativement au salaire médian des employés, déposée par le député Jagmeet Singh, propose d’augmenter le taux d’imposition des grandes entreprises ayant des disparités dans le ratio entre le salaire du PDG comparativement au salaire médian des employés. L’augmentation du taux d’imposition des sociétés serait de 0,5 point de pourcentage si le ratio était compris entre 50 et 100. Cette augmentation serait progressivement portée à 5 points de pourcentage si le ratio était égal ou supérieur à 500. Aux fins de la motion, le PDG est la personne la mieux payée au sein de l’entreprise. Le terme « grande entreprise » désigne une entreprise publique ou privée, mais dans le cas d’une entreprise privée elle doit avoir plus de 500 employés ou des revenus totaux de plus de 100 millions de dollars. La motion exclut le recours à des entrepreneurs pour éviter de divulguer le salaire médian des employés.

Ce rapport fait ressortir les faits saillants de l’Énoncé économique de l’automne de 2023 pour aider les parlementaires dans leurs délibérations budgétaires.

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Dans l’ensemble, les perspectives de croissance du produit intérieur brut (PIB) réel de 2023 à 2028 présentées dans l’Énoncé économique de l’automne (ÉÉA) sont légèrement plus faibles par rapport aux perspectives du DPB d’octobre. En effet, la croissance annuelle moyenne s’établit respectivement à 1,7 % et 1,8 %. Cette légère différence reflète à la fois la croissance plus modérée prévue par les économistes du secteur privé pour 2024 et 2025. Le PIB nominal dans l’ÉÉA est inférieur de 32 milliards de dollars (1,0 %) par année, en moyenne, de 2023 à 2028, par rapport aux perspectives du DPB d’octobre. Cette différence reflète à la fois la croissance plus faible du PIB réel à court terme et l’inflation prévue par les économistes du secteur privé dans l’Énoncé économique de l’automne.

Une analyse des inégalités selon l’approche novatrice du Laboratoire sur les inégalités mondiales, celles des comptes nationaux distribués (DINA). L’apport supplémentaire du texte est de l’appliquer au Canada ainsi qu’aux provinces, et ce tant pour les revenus avant impôt qu’après impôt.

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Dans cette étude, la distribution de la totalité du revenu national au Canada dans son ensemble ainsi que dans les provinces, dont le Québec, est estimée pour la période 1982 à 2021. La méthodologie des comptes nationaux distribués (mieux connue sous son acronyme anglais « DINA ») est appliquée aux tableaux fiscaux, combinés aux données des comptes nationaux et aux données d’enquête. Les données sur les revenus avant et après impôt sont analysées.

Il est alors constaté que les parts des revenus les plus élevés publiées par Statistique Canada dans les comptes nationaux ont tendance à sous-estimer les inégalités de revenus par rapport aux parts des revenus les plus élevées calculées à l’aide de la méthode DINA. Ceci s’explique par le fait que la méthode DINA incorpore dans les revenus des individus non seulement leurs revenus personnels, mais également les revenus du capital non distribués qui sont conservés dans leurs entreprises.

Conformément aux recherches antérieures, les inégalités de revenus au Canada ont augmenté de manière significative de 1982 jusqu’au milieu des années 2000. De 1982 à 2000, le revenu réel des 50 % de Canadiens les plus pauvres a stagné, tandis que celui du 0,01 % le plus riche a quadruplé. Depuis le milieu des années 2000, les inégalités de revenus ont légèrement diminué, même si elles restent bien supérieures aux niveaux observés au début des années 1980.

Parmi les provinces canadiennes, sur la base du revenu disponible, l’Ontario a toujours connu des inégalités plus importantes que le Québec, même si l’écart s’est réduit au cours des dernières années. Le Québec possède le système d’imposition et de transfert le plus progressif des six sous-régions analysées. En Alberta, des niveaux records d’inégalités ont été atteints au milieu des années 2000 et semblent avoir été un facteur important du pic national d’inégalités au cours de cette période.

Les inégalités des revenus après impôt ont d’abord diminué pendant la pandémie parce que d’importants programmes de transferts temporaires ont été mis en place. Cependant, les inégalités des revenus avant impôt ont augmenté (et sont même revenues à des niveaux observés au cours des années 2010), en particulier en 2021, lorsque les bénéfices des entreprises ont atteint des niveaux record.

Les auteurs s’intéressent à la soutenabilité budgétaire en relation avec la question du déficit de maintien des actifs (DMA) et concluent que la réduction du DMA entraîne un arbitrage avec l’objectif de soutenabilité budgétaire.

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Leurs analyses les amènent à conclure que les investissements prévus sont peu susceptibles d’être suffisants pour prendre en charge le DMA qui s’accroît rapidement. Autrement dit, la dynamique actuelle des investissements en infrastructures du gouvernement du Québec n’est pas soutenable. Les projections de leur modèle montrent que le rythme actuel de croissance des dépenses d’infrastructures pose un risque pour la soutenabilité budgétaire. En ce qui concerne le DMA, les projections révèlent aussi un problème de ce côté, avec une augmentation rapide du DMA. Les simulations montrent qu’une augmentation de la portion des investissements au PQI affectée à la résorption du DMA entraînerait en toute probabilité une forte réduction de celui-ci, mais sans aucun impact sur la soutenabilité budgétaire.

Cette note propose des pistes de réflexion basées sur les études récentes de l’Institut du Québec pour inspirer des politiques publiques qui permettraient de mieux préparer l’avenir et s’inscrit dans le cadre des consultations prébudgétaires du gouvernement du Québec.

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Cette note propose des pistes de réflexion basées sur les études récentes de l’Institut du Québec pour inspirer des politiques publiques qui permettraient de mieux préparer l’avenir. Elle s’inscrit dans le cadre des consultations prébudgétaires du gouvernement du Québec.

Le ministère des Finances du Québec et les institutions financières prévoient que la croissance du PIB québécois sera à peu près nulle en 2024. Dans les faits, ce qu’il importe de retenir, c’est que cette pause de l’activité économique sera relativement modeste.

Au cours de la prochaine année, le Québec devrait donc prioritairement investir dans son avenir. Car, à plus long terme, son véritable défi sera d’assurer une croissance économique suffisante pour créer de la richesse, afin notamment de permettre à l’État de dispenser adéquatement des services publics aux citoyens. Selon cette note d’analyse, voici quelques actions qui devraient se situer en tête de liste :

  • Miser sur les investissements;
  • S’attaquer aux enjeux de main-d’œuvre;
  • Assurer plus de cohérence en immigration; et
  • Prendre des mesures pour assurer la pérennité des finances publiques.

Le récent amendement au Code des impôts américain, le Foreign Pollution Fee Act, propose de taxer les importations à forte intensité de carbone. Cette analyse se penche sur les détails du projet de loi et exprime des inquiétudes quant à sa complexité, son pouvoir discrétionnaire excessif et l’accent mis sur la géopolitique plutôt que sur la protection du climat mondial.

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Senators Bill Cassidy (R-La.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), and Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) have introduced to the 1st session of the 118th Congress an amendment to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code that would levy charges on imports deemed more carbon intensive than competing U.S. goods. Titled the Foreign Pollution Fee Act, the bill may succeed where other U.S. border carbon adjustment proposals have failed, both because it does not impose any carbon costs on U.S. producers and because it draws on bipartisan support for restricting imports from China.

This note unpacks the substance of the Act in detail and offers opinions on that substance, laid out below in a series of facts/commentary couplets that focus on the Act’s key elements. It concludes by arguing that the bill would be highly complex to administer, offers too much discretionary power to administrators, and is more focused on geopolitics and protecting U.S. producers than it is on protecting the global climate.

États-Unis

L’auteur est d’avis que dans les États ayant récemment réduit les taux d’impôt sur le revenu, les décideurs politiques devraient, dans la mesure du possible, annuler ces réductions ou du moins les réduire considérablement avant que les pertes de revenus ne deviennent encore plus graves et que le besoin de coupes budgétaires néfastes ou de compensations fiscales plus régressives ne se fasse sentir.

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State policymakers nationwide have embarked on a tax-cutting spree over the past three years, using the cover of temporary budget surpluses stemming from robust federal aid in response to COVID-19 and the economic recovery that followed. The tax cuts — most of which are both permanent and tilted toward wealthy households and corporations — will weaken state revenues by large and growing amounts over time, limiting these states’ ability to maintain support for schools and other vital public services or make new investments that can strengthen the economy and promote opportunity. From 2021 to 2023:

  • Twenty-six states cut their personal income tax rates and/or corporate income tax rates, 13 of them multiple times. Permanent cuts to tax rates are especially harmful to state balance sheets since they reduce revenues every year going forward absent further legislative action, in contrast to temporary or one-time tax cuts.
  • Combined, the cuts will cost those 26 states an estimated $124 billion by 2028, including $13 billion that they have already lost (2022-2023) and $111 billion over the next five years (2024- 2028). That means, together, rate-cutting states will collect an estimated 3.6 percent less in general revenue over the next five years than if they had not enacted the cuts. This 3.6 percent share is equivalent to more than a third of states’ general fund spending on higher education and more than half of what goes to state correctional systems.1
  • Rate cuts in Arizona, North Carolina, and West Virginia are especially large and could shrink their general funds by about 11 percent over the next five years, losses comparable to the disastrous Brownback tax cuts in Kansas during the 2010s.

These sums don’t include lost revenues from a wider swath of tax reductions enacted during this time, such as one-time rebates and senior tax breaks. All told, 48 states and the District of Columbia passed some sort of tax cut from 2021 to 2023, according to the Tax Policy Center.2

Le CBO a élaboré une méthode d’estimation des dépenses relatives aux programmes d’aide fédérale au crédit afin d’avoir une meilleure transparence dans l’évaluation des coûts de ces programmes – laquelle méthode a été utilisée par l’auteur pour analyser certains programmes.

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The Congressional Budget Office has developed a method for estimating the present value of the lifetime administrative costs of certain federal credit programs—referred to as the administrative cost subsidy. That method produces estimates for a single cohort of loans or loan guarantees that are calculated on a basis similar to that used for credit subsidy estimates. CBO presents those estimates in an effort to promote transparency about the costs of federal credit programs.

The agency’s findings are as follows:

  • Direct loans versus loan guarantees. The administrative cost subsidy rates for direct loans tend to be higher than those for loan guarantees. (The administrative cost subsidy rate is equal to the administrative cost subsidy divided by the amount of credit obligations.)
  • Program size. Large direct loan and loan guarantee programs (measured by the amount of credit obligations) tend to have lower administrative cost subsidy rates than smaller programs.
  • Comparison with private lending. The administrative cost subsidy rates for federal student loans and housing and real estate loans are lower than those of private lenders, but those for the government’s commercial loans are higher. A comparative analysis is limited, however, because the government does not perform all administrative functions for the loans, and its motivation for lending may differ from that of private lenders.

Le défaut de paiement annuel d’environ 15 % des impôts fédéraux aux États-Unis représentant environ 496 milliards de dollars serait principalement dû à des revenus sous-déclarés (80 %) et à des paiements insuffisants (12 %). Cela suscite des discussions sur les stratégies de mise en application et les éventuels changements de politique visant à freiner l’évasion fiscale et à résoudre les lacunes de déclaration, impactant ainsi les recettes gouvernementales et les décisions en matière de politique fiscale.

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The federal tax gap is a measurement of the amount of federal taxes that taxpayers legally owe but do not pay on time in a given year. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that the average annual gross tax gap from 2014-2016 was $496 billion, or 15% of taxpayers’ true tax liability. The net tax gap, which accounts for late payments and revenues raised through enforcement, averaged $428 billion, or 13% of true tax liability.

In addition to formally estimating the tax gap based on data that may take years to generate and analyze, the IRS publishes cruder projections of the tax gap for more recent years. The IRS projects that in 2021, the gross tax gap was $668 billion while the net gap was $625 billion, and in 2020 the gross gap was $601 billion and the net gap was $539 billion. The agency also estimates that from 2017 to 2019, the gross tax gap averaged $550 billion, while the net tax gap averaged $480 billion. While the dollar amounts of the tax gap have increased in recent years as the amount of total receipts has grown, the rate of noncompliance (i.e., the gross tax gap) has remained fairly constant. Roughly 85% of taxes are paid on time, while about 15% are not. The tax gap includes both deliberately evaded taxes and those that taxpayers do not pay because of unintentional errors.

L’impôt fédéral sur les successions a été introduit par le Congrès il y a plus d’un siècle afin de favoriser la contribution des grandes fortunes au financement des investissements publics. Ce document présente certaines lacunes de ce mode d’imposition aux États-Unis.

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Key findings:

  • The tax law enacted under President Donald Trump has reduced the reach of the federal estate tax to historic lows. In 2019, the most recent year for which data are available, only 8 of every 10,000 people who died left an estate large enough to trigger the tax.
  • Legislative changes under presidents of both parties have increased the basic exemption from the estate tax over the past 20 years. This has cut the share of adults leaving behind taxable estates down from more than 2 percent to well under 1 percent.
  • Historical data on the share of estates taxed each year demonstrate that less than 1 percent of adults would leave behind taxable estates under any proposal before Congress.
  • While the federal estate tax rate is currently 40 percent and has, at times, been higher than 50 percent, the share of estate assets going towards the tax is almost always much lower and has averaged around 20 percent in recent years.
  • Most of the estate tax is paid by estates worth more than $20 million; in recent years the majority has been paid by estates worth more than $50 million.
  • Contrary to one criticism of it, the estate tax does not result in “double taxation,” and, in fact, much of the assets subject to the tax are unrealized capital gains, income that would escape taxation forever if not for the estate tax.
  • Several tax provisions, including the federal gift tax and several rules related to trusts, are designed to prevent people from avoiding the federal estate tax, but they are rife with loopholes that further reduce the reach of the tax and which Congress can address legislatively.

Ce texte présente les dépenses actuelles et les projections pour la couverture de santé en Californie pour le programme Medi-Cal ainsi que les impacts sur le budget de l’État.

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This post describes our fiscal outlook for General Fund spending in Medi-Cal. Specifically, this post concerns projections of Medi-Cal local assistance spending within the Department of Health Care Services (DHCS).Estimate Downward Revision for the Current Year. We estimate that Medi-Cal General Fund spending will be $37 billion in 2023-24, a decrease of about $500 million (1.3 percent) compared to the 2023-24 Budget Act. This adjustment largely is driven by a lower level of estimated caseload than was projected at the time the budget was enacted. Project Slight Net Reductions for the Budget Year. From our estimated level in 2023-24, we project General Fund spending to decline in 2024-25 by $400 million (1.1 percent) to $36.6 billion. Downward adjustments related to limited-term initiatives and caseload drive the reduction in spending. Several upward adjustments nearly offset these reductions, such as increases in per-enrollee costs, the ramp up of comprehensive coverage for undocumented individuals, and adjustments related to the recently enacted managed care organization (MCO) tax package. Project Longer-Term Growth. We project Medi-Cal General Fund spending to increase in the remaining years of the outlook period, rising to more than $43 billion in 2027-28. This longer-term growth primarily is driven by changes in caseload, continued growth in underlying per-enrollee costs, and the ramp down of the MCO tax package.

La création et la stimulation à l’emploi ne sont pas toujours chose facile pour les autorités gouvernementales. Ce document expose l’approche à multiples facettes que préconise la Californie pour stimuler ou soutenir la création d’emplois dans le secteur privé.

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California uses a multi-faceted approach to spur or support job creation in the private sector. These efforts include direct tax credits for hiring workers, grants and loans, and training and support for both entrepreneurs and workers. All of these policies have their economic rationales, from the hiring incentives and business advantages provided by tax credits to the enhanced job skills and productivity gained through worker training and assistance programs.

Policies like these can address barriers to creating private sector jobs and should not be casually dismissed as “corporate welfare” or “taxpayer giveaways.” Rather, it is critical to ask which policies work and how well they work. To that end, we provide an inventory of job creation policies and programs and evaluate them based on existing research. Our inventory provides a wide range of policies; we count 21 in place.

  • Three policies have quite strong evidence of being effective in creating jobs. Among these, the California Competes Tax Credit shows the most compelling evidence for positive job creation effects, while the Employment Training Panel shows positive effects on firm employment and sales, and on worker earnings and employment stability.
  • For the remaining programs, four have convincing but mixed evidence around effective job creation; six have some evidence, but it is less convincing; and the final eight programs have no evidence available.

The three programs that appear to create jobs have sizable allocations in the state budget—greater than $272 million in 2022–2023. With these policies, California is putting money behind policies that are working—and the state might consider expanding efforts. However, eight programs with moderate budget allocations do not yet have evidence for their effectiveness. Together, these programs are allocated over $245 million in 2022–2023. It is not yet clear whether the money dedicated to these policies will lead to more jobs for California. More evaluation research should be conducted in order to understand who benefits from these programs, in order to create an effective, equitable, multi-faceted approach in California to support jobs and the economy.

Le gouvernement tente, par plusieurs moyens, de stimuler l’emploi et réduire son taux de chômage. Pour ce faire, cela appelle les autorités à innover et mettre en place certaines mesures. Ce rapport analyse le franc succès du California Competes Tax Credit.

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Established in 2013, the California Competes Tax Credit (CCTC) aims to boost job growth by lowering the cost of labor to businesses that want to locate or expand in California. Using tax credit data from fiscal years 2014–15 to 2017–18, we evaluate the impact of the CCTC on job creation. We find:

  • Each CCTC-incentivized job in a neighborhood (i.e., a census tract) increases the number of individuals working in that neighborhood by close to three—a significant local multiplier indicating that the CCTC creates more jobs than the number it directly incentivizes.
  • CCTC awards increase employment among workers across socioeconomic and demographic groups, including workers living in poverty, those without a bachelor’s degree, Black workers, and Latino workers. CCTC also spurs job creation in both more- and less-advantaged neighborhoods, as measured by poverty and unemployment levels.
  • Being awarded CCTC credits boosts firm employment and payroll growth within California by as much as 30 percent within three years, with positive effects extending to firms in areas with higher poverty and unemployment.
  • For every $1 spent on the CCTC, we estimate as much as $5.66 in benefits generated, driven by the fact that earnings from the jobs created well exceed the costs of spurring this job creation.

Our results indicate that the CCTC is a well-targeted and well-designed hiring incentive subsidy that has proven effective in promoting local business expansions. Moreover, the costs per job created are low relative to other job creation incentive programs, suggesting that the benefits of the CCTC considerably outweigh the costs. Our evidence also suggests that the recent short-term expansion of the CCTC in 2021–22, as well as the creation of a related grants program, could lead to additional job creation at relatively low cost. However, more research would be necessary to determine if these changes are as effective as the smaller-scale, credit-based program.

L’auteur constate que la grande majorité des impôts sur les biens meubles corporels provient d’un très petit nombre de grandes entreprises et de services publics.

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All policy choices involve trade-offs—but occasionally, the ratio of costs and benefits is shockingly lopsided. Adopting a de minimis exemption for tangible personal property (TPP) taxes is just such a policy: one which massively reduces compliance and administrative burdens at trivial cost. Taxes on TPP (business machinery, equipment, fixtures, and supplies) are a small but still meaningful part of the property tax base in most states. However, the vast majority of revenue comes from extremely few businesses, while small and medium-sized businesses absorb substantial compliance costs—and local governments face substantial administrative burdens—to remit a few dollars in taxes. Adopting an exemption for modest amounts of TPP costs governments extremely little, with substantial benefits to taxpayers and tax administrators. Unsurprisingly, such thresholds are catching on in red and blue states alike. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia either broadly exempt TPP from taxation (14 states) or provide an exemption for small businesses with little tangible property (10 states and the District of Columbia).

Ce texte de Tax Foundation répond à une demande du département du Trésor en lien avec la Convention multilatérale de l’OCDE et du G20 sur la taxe numérique ainsi que des enjeux liés à l’assiette fiscale américaine. 

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Tax Foundation appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Treasury Department’s request for public input on the draft OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Pillar One Multilateral Convention text. Over the past several years, Tax Foundation has closely followed the developments at the Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD) and provided analysis and commentary as the Pillar One proposal has developed.In general, our appraisal can be summarized with four points. First, Pillar One represents a potential path to eliminating the discriminatory and distortionary digital services taxes some countries have implemented in recent years. Second, the allocation of the tax base to market jurisdictions is overly complex, and the policy outcome will be untethered to economic circumstances faced by businesses. Third, Pillar One and Pillar Two combined could result in the U.S. Treasury being a net donor to the Amount A system. However, this depends on corporate behavior in reaction to either pillar. Fourth, the impact on Puerto Rico should be examined to avoid unnecessary fiscal consequences for that U.S. territory. Tax Foundation has supported proposals that comprehensively shift sourcing rules for corporate taxation from the places of production to the location of consumption. The destination-based cash flow tax in the 2016 Republican Blueprint for tax reform was one such proposal. Compared to that proposal, Pillar One Amount A is a complex mess. It allocates only a fraction of the profits of a fraction of taxpayers to the location of final consumption (either identified directly or indirectly using a proxy measure) resulting in a distortionary tax base that falls heavily on U.S. taxpayers relative to foreign ones. It also eliminates double taxation through formulas that make very little economic sense but offer some near-term political convenience for the United States. Ultimately, the decision to ratify this treaty rests with the United States Senate, and we hope both senators and the team at Treasury will closely study the issues raised here.

International

Les auteurs discutent de la mise en place d’une taxe sur la politique d’inflation, soit un prélèvement qui obligerait les entreprises à payer une taxe proportionnelle à l’augmentation de leurs prix, en tant qu’instrument complémentaire à la politique monétaire pour le contrôle de l’inflation. Ils abordent les défis potentiels liés à sa mise en œuvre ainsi que ses implications politiques et économiques.

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When inflation originates from distributional conflicts, shifts in inflation expectations, or energy price shocks, monetary policy (MP) is a costly stabilization instrument. We show that a tax on inflation policy (TIP), which would require firms to pay a tax proportional to the increase in their prices, would effectively correct externalities in firms’ pricing decisions, tackle excessive inflation and reduce output volatility, without exacerbating price distortions. While proposals from the 1970s saw TIP as a substitute to MP, we find that it is a complement, with TIP addressing markups and inflation expectation shocks, and MP addressing demand shocks.

Au Royaume-Uni, les dépenses d’éducation ont diminué en tant que part du revenu national, passant d’environ 5,6 % du revenu national en 2010-2011 à environ 4,4 % en 2022-23. C’est à peu près la même part du revenu national qu’au début des années 2000, au milieu des années 1980 et à la fin des années 1960.

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This is our sixth annual report on education spending funded by the Nuffield Foundation. It seeks to provide a clear and consistent comparison of the level and changes in spending per student across different stages of education. Our dedicated website further provides easy access to our latest analysis, figures, and the underlying methodology. Following on from cuts to most areas of education spending during the 2010s, the government has provided additional funding at successive spending reviews between 2019 and 2021. However, rising levels of inflation and cost pressures have dampened the effects of extra funding. The government also has high ambitions for education to play a major role in ‘levelling up’ poorer areas of the country. In this year’s annual report, we therefore focus on geographic differences in education spending across each stage of education, as well as the extent to which education spending is targeted at pupils from more disadvantaged backgrounds.

Il s’agit du principal rapport semestriel du Conseil, le rapport d’évaluation fiscale. Ce rapport évalue le budget 2024 du gouvernement en termes d’orientation budgétaire générale, de prévisions économiques et budgétaires et de conformité de l’Irlande avec les règles budgétaires.

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Key messages:

  1. Given the strong economic recovery, exceptionally tight jobs market, and high price pressures, this was not a time to add fuel to the fire
  2. Budget 2024 was substantial and indicates a further breach of National Spending Rule already planned for 2025
  3. Fiscal gimmickry and poor budgeting, especially for health, reduce fiscal credibility
  4. Ireland needs to be serious about National Spending Rule
  5. We welcome the Future Ireland Fund and Infrastructure, Climate and Nature Fund 6. Not panicked nor relieved about corporation tax: not a concern if budget properly

En 2022, les ratios impôts/PIB de la plupart des pays de l’OCDE ont diminué et le ratio impôts/PIB moyen a reculé de 0.15 point de pourcentage, passant à 34.0 %.

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Les données sur les recettes des administrations publiques, et sur le produit de la fiscalité en particulier, constituent la base de la plupart des travaux de description des structures économiques et d’analyse économique, et sont de plus en plus utilisées pour comparaisons internationales. Cette publication annuelle présente un cadre conceptuel dont le but est de définir les recettes publiques devant être assimilées à des impôts et de classifier les différentes catégories d’impôts. Elle constitue également un ensemble unique de statistiques fiscales détaillées et comparables au niveau international, utilisant une présentation identique pour tous les pays de l’OCDE depuis 1965. La présente édition inclut une étude spéciale sur le dynamisme des recettes fiscales dans les pays de l’OCDE.

Afin d’améliorer la coordination nationale et la coopération internationale, l’OCDE souligne la nécessité de sensibiliser les enquêteurs et les décideurs politiques aux différents stratagèmes utilisés pour contourner le paiement de l’impôt sur les dividendes.

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L’arbitrage de dividendes est une forme de fraude commise par le truchement d’un dispositif complexe d’opérations de négociation, de vente et de rachat d’actions exécutées sur une période bien précise et dont le but est d’éluder l’impôt sur les dividendes ou de solliciter des remboursements illégitimes de la retenue à la source sur le dividende. Sous ses diverses variantes, l’arbitrage de dividendes représente une menace sérieuse en termes d’érosion de la base d’imposition pour de nombreuses juridictions. Il peut en outre engendrer des distorsions de marché qui portent atteinte à l’intégrité du système financier. Ce rapport a pour objet de sensibiliser aux pratiques frauduleuses reposant sur l’arbitrage de dividendes et offre aux pays plusieurs recommandations permettant d’identifier les risques posés par ce phénomène, d’améliorer la coordination entre les autorités nationales et de renforcer la coopération internationale. En particulier, la lutte contre ce phénomène exige une étroite coordination entre organismes publics nationaux, une forte coopération internationale et un réseau efficace d’échange de renseignements entre juridictions. À cet égard, les pays peuvent envisager des actions ciblées et des stratégies globales, qui associent les administrations fiscales et les autorités répressives, mais aussi les organismes de régulation et de surveillance financières, ainsi que les autorités compétentes en matière de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux. Dans certains cas, des modifications de la législation peuvent également s’avérer nécessaires.

Les faiblesses des règles actuelles créent des possibilités d’érosion de la base d’imposition et de transfert de bénéfices. Selon l’OCDE, des mesures audacieuses sont exigées de la part des décideurs politiques pour restaurer la confiance dans le système et garantir que les bénéfices sont imposés là où les activités économiques ont lieu et où la valeur est créée.

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Under the BEPS Action 5 minimum standard, members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) have committed to counter harmful tax practices with a focus on improving transparency. One part of the Action 5 minimum standard is the transparency framework for compulsory spontaneous exchange of information on certain tax rulings. The exchange on tax rulings is a critical tool in improving access of tax administrations to information relevant to assess the corporate tax affairs of their taxpayers and to efficiently tackle tax avoidance and other BEPS risks. Over 140 countries and jurisdictions participate in the Inclusive Framework on BEPS and take part in the peer review process to assess their compliance with the transparency framework. Specific terms of reference and a methodology have been agreed for the peer reviews, focusing the assessment on five key elements: information gathering process, exchange of information, confidentiality of the information received, statistics on the exchanges on rulings, and transparency on certain aspects of intellectual property regimes. This report reflects the outcome of the seventh annual peer review of the implementation of the Action 5 minimum standard.

La combinaison d’une croissance lente et de fortes inégalités met à rude épreuve le niveau de vie des Britanniques à revenu faible ou moyen.

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Countries are bound together in a sense of shared endeavour by many things, from a common history to the collective provision of security for our homes, families and communities. But as traditional hierarchies have weakened and advanced economies become more diverse, the role of the state in delivering shared prosperity has become more central in underpinning social contracts. Rising wages, higher employment and the security of the welfare state have all helped deliver this in the past. Real wages nearly quadrupled, while state spending on healthcare as a share of the economy almost trebled, between the Second World War and the turn of the millennium.

But that progress, and the strength it gives to our society and democracy, should not be taken for granted. There are periods when the social contract comes under pressure; when a clear route to a better tomorrow is lacking, the improvements people expect dry up and some groups are left wondering whether the country works for them. Britain, as we outline in this final report of the Economy 2030 Inquiry, is in this undesirable position today.

This, the Final Report of The Economy 2030 Inquiry, sets out what such a path – a serious attempt to end Britain’s relative decline – looks like. It navigates, rather than ignores, the constraints and trade-offs involved, and is hard-headed about what it takes to drive growth and ensure fairness. Prosperity must be built on an understanding of Britain’s strengths, and a resolve to invest in our future rather than live off our past.

Les prévisions récentes de l’Office for Budget Responsibility et de la Banque d’Angleterre indiquent que le marché du travail continuera à se détériorer au cours de l’année 2024. Il y a toutefois de bonnes nouvelles du côté des politiques, sous la forme d’une nouvelle augmentation du National Living Wage (NLW) qui, en avril prochain, atteindra l’objectif de la Low Pay Commission, à savoir deux tiers du salaire horaire type.

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Over the course of 2023, the labour market has been gradually cooling on most measures. Even ignoring data from the Labour Force Survey that has recently been called into question, vacancies have been falling for 16 consecutive months and growth in payrolled employment has slowed. But nominal wage growth has remained resilient – even, since June, outpacing still-high inflation. In this Outlook’s spotlight, we explore what is happening to wages, and how long we can expect high wage growth to last.

Looking ahead, recent forecasts from both the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Bank of England have the labour market continuing to loosen over the course of 2024. But there is some good news from the policy side in the form of another increase in the National Living Wage (NLW), which this coming April will reach the Low Pay Commission’s target of two-thirds of typical hourly pay.

In the Lifting the Lid section, we explore recent statistics on the ethnicity pay gap, how labour market tightness varies across different industries, and the highest- and lowest-paid local authorities from the latest Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings release.

L’auteur analyse les modifications apportées à l’allocation de logement locale (LHA) et s’intéresse à l’évolution de la mesure depuis son introduction.

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In the 2023 Autumn Statement, the Chancellor announced that the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) will be re-pegged to the 30th percentile of local rents in April 2024. This will be the first increase to the LHA in four years, good news for the 1.3 million private renter households in receipt of Universal Credit or Housing Benefit with housing costs that are higher than current rates. Many will see a substantial boost to their income as a result. Three-bedroom households renting in Central London could be as much as £82 a week better off, for example. But the potential gains are material for those living elsewhere too, especially in other large cities. Similar households living in Bristol could gain by as much as £69 a week; in Glasgow by £48 a week; and in Leeds by £38 a week.

However, there are two reasons to temper our positivity about the Chancellor’s announcement. First, when LHA rates are increased next April, thousands more households will run up against the benefit cap, which will not be uprated next year. We estimate that a couple with two children in receipt of the full UC award will hit the benefit cap in more than four-in-five (83 per cent) local areas come next April, up from just over half (53 per cent) today.

Second, the Chancellor confirmed his intention to freeze LHA rates once again from 2024 onwards. This sporadic thawing then freezing of the LHA is a sub-optimal way to support low-income renters with housing costs, creating arbitrary shortfalls between rents and housing support that differ drastically by area and over time. This puts intense pressure on low-income households – and cash-strapped local authorities who are often relied upon to provide emergency support – until the next reset occurs.

Dans cette note de recherche, les codirecteurs du WIL montrent qu’Auten et Splinter attribuent à tort un montant important et croissant de revenus d’entreprises et de capitaux non imposés au bas de l’échelle de distribution.

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Auten and Splinter (2023), henceforth AS, provide estimates of income inequality in the United States, starting with income observed in tax returns and making adjustments to account for unobserved income. They conclude that after their adjustments, the top 1% income share has not changed much since 1960.

Because the concentration of observed income has increased dramatically (a non-controversial fact), AS must assume that unobserved income has become much more equally distributed to obtain their results.

In previous work we showed that AS’s assumptions imply implausibly low levels of concentration of untaxed income (Pikkety, Saez and Zucman, 2019). We detailed the specific problems in the AS approach that account for this issue (Saez and Zucman, 2020). However, AS’s estimates are essentially unchanged relative to their earlier drafts and do not address these problems. This comment provides a simple, graphical illustration of the core issues in AS.

In a nutshell: AS erroneously allocate a large and growing amount of untaxed business and capital income to the bottom of the distribution due to several clear and long-understood mistakes in their methodology.

Les statistiques actuelles sur la pauvreté ignorent la part importante du revenu national qui revient aux individus sous la forme de biens publics. Par conséquent, Amory Gethin construit les premières estimations de la pauvreté et de l’inégalité dans le monde qui intègrent la consommation de biens publics.

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This article constructs new estimates of global poverty that incorporate the consumption of public services. Combining data from multiple sources, I build a novel historical database on the value and progressivity of public education, healthcare, and other in-kind transfers received worldwide since 1980. Public goods are large and have considerably grown: they represent 30% of global GDP and have been a major driver of inclusive growth. The consumption of public goods accounts for about 20% of global poverty reduction since 1980. Total government redistribution, including cash and in-kind transfers, accounts for 30%. In a companion paper, I incorporate in this analysis the causal impact of education on pretax incomes. Combining direct redistribution and indirect investment benefits from education brings the total contribution of public policies to global poverty reduction to 50-80% or more.

Équipe de rédaction

Recherche et sélection des articles :

  • Léa Béliveau
  • Pierre-Alexandre Bernier
  • Gabrielle Gosselin
  • Anne-Sophie Paquet

Coordination et édition :

  • Tommy Gagné-Dubé
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