Bulletin de veille du 17 mai 2022
Québec/Canada
Les auteurs ont été en mesure d’observer une surreprésentation des étudiants provenant du quintile supérieur parmi les effectifs étudiants au baccalauréat ainsi qu’un taux de diplomation et un taux de poursuite des études aux cycles supérieurs qui augmentent en fonction du quintile de revenu parental.
L’objectif principal de ce rapport est de présenter une analyse descriptive de la mobilité sociale des diplômés du baccalauréat des différentes universités du Québec selon le domaine d’études, mobilité étant ici captée par la transmission intergénérationnelle du revenu. À partir de données administratives sur l’ensemble des étudiants du Québec, il est possible d’observer les taux de diplomation ainsi que les revenus des diplômés une fois sur le marché du travail, le tout par quintile de revenu parental. Au niveau de la fréquentation universitaire de premier cycle au Québec, nous observons une surreprésentation des étudiants provenant de milieux plus aisés. Nos résultats suggèrent également que le taux de diplomation des étudiants au baccalauréat est plus faible pour les étudiants provenant de familles à faible revenu et augmente avec le quintile de revenu parental. Notre analyse de la mobilité intergénérationnelle, à l’aide d’une matrice de transition, suggère que les jeunes diplômés universitaires ont une assez bonne mobilité relativement à la population comprenant tous les niveaux de scolarité, et que les étudiants provenant de milieux moins favorisés ont une mobilité nettement supérieure à leur population de référence. Nous calculons aussi, par université et domaine d’études, une mesure de mobilité intergénérationnelle qui tient compte de l’accès aux études universitaires et de la mobilité ascendante (passer du quintile inférieur de revenu au quintile supérieur). On constate que la mobilité ascendante varie d’une université à l’autre, mais également par domaine d’études, les institutions spécialisées en ingénierie et les programmes en science, technologie, ingénierie et mathématiques démontrant les mobilités ascendantes les plus élevées. Une limite importante de nos données est que l’horizon de temps suivant l’obtention du diplôme est limité, de telle sorte que les revenus d’emploi observés ne sont pas nécessairement représentatifs du revenu permanent des diplômés.
Une recension détaillée des caractéristiques connues ou présumées du Compte d’épargne libre d’impôt pour l’achat d’une première propriété (CELIAPP) ainsi que sa mise en parallèle avec le CELI et le REER, mais aussi avec le défunt REEL (Régime enregistré d’épargne logement).
Le Compte d’épargne libre d’impôt pour l’achat d’une première propriété (CELIAPP) est la nouveauté fiscale touchant les particuliers la plus significative annoncée dans le budget fédéral 2022. Il s’agit d’un compte enregistré mis en place pour permettre aux particuliers d’épargner en vue de l’achat de leur première propriété.
Au moment d’écrire ces lignes, il convient de signaler que le gouvernement n’a dévoilé que les éléments clés de la conception du CELIAPP, d’autres détails devront être précisé dans le texte législatif à venir. Toutefois, ce régime, tel que décrit dans le budget, combine les avantages d’un Régime enregistré d’épargne retraite (REER), soit la déductibilité des cotisations et d’un Compte d’épargne libre d’impôt (CELI), soit la non-imposition des retraits.
Il est prévu que ce régime voit le jour en 2023 et dès lors, il permettra aux résidents canadiens âgés d’au moins 18 ans qui n’ont pas été propriétaire dans l’année de l’ouverture du compte et les quatre années précédentes, d’épargner en vue d’acheter une propriété. Les cotisations maximales de 8 000 $ par année, pour un maximum de 40 000 $, seront déductibles du revenu alors que les rendements et le retrait pour l’achat d’une première propriété ne seront pas imposables. Le retrait ne pourra être effectué qu’une seule fois, et au plus tard 15 ans après l’ouverture du compte.
Cette analyse recense les caractéristiques connues ou présumées du CELIAPP et présente les similitudes, et ce qui le distingue du CELI et du REER. Il aborde également feu le Régime enregistré d’épargne logement pour tirer quelques leçons du passé. Puis, basé sur les seules connaissances actuelles, le texte nomme des alternatives possibles et fait quelques observations relativement à des planifications fiscales. La conclusion soulève plusieurs questions et note la nécessité de mieux cerner tous les contours du CELIAPP.
Bien que seuls des détails préliminaires aient été publiés à ce stade, l’auteur recense certaines questions politiques importantes découlent de ce que nous savons jusqu’à présent.
The new Tax-Free First Home Savings Account (FHSA) — a registered account set up to allow individuals to save for the purchase of their first home — is certainly the most significant personal tax change in the 2022 federal budget.
Will it do what it’s intended to do for first-time home buyers? Will it impact housing prices? Will it benefit higher-income and older Canadians more than others? Is there a better alternative?
Les auteurs analysent la réforme du système de revenu de retraite au Canada et constatent que les réformes visant à aider les personnes ayant accumulé peu de revenu de retraite devraient prendre en considération l’interaction avec le système d’imposition. Ça n’a pas été fait lors de la récente augmentation du RPC, qui s’est donc traduite en un bénéfice limité.
Canadians nearing retirement age have seen a doubling in the median value of both their assets and net worth since 1999, and real median family incomes were up 1.2 times, making retirement prospects seem rosier – but not equally for all, according to a new C.D. Howe Institute report.
In “The Evolving Wealth of Canadians: Who Is Better Fixed for Retirement? Who is Not?” author Bob Baldwin looks at wealth of Canadians approaching retirement from 1999 to 2019. At a general level, one can’t help but be impressed by the substantial increase in total assets, net worth and retirement wealth of age groups approaching retirement age, writes Baldwin, who is Chair of the Pension Policy Council at the C.D. Howe Institute. “Even though much of this increase is offset by the rising cost (to date) of a dollar of retirement income, it is not totally offset. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that retirement incomes will improve for many from current levels that are certainly satisfactory – but not perfect.” Adds Baldwin: “It is equally clear, however, that there are subsets of the population for whom this generalization does not hold.”
Baldwin warns that a full one-quarter of Canadians aged 45 – 64 have no private retirement assets and the median RRSP and TFSA wealth accumulations for people who are not participating in workplace pension plans (WPPs) is low. “These realities suggest that a minority of the future elderly may have trouble maintaining their standard of living in retirement,” says Baldwin.
L’auteur observe de quelle façon les efforts déployés en 2020 afin de compenser la perte de revenu des contribuables a grandement aidé à faire reculer le taux de pauvreté au Québec.
Lutter contre la pauvreté n’est pas facile. La pauvreté constitue un problème complexe, multidimensionnel et épineux, ce qu’on appelle en anglais « a wicked problem ». Plusieurs solutions semblent plausibles, sans qu’aucune ne se démarque clairement. Comment y arriver ?
On peut d’abord miser sur la croissance économique et l’emploi. C’est la solution préférée de ceux qui valorisent le libre fonctionnement du marché. Si l’activité économique est vigoureuse et que presque tout le monde travaille, on vaincra la pauvreté, non ?
Eh bien non, justement. La croissance n’est pas suffisante en elle-même. Dans son rapport phare Croissance et inégalités, paru en 2008, l’OCDE – une organisation de pays généralement riches et qui partagent tous une économie de marché – démontrait qu’en dépit d’une croissance soutenue et d’un haut niveau d’emploi dans les pays membres à partir des années 1990, les inégalités et la pauvreté n’avaient pas reculé, au contraire. Le titre de la version anglaise, Growing Unequal, était encore plus évocateur quant à la présence simultanée d’une croissance forte et d’inégalités en hausse.
L’IRIS présente ses calculs de revenu viable pour les villes de Montréal, Québec, Gatineau, Sherbrooke, Saguenay, Trois-Rivières et Sept-Îles.
Dans une actualité changeante qui bouscule à plusieurs titres les modes de vie, quels repères faut-il se donner pour décrire un niveau de vie digne, exempt de pauvreté, et un revenu après impôts et transferts pouvant assurer ce niveau de vie au Québec? Le défi de déterminer un tel revenu viable en 2020 et en 2021, en pleine pandémie, s’amplifie en 2022, en raison de l’inflation et de l’incertitude économique causée par l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie. La présente édition sur le revenu viable fait état de ces changements tout en demeurant comparable aux éditions précédentes sur le plan de la méthode. Le revenu viable permet d’évaluer le revenu nécessaire à trois types de ménage, dans sept localités québécoises, pour atteindre un niveau de vie digne et sans pauvreté, au-delà de la seule couverture des besoins de base telle qu’établie par la Mesure du panier de consommation (MPC). Il offre ainsi un repère nécessaire, crédible et complémentaire à la MPC pour l’analyse des situations de pauvreté dans le continuum des revenus. En 2022, le revenu viable calculé pour une personne seule varie entre 25128 $ (Saguenay) et 34814 $ (Sept-Îles). À Montréal, il est de 29577 $ pour une personne seule alors qu’il s’élève à 65033 $ pour deux adultes avec deux enfants en CPE. L’inflation qui caractérise l’année 2022 et la volatilité du coût de l’essence et des voitures d’occasion augmentent les dépenses des ménages dépendants de l’automobile. Leur revenu viable augmente plus que celui des ménages utilisant uniquement le transport en commun, dont les coûts sont relativement stables.
Plusieurs des programmes de dépenses du gouvernement fédéral sont financés par des emprunts qui devront ultérieurement être remboursés par les impôts collectés. L’article analyse le support de la population quant à l’établissement de garderies à contributions réduites à l’échelle canadienne, d’une assurance médicale ainsi qu’une assurance dentaire universelles concluant que le support chute drastiquement lorsque ces programmes doivent être financés par l’augmentation des taxes à la consommation.
Support plummets to well below half of Canadians for new federal government programs, including dental care, pharmacare and $10-a-day daycare when the taxes needed to pay for them are included, finds a new Leger poll commissioned by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy thinktank.
All three programs were included or committed to in the recent federal budget.
[…]The poll, which interviewed 1,509 Canadians between April 15 and April 17, 2022 following the budget, finds that support for $10-a-day daycare, pharmacare, and dental care was overwhelming—69 per cent or higher–when no changes in taxes were attached to the new programs.
Support for these same programs plummets well below 50 per cent when an increase in the GST is attached to them, which would roughly pay for the program.
[…]“The reality of any new or expanded government program is that at some point Canadians have to pay for them, either in the form of higher taxes or less spending on other programs,” Fuss said.
Comparativement à la mise à jour de novembre 2021, le budget du gouvernement provincial de l’Alberta (24 février 2022) reflète des revenus provenant des ressources naturelles significativement plus élevés. Or, plutôt que de rembourser ses dettes, réduire les impôts ou augmenter ses investissements, le gouvernement de cette province utilise ses recettes supplémentaires pour augmenter ses dépenses.
The Alberta provincial government is experiencing a windfall in resource revenues, which is an opportunity to stabilize Alberta’s government finances for the long term provided the government holds the line on program spending, finds a new study by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.
[…]The study finds that following a windfall in resource revenue, the recent Alberta budget increased program spending by $4 billion over the next three years above and beyond what would be required to keep pace with higher expectations for inflation and population growth. Resource revenues were projected to average $4.5 billion a year in Budget 2021 but increased to $10.0 billion (on average) a year by the mid-year update in November 2021—and $13.1 billion a year in the Budget in February 2022.
A recent analysis showed that current commodity prices and forward trading markets indicate revenues will likely be even higher than forecast in Budget 2022. With this windfall, Alberta has an extraordinary opportunity to stabilize provincial finances.
Namely, the government can save the windfall to re-establish a rainy-day account based on the previously successful Alberta Sustainability Fund. The idea behind the ASF is simple; save resource revenue during the good times to ensure a stable amount of resource revenues for the provincial budget during the bad times.
[…]
États-Unis
Les auteurs démontrent que les taxes sur le carbone actuelles dans la plupart des juridictions ayant signé les accords de Paris ne permettent pas de répondre à ses objectifs et devraient être revues à la hausse.
We study local carbon policy to address the consequences of climate change. Standard analysis suggests that the social cost of carbon determines optimal carbon policy. We start by using the spatial integrated assessment model in Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg (2021) to measure the local social monetary cost of CO2 emissions: the Local Social Cost of Carbon (LSCC). Although the largest welfare costs from global warming are concentrated in the warmest parts of the developing world, adjusting for the local marginal utility of income implies that the LSCC peaks in warm and high-income regions like the southern parts of the U.S. and Europe, as well as Australia. We then proceed to study the effect of the actual carbon reduction pledges in the Paris Agreement and the progress they can make in implementing the expressed goal of keeping global temperature increases below 2◦C. We find that although the distribution of pledges is roughly in line with the LSCC, their magnitude is largely insufficient to achieve its goals. The required carbon taxes necessary to keep temperatures below 2◦C over the current century are an order of magnitude higher and involve large implicit inter-temporal transfers. Increasing the elasticity of substitution across energy sources is important to reduce the carbon taxes necessary to achieve warming goals.
Les auteurs présentent sommairement les avantages et inconvénients des Reconcilliation bills dans la législation américaine et comment ils peuvent s’appliquer dans le cadre de mesures budgétaires.
Policymakers have enacted 22 budget reconciliation bills since the process was established in 1974; Congress approved five other reconciliation bills but the President vetoed them.1 Policymakers used reconciliation to enact major spending cuts during President Reagan’s first year in office, several deficitreduction packages during the 1980s and 1990s, changes to the nation’s cash assistance program in 1996, and the large Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003. More recently, reconciliation was used in 2010 to amend the Affordable Care Act and modify the federal student loan program,2 in 2017 to enact large tax cuts, and in 2021 to enact additional COVID-19 relief though the American Rescue Plan. Republican majorities also twice attempted to use the reconciliation process to repeal key elements of the Affordable Care Act; President Obama vetoed the first attempt (in 2016), and the second attempt (in 2017) failed to pass in the Senate.
Les auteurs présentent pourquoi les récentes bonifications aux comptes épargne 401(k) et Roth IRA profiteraient disproportionnellement aux contribuables à revenu plus élevé.
The Securing a Strong Retirement Act of 2022 passed the House on March 29 with broad bipartisan support and is expected to garner strong support in the Senate. Unfortunately, its key provisions, which would expand the federal tax subsidies for retirement saving, mainly help people with higher incomes and financially secure retirements — who benefit the most from existing subsidies — and would do little for people with low and moderate incomes, who have much more pressing needs. The bill also relies on timing gimmicks to offset its cost within the ten-year budget window; after the initial decade it would lose significant revenue. Tax subsidies for retirement savings are one of the largest federal tax expenditures, costing around $380 billion annually. 1 The primary retirement tax subsidies allow people to contribute to accounts such as a traditional 401(k) or IRA plan on a pre-tax basis. That is, taxpayers can defer all taxes on retirement contributions and earnings until they withdraw the money in retirement, at which point it is taxed as ordinary income. With “Roth” IRAs and Roth 401(k)s, the tax treatment is reversed: contributions are made with after-tax income, but neither the growth of the assets in these accounts over time as they produce earnings, nor the withdrawals made in retirement, are subject to tax.
Les auteurs proposent plusieurs façons d’améliorer le programme de supplemental security income afin qu’il soit mieux adapté aux besoins des bénéficiaires actuels.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which policymakers created in 1972, provides monthly cash assistance to people who are at least age 65 or are disabled and have little income and few assets. SSI benefits are critical for those who need them — but SSI is woefully out of date, leaving many people in need ineligible for benefits and others who receive them without enough resources to meet basic needs. Policymakers need to update SSI’s rules in a variety of ways. Its maximum benefit is only threefourths of the poverty line, and 4 in 10 recipients have incomes below the federal poverty line even with their SSI benefits. Its income and asset limits have not been updated for decades. These rules allow recipients to keep only a meager amount of their earnings, other benefits, and savings, and prevent many older and disabled people in need from qualifying. SSI also excludes most immigrants (until they become U.S. citizens) and residents of U.S. Territories, most of whom are people of color. SSI’s complex and intrusive rules make it more expensive to administer and burdensome for applicants and beneficiaries. The Social Security Administration (SSA) spends more to administer SSI than it does to administer the much bigger Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program.
Les auteurs présentent les différentes utilisations par les États de leur Fiscal Recovery Fund afin d’investir dans des projets environnementaux.
States are taking steps to advance environmental protection and environmental justice using flexible State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (FRF) provided through the American Rescue Plan. With a collective $70 billion in FRF remaining, 1 states can use these funds to build healthier, more equitable, climate-resilient communities. Sixteen states, Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico have allocated a combined $2.1 billion of their FRF toward environmental initiatives, 2 including cleanups of industrial pollution and preservation of natural habitats. Climate change and other environmental challenges pose a serious risk to people’s health and well-being, especially those with low incomes and communities of color. Some state and local governments are confronting these challenges head-on, using Fiscal Recovery Funds to invest in efforts to reduce carbon emissions and improve energy efficiency, stem pollution, clean up environmental hazards, and mitigate or reduce harm to habitats from a variety of sources. States are actively monitoring environmental needs and changes to preemptively mitigate the consequences of climate change, which can result in costly remediation and long-term health effects. States also can protect and restore the natural environment by mitigating and reversing harm to habitats through solar or wind energy projects.
L’article analyse comment le paiement en fonction des services requis dans le cadre des systèmes de soins de santé à payeur unique Medicare affecterait les soins de santé, le budget et l’économie des États-Unis et conclut que la longévité et la productivité au travail en seraient positivement affectés.
There are various ways to achieve near-universal health insurance coverage using some form of automatic coverage. A single-payer system is one approach, and it could be implemented in different ways.
Today, I will discuss how single-payer health care systems based on the Medicare fee-for-service program would affect our nation’s health care and budget and its economy. The Congressional Budget Office has analyzed five options in detail among many possibilities. Those options illustrate the effects of differences in providers’ payment rates, patients’ cost sharing, and the system’s coverage of long-term services and supports. The system proposed by Chairman Sanders in S. 1129, the Medicare for All Act of 2019, is like the options in some ways and different in others; CBO has not analyzed S. 1129.
Barry F. Huston, Anthony A. Cilluffo et Sarah A. Donovan, « Social Security Benefit Formula and Payroll Taxes: Potential Impacts of Policy Changes on Selected Worker Groups », 4 mai 2022, 50 p.
Milan N. Ball, « Taxing Authority in Federal Areas », 11 mai 2022, 14 p.
Molly F. Sherlock, « Supporting Semiconductor Fabrication with an Investment Tax Credit (ITC) », 11 mai 2022, 3 p.
Comparant le système fiscal des États-Unis à celui de la Chine, un de ses principaux partenaires économiques, cet article en vient à la conclusion que les États-Unis devraient éviter de punir leurs industries domestiques, et invite donc à rejeter l’augmentation des impôts des entreprise privées proposée dans le budget de Biden, favoriser davantage la R&D ainsi que les investissements en capital.
Federal policymakers are debating a legislative package focused on boosting U.S. competitiveness vis-a-vis China; however, it currently contains little to no improvements to the U.S. tax code.
The existing U.S. tax code is biased against capital investment and it is scheduled to worsen over the next decade. The tax bias against domestic investment would further worsen if tax increases included in President Biden’s budget proposal were enacted.
The federal corporate income tax rate in the United States is currently 21 percent, and rises to 25.8 percent when factoring in the average state and local corporate tax rates. Profits earned from highly immobile intangible assets to support exports face a lower tax rate (13.125 percent) due to the deduction for Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (FDII). The headline corporate tax rate in China is 25 percent, and lower rates of 5 percent to 15 percent apply in certain districts.
The marginal effective tax rate (METR) in the United States under current law is 18.3 percent, compared to 4.8 percent in China, indicating the U.S. places a higher burden on marginal investment than China.
Within the realm of fiscal policy, rather than focus on providing subsidies to specific U.S. industries, lawmakers should consider improving the baseline tax treatment of domestic investment to boost U.S. competitiveness with China and other countries.
Les bénéficiaires du crédit d’impôt pour enfants ont connu une baisse plus importante de l’insécurité alimentaire et une évolution similaire de l’emploi que les non-bénéficiaires entre 2020 et 2021.
The temporary expansion of the child tax credit (CTC) in the American Rescue Plan delivered monthly payments to most families with children from July through December 2021. We use data from the Urban Institute’s Well-Being and Basic Needs Survey to compare adults ages 18 to 64 that received the payments with those that did not. We find the share of adults who received the payments reporting food insecurity declined more than the share of adults who did not receive the payments. We found no significant differences in the changes in employment between December 2020 and December 2021 for adults who received the payments and adults who did not receive the payments.
Les principaux résultats des auteurs suggèrent à la fois qu’une part plus importante de l’impôt sur les sociétés que ce que l’on croyait auparavant est imputée au » travail, mais parce que le partage de la rente se concentre sur les travailleurs à hauts revenus, l’impôt sur les sociétés demeure assez progressif dans les modèles les plus plausibles de partage de la rente.
Standard analysis of the corporate income tax assumes shareholders bear the burden of taxes on excess returns. But evidence shows that firms share rents with workers, especially high-income workers, which implies that these workers bear some of the burden as well. Using the Tax Policy Center microsimulation model, we show that, relative to standard assumptions, allowing for rent sharing with high-income workers consistent with recent studies changes the incidence of the tax – labor bears more of the burden – but the tax remains highly progressive. We discuss several implications of the results and directions for future research.
International
Cette analyse documente le rôle de l’informalité dans la détermination de l’ampleur des multiplicateurs fiscaux. Les résultats montrent surtout que les multiplicateurs fiscaux ne varient pas de manière significative entre les pays à haut et à faible revenu lorsque le niveau d’informalité est pris en compte, ce qui suggère que le niveau d’informalité est un élément clé expliquant la différence des multiplicateurs fiscaux entre les économies avancées et en développement.
This paper investigates the role of informality in affecting the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier in a panel of 141 countries, using the local projections method. We find a strong negative relationship between the degree of informality and the size of the fiscal multiplier. This result holds irrespective of the levels of economic development and institutional quality and is robust to additional country characteristics such as trade, financial openness and exchange rate regime. In a two-sector new- Keynesian model, we rationalize this result by showing that fiscal shocks raise the relative price of official goods, shifting demand towards the informal sector. This reallocation effect increases with the level of informality, because a larger informal sector is associated with a stronger appreciation of relative prices in response to fiscal shocks. Thus, informality raises the size of the unofficial multiplier. A higher degree of non-separability between public and private goods also contributes to rationalize the lower multipliers in high-informality countries.
Ce document examine l’impact de la réforme Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) sur les investissements directs étrangers entrants aux États-Unis et sur les investissements en biens, usines et équipements des entreprises américaines à capitaux étrangers.
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) sharply reduced effective corporate income tax rates on equity-financed US investment. This paper examines the reform’s impact on US inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) and investment in property, plant and equipment (PPE) by foreign-owned US companies. We first model effective marginal and average tax rates (EMTRs and EATRs) by country, industry, and method of finance, and then use those tax rates to calculate the tax semi-elasticities of inbound FDI and PPE investment. We find that both PPE investment and FDI financed with retained earnings responded positively to the TCJA reform, but FDI financed with new equity or debt did not. In country-level PPE regressions, inclusion of macroeconomic controls renders tax rate coefficients insignificant, suggesting that the increase in PPE investment after TCJA was driven by general economic growth. In regressions of FDI financed with retained earnings, however, tax coefficients were robust to inclusion of macroeconomic controls. As the literature predicts, EATRs have a greater impact on cross-border investment than EMTRs. Country-by-industry regressions showed a larger effect of taxes on PPE investment than aggregate country-level regressions, but industry-level tax rates appear to have no effect on earnings retention.
L’OBR publie son commentaire mensuel sur les finances publiques du Royaume-Uni, observant entre autres que le déficit du mois de mars excède celui prévu au dernier budget.
The initial full-year estimate of government borrowing in 2021-22 is £151.8 billion, less than half the 2020-21 figure but £24.0 billion above our March forecast (and £16.7 billion above it on a like-for-like basis). This surprise relative to forecast is largely due to higherthan-expected central government spending, which outweighed stronger-than-expected receipts. The like-for-like surprise could narrow as accrued spending figures are revised over the next six months. That said, central government cash borrowing also exceeded our forecast by £20.0 billion. Public sector net borrowing (PSNB) was £18.1 billion in March, down £8.8 billion on the previous year. PSNB was £151.8 billion in 2021-22 as a whole – less than half its 2020-21 level of £317.6 billion but £24.0 billion (18.8 per cent) higher than our latest forecast. This is the first estimate from the ONS and can be expected to be revised over the coming months. Central government accrued receipts (excluding PSNB-neutral transfers related to quantitative easing) raised £822.6 billion in 2021-22, up £109.2 billion (15.3 per cent) on 2020-21 and £6.5 billion (0.8 per cent) higher than our March forecast. This reflects strength across most taxes, thanks to strong growth in the cash size of the economy.
Cet article, comportant plusieurs témoignages des personnes affectées par la situation, analyse les stratégies que devraient utiliser le Royaume-Uni dans la prochaine décennie afin d’adresser la stagnation du niveau de vie et les fortes inégalités, tant intergénérationnelles qu’intragénérationnelles, et de naviguer à travers les changements tel le Brexit, le net zero transition (carboneutralité) et la période post-pandémie.
What economic strategy should the UK pursue over the next decade, in order both to address long-standing problems in the country (stagnating living standards and high inequality) and to navigate ongoing change (Brexit, net zero transition and a post-pandemic world)? The Economy 2030 Inquiry is a two-year collaboration between the Resolution Foundation and the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics investigating this very question. Drawing on evidence about how people, places and firms flourish, the Inquiry aims to provide a roadmap for a more productive and equitable UK in 2020s and beyond.
This report is unlike the majority of research produced by the Inquiry to date, however, in that it is based on the voices of 56 participants from six semi-structured focus groups we held in March 2022. We created this space in the Inquiry to listen to people from all walks of life voice their experience of the economy for a range of reasons. This exercise allowed us to test if what we have found in the Inquiry so far truly reflects people’s lives, and to probe motivation, explore constraints and understand how people engage with, and experience, the world. Most importantly, these voices are key in helping us decide not just the objectives for a new economic strategy, but also which routes to change are desirable and feasible.
This, then, is what we heard.
Les auteurs concluent que les baisses d’impôts ne peuvent pas remplacer une hausse substantielle des salaires en Australie.
A comprehensive review of Australian wage trends indicates that wage growth is likely to remain stuck at historically weak levels despite the dramatic disruptions experienced by the Australian labour market through the COVID-19 pandemic. The report finds that targeted policies to deliberately lift wages are needed to break free of the low-wage trajectory that has become locked in over the past nine years.
The report, The Wages Crisis: Revisited, authored by three of Australia’s leading labour policy experts: Professor Andrew Stewart from Adelaide Law School, Dr Jim Stanford from the Centre for Future Work, and Associate Professor Tess Hardy from Melbourne Law School, updates analysis and recommendations from their 2018 edited book, The Wages Crisis in Australia.
The report shows that annual nominal wage growth recovered after initial lockdowns during the pandemic – but rebounded only to the same slow pace (just above 2% per year) recorded for several years prior to COVID. Unprecedented fluctuations in employment and labour supply, including a significant decline in the official unemployment rate, do not seem to have altered wage growth, which is still tracking at the slowest sustained pace in post-war history.
The research found little correlation between the lasting slowdown in wage growth after 2013, and changes in supply-and-demand balances in the labour market. Traditional market forces did not cause the wages crisis, and market forces are unlikely to be able to fix it – even with a relatively low unemployment rate.
Instead, the authors identified nine policy and institutional factors which were more important in explaining the deceleration of wages, including: the erosion of collective bargaining coverage; inadequate minimum wages; pay restraint imposed on public sector workers; and widespread wage theft.
The problem of restrained compensation in public and human services reaches further than just the pay caps imposed directly on public servants. Wages in publicly funded services (like aged care, the NDIS, and early child education) are also held back by inadequate funding and weak labour standards in those programs. The report makes special mention of the need to improve wages in aged care, in the wake of the recent Royal Commission’s finding that wages in the sector must be improved as a top priority in improving care standards and attracting the new workers the sector needs.
The authors suggest that nominal wages should grow faster than 4% per year in coming years, to restore healthy relationships with productivity growth, inflation, and national income distribution. But a resuscitation of wage growth will not occur without proactive wage-boosting policies.
The authors list five broad measures to quickly support wage growth. One is a proposal for a new statutory definition of employment. This would prevent businesses from drafting contracts that present workers as being self-employed, even if in reality they have no business of their own. The authors predict that such arrangements will become far more widespread, including in the growing gig economy, in the wake of two recent decisions by the High Court.
Les auteurs analysent les différentes façons de mesurer les inégalités de revenu dans plusieurs pays d’Amérique Latine et mettent certains points faibles de ces méthodes en lumière.
There is a large gap between income estimates used in inequality studies and macroeconomic statistics. This makes it hard to assess how economic growth is distributed across the population, and to what extent mainstream distributional statistics are an accurate representation of income flows. We take stock of these discrepancies by confronting estimates of the income distribution from surveys, administrative records and aggregates from the system of national accounts, thoroughly documenting them over the past two decades for ten Latin American countries. We find that surveys only account for around half of the macroeconomic income in the region. Measurement gaps account for just over half of the overall gap on average, while the rest is due to conceptual differences across data sets. Measurement gaps have been growing fast for many countries, the bulk being due to non-covered capital income. We also compare the top tails in administrative data and surveys, finding diverging averages –especially for non-wage incomes– and different shapes. We discuss the degree to which inequality levels and trends could be affected.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Samuel Carbonneau
- Florence Lemire Jeune
- Jean-Nicolas Tremblay
- Camille Turgeon
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé