Bulletin de veille du 15 septembre 2026
Québec/Canada
Ce panorama met en évidence l’absence de retour à l’équilibre budgétaire au fédéral d’ici 2030-2031, un retour prévu au Québec d’ici 2029-2030 malgré des écarts à résorber, ainsi qu’une hausse de la dette nette fédérale et une baisse de celle du Québec à l’horizon 2030-2031.
L’édition 2026 du Panorama des finances publiques du Québec contient trois sections. Selon les sections, il est possible d’analyser la situation budgétaire du gouvernement fédéral, puis du gouvernement du Québec (section 1), ensuite de comparer le Québec avec les autres provinces, pour l’administration provinciale (section 2), et enfin d’effectuer une comparaison de la situation prévalant au Québec à celle des finances publiques des pays membres de l’OCDE, cette fois en considérant l’ensemble des administrations publiques transigeant avec les agents économiques présents dans une juridiction (section 3).
Les données réelles les plus récentes disponibles sont utilisées pour les comparaisons et ont pour objectif de consolider dans un même document des informations de base sur les finances publiques du Québec. Une perspective historique est également présente dans plusieurs cas. Puis, s’ajoutent, lorsque disponibles, la présentation des données provisoires ainsi que les plus récentes prévisions fournies par les gouvernements fédéral, du Québec, l’OCDE et le FMI, permettant de constater ce qui est aujourd’hui anticipé à moyen terme en matière d’indicateurs de finances publiques.
Tout au long de cette édition, des encadrés permettent d’approfondir des notions ou encore de mettre à jour les résultats de certains cahiers de recherche publiés précédemment et portant sur les finances publiques québécoises. Ainsi l’on retrouve notamment un regard sur les tarifs douaniers et les exportations québécoises, une estimation du déficit structurel du Québec, un aperçu du plan québécois des infrastructures et du déficit de maintien des actifs, des résultats relatifs à la soutenabilité des finances publiques et un calcul de l’écart de PIB réel par habitant Ontario-Québec.
Ce rapport analyse plus de 25 ans de réductions de l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers au Québec afin de déterminer à qui ces réductions ont le plus profité.
Depuis 25 ans, les gouvernements fédéral et du Québec ont octroyé de significatives réductions des impôts des particuliers.
Ces réductions fiscales ont notamment pris la forme de diminution de taux au sein des barèmes d’impôts, de modifications de déductions et de crédits des régimes d’imposition, puis de mises en place et de bonifications de prestations fiscalisées.
L’analyse veut déterminer à qui ces réductions fiscales des 25 dernières années ont réellement profité. On entend souvent dire que les réductions de la charge fiscale profitent davantage aux mieux nantis au détriment des contribuables à revenu plus modeste, mais est-ce nécessairement le cas, sachant que bien des réductions de l’impôt ont plutôt pris la forme de mise en place ou de bonifications des prestations fiscales ?
Pour tenter d’y voir plus clair, le présent Regard CFFP quantifie l’impact consolidé de modifications fiscales pour quatre types de ménage québécois : personne seule, couple sans enfants, familles biparentales et monoparentales. Pour chacun de ces ménages, l’évaluation est effectuée à l’aide des mesures de la charge fiscale nette, des réductions de cette dernière et de l’évolution du revenu disponible, pour des revenus d’emploi allant jusqu’à 200 000 $. Un aperçu des effets consolidés pour un aîné seul s’ajoute également.
Ce cahier discute de l’utilisation de mesures socio-fiscales pour mitiger la baisse du nombre de naissances, alors que la politique familiale du Québec qui est relativement développée et généreuse impliquerait vraisemblablement un coût élevé pour un résultat qui demeurerait incertain.
Ce cahier propose un état des lieux à l’égard de l’utilisation de mesures socio-fiscales pour mitiger la baisse du nombre de naissances au Québec. Après avoir contextualisé et relativisé l’enjeu de la dénatalité au Québec, le texte examine quelques incitatifs à la fécondité à l’aide de la littérature disponible. Les impacts de l’allocation pour nouveau-né offerte par le Québec entre 1988 et 1997 sont notamment présentés. Enfin, il est évalué que l’implantation d’une mesure semblable dans le contexte actuel génèrerait des effets limités pour un coût relativement élevé.
La CFFP a sondé la population québécoise afin d’évaluer cinq dimensions de l’équilibre budgétaire, à l’aube des élections québécoises 2026, alors que le Québec poursuit son plan de retour à l’équilibre budgétaire dans un contexte toujours déficitaire : l’évaluation de la situation actuelle, l’adhésion au principe, la limitation des déficits aux périodes de récession, la priorisation de cet enjeu pour les prochaines élections et les solutions envisagées pour atteindre l’équilibre.
Les résultats montrent que les Québécois évaluent plutôt négativement la situation budgétaire actuelle du gouvernement, mais qu’ils demeurent fortement attachés au principe de l’équilibre budgétaire. Une majorité estime également que les déficits devraient être réservés aux périodes de récession et que le retour à l’équilibre budgétaire devrait constituer une priorité pour les partis politiques lors des prochaines élections. Lorsqu’ils doivent choisir entre les moyens à privilégier pour y parvenir, les répondants sont toutefois davantage divisés, même si une préférence se dégage en faveur d’une réduction des services plutôt que d’une hausse des impôts.
Au-delà des résultats descriptifs, l’étude propose également des analyses approfondies, dont un exercice de contextualisation visant à mesurer l’incidence de l’ajout d’informations sur la situation budgétaire du Québec sur les réponses des participants. Les conclusions indiquent que les opinions exprimées varient peu selon le contexte présenté, ce qui suggère que les répondants possèdent déjà des repères relativement bien établis sur les enjeux budgétaires. Une analyse des intentions de vote montre également que les préférences partisanes constituent le principal facteur expliquant les différences observées entre les répondants, davantage que l’âge, le revenu ou le niveau de scolarité notamment.
Ce rapport analyse près de 80 ans de promesses électorales fiscales dans le contexte québécois. L’analyse relève plusieurs constantes, dont celle de proposer des baisses d’impôt.
À chaque élection, les partis québécois promettent des choses aux électeurs sur leurs impôts et leurs taxes. Ce texte revient sur ces promesses depuis 1944 : qu’est-ce qui revient d’une campagne à l’autre, et qu’est-ce qui change?
Pour le savoir, les auteurs ont examiné les programmes des partis et dépouillé deux journaux, La Presse et Le Devoir, sur l’ensemble des campagnes. Ils se sont posé trois questions : que promettent les partis en matière de fiscalité, comment les journalistes en parlent-ils, et la fiscalité est-elle un enjeu important ou secondaire dans les campagnes?
Deux constats ressortent. D’abord, les partis promettent presque toujours de baisser les impôts, rarement de les hausser, et ce, peu importe le parti ou l’état de l’économie. Ensuite, certains thèmes reviennent élection après élection sous le même nom, même si ce qu’ils recouvrent a complètement changé avec le temps. Le texte montre aussi que la question qui divise les partis s’est déplacée : on est passé du débat sur l’autonomie fiscale du Québec face à Ottawa à une compétition sur la crédibilité des promesses.
En suivant ces promesses sur près de 80 ans, le cahier se penche sur un objet rarement étudié : ce que les partis choisissent de dire sur les impôts et taxes en campagne électorale.
Cette étude conteste le principe voulant que « la croissance paie pour la croissance » et propose de réduire puis d’abolir les redevances de développement, jugées inflationnistes pour le coût des logements neufs, au profit de l’emprunt municipal et de la tarification des services.
Development charges were introduced to help finance infrastructure needed to accommodate growth and became widely accepted under the principle that “growth should pay for growth.” As housing affordability has worsened and charges on new homes have risen in many Canadian municipalities, they have become a major policy issue.
The idea that “growth should pay for growth” rests on questionable assumptions. It assumes that the benefits of growth-related infrastructure accrue mainly to new residents and that growth-related costs can be clearly separated from other municipal expenditures. Both assumptions are difficult to sustain in practice. Moreover, most evidence suggests that development charges increase the cost of new housing and put upward pressure on housing prices more generally.
Development charges should be gradually reduced over time, with the long-term goal of eliminating them. Alternative financing approaches like greater municipal borrowing and the use of water and wastewater user fees could spread infrastructure costs more fairly across those who benefit from growth while reducing barriers to housing supply.
Cette note d’intervention retrace cinquante ans d’évolution des inégalités de revenus au Québec et conclut que, malgré une hausse marquée des inégalités durant les années 1990, le Québec demeure aujourd’hui plus égalitaire que l’Ontario, le Canada dans son ensemble et plusieurs pays de l’OCDE selon le coefficient de Gini.
Dans une nouvelle étude de l’IRÉC, notre chercheur Pierre Godin propose un regard sur l’évolution des inégalités de revenus au Québec.
Analysant cinquante ans de données et mesurant l’impact de nos politiques publiques sur la redistribution de la richesse, l’étude montre que le modèle québécois se hisse parmi les plus égalitaires de l’OCDE, rivalisant avec les pays scandinaves. Basée sur l’utilisation du coefficient de Gini, l’analyse relève que cela repose essentiellement sur l’efficacité des transferts gouvernementaux plutôt que sur l’impôt sur le revenu. Ce constat confirme l’impact direct et déterminant des choix de politiques publiques, ainsi que des programmes de redistribution sur la cohésion sociale.
Ce rapport soutient que l’élimination des subventions accordées aux entreprises au Canada permettrait de réduire les distorsions économiques, d’améliorer l’efficacité du système fiscal et de favoriser une croissance économique plus forte à long terme.
Though widely used in Canada, economic literature suggests corporate subsidies are a wasteful use of taxpayer dollars that do not boost economic growth.
Subsidies are often unfair to businesses that do not receive them, and substitute the government’s judgment for consumers’ judgment, rewarding firms that create value for politicians rather than those that create value for consumers.
Federal and provincial spending on corporate subsidies has increased substantially over time, with a marked increase beginning in 2015. Between 2007 and 2015, spending on subsidies increased from $22.2 billion to $25.1 billion (inflation-adjusted), or 12.8 percent. From 2015 until 2019, spending increased more rapidly, such that the 2019 level was 44.2 percent more than in 2015. After the pandemic, spending on corporate subsidies increased in 2022, 2023, and 2024. The inflation-adjusted level of spending in 2024 stood at $87.7 billion, more than triple the level observed in 2015.
Even when accounting for both inflation and population, spending on subsidies has increased in every province and at the federal level between 2015 and 2024.
The increased spending on corporate subsidies has occurred in Canada during a period of economic stagnation and renewed interest in policies that can drive economic growth.
Governments in Canada have an opportunity to substantially boost economic growth by eliminating corporate subsidies and directing the savings to broad-based business tax relief.
Ce rapport montre qu’au Canada, la facture fiscale des ménages a augmenté beaucoup plus rapidement que leurs revenus au cours des dernières décennies, les taxes représentant aujourd’hui une part plus importante du budget familial que les dépenses de logement, d’alimentation et d’habillement réunies.
The Canadian Consumer Tax Index tracks the total tax bill of the average Canadian family from 1961 to 2025. Including all types of taxes, that bill has increased by 2,928% since 1961.
Taxes have grown much more rapidly than any other single expenditure for the average Canadian family: expenditures on shelter increased by 2,349%, food by 952%, and clothing by 526% from 1961 to 2025.
The 2,928% increase in the tax bill has also greatly outpaced the increase in the Consumer Price Index (946%), which measures the average price that consumers pay for food, shelter, clothing, transportation, health and personal care, education, and other items.
The average Canadian family now spends more of its income on taxes (41.9%) than it does on basic necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing combined (36.0%). By comparison, 33.5% of the average family’s income went to pay taxes in 1961 while 56.5% went to basic necessities.
In 2025, the average Canadian family earned an income of $121,111 and paid total taxes equaling $50,721 (41.9%). In 1961, the average family had an income of $5,000 and paid a total tax bill of $1,675 (33.5%).
Ce rapport analyse la progressivité du régime fiscal canadien et conclut que le Canada possède déjà un système d’imposition fortement progressif, les ménages à revenu élevé assumant une part disproportionnée du fardeau fiscal total.
There is a common misperception in Canada that top income earners do not pay their share of taxes and that increasing taxes on this income group is an effective way to generate significant additional government revenue.
However, high-income families already pay a disproportionately large share of all Canadian taxes. Indeed, the evidence shows that the top 20 percent of income-earning families pay nearly two-thirds (65.3 percent) of the country’s personal income taxes and more than half (58.3 percent) of total taxes.
In contrast, the bottom 20 percent of incomeearning families are estimated to pay 0.7 percent of all federal and provincial personal income taxes and 1.7 percent of total taxes in Canada. This is, in part, due to the progressivity of Canada’s tax system, where the share of taxes paid typically increases as income rises.
Raising taxes on high income earners ignores the economic consequences of tax rate increases and the associated behavioral responses of taxpayers when faced with higher tax rates or new taxes. In response to a tax increase, many taxpayers will change their behavior in ways that reduce their taxable income through tax planning, avoidance, or evasion that results in governments raising less revenue than anticipated.
Tax increases also reduce Canada’s competitiveness with other industrialized countries, particularly the United States. Specifically, increasing taxes on top income earners makes Canada a less attractive place to live and to work for highly skilled people such as doctors, scientists, managers, and software engineers.
Ce rapport dresse le bilan de l’événement annuel de l’Observatoire sur le filet social québécois et met en perspective, à l’aide de la littérature et des données, la progressivité et les faiblesses de ce filet en 2026.
En 2026, l’état du filet social représente un enjeu majeur d’actualité au Québec. L’augmentation de l’itinérance, la crise du logement, la hausse du coût de la vie, l’insécurité alimentaire, les défis de la cohabitation avec des populations marginalisées ainsi que la grève des organismes communautaires ce printemps comptent parmi les facteurs qui rendent urgente une discussion collective. Malgré l’existence d’un filet social qui vise à fournir un niveau de vie minimal à toutes et à tous, certaines composantes de ce filet auraient besoin d’être retissées.
Ce rapport a pour objectifs de dresser le bilan de l’événement annuel de l’Observatoire québécois des inégalités intitulé « Retisser le filet social pour réduire les inégalités », qui a eu lieu le 14 avril 2026, et de mettre en perspective les contributions des participants et des participantes avec la littérature scientifique et diverses données.
États-Unis
Cette réflexion soutient que les impôts sur la fortune rapportent peu et favorisent l’évitement et la fuite des capitaux, et propose plutôt d’orienter la fiscalité fédérale américaine vers une base de consommation.
Wealth taxes are making headlines. Californians will vote this November on a one-time levy on wealthy residents, and some states are considering imposing annual taxes on wealth. In Congress, prominent members are pushing various proposals for annual wealth taxes and other special charges on high earners. Meanwhile, abroad, Norway and Spain have expanded their wealth taxes in recent years, while Brazil is pressing for the multilateral adoption of a global minimum wealth tax.
Such moves are starting to reverse the decades-long policy consensus that wealth taxes and high taxes on capital are damaging and should be reduced. Since the 1990s, most industrial nations have cut their corporate and capital gains tax rates, and most nations that had annual wealth taxes repealed them. Governments have found that wealth taxes and high taxes on capital income encourage tax avoidance and capital flight, raise little revenue, and tend to become riddled with loopholes.
The new push to impose higher taxes on wealth is misguided. Wealth in the United States overwhelmingly consists of productive business capital, which is mostly self-made rather than inherited. Wealth is savings, which the economy harnesses for investment to support higher wages and more jobs. Raising taxes on wealth would impose costs that ultimately fall on average Americans through reduced productivity and innovation. A further concern is that a federal wealth tax would be of dubious legality under the US Constitution.
A better way to tax wealth than special high-end charges is to shift the federal tax system toward a consumption base. This study describes how such a reform would fully tax millionaires and billionaires—but do so in a way that does not undermine jobs, investment, and economic growth.
Ce rapport montre qu’aux États-Unis, près de 19 millions d’enfants de familles à faible ou moyen revenu ne reçoivent pas le plein montant du crédit d’impôt pour enfants, et conclut qu’une bonification de ce crédit constituerait un moyen efficace de réduire la pauvreté infantile et de renforcer la sécurité économique des familles.
Every family should have a strong foundation of economic security that lets them meet their needs and support their children, whether they live in rural communities or big cities, whether parents and caregivers are working for pay; are unable to work due to health conditions or caregiving responsibilities; or are between jobs, which happens frequently, particularly for low-paid workers. Policymakers play a huge role in strengthening or weakening families’ economic security through the laws they pass and the actions they take. For policymakers who want to address affordability concerns, the Child Tax Credit is a proven, bipartisan tool to strengthen families’ economic security that can and should be improved. Lawmakers should make the full credit available to children in families with low and moderate incomes, as they did in the American Rescue Plan Act’s temporary expansion of the credit for tax year 2021. Research done at the time showed that the vast majority of families with low and moderate incomes spent some or all of the additional income from the expanded Child Tax Credit ($3,600 per child under age 6 and $3,000 per child ages 6-17) on essentials like food, housing, utilities, and clothing. Combined with other forms of COVID-19 pandemic relief, the expanded Child Tax Credit helped drive the child poverty rate down to record lows in 2021.
Ce rapport recommande au Congrès américain de rejeter les allègements fiscaux proposés pour les cryptomonnaies, faisant valoir qu’elles servent surtout à des fins criminelles et spéculatives et qu’aucune raison ne justifie de les soustraire aux règles fiscales applicables aux autres actifs.
Cryptocurrency is essentially computer code that proponents claim can, or one day will, be used the way we use money for financial transactions. To the extent it is being used today for transactions (other than simply buying and selling crypto itself) its main use is for crime. Aside from their usefulness for illicit activities, cryptocurrencies are mainly speculative assets attracting investment from people who believe they will one day be used as money, and people who see a way to profit from those who hold this belief.
Crypto is founded on the premise that it will allow people to make transactions free of government and free of intermediaries like banks. However, today the crypto industry is dominated by large institutions which claim that they cannot thrive without Congress enacting special tax breaks for crypto that are not available for other types of assets and transactions.
Ce rapport examine les revenus fiscaux tirés des paris sportifs aux États-Unis et conclut que ceux-ci sont généralement modestes, souvent compensés par une baisse d’autres recettes publiques et potentiellement inférieurs aux coûts sociaux associés à leur légalisation.
Many states are facing a backlash to the recent and rapid legalization of sports gambling. Some legislatures are considering regulations meant specifically to curb addiction and game-rigging. Opponents of regulation point to the promise of added tax revenue, a major reason that states legalized in the first place. Sports gambling generates tens of millions of dollars for legalization states, cash that budget-conscious state lawmakers are unwilling to forgo.
But is legal sports gambling actually a net positive for state budgets? This report argues no, because:
The tax revenue generated by sports gambling is relatively small, representing roughly 0.2% of all state tax receipts on average.
In many states, that revenue is likely being “cannibalized” from other sources, such as lotteries and sales-tax revenue. This means that added dollars may be illusory, taken from one pot to place in another.
The well-documented social costs of legalization inevitably end up on states’ balance sheets, generating costs that, under reasonable assumptions, well exceed revenue.
Advocates of regulating sports gambling should not allow the revenue argument to deter them. Rather, sports-gambling taxes should be set to minimize harms—not to maximize revenue.
Ce rapport estime qu’aux États-Unis les hausses tarifaires mises en œuvre depuis 2025 ont réduit le revenu réel des ménages et conclut que des crédits d’impôt remboursables ciblés pourraient compenser une part importante du fardeau économique supporté par les familles.
WhY THIS MATTERS
Since the US Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) did not grant the president tariff authority, the federal government has repaid about $21 billion (as of May 31) to the businesses that paid those levies. But economists generally view tariffs as burdening all US residents, not just importers, through increases in prices and reductions in income.
We examine four options for one-time tariff credits that would offset at least some of the IEEPA burden.
WHAT WE FOUND
The IEEPA tariffs reduced the inflation-adjusted value of families’ after-tax income—thus increasing their tax burden by $1,250 on average. The magnitude of the increase ranged from $230 in the lowest income quintile to $4,430 among families in the top quintile.
We considered four options that would offset the IEEPA tariff burdens:
Under the first option, the maximum credit amount would be $700 for unmarried filers (roughly the average IEEPA burden for single filers) and $1,400 for married couples. The credit would be increased by $350 for one dependent and $700 for two or more dependents. If all families were eligible, the average credit would be $1,090, offsetting 87 percent of the average IEEPA tariff burden.
About 82 percent of families would be eligible if the credit began to phase out when income exceeded $75,000 ($150,000 for married couples filing joint returns). On average, that credit would offset about two-thirds of the IEEPA tariff.
Both those options overcompensate families, on average, in the lower two income groups and undercompensate those in the top two income quintiles.
If the credit was both phased in and phased out—with the maximum credit reached at $35,000 ($70,000 for joint filers)—the average credit for all families would drop to $570; in the second quintile, the average would be reduced to $660. However, about one-third of families in the bottom quintile would not receive a credit.
Alternatively, the maximum credit could be set at $400 for unmarried filers (about the average IEEPA tariff burden for single filers in the second quintile) and $800 for married couples. The average credit would be roughly the same as in the third option, but all families would be eligible. With no phase-in or phaseout range, families in the second quintile would receive an average credit of $520 whereas the top income group’s credit would average $800.
HOW WE DID IT
In the analysis of tariff refunds, we assume that US families bear tariff burdens through increases in prices and reductions in income. To trace the tariffs from those paid directly by importers to all families, we use a tariff rules engine, a supply chain model, and a microsimulation tax model of the federal tax system.
Ce rapport montre qu’aux États-Unis, la croissance des recettes fiscales des États ralentit malgré des revenus de l’impôt sur le revenu encore solides, tandis que les gouvernements font face à des pressions budgétaires croissantes liées à la hausse des dépenses, à l’incertitude économique et à la réduction du soutien fédéral.
Inflation-adjusted tax revenues declined in more than half of the states during the first nine months of fiscal year 2026. Although a handful of states with progressive personal income tax structures and high concentrations of high-income taxpayers benefited from strong stock market performance and elevated capital gains realizations, this growth masked widespread weakness across the rest of the country.
As states entered fiscal year 2027, slower economic growth, heightened geopolitical uncertainty, renewed inflationary pressures, financial market volatility, and uncertainty surrounding federal fiscal policy and intergovernmental funding complicated revenue forecasting and budget planning. At the same time, states continued to pursue increasingly divergent tax policy strategies, with some implementing previously enacted tax cuts while others broadened tax bases or explored new revenue sources.
Trends in Tax Revenue
State tax revenue data for the first quarter of 2026 highlight continued variation across states and major tax sources. Key year-over-year trends include the following:
State total taxes: Inflation-adjusted tax revenues declined in 26 states during the first nine months of fiscal year 2026, while only seven states reported real revenue growth of 4.0 percent or more. Preliminary data for the second quarter of 2026 indicate that revenue growth remained modest overall.
Personal income taxes: Robust estimated payments and elevated capital gains realizations kept this the strongest-performing revenue source. However, withholding growth continued to moderate, and several states with recently enacted income tax rate reductions reported lower collections.
Corporate income taxes: Revenues remained weak in many states despite continued growth in national corporate profits. Recent rate reductions, tax planning strategies, apportionment changes, and timing effects contributed to sluggish collections.
Sales taxes: Sales tax growth remained modest as consumer spending continued to soften. Growth in durable and nondurable goods spending remained weak, while services spending moderated after several years of stronger growth.
What We’re Focusing On
This quarter’s report includes a special section on the rapid growth of prediction markets and the challenges they pose for state tax systems. The section examines the evolving federal regulatory framework, recent state tax and regulatory responses, and potential implications for state gambling tax revenues. More broadly, it highlights the growing challenge states face in adapting tax systems to emerging digital markets while protecting existing revenue bases.
What to Expect in the Future
Looking ahead, given their more constrained fiscal environment, many states are considering new revenue sources, including taxes on emerging industries such as prediction markets and large electricity-intensive data centers, while others continue implementing previously enacted tax reductions. These competing policy approaches are likely to contribute to increasingly divergent fiscal outcomes across states.
International
Ce rapport montre que les récentes mesures de lutte contre l’évitement fiscal dans l’Union européenne renforcent l’argument en faveur d’une plus grande harmonisation de l’impôt sur les sociétés afin de réduire les distorsions d’investissement au sein du marché intérieur.
The European Union’s implementation of global anti-tax avoidance rules and the global minimum tax is widely regarded as a success. By substantially reducing opportunities for profit shifting, these reforms have strengthened revenue protection. But this success also has an underappreciated implication for the EU. Profit shifting in part emerged as a response to differences in national corporate tax systems. It resulted in multinational firms reducing the effective tax burden associated with investing in higher-tax EU countries. It thus both eroded tax bases and offset the influence of tax differences on real investment decisions. By constraining this form of ‘self-help’ while leaving the underlying diversity of national corporate tax systems largely intact, antiavoidance reforms potentially increase the sensitivity of investment to tax differentials across the EU. Evidence shows that investment has become significantly more responsive to effective corporate tax rates in the last decade since coordinated antiavoidance rules started to be discussed. Reforms to tackle profit shifting have thus shifted the trade-off facing European policymakers to a trilemma involving tax sovereignty, revenue protection and investment neutrality. In this context – though not questioning the merits of combatting profit shifting – the success of anti-avoidance reforms strengthens the economic case for further coordination of corporate taxation within the single market, as antiavoidance policy and tax harmonisation become increasingly complementary.
Ce rapport examine la fiscalité du secteur financier dans l’Union européenne et conclut que l’exonération de TVA applicable aux services financiers, conçue à l’origine pour surmonter des difficultés techniques, génère aujourd’hui des distorsions économiques, des coûts de conformité élevés et une fragmentation fiscale susceptible de nuire à l’innovation, à la compétitivité et à l’intégration du marché unique.
This study, examines the taxation of the financial sector in the EU, covering banking, insurance and other financial services. It assesses the current tax framework, with a focus on the VAT exemption for financial services and the sectoral taxes applied by Member States, and analyses whether this framework remains fit for purpose. The study combines legal, economic, sectoral, VAT liability and compliance analyses, supported by stakeholder consultation in the EU and relevant third countries and economic modelling, including a novel empirical analysis of tax incidence in the financial sector. Starting from the outdated nature of the VAT exemption, which was originally introduced to deal with the technical difficulty of applying VAT to financial services, the study identifies two main problems with the current situation: tax-driven distortions caused by non-deductible (i.e., hidden) VAT on financial services inputs, and an uncertain, complex and fragmented tax framework. These problems increase compliance costs, affect business organisation and outsourcing decisions, and may hinder innovation, specialisation, competitiveness and Single Market integration. The study then assesses possible policy considerations, ranging from targeted modernisation and simplification of the existing VAT rules to broader reforms. While noting that any decisions on future action are inherently political, the study provides detailed evidence on the impacts, advantages and disadvantages of different approaches. By way of example, the study concludes that it would be technically feasible to tax the financial sector’s value added, either through a value-added tax (VAT) or a financial activities tax (FAT). The study goes on to assess what this would mean in terms of broader fiscal implication, tax burden on the financial sector, costs for consumers or wider impact on the economy.
Ce rapport évalue la mise en œuvre du mécanisme d’autoliquidation de la TVA dans l’Union européenne et conclut qu’il demeure un outil efficace pour réduire la fraude à la TVA dans les secteurs les plus à risque, bien que son succès dépende d’un encadrement rigoureux et d’une harmonisation accrue entre les États membres.
This European implementation assessment aims to inform the ongoing work of the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters on an own-initiative report (2025/2261(INI)) on the implementation of the VAT reverse charge mechanism (RCM) and quick reaction mechanism (QRM) in EU Member States. The study is composed of two parts. The first part is an introduction by the European Parliamentary Research Service that provides the context, scope and contribution of the external study to parliamentary and EU policymaking. The second is a comprehensive study undertaken by a team of external experts, assessing the effectiveness of the RCM and QRM in the EU and their impact on administrative burden and compliance costs of tax authorities and businesses. The study is based on desk research, stakeholder consultations, and eight case studies, providing an up-to-date assessment of the mechanism’s implementation and impact. The study also identifies lessons learnt and challenges from the implementation of the RCM and QRM across the EU, and offers recommendations in the context of their review and the decision-making process regarding their potential extension beyond the current deadline of 31 December 2026.
Ce rapport fait le bilan de la taxe française sur les transactions financières : un rendement significatif (2,5 Md€ en 2025) malgré une assiette étroite et de larges exonérations, des effets économiques indéterminés et une collecte peu coûteuse, mais fragilisée par des risques de non-déclaration.
Instaurée dans le contexte de l’après-crise financière par la loi de finances rectificative pour 2012, la taxe sur les transactions financières poursuivait initialement trois objectifs : faire contribuer le secteur financier au redressement des finances publiques ; exercer une action de régulation sur les marchés financiers ; et initier un mouvement d’adhésion des autres États membres de l’Union européenne au projet de taxe européenne porté par la Commission dans le
cadre d’une coopération renforcée.
Treize ans après la création de cette taxe, et en réponse à une saisine reçue dans le cadre de sa troisième campagne de participation citoyenne en septembre 2024, la Cour en a examiné les conditions de mise en œuvre, les effets économiques et les modalités de collecte. La présente enquête porte sur la période 2017-2025, mais rappelle le contexte et les évolutions intervenues depuis 2012.
Ce document de réflexion attribue le blocage des réformes fiscales britanniques à trois « pathologies » (publique, politique, médiatique) et propose notamment de remplacer le council tax et le stamp duty par une taxe foncière proportionnelle (environ 0,65 %) et d’aligner l’impôt sur les gains en capital sur celui du revenu.
Britain’s tax system isn’t fit for purpose. As this paper shows, the historical evolution of our tax system has produced one marked by a great deal of complexity, but which struggles to raise the revenue required to meet the public’s demands on the state.
At the same time, almost two decades of weak economic growth and an ageing population have left British taxpayers in an invidious position: where the critique of the public was once that they wanted a European-style welfare state on American levels of taxation, they are now facing something more like an American-style welfare state on European levels of taxation. Fiscal pressure will only continue to grow as our population ages, immigration falls, and governments grapple with the demands of our growing defence needs and the climate transition.
Many sensible proposals for tax reform have been put forward over several decades. But few really big reforms have come to pass. This paper attributes that inertia to three pathologies.
- A public pathology, whereby the British public shies away from the tax implications posed by their expectations of public services.
- The political pathology, whereby in response to the public pathology, politicians have continually sought easy fixes – like freezing thresholds or stealth taxes – rather than confront the public with honest fiscal truth.
- The press pathology, which amplifies the losers of any tax rise, and distorts political debate and public perceptions.
Ce document de travail juge légitime l’objectif de la « taxe Zucman » sur les fortunes de plus de 100 M€, mais lui préfère un impôt sur le revenu économique et certain (ACIT) taxant tous les gains en capital à leur réalisation, moins exposé à la sous-évaluation et à l’évitement.
We re-examine here the proposal for a floor tax on wealth above €100 million, known as the “Zucman tax”, and propose an alternative tax (ACIT). The “Zucman tax” attempts to respond to the decline in effective tax rates at the top of the distribution of “economic” income. A floor tax on large fortunes would restore progressivity, block certain avoidance strategies, and bring the contribution of the ultra-rich closer to the principle of taxation according to ability to pay. However, while the objective is legitimate, the proposal to tax wealth is inconsistent with the problem identified — the under-taxation of economic income — because wealth is not a good proxy for income at the individual level. Moreover, if the tax base depends on market valuation, agents have an incentive to avoid its revelation. Staying “in the shadow of the market” allows both a systemic undervaluation of wealth and the avoidance of taxation during sharp rises followed by falls. By tying the tax to observable price signals, such as those produced by funding rounds or initial public offerings, the tax could discourage market participation — which is precisely what makes it possible to establish these valuations. There is an alternative that pursues the same objectives and answers the main objections. Rather than relying on imperfect wealth proxies, we propose to tax economic income directly, that is, annual income flows augmented by capital gains. Current tax law, in France and in other countries, largely exempts realized capital gains. A tax on ascertainable comprehensive income (ACIT) — “ascertainable” in the sense of realized and known with certainty — would eliminate these possibilities of erasure by taxing all capital gains upon sale, as well as upon transfers for consideration or free of charge (gifts and inheritances).
Ce rapport examine les progrès de la coopération fiscale internationale en faveur du développement et conclut que le renforcement des capacités des administrations fiscales et l’approfondissement de la coopération internationale contribuent à accroître durablement la mobilisation des recettes publiques dans les pays en développement.
Accompagner les pays en développement dans leurs efforts pour renforcer leurs systèmes fiscaux est depuis longtemps une priorité pour l’OCDE. Le programme de l’OCDE sur la fiscalité et le développement a été mis sur pied il y a plus de dix ans afin de collaborer efficacement avec les pays qui luttent contre la fraude et l’évasion fiscales, d’améliorer la mobilisation des recettes et de faire avancer les réformes de la politique fiscale et de l’administration de l’impôt. Il a notamment vocation à faciliter la participation des pays à des initiatives essentielles en matière de fiscalité internationale telles que le Cadre inclusif sur le BEPS et le Forum mondial sur la transparence et l’échange de renseignements à des fins fiscales, à fournir des données fiables et comparables au niveau international pour éclairer l’analyse des politiques et à dispenser une assistance technique ciblée sur un large éventail de questions de fiscalité internationale. Le présent rapport donne un aperçu général des activités et des résultats dans ces domaines en 2025, année qui coïncide avec le 10e anniversaire de l’initiative conjointe du PNUD et de l’OCDE : Inspecteurs des impôts sans frontières. Il présente également les priorités pour 2026.
Ce rapport présente les résultats du programme Inspecteurs des impôts sans frontières de l’OCDE et du PNUD et montre que le renforcement des capacités des administrations fiscales des pays en développement contribue à accroître les recettes fiscales, à améliorer la conformité et à renforcer la mobilisation des ressources nationales.
Ce rapport annuel dresse le bilan des résultats et des activités de l’initiative « Inspecteurs des impôts sans frontières » (IISF) pour l’année 2025. Il s’agit d’une initiative conjointe de l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) et du Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) visant à aider les pays en développement à renforcer leurs capacités en matière de contrôle et d’enquêtes fiscales.
Il met en lumière les principaux résultats obtenus au cours de l’année, notamment les progrès continus réalisés dans les domaines de la mobilisation des recettes intérieures, du renforcement des capacités et de la coopération internationale. Au-delà des résultats liés aux recettes, le rapport examine l’impact plus large des programmes IISF sur les capacités institutionnelles, les cadres législatifs, la conformité des contribuables, la confiance des vérificateurs et l’apprentissage entre pairs au sein des administrations fiscales.
Le lancement d’IISF 2.0 en 2025 a constitué une étape clé, marquant une nouvelle phase dans l’évolution de l’initiative. Le rapport explore la manière dont l’IISF répond à un environnement fiscal international de plus en plus complexe grâce à des modalités de programme améliorées, à l’élargissement des partenariats et à des approches innovantes en matière de renforcement des capacités. Il présente également le réseau mondial croissant des parties prenantes de l’initiative, les efforts de communication et de sensibilisation, ainsi que les mesures mises en place pour renforcer son efficacité et sa viabilité à long terme.
Dans une perspective d’avenir, le rapport expose les priorités de l’IISF pour l’année 2026 et la manière dont, avec ses partenaires, l’initiative continuera à répondre à la demande croissante d’un soutien pratique au renforcement des capacités fiscales, tout en contribuant au renforcement des administrations fiscales et à la réalisation des objectifs de développement durable à travers le monde.
Ce rapport évalue la viabilité à long terme des finances publiques du Royaume-Uni et conclut que le vieillissement de la population, la hausse des dépenses de santé et les pressions budgétaires croissantes nécessiteront des ajustements fiscaux importants pour assurer la soutenabilité des finances publiques.
This report assesses fiscal sustainability through scenarios which illustrate the likely major sources of pressure on the public finances over the next 50 years. The UK’s public finances are currently in a challenging position relative to history and to other similar countries, with government debt having increased by one of the largest shares of GDP of any advanced economy over the past two decades. And there are many sources of risk to the short- and medium-term outlook for the public finances, most obviously at present from the impact of the conflict in the Middle East. It is important that these medium-term risks and challenges are also seen in the light of an assessment of longer-term fiscal sustainability. This is because, while the analysis in this report focuses on difficult fiscal outcomes that could emerge some years down the road, a key finding is that early action to head these off is much less costly than late action.
Long-term projections such as these are highly uncertain and very sensitive to the underpinning assumptions, which is why we present multiple scenarios. In almost all cases, these scenarios show the public finances eventually moving onto an unsustainable path. It is not plausible that the public finances could actually follow such trajectories indefinitely – it is almost certain that future governments would at some point have to take action to prevent this happening. The scenarios should, therefore, not be seen as forecasts, but as illustrations of the likely future pressures on the public finances and the scale of changes that would be needed at some point to maintain fiscal sustainability.
Ce document examine l’incidence des taxes sur les carburants en Espagne et montre que leur répercussion sur les prix dépend largement de la position concurrentielle des entreprises.
This paper studies the pass-through of commodity taxes that apply differentially across competing firms. We exploit regional variations in fuel taxes in Spain, which generated sharp tax differences among competitors at either sides of regional borders. Using pump-level price data covering the universe of fuel stations in Spain, we find that equivalent tax shocks generate different price effects depending on whether they place affected firms at a competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to cross-regional rivals. High-tax stations near borders only partially shifThis paper studies the pass-through of commodity taxes that apply differentially across competing firms. We exploit regional variations in fuel taxes in Spain, which generated sharp tax differences among competitors at either sides of regional borders. Using pump-level price data covering the universe of fuel stations in Spain, we find that equivalent tax shocks generate different price effects depending on whether they place affected firms at a competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to cross-regional rivals. High-tax stations near borders only partially shift.
Ce document compare les crédits d’impôt à la R-D et les régimes de brevets (« patent boxes ») comme outils de soutien à l’innovation et conclut que les crédits d’impôt sont généralement plus efficaces lorsque les dépenses de R-D sont observables, tandis que les régimes de brevets peuvent être préférables lorsque certains intrants sont difficiles à mesurer.
We analyze the relative desirability of R&D tax credits (TCs) and patent boxes (PBs) as instruments for stimulating R&D, in a setting which allows for several organizational forms within the R&D sector and where there are several market failures, all of which imply under-investment in R&D. There are two key features of the model. The first is that it is a closed economy, so the (international) profit shifting role for the PB is absent. The second is that there may be an unobservable input to R&D (e.g. managerial effort) that cannot be subsidized by a TC. The government can choose a TC, a PB, and also the main rate of CIT. We find that (i) when the unobservable input is absent, a PB should never be used, but a TC may be, if market failure is severe enough; (ii) when the unobservable input is present, the optimal policy depends on the need for tax revenue, as measured by the MCPF. When this is low, the TC should never be used, but a PB may be, but as need rises, both instruments should be used, and when it is very high, only a TC should be used.
Ce document analyse l’effet de l’échange automatique de renseignements financiers en Afrique du Sud et montre que, malgré une hausse importante de la déclaration des revenus détenus à l’étranger, une part substantielle de ces revenus demeure non déclarée aux autorités fiscales.
In a coordinated effort to curb tax evasion, governments systematically exchange information about bank accounts with foreign owners. We study the compliance effects of the policy in the context of South Africa using information reports on 1 million foreign bank accounts linked to income and audit data. We find that self-reported foreign income increased sharply and persistently at the onset of information exchange, but remained much below the true foreign income implied by the information reports. We explain the partial compliance response by showing that, contrary to standard theory of third-party reporting, the detection risk associated with non-compliance was modest.
Ce rapport soutient qu’une décision internationale sur la coopération fiscale pourrait permettre de récupérer jusqu’à 500 G$ de recettes fiscales perdues chaque année et souligne l’importance d’un renforcement des règles mondiales pour lutter contre l’évasion fiscale des multinationales et des grandes fortunes.
With a UN Tax Convention in sight, the world now faces a decision that could fundamentally reshape corporate taxation. This study, co-published with Public Services International, shows the revenue gains come in at 500 billion dollars each year – and almost everyone stands to gain.
The decision concerns the drafting of the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. A pivotal commitment, in Article 5 of the current negotiating text, has the potential to ensure that countries can exert taxing rights according to the location of economic activity. That is, each country could tax multinationals in proportion to their share of the global activity.
In practical terms, this would mean moving away from a 100-year-old “pay-where-you-say” approach to a “pay-where-you-play” approach. In technical terms, it would be a shift away from the transfer pricing system based on the “arm’s length principle” to unitary taxation with formulary apportionment.
This study presents the country-level revenue impacts of this change, modelling different scenarios for implementing the change. The study makes two innovative contributions to the literature: it demonstrates that resource rights must precede taxing rights and that sales need to be measured where customers are located rather than where they originate.
Ce document soutient que la justice fiscale constitue une condition essentielle à la réalisation des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, en soulignant que l’évasion fiscale et les flux financiers illicites privent les États de ressources cruciales pour financer les services publics et réduire les inégalités.
Our submission responds to the OHCHR call for inputs on the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, focusing on mobilizing public resources through tax justice. We explain how progressive taxation, stronger tax transparency, beneficial ownership disclosure, public country-by-country reporting and well-resourced tax administrations can help States mobilize maximum available resources, reduce inequality and finance essential public services. We also highlight the importance of ensuring that fiscal policies respect equality, non-discrimination, participation and accountability.
We examine the challenges that tax abuse and weaknesses in the international financial system create for domestic resource mobilisation. Cross-border tax abuse, profit shifting and financial secrecy continue to erode countries’ tax bases, limiting resources available for economic, social and cultural rights and disproportionately affecting communities that rely on public services. We therefore emphasise the need for stronger international cooperation, fairer international tax rules, debt relief and other forms of international public finance that expand countries’ fiscal space.
Our submission concludes by presenting tax justice as a key pathway to human rights and sustainable development. Drawing on our 5Rs framework—Revenue, Redistribution, Repricing, Representation and Reparations—and our ABC to G₃ framework, we set out reforms to strengthen transparency, accountability, progressive taxation and international tax cooperation. Together, these measures can help States mobilise and use public resources more fairly and effectively while addressing inequality and advancing economic, social and cultural rights.
Ce document analyse les mécanismes de transfert de bénéfices des multinationales et conclut que ceux-ci continuent de déplacer artificiellement des profits vers des juridictions à faible fiscalité, privant les États de recettes fiscales importantes et accentuant les inégalités fiscales à l’échelle mondiale.
This paper develops a data-driven methodology for detecting potential profit shifting by multinational enterprises in South Africa. Drawing on detailed administrative tax and customs data, we construct a series of red-flag indicators based on firm-level profitability, intra-group transactions, and trade with tax haven jurisdictions. A firm is flagged only if it persistently reports profits below its industry average while exhibiting at least one additional red flag related to related-party debt, service payments, or haven-linked trade. Although less than 1% of multinational enterprises are flagged, this small subset accounts for a disproportionately large share of potential tax revenue at risk. The approach offers a practical and replicable framework for tax administrations in developing countries seeking to prioritise audits and strengthen domestic resource mobilization using existing administrative data.
Ce rapport résume les négociations de la cinquième session de la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur la coopération fiscale internationale et met en lumière les profondes divergences entre les États quant à la réforme de la gouvernance fiscale mondiale, notamment sur le partage des droits d’imposition et la lutte contre l’évitement fiscal.
Between 3 August and 13 August, the Fifth Session of the negotiations for the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNFCITC) took place in New York.
This report summarizes the negotiations of the Fifth Session as they took place in line with the programme of work. The report covers the negotiations under the three workstreams, namely the framework convention (workstream 1), the protocol on cross-border services (workstream 2) and the protocol on the prevention and resolution of crossborder tax disputes (workstream 3).
The summaries are the result of contributions by Tax Justice Network staff, including Alex Cobham, Bob Michel, Carolina Finette, Florencia Lorenzo and Liz Nelson.
Ce rapport montre qu’en Australie, les recettes de la taxe sur les produits et services (GST) n’ont pas suivi la croissance de l’économie, privant les États de près de 279 G$ depuis 2000, et soutient qu’un élargissement de l’assiette de la GST ainsi que de nouvelles sources de revenus seraient nécessaires pour assurer un financement durable des services publics.
When introduced in July 2000, revenue from Australia’s Goods and Services Tax (GST) was expected to grow in line with the overall Australian economy, providing a secure revenue source for state governments to fund services. This has not occurred.
This paper identifies that the states are struggling to provide the services that the people of Australia expect, and the problem is a lack of revenue. States have lost out on $279 billion since the GST was introduced. This is because revenue has failed to keep up with national income. The economy has grown at 5.9% while GST revenue has grown at 5%. The paper recommends broadening the GST to include private health insurance and private school fees, and adding other taxes to the pool of money that flows to the states.
Key points
While the population has continued to grow and the cost of the services state governments provide has increased, the revenue they receive from the GST has not kept up.
States and territories will continue to see falling GST revenue if there is no change.
Adding additional taxes to the pool of revenue, alongside the GST, could bridge the funding gap and give the states a more sustainable revenue stream for the long term.
Ce document révèle qu’une part importante de la richesse des milliardaires est liée à des actifs à fortes émissions de carbone et conclut qu’une taxation ciblée des grandes fortunes les plus carbonées pourrait contribuer à réduire les inégalités tout en soutenant les objectifs climatiques.
How large are billionaires’ carbon footprints? While increasing evidence highlights large disparities in emissions between and within countries, detailed individual-level data on emissions portfolios remain scarce. In this paper, we analyze the wealth composition of the top 501 billionaires and construct a dataset linking each of their assets to emissions. According to our ownership-based emission accounting framework, every USD million held by billionaires is associated with more than 65 tCO2e per year—about 10 times the annual carbon footprint of the average person. Further, our estimates reveal an extreme concentration of wealth among the super-rich and, even more so, emissions. About 50 billionaires account for around three-quarters of total emissions in our sample, with publicly traded equity in Basic Materials, Industrials, and Utilities playing a disproportionate role as emission sources. Emission intensity is key: 97% of the variance in log emissions is explained by intensity differences, suggesting that scale effects play a limited role and carbon footprints are almost entirely driven by investment choices. The highest-emitting billionaires — including some of the wealthiest — derive a substantial share of their emissions (between 44 and 66%) from hardto-abate sectors. Comparing alternative taxation schemes targeting both extreme wealth and emissions, we show that the introduction of a new progressive carbon wealth tax can potentially achieve three objectives: progressively taxing billionaires to curb inequality, targeting the most polluting activities, and raising substantial resources to finance a sustainable and equitable transition.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
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Coordination et édition :
- Ariane Gaboury
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Note: L’intelligence artificielle générative a été utilisée dans la préparation de ce bulletin de veille.