Bulletin de veille du 19 mai 2026
Québec/Canada
Ce rapport, produit dans le cadre du chantier sur la fiscalité municipale de l’Union des municipalités du Québec, présente les principaux constats et perspectives des auteurs en lien avec la fiscalité municipale à la suite d’une démarche effectuée en collaboration avec les acteurs du monde municipal.
Il y a un an, l’UMQ lançait un chantier pour faire évoluer la fiscalité municipale dans lequel elle nous confiait le mandat d’examiner les enjeux sous un angle renouvelé. Pour ancrer notre démarche dans la réalité des acteurs municipaux, nous l’avons articulée principalement autour de panels d’experts, d’un sondage auprès des municipalités et de rencontres avec les représentants de villes représentatives de la diversité municipale.
Après un an de réflexion liée à ce chantier, certains constats apparaissent comme incontournables. En voici cinq.
Le premier touche l’impôt foncier. Sans être parfait, cet impôt demeure un bon impôt ; il constitue aujourd’hui l’assiette centrale dont disposent les municipalités et il le restera dans l’avenir prévisible. Or, nos travaux montrent qu’il a été sous‑utilisé, comme en témoigne notamment la baisse de la part relative des revenus municipaux dans l’ensemble des revenus des administrations publiques au Québec. Cela peut sembler évident, mais les municipalités doivent prélever des revenus à la hauteur des dépenses qu’elles assument, en se questionnant, bien entendu, sur le bien‑fondé et l’efficience de ces dépenses, plutôt que de se fixer des barrières psychologiques. La plus fréquente est la limitation de l’évolution des taxes foncières à l’inflation, une contrainte que ni les gouvernements fédéral ni celui du Québec ne s’imposent.
Le deuxième constat concerne les revendications fiscales du monde municipal. Elles se sont beaucoup concentrées, au cours des dernières décennies, autour de la diversification des revenus. Or, il est rapidement apparu que cette notion ne recouvre pas la même réalité pour tous. Dans une majorité de cas, elle renvoie davantage à une attente de bonification des transferts gouvernementaux qu’à une volonté de diversifier les revenus autonomes des municipalités. Même s’il est clair qu’un dialogue doit se tenir entre Québec et les municipalités afin notamment de clarifier certaines responsabilités importantes et le financement qui devrait leur être associé, le contexte actuel des finances publiques conduit à aborder avec modération le fait de simplement demander plus d’argent.
Un troisième constat cible la diversification des revenus fiscaux. Aucun consensus clair ne s’est dégagé quant à l’ampleur du potentiel fiscal des pouvoirs qui ont été accordés aux municipalités au cours de la dernière décennie. Plusieurs sont d’avis que les municipalités n’ont pas encore exploité le plein potentiel de ces pouvoirs et d’autres croient qu’il ne s’agit que de nouvelles sources de revenus limitées. S’il y a des améliorations possibles au cadre fiscal, et plusieurs ont été soulignées par les intervenants, il n’y a pas de solution facile pour générer des revenus importants. Notre principal constat est que les municipalités ont besoin de temps et d’expertise pour leur permettre d’aller plus loin avec les pouvoirs qui leur ont été dévolus. La diversification demeure pertinente, mais elle peut prendre du temps à se mettre en place et il apparaît mal avisé de chercher à développer trop rapidement de nouvelles sources de revenus afin de combler un manque à gagner découlant d’une sous‑utilisation de l’impôt foncier. Une mesure mal ficelée peut avoir des impacts non seulement sur la municipalité qui la met en place, mais également sur toutes celles qui envisageaient le faire.
Le quatrième constat vise les transferts gouvernementaux. À enveloppe égale, il serait certainement possible de faire davantage et de faire mieux. Le constat principal qui se dégage est qu’il y a trop de programmes, et pas assez de flexibilité ni de prévisibilité. Cela entraîne une série de conséquences contre‑productives et nuit sérieusement à l’autonomie municipale. Les exemples de municipalités qui ont eu à prioriser certains projets au détriment d’autres projets pourtant prioritaires pour ne pas laisser d’argent sur la table ont été trop nombreux.
Le cinquième constat porte sur les infrastructures. Reconnaissons que les municipalités font face à de nombreux défis : logement, transport collectif, adaptation aux changements climatiques, itinérance, pour n’en nommer que quelques‑uns. Tous sont importants et exigent davantage de clarté et de prévisibilité quant au partage des responsabilités et au financement, dans les échanges entre Québec et les municipalités. Toutefois, un enjeu est ressorti nettement du lot dans la démarche et fait consensus, toutes tailles de municipalités confondues : les infrastructures. Cet enjeu s’impose d’ailleurs dans l’ensemble du discours politique québécois depuis quelques années. Certes, les municipalités doivent faire leur part, mais Québec doit également jouer un rôle central pour permettre le maintien et la réfection des infrastructures municipales. La diminution de la part relative du Plan québécois des infrastructures (PQI) consacrée spécifiquement aux municipalités n’apparaît pas compatible avec l’ampleur des défis auxquels elles font face.
À la lumière de ces constats, une base fragilisée ne constitue pas un socle idéal pour proposer un éventail de nouvelles solutions, aussi innovantes puissent-elles être. Il est apparu clair que les municipalités doivent solidifier la base pour avoir les moyens d’agir.
Cette étude analyse les effets des hausses du taux d’imposition des sociétés dans plusieurs provinces canadiennes et conclut qu’une augmentation de l’impôt sur le revenu des sociétés peut entraîner des coûts économiques importants en réduisant l’investissement, la productivité et l’assiette fiscale, particulièrement en Colombie-Britannique.
Corporate income tax (CIT) is an important source of revenue for Canadian provinces, and governments often increase CIT rates to address budgetary pressures.
Higher CIT rates can reduce productivity and discourage investment and business activity, creating broader economic costs beyond the revenue generated. The marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) helps assess these trade-offs by measuring the economic cost of generating an additional dollar of tax revenue.
This study estimates the short-run MCPF for provincial CIT in four major provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. The analysis first focuses on investigating how sensitive the CIT base is to changes in tax rates.
Results show that a one percentage-point increase in the CIT rate reduces the tax base by 4.82% in British Columbia, 4.00% in Alberta, 3.47% in Ontario, and 3.10% in Quebec.
Using these estimates, the study then computes the short-run MCPF as follows: 2.37 for British Columbia, 1.47 for Alberta, 1.66 for Ontario, and 1.55 for Quebec. This suggests that raising one additional dollar of CIT revenue costs the economy $2.37 in British Columbia, $1.47 in Alberta, $1.66 in Ontario, and $1.55 in Quebec. The results highlight significant differences across provinces, with British Columbia facing the highest economic cost.
A key policy message is that a higher CIT rate can be an inefficient way to raise revenue. Policy makers should weigh these economic costs against fiscal needs and long‑term goals such as improving investment, productivity, and growth. Greater reliance on less distortionary taxes may reduce economic costs while supporting fiscal sustainability.
États-Unis
Ce rapport montre que la suppression de l’indexation annuelle des prestations d’aide aux familles défavorisées (TANF) par le District de Columbia fera perdre 2 429 dollars à une famille de trois enfants d’ici 2030 et réduira leur pouvoir d’achat de 9 %, alors que d’autres indexations (impôt successoral, taxe d’enregistrement) sont maintenues pour les contribuables plus aisés.
Beginning October 2026, DC lawmakers will reduce cash assistance for families with the fewest resources by eliminating the annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits pushing more children into poverty and deepening hardship for those already struggling. By FY 2030, inflation will erode the value of benefits for a family of three by 9 percent. To prevent inflation from diminishing the value of this already limited support, DC lawmakers must reverse the cuts to TANF’s COLA – an investment of $5.7 million in FY 2027. Meanwhile, DC lawmakers have maintained COLAs for estate taxes, recordation taxes for first-time homebuyers, and a commercial property tax abatement that will skyrocket from $5 million to $41 million. Failing to reverse the cut will push families deeper into hardship, even as the District continues to protect the value of benefits in other programs.
Ce rapport montre que l’exemption de longue date des services publicitaires aux États-Unis des taxes de vente étatiques n’est plus justifiable à l’ère des mégadonnées. Leur taxation pourrait générer entre 16 et 27 milliards de dollars par an tout en corrigeant un biais structurel qui subventionne implicitement les grandes plateformes numériques.
States have for many years exempted advertising from state and local sales taxes, but these exemptions should be reconsidered for two main reasons: advertising is a major financing mechanism for the consumption of goods and services; and most advertising today takes the form of targeted or programmatic ads flowing through a few gigantic corporations, funding social media and other online services associated with harms to mental health, the demise of local journalism, and other problems. If all other states taxed either targeted advertising, or all advertising, at rates comparable to current sales taxes that they levy on other forms of consumption, they could collectively raise roughly $16 billion to $27 billion a year. Some of these taxes have been challenged in court as violations of the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), but there is reason to hope that courts will find all or most of these taxes to be compliant with ITFA. The report discusses legal challenges, the incidence of the tax, and options for using the revenue to offset regressivity (e.g., state Child Tax Credits).
Ce rapport soutient que les prochaines réformes fiscales progressistes aux États-Unis devraient prioriser l’impôt sur les sociétés et propose trois mesures clés : établir un impôt minimum mondial robuste, étendre l’impôt sur les sociétés aux grandes entreprises « pass-through », et relever le taux d’imposition des plus grandes firmes.
The next time Congress is serious about making the wealthiest pay their fair share in federal taxes, they will need to make three key changes to the federal corporate income tax so that it applies effectively to all the businesses that generate their income. Policymakers should: Establish a strong global minimum tax; subject certain “pass-through” businesses to corporate tax; raise the corporate tax rate on the largest companies. Any progressive tax reform plan must be resilient, meaning it is designed to survive the ideological hostility, or even corruption, it will face from the Supreme Court and possible future presidents and Congresses. Policymakers can make tax reform resilient by preventing sabotage by the Supreme Court (corporate tax reforms are far less likely to be overturned than taxes on wealth or unrealized gains), preventing sabotage by a future president (by creating standing to sue when Treasury illegally cuts corporate taxes), and preventing sabotage by a future Congress (by reinstating the original, stronger global minimum tax agreement).
Ce rapport montre que les taxes discriminatoires sur les services transfrontaliers, tels que les grandes plateformes numériques, créent des distorsions importantes dans le commerce international, compliquent l’administration fiscale et risquent d’alourdir les coûts pour les entreprises tout en fragilisant la cohérence des systèmes fiscaux nationaux.
Cross-border services face a growing patchwork of discriminatory taxes worldwide. Three prominent examples from the UN, Europe, and the US function as quasi-tariffs.
All three attempt destination-based taxation in unprincipled or haphazard ways, resulting in tax pyramiding, double taxation, and distorted production decisions.
Though foreign companies may seem like soft targets in domestic politics, any advantage of discriminatory taxation is lost when that discrimination is reciprocated. Countries that violate neutrality receive neutrality violations in turn.
The UN convention on tax threatens to legitimize violations of tax policy principles, including forms of trade neutrality and net-basis taxation.
European digital services taxes target gross revenues against a dubious and gerrymandered tax base.
The US base erosion and anti-abuse tax creates many of the same distortions the US criticizes abroad.
The US, as the world’s largest services exporter, has a stronger interest in combating discriminatory services taxation than in pursuing tariffs.
Ce rapport évalue la conception et l’administration des taxes carbone à travers différents pays et montre que leur efficacité dépend fortement de la structure du système fiscal, de la clarté des règles d’application et de la capacité des gouvernements à en assurer une mise en œuvre simple, transparente et économiquement efficiente.
Carbon taxes are a popular solution to climate change because they are an economically efficient way to price in negative externalities of greenhouse gas emissions.
In practice, carbon taxes have been partial measures, either exempting certain sectors of the economy or offering substantially reduced rates for certain activities.
One way to judge the design and administration of carbon taxes is by measuring the ratio of actual revenue collected divided by potential revenue, known as a c-efficiency ratio. The resulting ratio illustrates how well the tax captures the theoretical tax base.
Using emission, tax rate, and revenue data from 2023, we estimated the c-efficiency ratio of carbon taxes around the world.
Luxembourg, Japan, and the Canadian jurisdictions of Northwest Territories and British Columbia performed the best, with c-efficiency ratios well above 0.6.
The average c-efficiency ratio of the jurisdictions studied is 0.29, and the weighted average c-efficiency ratio is 0.26.
Some countries employ multiple carbon pricing systems, often for different sectors of the economy, which explains some carbon taxes’ lower c-efficiency ratios.
To account for this, we also used an adjusted calculation that subtracted emissions excluded from carbon taxes but subject to other carbon pricing systems (most commonly the European Union’s Emissions Trading System).
After implementing this adjustment, c-efficiency ratios rise to an unweighted average of 0.36 and a weighted average of 0.36.
While most jurisdictions fall short of the ideal, high c-efficiency ratios for some jurisdictions that rely heavily on carbon taxes show it is a viable policy tool for capturing its desired tax base
Ce rapport analyse les droits de douane imposés sous l’administration Trump et montre que cette guerre commerciale a surtout accru les coûts pour les consommateurs et les entreprises américaines, tout en provoquant des tensions commerciales persistantes avec les partenaires internationaux.
In 2025, the Trump tariffs amounted to an average tax increase of $1,000 per US household. We estimate the new Section 122 and Section 232 tariffs announced and imposed will increase taxes per US household by $700 in 2026.
President Trump imposed tariffs on nearly all trading partners under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and on several sectors using Section 232. On February 20,2026, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, leaving only the new Section 232 tariffs in place. Trump responded by imposing a 10 percent tariff on nearly all countries under Section 122, effective February 24, 2026, applying to an estimated $1.2 trillion (34 percent) of annual imports. The Section 122 tariff is scheduled to expire after 150 days, and several new Section 301 investigations are ongoing.
The IEEPA ruling reduced the weighted average applied tariff rate on all imports from 14.9 percent to 8.2 percent in 2026 under the remaining Section 232 tariffs. The revised Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper; the new tariffs on pharmaceuticals; and the Section 122 tariff increase this rate to 11.7 percent.
The average effective tariff rate was in 2025—the highest since 1947. If the 10 percent Section 122 tariffs expire on schedule, we estimate the average effective tariff rate will be 5.7 percent for calendar year2026, the highest since 1972.
We estimate that the Section 232 and Section 122 tariffs will raise $956 billion in revenue from 2026-2035 on a conventional basis. The permanent Section 232 tariffs will reduce long-run US GDP by 0.3 percent before foreign retaliation. Accounting for negative economic effects, the revenue raised by the tariffs falls to $697 billion over the decade. We estimate that the Section 232 tariffs raised $38 billion in net tax revenue in 2025.
The tariffs have not meaningfully altered the trade balance, which fell by only $2.1 billion in 2025, driven by an increase in the trade surplus of services.
Ce rapport examine dans quelle mesure des hausses d’impôts pourraient contribuer à réduire la dette nationale américaine et montre qu’ils ne suffiraient pas à eux seuls à stabiliser la dette sans réformes structurelles plus larges touchant les dépenses publiques et la soutenabilité fiscale à long terme.
The US federal government faces several fiscal challenges in the coming decades, as the Congressional Budget Office projects that, under current law, publicly held debt as a share of GDP will rise to a new record high within the next four years and continue rising to 175 percent of GDP by 2056. While revenues are projected to grow as a share of GDP, spending will grow faster so that deficits rise to 9.1 percent of GDP by 2056.
Most of the projected deficit is from rising interest payments on the debt, but the primary deficit that excludes interest costs is also large, averaging more than 2 percent of GDP over the next decade, and growing in the long run primarily due to growth in spending on Social Security and Medicare.
Closing the primary deficit is the key to debt sustainability, but attempting to do so by tax adjustments alone would involve unprecedented tax hikes that slow the economy and encourage avoidance, reducing revenue gains over time.
This study simulates several large tax increases and consistently finds that even tax increases large enough to close the primary deficit in the near term will lose ground over time and fail to put the debt on a sustainable course.
The most popular proposals, from hiking taxes on the rich to raising tariffs, tend to target a narrow set of taxpayers and produce the least sustainable revenues. These options are likely to introduce large economic distortions and slow economic growth without substantially improving the debt trajectory.
The results suggest deficit reduction efforts should focus first on reducing the growth of major entitlements, and second on relatively efficient, broad-based tax increases.
Ce rapport analyse les effets fiscaux du Family First Act aux États-Unis, en montrant que l’élargissement de plusieurs crédits d’impôt pour les familles et les couples réduirait l’impôt de nombreux ménages, tout en augmentant le coût budgétaire fédéral d’environ 150 milliards de dollars sur dix ans et en désavantageant certains parents monoparentaux.
The Family First Act (FFA), introduced by Representative Blake Moore and Senator Jim Banks, seeks to support children, pregnant women, and marri ed couples while consolidating some benefits for families with children. The proposal would reduce taxes for some families by expanding the child tax credit (especially for families with young children and children age 17), creating a new credit for pregnant women, and doubling the earned income tax credit (EITC) for married workers without children. For families with children, the bill would create a new set of EITC rules that would apply only to children under 19: The EITC would no longer provide higher benefits to families with more than one child. All families with children would use the same EITC formula. This would reduce EITC benefits for families with more than one child under age 19, offsetting some of the bill’s expansions for families with children. Families with children 19 and older would remain eligible for the existing EITC for those children, which is larger for larger families. The bill would also eliminate the child and dependent care tax credit for children, the credit for other dependents, and head of household filing status (a filing status typically used by single parents) and would limit the state and local tax deduction for people who itemize on their federal taxes.
Families with children, especially young children, and married couples are most likely to see their taxes decrease and after-tax incomes rise. Single parents with older children are most likely to owe more in taxes and see their after-tax incomes fall. Unmarried workers without children and older individuals will see few changes from the legislation. We estimate these changes will cost about $150 billion over the 10 -year budget window from FY 2026 to FY 2035.
International
Ce rapport montre que la dette publique mondiale, déjà proche de 94 % du PIB en 2025, devrait atteindre 100 % d’ici 2029, révélant une pression croissante sur les finances publiques à travers toutes les économies en raison de dépenses en hausse, de taux d’intérêt plus élevés et des répercussions budgétaires du conflit au Moyen‑Orient.
Global public debt rose to just under 94 percent of GDP in 2025 and is set to reach 100 percent by 2029, one year earlier than projected in April 2025. This accumulation is driven largely by the world’s major economies. Public finances are under strain from mounting spending pressures—on social needs, defense, and strategic autonomy—and rising interest burdens. The fiscal consequences of the Middle East conflict add further to these fragilities. Structural shifts in sovereign debt markets—including the growing role of leveraged nonbank intermediaries and erosion of the U.S. Treasury’s safety premium—are amplifying vulnerability to repricing. Credible, well-sequenced fiscal adjustment is urgently needed across all country groups.
The estimates and projections in the April 2026 Fiscal Monitor Chapter 1 and Methodological and Statistical Appendix are based on statistical information available through April 1, 2026, but may not reflect the latest published data in all cases.
Ce document montre que les inégalités au Royaume‑Uni sont multiples, profondément interconnectées et souvent liées à des défaillances de marché, et qu’il invite les décideurs publics à utiliser un ensemble d’outils pour comprendre les sources de ces inégalités, évaluer leurs interactions et concevoir des politiques capables de les réduire de manière efficace tout en limitant les pertes d’efficience économique.
We focus our discussion of policymaking around the relationship between inequalities and economic efficiency. This is a key consideration for policymakers because in many cases there are equity–efficiency trade-offs. It is also important because there are frequently problems – market failures – that cause both inefficiencies and inequalities. Market failures occur when private markets, left to themselves, lead to an inefficient allocation of resources (for example, due to costs or benefits that are not reflected in prices, market power, imperfect information, or other causes).
Policymakers will have widely varying views on what (if any) kinds of inequality are problematic, and on the priority attached to reducing them. We do not take a stance on that. But for policymakers who have identified a specific inequality as a cause for concern, our toolkit contains three guiding questions:
1. What is the source of the inequality and does it involve a market failure? When there is a market failure, the appropriate policy response will usually involve directly addressing it. When there is not, policymakers will need to take a stance on how much economic efficiency they are prepared to give up for a given decrease in inequality.
2. What are the interrelations between, and effects of, inequalities? In some cases, inequalities are mutually reinforcing, and so action to reduce one will also reduce another. In other cases, policies may reduce one inequality but increase another.
3. What is the least inefficient way to address the inequality, and are the costs of doing so exceeded by the government’s concern about this dimension of inequality?
We also suggest two practical considerations. First, it may not be possible to design and implement a good policy and there can be risks of government failure. Political, technical, informational or administrative constraints may exist that mean that while a policy is theoretically beneficial, in practice it is not.
Second, a rationale for a type of policy intervention (such as a minimum wage) does not necessarily imply a rationale for a specific policy (such as a minimum wage at a particular level). It is therefore key to consider costs and benefits of specific policy interventions.
Applying this toolkit, we discuss policy with respect to educational inequalities, ‘good jobs’, geographical inequalities and wealth inequalities, examining the potential perceived problems and policy options.
Ce rapport analyse les avantages fiscaux liés aux cotisations de retraite par sacrifice salarial au Royaume-Uni et conclut que ces dispositifs profitent de manière disproportionnée aux ménages à revenu élevé, soulevant des enjeux d’équité et d’efficacité dans le soutien public à l’épargne retraite.
Higher-earning employees are much more likely than lower earners to make salary sacrifice pension contributions of more than £2,000 per year. Overall, 15% of employees make salary sacrifice contributions above this threshold. Among the lowest-earning fifth of employees, this share is less than 1%, compared with 48% for employees in the top 10% of the distribution. This is both because higher earners are more likely to use a salary sacrifice pension scheme and because they are more likely to contribute more than £2,000 per year to a pension. 69% of the total additional NICs liability is borne by the top earnings decile and their employers.
In addition to particularly impacting high-earning individuals, the policy mainly affects the top tenth of the household income distribution. If pension contributions remained unchanged and employers were to pass on the extra employer NICs through reductions to affected employees’ wages, households in this top decile would lose, on average, over £300 per year due to the policy. Around 65% of households in the top decile would experience no change in income as they do not use salary sacrifice. The average loss among affected households in the top decile of the household income distribution would be £888 per year. Households in the bottom decile of the income distribution would – under the same assumptions – see virtually no change in household income. Of course, in practice, the reforms may well impact some households who currently do not make salary sacrifice contributions above £2,000 – for example, if affected employers reduce wages of these employees or if these employers stop offering salary sacrifice arrangements altogether.
The private sector will be affected by the policy to a much greater extent than the public sector because it makes greater use of salary sacrifice. 18% of private sector employees make salary sacrifice pension contributions of more than £2,000 per year, compared with only 7% of public sector employees. The resulting average yearly increase in employer NICs in the private sector (£151 per employee) is over four times that in the public sector (£37). Public sector employees are more likely to receive large employer pension contributions, which are unaffected by the policy.
Within the private sector, there is substantial variation in the impact of the policy across industries. Almost 40% of employees in finance & insurance and information & communication are making salary sacrifice contributions of more than £2,000 per year. This compares with less than 2% of employees working in accommodation & food services.
Whether the announced change would improve the system of pension taxation in the UK is up for debate. It would certainly add complexity to the system. In addition, it would do little to address fundamental issues with the NICs treatment of pension contributions. The fact that employer pension contributions are not liable for NICs either at the point of contribution or in retirement is the biggest tax break for pensions in revenue terms. However, this tax break is opaque, unavailable for the self-employed, and creates a fundamental asymmetry with the NICs treatment of individual pension contributions. The reform does not address this asymmetry – it reduces one arbitrary distinction in the tax system (between salary sacrifice and employee pension contributions), while creating another (between employer and salary sacrifice pension contributions).
Ce rapport analyse le financement de la protection sociale au Cameroun et conclut que l’élargissement de l’assiette fiscale et la diversification des sources de financement sont essentiels pour soutenir durablement les systèmes de protection sociale.
Ce rapport analyse les principales options dont le Cameroun dispose pour étendre durablement la couverture et améliorer l’adéquation des prestations de son système de protection sociale aux besoins de la population, dans un contexte marqué par une forte informalité, une faible pression fiscale et une dépendance aux financements extérieurs. À court terme, les recettes fiscales générales joueront un rôle central pour financer l’extension progressive de la Couverture Santé Universelle et renforcer les dispositifs d’assistance sociale. L’introduction d’une cotisation dédiée à la santé pourrait compléter cette approche, dans le cadre d’une stratégie de financement plus large visant à placer le système de santé sur une trajectoire plus soutenable. Le rapport identifie des options de réforme de la politique fiscale visant à accroître les recettes fiscales générales, incluant notamment la rationalisation des dépenses fiscales, et souligne l’importance de la formalisation de l’économie comme levier clé pour renforcer les régimes d’assurance sociale.
Ce rapport analyse l’évolution des recettes fiscales en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes entre 1990 et 2024, en mettant en évidence la hausse graduelle des ratios impôts-PIB, les écarts persistants avec les pays de l’OCDE et l’importance croissante des politiques fiscales pour soutenir les finances publiques de la région.
This report compiles comparable tax revenue statistics over the period 1990-2024 for 29 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. It provides harmonised data on the level and structure of tax revenues based on the OECD classification of taxes, thereby enabling comparison of national tax systems on a consistent basis, both across the region and with other economies globally. The report includes a special feature on revenues from non-renewable natural resources in the LAC region in 2024 and 2025. The publication is jointly undertaken by the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, the OECD Development Centre, the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-ECLAC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Ce rapport propose une réorientation de la politique économique du Royaume-Uni face au ralentissement de la croissance et à la dégradation des finances publiques, en soulignant l’importance de choix budgétaires et fiscaux ciblés pour soutenir le niveau de vie et rééquilibrer les politiques publiques en faveur des ménages actifs plus jeunes.
This briefing note sets out how the Government can reset Britain’s economic policy following disastrous local election results, arguing that an honest assessment of where the country stands is the indispensable starting point for repairing its relationship with voters.
The economic backdrop remains highly challenging with the conflict in the Middle East providing another unwanted headwind for growth. The growth outlook has deteriorated since the 2024 general election and lags well behind the US. Since the pandemic, median incomes have crawled up, while for many poorer families real income fell. Some household groups have fared better with pensioner incomes outperforming working-age families since the pandemic. Looking over a longer sweep of history, wealthier families have also fared better.
The Government should put boosting growth and raising living standards first. That means making some serious choices, choices that can’t please everybody. This means avoiding distractions and doubling down on its commitment to growth. This is the best way to make people better off. It should also rebalance policy towards younger, working families and away from the advantages enjoyed by older, wealthier people. Given a tight fiscal position, this rebalancing is going to be less concerned with giveaways than difficult decisions about ruthlessly prioritising spending and identifying additional revenues.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Carole Habib
- Kristine Javier
- Félix Musas
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé
- Ariane Gaboury
Note: L’intelligence artificielle générative a été utilisée dans la préparation de ce bulletin de veille.