En Ontario, il y a une réduction de 18,5 G$ sur cinq ans entre les plans budgétaires 2018 et 2019 dans les dépenses d’immobilisation pour le transport. Une partie de cet écart (±1,1 G$) provient de l’annulation du transfert de deux cents de plus par litre d’essence en financement pour les municipalités.
Consulter le document »

Le présent rapport vise à soutenir l’examen du Budget des dépenses 2019-2020 du ministère des Transports (MTO) réalisé par le Comité permanent des budgets des dépenses. Le rapport commence par un aperçu financier du ministère. Le rapport se penche ensuite sur les plans quinquennaux d’immobilisations du ministère sur le transport en commun et les routes. En dernier lieu, le rapport examine les dépenses proposées en 2019-2020 par programme et relève les tendances en matière de dépenses ainsi que les modifications apportées aux programmes.

Des niveaux élevés de lobbying dans le domaine des industries fossiles au Canada conduisent à des taux d’imposition plus bas et à une réglementation environnementale réduite.
Consulter le document »

Cette étude fournit une analyse en réseau du lobby fédéral l’industrie des combustibles fossiles au Canada sur une période de sept ans allant de 2011 à 2018. La période étudiée permet de comparer des modèles de lobbying sous le gouvernement conservateur de Stephen Harper et le libéral gouvernement de Justin Trudeau. Le réseau que cette recherche révèle représente un petit monde d’intense interactions entre relativement peu de lobbyistes et les titulaires de charge publique désignés sont leurs cibles. En comparant le lobbying des administrations Harper et Trudeau, nous trouvons un modèle de continuité dans le changement: sous Trudeau, l’essentiel du lobbying était effectué par le même grandes entreprises comme sous Harper alors que le réseau de lobbying était concentré sur moins d’agences d’État. L’étude examine également le moment et l’intensité des activités de lobbying dans le secteur et entreprises sélectionnées à la formation de cadres politiques importants et en relation avec des projets tels que des propositions de pipeline et des décisions. Nous soutenons que le stratégique, organisé et efforts de lobbying soutenus du secteur des combustibles fossiles aident à expliquer.

Avant impôts, un migrant du Québec vers l’Ontario subit une chute de 2,4 % de revenu; après impôt, la même personne bénéficie d’un revenu plus élevé (allant de 3,2 % à 4,7 %).
Consulter le document »

Une lecture de nos résultats est que, globalement, le Québec bénéficie de la migration interprovinciale. Étant donné les défis que pose le financement d’importants programmes sociaux tels que la santé et les soins aux personnes âgées ainsi que le financement de l’éducation, il serait préférable de demander: Le Québec pourrait-il aller mieux? En d’autres termes, le Québec pourrait-il retenir un plus grand nombre de travailleurs susmentionnés qui quittent la province et attirer davantage de travailleurs supérieurs à la moyenne provenant de d’autres provinces? La présente analyse propose ce que le Québec peut faire.

La taxe carbone permet au Canada de diminuer son empreinte écologique, mais certaines politiques mises en place pourraient provoquer un déménagement d’entreprises vers des pays plus laxistes.
Consulter le document »

Carbon pricing has both benefits and undesirable consequences (e.g., carbon leakage). This report provides a data-driven approach to further understand this important cross-cutting policy issue in Canada’s context.

Les perspectives de croissance du PIB du Canada pour 2020-2021 sont révisées à la baisse en raison de plusieurs facteurs dont la réduction des dépenses du gouvernement de l’Alberta.
Consulter le document »

Le directeur parlementaire du budget (DPB) a révisé à la baisse ses perspectives de croissance de l’économie canadienne au deuxième semestre de 2019, en raison, notamment, des tensions commerciales accrues et de l’incertitude qui en découle. La croissance du PIB réel en 2020 et 2021 devrait s’établir à 1,7 % et 1,6 %, respectivement. Ce taux est inférieur de 0,3 et 0,2 point de pourcentage, respectivement, à nos projections de juin 2019 dans la prévision de référence du coût des mesures proposées en campagne électorale (CMP). Cette révision à la baisse découle du fléchissement des exportations, du recul des investissements dans les stocks et des réductions aux dépenses du gouvernement provincial en Alberta.

La bonne performance de l’économie du Québec permet au gouvernement d’accélérer la bonification de l’Allocation famille et l’abolition de la contribution additionnelle pour la garde d’enfants.
Consulter le document »

Le point sur la situation économique et financière du Québec de novembre 2019 permet au gouvernement de présenter une mise à jour de la situation budgétaire du Québec et de poursuivre la réalisation de ses engagements grâce à de nouvelles actions concrètes. L’économie du Québec performe de manière remarquable.

• La croissance du PIB réel en 2019 a été révisée à 2,4 % par rapport à la prévision de 1,8 % du budget de mars 2019.
• En 2019, soit pour une deuxième année consécutive, la progression du PIB réel enregistrée au Québec dépassera celle du Canada.
• Plusieurs indicateurs économiques ont été révisés à la hausse, notamment le PIB nominal, les salaires et traitements et la consommation nominale des ménages.

La performance de l’économie se traduit par une amélioration de la situation budgétaire, en particulier du côté des revenus autonomes du gouvernement.

New OECD proposals on digital taxation would mean a substantial overhaul of Canadian tax rules if they are brought into effect, according to a new report from the C.D. Howe Institute.

In “The Big Shakeup: Making Sense of the OECD Digital Tax Proposals,” authors Jeffrey Trossman and Jeffrey Shafer examine recent proposals from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) which aim to deal with the issue of multinational enterprises (MNEs) earning significant profits in places where they have no obligation to pay income tax locally.

The proposals aim to provide “market” jurisdictions with a new, internationally agreed, taxing right overriding traditional international income allocation rules. Market jurisdictions would gain the right to tax a to-be-agreed percentage of the profits of large affected MNEs that are attributable to that country.

The key proposed measure would require a tax calculation based on the MNE group’s profits as reflected in its consolidated financial statements.

This would introduce a new form of tax base into the Canadian system, note the authors. The Income Tax Act generally imposes tax on income of a non-resident company that carries on business in Canada, and not on separate entities in its corporate group that may themselves have no connection to Canada – notably companies operating in the digital space with a limited physical presence in the country. Domestic rules would need to be substantially overhauled to align with the OECD proposal.

“With the increased digitalization of the economy, profits are more readily generated with no meaningful physical presence,” said Trossman. “This has generated controversy over the perceived unfairness of businesses earning significant profits in places where they have no obligation to pay income tax locally, but in which they nonetheless generate sales to consumers.”

Unlike unilateral digital service taxes (DSTs) introduced in France and proposed in the United Kingdom, the proposal’s scope extends to not only digital centric businesses but also to other so-called “consumer-oriented” businesses that generate significant profits attributable to intellectual property and other businesses that have adapted modern business methods to generate sales in a jurisdiction without establishing a physical presence. The consultation paper acknowledges that further discussion is required to define the proposal’s scope; for now, it does not specify whether financial services businesses would be affected.

Le Québec apparaît au 56^e rang des États nord-américains et en ce qui concerne la liberté économique préparé par l’Institut Fraser. Le régime fiscal fait partie des critères étudiés pour construire cet indicateur.
Consulter le document »

Economic Freedom of North America 2019 is the fifteenth edition of the Fraser Institute’s annual report. This year it measures the extent to which—in 2017, the year with the most recent available comprehensive data—the policies of individual provinces and states were supportive of economic freedom, the ability of individuals to act in the economic sphere free of undue restrictions. There are two indices: one that examines provincial/state and municipal/local governments only and another that includes federal governments as well. The former, our subnational index, is for comparison of individual jurisdictions within the same country. The latter, our all-government index, is for comparison of jurisdictions in different countries.

La prestation pour les familles et les enfants de l’Alberta rapportera davantage aux familles à très faibles revenus, mais de nombreuses familles – y compris certaines qui sont près du seuil de pauvreté – recevront moins que sous l’ancien régime.
Consulter le document »

Alongside pledges to get people back to work and reverse the province’s fiscal course, the UCP government articulated in its inaugural budget a commitment to making life better for Albertans—including creating better and smarter public services. In the words of the government, programs will be redesigned methodically and responsibly, and in a way that will ensure vulnerable Albertans continue to receive support.

One such program is the Alberta Child and Family Benefit (ACFB), which will consolidate the Alberta Child Benefit (ACB) and Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit (AFETC). According to the government, the ACFB will deliver increased financial support to low-income families and result in simplified payments.

Des investissements publics importants en innovation ont été fondamentaux pour développer le potentiel économique de l’Alberta et cette avenue doit à nouveau être privilégiée pour permettre la croissance et la diversification économique de la province.
Consulter le document »

Disruption, but without too much prescription, should be the Alberta government’s method of choice as it shapes the province’s economic future and deals with the twin challenges of diversification and decarbonization. For guidance in setting a clear course, the government need only look to the history of the province’s oilsands industry and the critical role of landmark funding of the $1.4-billion (in today’s dollars) Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority (AOSTRA).

Aux États-Unis, les causes des inégalités de richesse sont en mutation et découlent – selon les auteurs – de moins en moins des transferts intergénérationnels de richesse et de plus en plus de la création de nouvelle richesse par des entrepreneurs.
Consulter le document »

Many political leaders and pundits consider wealth inequality to be a major economic and social problem. They complain about a shift of wealth to the top at everyone else’s expense and about plutocrats dominating policymaking in Washington.

Is wealth inequality the crisis that some people believe? This study examines six aspects of wealth inequality and discusses the evidence for the claims being made.

Aux États-Unis, la déduction d’impôt pour don d’un bien immobilier à des fins de conservation est un élément essentiel de la stratégie de préservation de la nature, mais des abus fiscaux potentiels doivent être surveillés.
Consulter le document »

Taxpayers may be able to claim a charitable deduction for the value of qualified conservation contributions, which include conservation easements. In recent years, deductions for conservation contributions have increased. There are concerns that some of this increase has been driven by syndicated conservation easements, where a pass-through business entity acquires real property on behalf of investors, makes a conservation contribution to a qualified organization, and then allocates the tax benefits among the investors. Conservation contributions made through syndicated conservation easement transactions often have seemingly inflated property appraisals, which could generate excessive tax deductions for investors.

A Taxpayer Bill of Rights, or TABOR, is a constitutional measure that limits the annual growth in state (and sometimes local) revenues or spending to the sum of the annual inflation rate and the annual percentage change in the state’s population. (For example, if the general inflation rate is 2 percent and the state’s population grows by 1 percent, state revenue available for expenditures can increase by 3 percent. The balance must be refunded to taxpayers.) Overriding these limits requires voters’ approval or some other high bar, such as a supermajority vote of the legislature. Colorado enacted the nation’s only TABOR in 1992 but suspended it for five years in 2005 in response to a sharp decline in public services. No other state has adopted it.

Afin de financer les dépenses en matière de transport, le Massachusetts s’apprête à hausse sa taxe sur l’essence. L’auteur estime qu’il serait préférable d’augmenter les impôts des sociétés pour augmenter les recettes.
Consulter le document »

As Massachusetts lawmakers seek to raise revenue to make needed investments in roads, bridges, and public transit, they should abandon plans that rely solely on regressive gas tax and user fee increases in favor of those that also ensure that corporations pay their share to fund these public resources — which, after all, enable corporations to get their products to market and their employees to work.

Les règles fiscales en vigueur aux États-Unis permettent à certaines compagnies de ne pas payer d’impôt à l’État dans lequel ils vendent leur produit. L’article analyse différentes solutions qui permettraient aux États d’aller chercher ces revenus non imposés.
Consulter le document »

When making a purchase at your local big box store, you might assume that the item’s manufacturer will owe tax to your state on its profit from the sale. But there’s a pretty good chance it won’t. And, maybe just as important, you have no way to find out. One big reason these companies might not pay any income tax to your state is an obscure 1959 federal law that says they don’t have to if they organize their activities in particular ways. Public Law 86-272 says that if an out-of-state company selling physical products limits its activities in a state to soliciting sales and delivering the goods, the state can’t tax the company’s profits from those sales.

L’instauration d’un crédit d’impôt pour les contribuables ayant un plus faible revenu (EITC) serait une solution adéquate afin de répondre aux problèmes économiques auxquels fait face Puerto Rico.
Consulter le document »

Puerto Rico faces a host of daunting challenges, including chronically high poverty (especially among children), low labor force participation, over a decade of economic decline, an unsustainably high debt burden, and the lingering effects of the devastating hurricanes of 2017 that make its long-term prosperity harder to attain. To address these challenges, the Commonwealth needs a comprehensive economic package that centers around powerful tools such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) — which goes to low- and moderate-income working people, encourages work, and is one of the nation’s most effective anti-poverty programs.

La France prévoit réduire de 10 milliards d’euros les impôts des particuliers et des sociétés, ce qui devrait lui permettre de quitter le dernier rang de l’International Tax Competitiveness Index de la Tax Foundation.
Consulter le document »

On September 27, France released its draft finance bill for 2020, with the final version expected to be enacted by the end of December. President Emmanuel Macron is taking new steps to make good on his promise to improve France’s business environment, proposing further spending and tax reforms.

Une taxe sur le carbone de 50 $ par tonne métrique aux États-Unis générerait 1,87 billion de dollars au cours des 10 prochaines années, mais aurait un impact négatif sur la progressivité des impôts et sur le taux d’emploi aux États-Unis. Les modalités de mise en place d’une éventuelle taxe carbone devraient être étudiées attentivement de manière à limites les effets négatifs sur l’économie américaine.
Consulter le document »

Over the past few years, lawmakers, businesses, and climate groups have expressed support for the United States to enact a carbon tax. In July 2019, Sen. Christopher Coons (D-DE), Rep. Francis Rooney (R-FL), and Rep. Dan Lipinski (D-IL) each introduced a carbon tax bill. These bills would introduce a border-adjusted tax on carbon emissions, with revenue being used for measures such as payroll tax cuts, investments in innovation and infrastructure, and carbon dividends. Businesses in sectors such as energy, food, and transport have publicly called for federal climate action, including a price on carbon.

Last week, Representative Don Beyer (D-VA) and Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) provided details on a proposed surtax on millionaires as part of an increased interest by policymakers to impose higher tax rates on high-income earners and the wealthy, with the goal of reducing economic inequality.

The proposed surtax would levy a 10-percentage point surtax on modified adjusted gross income (AGI) for taxpayers with an AGI above $1 million ($2 million for taxpayers filing jointly). This use of modified AGI as the surtax base contrasts with the individual income tax, which applies to taxable income after accounting for the standard deduction or itemized deductions. The surtax would apply to all income, including labor income, business income, and investment income accrued through realized capital gains and dividends.

Wireless service is increasingly the sole means of communications and connectivity for many Americans, particularly young people and those with lower incomes. At the end of 2018, according to the Centers for Disease Control, about 67 percent of all poor adults lived in wireless-only households and 57 percent of adults of all incomes lived in wireless-only households. These excessive taxes and fees–especially those that impose high per-line taxes and fees–impose a disproportionate tax burden on those least able to afford them.

.

Avec la réforme fiscale qui a été adoptée en 2017 aux États-Unis (“TCJA”), les contribuables qui ont fait des contributions charitables ont plus de choix à leur disposition pour bénéficier d’une déduction lors du calcul de leurs revenus imposable.
Consulter le document »

From the earliest years of the modern income tax system, charitable contributions have been deductible in computing taxable income. And from the earliest years, it was recognized that this deduction provided an incentive for taxpayers to contribute to charities. In 1944, the standard deduction was added to the tax code as an alternative to itemizing deductions. Although this lowered the compliance burden for many taxpayers, it also eliminated the tax incentive to contribute for those who chose it. In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) essentially doubled the size of the standard deduction, and the Tax Policy Center estimates that about 88 percent of tax filers will choose the standard deduction for tax year 2019, and only about 9 percent will receive a tax deduction for charitable contributions. This, along with the recognition that a deduction coupled with a progressive tax system provides larger subsidies to higher income taxpayers, has led to renewed interest in alternative tax incentives to contribute to charitable organizations.

La proposition du Parti travailliste du Royaume-Uni, selon laquelle la réduction de l’horaire de travail des employés de l’État à 32h/semaine serait contrebalancée par une augmentation de la productivité, pourrait en fait coûter jusqu’à 45 milliards de Livres au gouvernement.
Consulter le document »

At its recent party conference, the Labour Party committed to reducing average working hours to 32 hours a week – effectively creating a four-day week.

A new paper by Jethro Elsden, Data Analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies, attempts to evaluate the costs for the public sector. The report featured in The Times this morning.

While it is extremely difficult to predict the state of the labour market in 10 years’ time, Elsden shows that at current productivity levels, the cost of this measure would be £45 billion – the equivalent of a 10p rise in the basic rate of income tax.

Making extremely generous assumptions about the productivity gains from employees working more efficiently during those shorter hours, this might fall to £17 billion – though it should be stressed that there is very little academic evidence to support such an optimistic forecast.

The Labour Party have argued that the costs of a four-day week could be covered by wider productivity increases across the economy and within the public sector. But this is highly unpersuasive.

ONS data shows that public sector productivity between 1998 and 2016 grew at just 0.2% a year – far below the figures needed to support such a reduction in hours.

Even if Labour’s economic management did result in a productivity miracle, the fall in hours – if not supported by hiring extra staff – would come at the cost of worse public sector performance, as workers who improved their efficiency by 10% were allowed to cut their hours rather than seeing the gains channelled into improved public sector performance. This does not seem terribly advantageous to the taxpayer.

Indeed, even the paper which Labour commissioned on this topic admits that the imposition of a 35-hour week in France resulted in a shortage of hospital staff, and that sectors such as health and social care are likely to deliver lower productivity increases than the wider economy.

To appreciate the scale of this measure, the £17 billion figure would represent the combined budgets of the Home Office and Ministry of Justice. The £45 billion figure is equivalent to the entire defence budget.

In short, in the absence of historically unprecedented productivity gains, a four-day week in the public sector would mean delivering significant cuts to wider government, or a huge increase in taxes – or accepting a lower standard of public services as any productivity gains went towards cutting workers’ hours rather than improving output.

Selon la Commission européenne, l’Union européenne a grandement amélioré son système de collecte d’information sur les contribuables auprès des institutions financières, mais du travail reste à faire afin d’éviter les erreurs et de réduire les coûts.
Consulter le document »

According to the findings of the Commission’s fitness check of the EU supervisory reporting requirements in the area of financial services, as presented on 7 November 2019, the existing supervisory reporting frameworks are effective in delivering necessary data.

Results however also show inconsistencies between reporting frameworks, which reduce the quality of data and increase the administrative burden for financial institutions. To improve the system, the fitness check suggests a comprehensive approach by the Commission and the relevant stakeholders to further streamline the requirements and develop a supervisory reporting that is fit for the future.

Les auteurs commentent la nouvelle approche unifiée proposée par l’OCDE pour taxer les grandes entreprises numériques. Ils s’intéressent notamment aux droits des contribuables et aux questions qui restent en suspens.
Consulter le document »

CFE Tax Advisers Europe has now published an Opinion Statement that sets out CFE’s response to the OECD public consultation on the Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One arising from the tax challenges of the digitalising economy.

CFE Tax Advisers Europe welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the public consultation and recognises the initial stage of the new proposals, and that many details are yet to be finalised depending on the direction taken by the members of the Inclusive Framework at political level.

CFE calls for more clarity and early consensus at political level as to the outcome of this process, recognising the consequences of departing from well-established principles of international tax law towards a more complex international tax system which partly introduces formulary apportionment.

L’utilisation d’outils technologiques qui permettent aux contribuables de produire leur déclaration de revenus de manière plus rapide a contribué à une hausse des revenus déclarés au Pérou.
Consulter le document »

This paper examines the impact of e-invoicing on firm tax compliance and performance using administrative tax data and quasi-experimental variation in the rollout of VAT electronic invoicing in Peru. We find that e-invoicing increases reported firm sales, purchases and value-added by over 5 percent in the first year after adoption. The impact is concentrated among smaller firms and sectors with higher rates of non-compliance, suggesting that e-invoicing enhances compliance by lowering compliance costs and strengthening deterrence. The reform’s positive effects on tax collection are hindered by shortcomings in the VAT refund mechanism in Peru, suggesting that digital tools such as e-invoicing should be complemented by other reforms to improve revenue mobilization.

Les politiques fiscales au Belize varient de manière cyclique dans les dernières années et cet article analyse des simulations pour déterminer le régime fiscal optimal pour le pays.
Consulter le document »

This paper assesses the cyclicality and sustainability of fiscal policy in Belize and applies a stochastic simulation model to determine the optimal set of fiscal rules. The empirical analysis shows that fiscal policy in Belize has been significantly procyclical and unsustainable much of the period since 1976. While the government’s recent commitment to maintain a primary surplus of at least 2 percent of GDP until 2021 is supporting debt reduction, stochastic simulations indicate that further improvement in the primary balance is necessary to reliably bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to a sustainable path. Given Belize’s history of large economic shocks, this paper proposes explicit fiscal rules designed for countercyclical policy and debt sustainability. It recommends integrating such rules into a well-designed fiscal responsibility law and establishing an independent fiscal council to improve accountability and transparency.

L’étude des taux d’inactivité et de chômage au Luxembourg laisse croire que le régime fiscal en vigueur pourrait décourager certains contribuables de gagner un revenu supplémentaire.
Consulter le document »

This paper combines both micro and macro approaches to identify the drivers of (un)employment and inactivity in Luxembourg. The young, low-skilled, and non-EU migrants are found to be the most vulnerable groups in the labor market. In addition to skills mismatches, work disincentives embedded in the tax-benefit system constitute a factor explaining structural unemployment. High unemployment of young and low-skilled workers reflects substantial unemployment traps, while disincentives for second earners (respectively the generosity of the pension system) contribute to lower labor market participation of women (respectively seniors). Further reduction of structural unemployment requires better integration of vulnerable groups into the labor market and improved targeting of benefits to make work more rewarding.

Les auteurs illustrent la notion de déficit par une image, soit le jour où les États de l’Union européenne ont dépensé toutes leurs recettes annuelles. Ils constatent notamment que la situation s’améliore par rapport à 2017 pour l’ensemble de l’Union européenne, mais que la France continue de rester à la traîne en ayant dépensé l’ensemble de ses recettes fiscales plus d’un mois avant la moyenne des pays de l’Union européenne.
Consulter le document »

Les administrations centrales de l’UE avaient épuisé en moyenne leurs ressources le 16 décembre, 16 jours avant la fin de l’année. C’est 4 jours plus tard qu’en 2017, ce qui représente une amélioration notable.

Parmi les 28 administrations centrales de l’UE, 11 étaient en situation excédentaire l’an passé, 14 épuisaient leurs ressources en décembre, 3 avaient tout dépensé avant.

L’administration centrale française avait dépensé l’intégralité de ses ressources le 12 novembre, 49 jours avant la fin du dernier exercice budgétaire clos.

L’écart entre la France et la moyenne de l’UE est de 33 jours. Il augmente de 4 jours entre 2018 et 2017 en dépit d’une conjoncture économique favorable.

Les projections réalisées par l’IEM montrent que la situation française n’est pas en voie de normalisation : les dépenses non financées de l’administration centrale française augmentent. Elles pourraient représenter 62 jours en 2019 et 59 jours en 2020.

Today was the intended date of Sajid Javid’s first Budget as Chancellor. The failure to implement a Brexit deal, and the general election campaign, means that the Budget has been delayed. Much has changed since the last set of official economic and fiscal forecasts were produced by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) last March. So had it not been delayed what would the fiscal backdrop to today’s Budget have been?

Le système fiscal du Royaume-Uni est globalement progressif et, même si les impôts au pays sont élevés selon des standards historiques, ils demeurent normaux dans une perspective internationale.
Consulter le document »

Taxation is set to be a central policy battleground in this election, as in so many others. This Briefing Note provides some essential factual background to the parties’ claims and policies, placing the UK’s current tax burden in historical and international context and discussing where – and who – the revenue comes from.

Afin de répondre à la croissance des dépenses publiques, le Royaume-Uni devra augmenter ses prélèvements fiscaux et la hausse de l’impôt sur le gain en capital pourrait faire partie de la solution.
Consulter le document »

The IPPR Commission on Economic Justice identified a need to move to a higher tax, higher spend economy – with future public spending challenges likely to increase over time. We also seek a tax system that is more progressive – so that those with the greatest ability to pay contribute the most – as well as more transparent and efficient. This briefing paper focuses on the proposal that income from wealth should be taxed the same as income from work, with a focus on capital gains. It is profoundly unjust that those who work for their incomes are taxed more highly than those whose income is derived from wealth. This situation is all the worse when we consider that the wealthiest are less likely to generate their income from labour than the rest of us. Among the richest 1 per cent, over one-quarter of total income is generated from dividends and partnership income alone. Economic justice demands change. In a previous report, Just Tax, we estimated the revenue impact of these changes to the taxation of capital gains. In this paper, we consider the impact of these changes if made alongside the new income tax schedules likely to be proposed by Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats.

À l’approche des élections au Royaume-Uni, il est pertinent d’analyser l’imposition d’un point de vue historique afin de déterminer si l’impôt actuel est élevé et de se questionner sur les défis auxquels doivent répondre les nouvelles politiques fiscales proposées par les différents partis.
Consulter le document »

Ahead of the general election, this report takes a broad look at the UK tax system. Should today’s taxes be considered high? How have they changed over time? What challenges face the tax system? And what do the parties propose to change? It is part of a trio, following ‘The shape of things to come’ – about public spending – with a further paper on the state of the welfare system to follow. Taxes have risen as a share of GDP, particularly when compared to the 1990s, though they remain low by international standards. We explore some of the reasons for this rise, including straightforward tax increases but also changes in the make-up of the economy. And we look at how taxes have changed for households and employees, where the picture is instead one of declining tax rates. We look at what the party manifestos are likely to contain, such as top tax rate increases by Labour and a National Insurance cut from the Conservatives, and explore the potential impacts of these changes. These and other policies mean there is likely to be a real divergence of options on offer at the election. But every party will need to also be straight about some of the structural challenges facing the UK’s tax system, which will need tackling in the 2020s.

Cet article soulève trois défis économiques que le prochain gouvernement du Royaume-Uni devra gérer : 1) les conséquences des années d’austérité; 2) le besoin d’instaurer de nouvelles politiques fiscales en réponse à la croissance des États et; 3) le vieillissement de la population.
Consulter le document »

The report finds that a new consensus has developed relating to the size of the state: namely that is should be bigger. Ahead of the publication of the election manifestos, we speculate as what that expansion might look like by using what the two major parties have said about their ambitions to date to model some illustrative scenarios. Those scenarios suggest that the UK public finances are heading back to 1970s levels over the coming years – whoever wins the election. The report also explores the backdrop against which such spending increases will be delivered. It emphasises three public finance challenges related to the past (the legacy of austerity); the present (the need to establish a new fiscal framework that considers the sustainability of state expansion); and the future (the demographic headwinds associated with an ageing population).

Les auteurs analysent les propositions fiscales des deux principaux partis au Royaume-Uni. Dans les deux cas, une hausse des investissements financée par des emprunts est prévue afin de stimuler l’économie et d’augmenter les rentrées fiscales.
Consulter le document »

Fiscal rules matter. They play a vital role in shaping a new government’s tax and spending plans and give a big picture sense of a party’s approach to economic policy. Today, both main parties have set out their own new fiscal rules – and the fact that they are both new tells you a lot: the turning of the political and economic cycles means parties are now competing on how to increase spending and borrowing plans, rather than on how to reduce them. Today they are resetting their fiscal rules for that reality – and in both cases drawing on recent Resolution Foundation work to do so. The big picture here is both parties setting out plans to borrow for investment – both on a significant scale, but particularly sizeable in Labour’s case. On day-to-day spending, the two parties have set out plans that are looser in the short term than those inherited from Philip Hammond. But the change is much more modest than we are seeing on investment. Both are committed to paying for day-to-day spending out of taxation. Just not quite yet.