Le gouvernement fédéral a subi pour 169 M$ de dollars de pertes de recettes de TPS sur les produits et les services numériques vendus de l’étranger au Canada en 2017.
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Le paysage du commerce de détail au Canada se transforme. Un plus grand nombre de personnes font leurs achats en ligne. L’essor du commerce électronique pose des défis pour l’établissement et la perception de la taxe sur les produits et services (TPS) et de la taxe de vente harmonisée (TVH). Cela vaut particulièrement pour les produits physiques ainsi que les produits et services numériques (tels que la musique et les vidéos) que les consommateurs canadiens achètent auprès de fournisseurs étrangers.

Cet audit visait à déterminer si, dans le cadre de leurs rôles et responsabilités respectifs, l’Agence du revenu du Canada, l’Agence des services frontaliers du Canada et le ministère des Finances Canada s’étaient assurés que le régime de la taxe de vente pour le commerce électronique était neutre (traitement égal pour tous les fournisseurs au regard de la TPS/TVH) et avaient protégé l’assiette fiscale de la TPS/TVH (c’est-à-dire tout ce qui est imposable).

Regard critique des quatre allègements offerts au consortium LNG Canada: les effets potentiels dans l’économie seront minimes.
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ON MARCH 25, 2019 THE BC GOVERNMENT publicly released details of its fiscal framework for LNG development.1 A package of tax breaks and subsidies to be provided to the LNG Canada Consortium is described in an official document, the Operating Performance Payments Agreement between the Province of BC and LNG Canada.2 The measures therein also serve as a framework for other LNG producers, including the smaller Woodfibre LNG plant planned for Squamish, the FortisBC Tilbury LNG facility in Delta and any other LNG projects that go ahead.

The centrepiece of the LNG Canada Agreement is a “Joint Economic Model” that specifies tax reaks and subsidies effective for up to 20 years after production commences (likely in 2025). Most of the attention is on LNG Canada’s proposed terminal to liquefy gas for export, but the Shell-led consortium has formed an integrated operation from the wellhead to final consumption as it includes major Asian buyers of BC gas and their Canadian subsidiaries who hold the upstream rights for gas development. The fiscal framework adds on to other generous policies made by the previous government that favour gas producers.

Overall, the new BC government has offered a much sweeter deal to the LNG industry than what the previous government was willing to extend. Not covered here, but also important, are tax breaks provided by the federal government to exempt imported modules for the LNG plant from steel tariffs (estimated at $1 billion in forgone revenue).

In this paper, I look at each of the four measures in turn and put some numbers to their cost. I also consider the context of BC’s already-generous royalty regime. Some of these measures have been in play since October 2018 when LNG Canada announced its Final Investment Decision. We are only just learning the details now, although the gist of the policy was announced in July 2018.4 I also comment on the relationship between this Agreement and the new CleanBC climate plan introduced in December 2018. As I have reported previously, the CleanBC plan fallswell short of meeting the province’s 2030 legislated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target, in large part due to LNG Canada’s liquefaction terminal in Kitimat and incremental upstream gas development in BC’s Northeast.

Lorsque les Canadiens évaluent leur opportunité d’utiliser leur CELI ou leur REER pour épargner, leur processus décisionnel équivaut à tirer à pile ou face.
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We conduct a stated-choice experiment to analyze the decision to contribute to front- or back-loaded tax-sheltered savings accounts. Our experimental design includes a randomized financial education treatment that provides information on the two types of accounts. We assess whether respondents learn about the tax implications of these accounts, and whether they make better contribution choices when exposed to the financial education intervention.

We find that, relative to a control group, our intervention improves both the understanding of the tax implications of the savings accounts (an increase of 6 to 15 points on a score of 100) and the quality of contribution decisions, improving the well-being of respondents by about 140$ in each scenario presented to them.

La réflexion sur une déclaration de revenus unique ouvre la porte à repenser en profondeur l’administration fiscale dans une optique de simplicité et d’autonomie.
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L’Assemblée nationale du Québec adoptait le 15 mai 2018, sans débat et à l’unanimité, la motion suivante :

« Que l’Assemblée nationale demande au gouvernement du Québec et au gouvernement fédéral la mise en place d’un rapport d’impôt unique, transmis à Revenu Québec, pour tous les contribuables québécois et ce, tout en préservant l’autonomie fiscale du Québec. »

Le parti formant le gouvernement à Québec s’est engagé à exécuter la volonté exprimée dans cette motion et les partis fédéraux se sont aussi saisis de la question en vue de l’élection de l’automne 2019. De plus, sans parler spécifiquement d’une déclaration unique, un comité mixte fédéral-provincial a été créé pour simplifier les déclarations de revenus des Québécois.

C’est dans ce contexte que la Chaire en fiscalité et en finances publiques de l’Université de Sherbrooke (CFFP) a jugé pertinent d’organiser une Journée de réflexion sur la déclaration de revenus unique pour les contribuables québécois en regard de l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers. L’activité a eu lieu le 6 mai 2019 au Campus de Longueuil de l’Université de Sherbrooke. Environ 70 personnes y ont participé.

Après un regard sur les enjeux de la déclaration de revenus unique, trois panels se sont succédé, chacun présentant sa vision d’une telle réforme :

• Les observations des partisans d’une réforme;
• Le point de vue académique;
• Le point de vue des praticiens.

L’activité s’est conclue par une synthèse des propos tenus tout au long de la Journée. Pour plus de détails sur le déroulement de la Journée et la liste des conférenciers invités, il est possible de consulter le programme à l’annexe A du présent document.

Pour ne pas que le fruit des discussions tombe dans l’oubli, la CFFP a décidé de publier la synthèse des propos tenus lors de la Journée. En publiant cette synthèse, la CFFP souhaite alimenter la réflexion sur les enjeux liés à la déclaration de revenus unique.

L’Institut du Québec estime que le surplus budgétaire du gouvernement du Québec devrait atteindre 4,3 G$ en 2018‑2019 après les versements au Fonds des générations.
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Soutenu par une économie qui continue de bien performer, le gouvernement semble à nouveau se diriger vers un surplus plus important que prévu. Selon les simulations de l’Institut du Québec (IDQ), sans nouvelles interventions du gouvernement, le surplus après les versements au Fonds des générations (FDG) de l’année 2018‑2019 devrait se situer entre 3,4 G$ et 4,6 G$ plutôt qu’atteindre la prévision de 1,65 G$ annoncée lors de la mise à jour économique de décembre dernier. Bien qu’il s’agisse, en soi, d’une bonne nouvelle, cette situation suscite toutefois quelques questions : pourquoi les surplus budgétaires sont-ils systématiquement plus élevés que prévus depuis 2015 ? Le gouvernement prêche-t-il par excès de prudence? Pour y voir plus clair, l’IDQ a développé un outil de projection du solde budgétaire.

Ainsi, pour l’année 2018‑2019, le simulateur de l’IDQ prédit que…

• Si rien d’inattendu ne survient, le surplus après les versements au FDG devrait atteindre 4,6 G$, en raison de revenus plus élevés que prévu et des retards dans les dépenses gouvernementales;
• Si toutefois, les dépenses de programmes s’accéléraient en fin d’année comme ce fut le cas l’an dernier et comme le prévoyait récemment le ministre des Finances, ce surplus s’établirait plutôt à 3,4 G$.

Bien que performant, cet outil ne tient pas compte des changements imprévus qui pourraient survenir en fin d’année – tel qu’un important ralentissement de l’économie – ou encore de l’impact de nouvelles initiatives gouvernementales – comme l’annonce d’une baisse d’impôt ou de nouveaux programmes – qui auraient pour conséquence de réduire encore davantage le surplus

Sans la contribution nette de l’Alberta, le déficit du Canada en 2017 aurait été plus que doublé, passant du 19 G$ que nous avons connu à plus de 39 G$.
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In a 2017 study, we measured Alberta’s net contribution to Canada’s economy during the most recent economic boom in the province. We showed that when it comes to overall economic growth, job creation, or business investment, Alberta made a substantial contribution to the health of the Canadian economy from 2004 to 2014.

Since 2014, Alberta has struggled and much has changed. However, Alberta continues to punch well above its weight in at least one critically important respect—its net contribution to federal government finances.

Even through the recent recession and uneven recovery, Alberta has remained, by far, the largest net contributor to federal finances.

Alberta’s net contribution to Confederation peaked in 2014 at $27.6 billion. Since then, due to economic weakness in the province, its net contribution shrunk somewhat, but was still $20.5 billion in 2017. In total, from 2014 to 2017, Alberta’s net contribution to Confederation exceeded $92 billion.

Alberta’s large contribution has helped stabilize federal finances and prevent the federal government from running even larger deficits. In 2017, for example, in the absence of Alberta’s net contribution and if all else had remained equal, Canada’s deficit would have been over $39 billion—more than twice the $19 billion that was in fact the case.

Alberta’s economic health is a matter of national importance and its struggles in recent years have implications for all Canadians. In short, Canada cannot reach its full economic and fiscal potential unless Alberta is able to do the same.

La déduction des passifs d’impôt différé sur l’augmentation du fardeau fiscal des sociétés ne devrait pas être permise par la législature des différents États américains puisqu’elle constitue un avantage injustifié.
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In an increasing number of states, lobbyists for large multistate corporations have been pushing for the enactment of a new tax break they call “deferred tax relief.” They have primarily been trying to attach this tax break — a new deduction from gross income — to an important loophole-closing measure that often increases corporations’ state income tax payments. This tax giveaway is unusual in that it would eventually cause states to forgo real revenue needed to fund education, health care, public safety, road maintenance, and other critical services and infrastructure to offset a “paper” expense that some corporations must report on their financial statements. Corporate lobbyists have succeeded in passing this tax break in six states though it has not yet led to revenue losses in any of them because the effective dates have been delayed.

Proponents of deferred tax deductions cite a faulty claim that shareholders of publicly traded corporations unfairly suffer a “double impact” from state corporate tax increases. The first adverse impact is the actual reduction in after-tax profits of the company; the second is an alleged reduction in stock value resulting from a one-time increase in income tax expense reported on corporate financial statements. But the second claim is both implausible and unsupported to date by any empirical evidence. Moreover, federal policymakers have never granted such a tax break even though federal corporate tax changes can have analogous and much larger impacts on the amount of tax expense reported on financial statements.

Si l’une ou l’autre des exemptions proposées est adoptée, la date d’expiration de la mesure devrait être fixée entre quatre et dix ans.
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In the May Revision, the Governor has proposed two new sales tax exemptions that would go into effect on January 1, 2020 and expire on December 31, 2021: one for menstrual products and another for children’s diapers. These exemptions would apply to the full amount of the state and local sales tax. The Governor’s proposal would require our office to submit reports evaluating these exemptions by January 1, 2021.

Les réductions d’impôts dans le plan de réforme annoncé vont rendre l’Autriche plus compétitive fiscalement, mais des changements plus fondamentaux demeurent nécessaires.
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Last week, the Austrian Finance Ministry released its tax reform package. The plan has been developed to go into effect in stages over the next several years, with 2023 the final year. The new reform plan includes changes to personal income taxes, business taxes, excise taxes, and simplifications of the tax system.

The total tax cut will amount to €8.3 billion per year by 2022 (including tax reforms already implemented by the current government, such as the Familienbonus Plus). The following table shows the estimated tax cuts resulting from each element of the tax reform plan.

The newly announced reform package should be viewed in the context of some previously announced tax changes including the digital tax package, which introduced a digital advertising tax.

Austria has an opportunity to not only adopt tax cuts, but also to make pro-growth reforms to its tax code. While the announced tax cuts are a move in the right direction, the proposals do not include many fundamental changes to the tax system.

Nonetheless, based on the Tax Foundation’s 2018 International Tax Competitiveness Index, we expect that this Austrian reform package, if implemented in its entirety, would improve the country’s rank from 10th to 9th among OECD countries.

Les revenus provenant des taxes sur les jeux et paris seront toujours faibles et volatiles, mais pour les augmenter, les États devraient considérer d’y inclure les paris faits en ligne.
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One year after the Supreme Court overturned the federal restriction on state authorization of legal sports gambling, seven states allow and tax sports wagers and several others are close to joining them. But despite sports betting ostensible popularity, the resulting state tax revenue is and will always be relatively small and volatile because of how sports betting operates and is taxed. This brief explains why sports betting emerged as a state finance issue in 2018, how state taxes on sports betting work, which states allow legal sports betting (both online and in person), and how much money states stand to gain from these taxes.

Le programme offert par le gouvernement a été utilisé par plus d’un ménage non admissible sur cinq.
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The low take-up of cost-effective and highly subsidized preventive health technologies in low-income countries remains a puzzle. One understudied reason is that the design of subsidy schemes is such that households remain financially constrained. This paper analyses whether, and how, microfinance supports a large public health subsidy program in the developing world — the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) — in achieving its aim of increasing uptake of individual household latrines. Exploiting a cluster randomized controlled experiment of a sanitation microfinance program that coincided with the launch of the SBM program, and unique survey data matched to administrative data, findings reveal that the complementarity runs on two levels: First, micro-credit allows households officially ineligible for the subsidy to invest in sanitation by alleviating credit constraints. Second, micro-credit also helps subsidy eligible households to overcome short-term liquidity constraints induced by the remuneration-post-verification subsidy design to invest in sanitation. Subsidy eligible households living in areas experiencing large delays in subsidy disbursements, or high toilet costs, are more likely to take a sanitation loan, but less likely to use the loan to construct a toilet.

Même les interventions brèves et superficielles peuvent avoir une incidence considérable sur les croyances et l’attitude des contribuables.
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An online survey experiment spanning 50 countries finds sizeable improvements in tax morale when (a) the salience of anti-corruption efforts is increased and (b) citizens are allowed to voice their expenditure preferences to the government. These results hold very broadly across a uniquely large and diverse sample of respondents from all continents. The findings are consistent with theories emphasizing the role of democratic accountability, as well as of perceptions of legitimacy and « retributive justice, » in generating voluntary tax compliance. Implications and avenues for further research are discussed.

Une imposition simplifiée et consolidée aiderait les petites entreprises britanniques pour qui la conformité fiscale est lourde et complexe.
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Think Small’ is a new report which looks to make life a lot easier for small companies. It is authored by Nick King, Head of Business at the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and a former special adviser at the Business Department for the Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP. The report calls for the Government to adopt an emblematic policy to champion small and family businesses: the Simple Consolidated Tax (SCT).

Small businesses are at the heart of the British economy. There are 5.6 million of them, employing almost 13 million people and generating three quarters of all new jobs.

Unfortunately, while Britain has a very strong track record in terms of creating businesses, it is harder than it should be to run – and grow – one. In particular, small companies complain about the burden of tax and administration, which is costly in terms of both money and time.

75 percent of small business owners and managers polled on behalf of the CPS said the current system is too complicated.

This report, endorsed by West Midlands Mayor Andy Street, who has written the foreword, argues that companies with revenue of under £1 million should be given the option to replace corporation tax, business rates, VAT and Employer’s National Insurance with a simple levy on turnover, charged on a cash basis: the Simple Consolidated Tax.

Les pays qui adoptent à la fois une réforme de l’administration des recettes et de la politique fiscale voient des gains beaucoup plus importants et persistants.
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How can Low-Income Countries (LICs) enhance tax revenue collection to finance their vast development needs? We address this question by analyzing seven tax reform experiences in LICs (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Maldives, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda). Three lessons stand out, although reforms must be tailored to individual circumstances: (i) Tax reforms require first and foremost political commitment and buy-in from key stakeholders; (ii) Countries that pursue both revenue administration and tax policy reforms tend to see much larger and persistent gains; and (iii) A successful strategy often starts with fiscal reform measures with immediate effect to build momentum. These can include: simplifying the tax system; curbing exemptions; reforming indirect taxes on goods and services (e.g., excises); and better managing compliance risks through strengthening taxpayer segmentation (often beginning with strengthening the Large Taxpayers Office). A comprehensive reform strategy (e.g., a medium-term revenue strategy) can help to properly sequence reform measures and facilitate their implementation.

Des réformes supplémentaires du système de retraite luxembourgeois sont nécessaires pour assurer sa viabilité à long terme.
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Luxembourg’s pension system is sound over the near term. With the lowest old-age dependency ratio in the EU and strong net migration flows in recent years, the pension system is currently in surplus and has accumulated appreciable reserves exceeding 30 percent of GDP. However, it faces important challenges over the long term. On the back of demographic pressure, pension expenditures are expected to roughly double to 18 percent of GDP by 2070. Under no policy change scenario, the pension system (pension expenditures minus contributions, excluding revenues earned on reserves) is expected to be in deficit already by the mid-2020s; the level of the pension reserves is expected to decline below the legally required threshold by the end of the 2030s and be exhausted by the mid-2040s. Within one generation (40 years), the pension system would increase the fiscal deficit and public debt by 9 and 76 percent of GDP, respectively. Against this background and given the long lags of pension reforms, an early start in reforming the system would allow for a more gradual transition and more intergenerational equity. While various combinations of reform options could ensure pension system sustainability, there are important macroeconomic tradeoffs among them.

Les politiques budgétaires contracycliques et les biais prévisionnels pourraient expliquer en partie la tendance à la hausse de la dette publique des pays développés.
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Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax-smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing though budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating governments’ tendencies to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low output growth, it is likely that some countries pay a price—in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility—for excessive debt accumulation.

Les salariés sont les premiers bénéficiaires du partage de la contribution sociale et fiscale des 40 grandes entreprises qui font partie de l’indice boursier parisien CAC 40.
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L’Institut économique Molinari publie la 2^e édition de la Contribution sociale et fiscale des entreprises du CAC 40. Cette étude intègre des chiffrages inédits apportant un nouvel éclairage sur la contribution des entreprises et son partage entre les salariés, les États et les actionnaires au titre de l’année écoulée.

L’étude montre que les entreprises du CAC 40 ont créé 373 milliards d’euros de richesse pour la collectivité française et mondiale en 2018. Les salariés sont les premiers bénéficiaires du développement des entreprises du CAC 40 avec 265 milliards d’euros, suivis par les États (72 milliards) et les actionnaires (36 milliards).

Par rapport à la précédente édition, portant sur 2016, la contribution fiscale et sociale du CAC progresse de 10 % à 373 milliards d’euros. Les États sont les premiers gagnants (+ 14 %), suivis des salariés (+ 10 %) et des actionnaires (+ 2 %).

Lorsqu’on se focalise sur le partage des seuls résultats non réinvestis, soit 84 milliards d’euros, les États sont les premiers bénéficiaires avec 43 milliards d’euros, devant les actionnaires (35 milliards) et les salariés (6 milliards).

L’étude montre que les entreprises du CAC 40 ont créé 373 milliards d’euros de richesse pour la collectivité française et mondiale en 2018. Ces 373 milliards d’euros ont été partagés entre les salariés (71 %), les États français et étrangers (19 %) et les actionnaires collectifs ou individuels (10 %).

Un pourcentage important des ménages, pouvant atteindre 40 à 50%, n’utilise pas l’aide gouvernementale pour les fins qu’elle doit servir.
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Credit constraints are considered to be an important barrier hindering adoption of preventive health investments among low-income households in developing countries. However, it is not obvious whether, and the extent to which, the provision of labelled micro-credit (where the loan is linked to the investment only through its label) will boost human capital investments, particularly when it is characterized by other attractive attributes, such as a lower interest rate. We study a cluster randomized controlled trial of a sanitation micro-credit program in rural India, which made available lower interest loans for sanitation. The loans were linked with sanitation through their name only. The loans were not bundled with any toilet, and loan use was weakly monitored, but not enforced. Hence it is not directly obvious that the loan should boost sanitation investments. A simple theoretical framework indicates that the intervention could increase sanitation ownership through three channels – relaxation of credit constraints, salience of the loan label, or the lowest interest rate. Our empirical evidence, combined with model predictions, allows us to conclude that the loan label (which to date has not received much attention in the literature) significantly impacts households borrowing and investment behavior. Labelling loans is thus a viable strategy to improve uptake of lumpy preventive health investments.

Le système de financement ne fonctionne pas comme un tout cohérent et le Fair Funding Review devient donc essentiel.
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This note addresses the questions raised by the HCLG Committee’s Local Government Finance and the 2019 Spending Review inquiry. It discusses past changes to local government funding and the current situation of councils, the fitness-for-purpose of the local government finance system and options for its reform, and how spending needs are assessed locally and nationally.

Les taxes municipales de Londres, archaïques et régressives, devraient plutôt être basées sur la valeur réelle des propriétés et comporter un mécanisme de report pour ne pas étouffer les personnes à faible revenu.
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The current council tax system in London is unfair. The tax could be a sustainable means of funding local government services while also functioning as a progressive tax on property wealth. However, at present it is highly regressive in relation to property value as well as representing an unduly large burden in terms of income for poorer Londoners. It is economically inefficient particularly because of its banding system, reliance on considerably outdated property prices and the inconsistencies between it, and commercial property taxation. Furthermore, it is increasingly unsustainable as a source of local government finance, a trend which is only set to continue.

In this paper, we set out the case for change of the council tax system in London. We outline some of the views of those who live in the capital and pay council tax in the system as it is, and how they would like to see it change. We also set out some key lessons from abroad on how our system compares.

We propose major reform of the system in three stages. First, the devolution of council tax to the capital. Second, we argue for some immediate reforms to the system to protect the poorest Londoners, who are being hit by a tax that increasingly resembles the poll tax. Third, in the longer term, we argue for the replacement of the existing banding system with a proportional property tax, with one rate, to be applied across London, which should be calculated on up to-date property values. Finally, we set out some key strategies to help overcome some of the difficult issues and barriers to reform.

Les nouvelles mesures qui interdisent notamment la déduction des intérêts avec le calcul du loyer imposable auront une incidence négative à la fois sur les locateurs et les locataires.
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[…] The government has recently passed tax measures that discriminate against private rented housing, both as an asset class and as a form of housing tenancy. The most damaging of these measures is ‘Section 24’1 which prevents landlords entirely offsetting interest against rents before taxable profits are calculated. This move is unjustifiable and will raise rents. The Treasury’s rationale for the tax change has no justification in public finance economics and it is concerning that the Treasury would make the arguments that it has made.

As a result of Section 24, many landlords will pay huge amounts of tax as a proportion of profits. Interest rate rises are likely to cause the tax rate to exceed 100 percent of their underlying profit in some cases. Tax will even be payable by some landlords who make a loss.

The government has also increased Stamp Duty on buy-to-let properties. Stamp Duty in general is widely regarded as one of the worst taxes from an economic efficiency point of view. The late James Mirrlees, Nobel Prize winner in economics wrote: ‘There is no sound case for maintaining the stamp duty and we believe that it should be abolished’ and ‘Stamp duty and business rates defy the most basic of economic principles by taxing transactions and produced inputs respectively. The government’s decision to increase Stamp Duty on buy-to-let properties will also damage the market and raise rents.

The increase in Stamp Duty was introduced with the expressed intention of promoting buying over renting. This may happen at the margin. However, any such effects will benefit a small minority of potential purchasers who will be relatively well off.