Bulletin de veille du 10 mars 2026
Québec/Canada
Ce rapport analyse la politique budgétaire de l’Ontario sous Doug Ford et conclut que, malgré une rhétorique de rigueur et de baisses d’impôt, les dépenses réelles par habitant ont augmenté et les déficits ont persisté, avec peu de progrès en matière de dette.
During his victorious 2018 campaign, and in his early years as premier, Doug Ford positioned himself as an ambitious fiscal reformer.
This bulletin reviews early statements and rhetorical commitments made by Doug Ford, demonstrating that prior to taking office and in the early years of government, the Ford government promised lower taxes, disciplined spending, balanced budgets, and a reduction in the provincial debt burden.
The actual fiscal outcomes during the Ford government’s time in office up to 2024/25 are markedly different than the commitments made regarding spending, taxes, and borrowing.
Inflation-adjusted per-person program spending increased by 5.4% since Ford took office (2017/18 to 2024/25).
The Ford government has not delivered significant tax reform and has not reduced personal or corporate statutory income tax rates.
Operating deficits have persisted throughout Ford’s time in office (up to 2024/25), with just one surplus in 2021/22 and deficits in all other years (six of the seven years included in the analysis.
There has been minimal progress in reducing the size of the provincial debt burden relative to the provincial economy. The provincial debt-to-GDP ratio has declined by only 3.5 percentage points since 2017/18, with most of this minimal progress currently forecast to be undone over the next three years.
Ce rapport examine la part de responsabilité d’un gouvernement de l’Alberta dans l’accumulation de la dette et conclut que, malgré des chocs externes comme les fluctuations des prix de l’énergie ou les décisions de la Banque du Canada, les choix budgétaires ont joué un rôle déterminant dans la stabilité du ratio dette-PIB.
To what extent are provincial governments responsible for the accumulation of debt? When assessing a provincial government’s responsibility for fiscal outcomes, it is important to note that it does not have full control over its sources of revenue and its spending obligations.
Alberta is especially vulnerable as its revenues are subject to shocks arising from world energy markets and regulations imposed by other governments.
Like other provinces, Alberta’s budget is also sensitive to the choices made by the Bank of Canada that influence rates of growth and borrowing costs.
In this study, we use simple accounting relationships to measure changes in the debt ratio due to economic cycles, energy price shocks, and government policy choices.
Applying 60 years of data to this accounting we show that at times the Government of Alberta has been a major contributor to volatility in its ratio of debt to GDP.
This volatility has at times been the result of the government’s making budget choices based, apparently, on an overly optimistic view about the permanence of increases in energy prices. At other times, volatility has arisen from inappropriate attempts to introduce counter-cyclical fiscal policies.
Since the early 2000s, policy contributions to this volatility have become smaller, most recently because of what appears to be a renewed commitment to saving energy royalties.
This study highlights the important role provincial governments have in enhancing the resilience of their economies by avoiding increases in debt ratios whenever possible. Doing so requires adjusting tax rates and designing spending programs in ways that are compatible with future trends in growth and borrowing costs.
Cette étude propose une réforme fiscale structurelle d’envergure pour le Canada, fondée sur une réduction des taux d’imposition du revenu des particuliers et des sociétés, compensée par une hausse de la TPS ou l’introduction d’une nouvelle taxe sur la masse salariale dédiée aux soins de santé.
After a decade of virtually stagnant per capita economic output, tax reform and broader growth reforms are now on the front burner once again. The need for bold growth-oriented policy changes has become even more acute in light of US « America First » tariff policies, geopolitical tensions, and higher private and public debt financing costs.
This report proposes a sweeping, « big bang » reform that would restructure Canada’s tax system to improve growth, reduce distortions, and simplify compliance and administration. At the federal level, it would lower marginal personal income tax rates, introduce an optional simplified $10,000 tax credit to reduce complexity, and overhaul corporate taxation through either a 10 percent « Irish-style » rate with base broadening or a 13 percent distributed profits tax that defers federal taxation on retained earnings until profits are distributed.
The reform is designed to be revenue-neutral in the short term. To offset lower income tax rates, it would shift toward less distortionary sources of revenue, including either a modest increase in the GST or the introduction of a new employer-paid payroll tax dedicated to healthcare, thereby reducing reliance on economically harmful income taxation. Over the long run, the reforms could increase non-residential capital by roughly $140 billion and raise GDP by approximately $79 billion (about 2.5 percent), generating more than $26 billion annually in additional tax revenues while preserving Canada’s strong redistributive outcomes.
Ce rapport montre que les systèmes de tarification du carbone appliqués aux grandes industries au Canada ont contribué à stabiliser les émissions et à attirer des investissements de décarbonation, mais que le surplus de crédits menacent l’efficacité du signal prix.
Canada’s province of Alberta implemented North America’s first industrial carbon pricing system in 2007. Since 2019, large industrial emitters in every region of Canada have been covered by either the federal carbon pricing system or a regional system if it meets the federal benchmark criteria, which is periodically assessed by the federal government. In this way, the federal system acts as a backstop industrial carbon pricing system.
This report examines the histories and designs of five major Canadian carbon pricing systems: Alberta’s Technology Innovation and Emissions Reduction (TIER) regulation, British Columbia’s Output-Based Pricing System (OBPS), Ontario’s Emission Pricing System (EPS), Quebec’s cap-and-trade system, and the federal OBPS.
For each section, we provide an overview of the industrial and emissions context for each system and outline their approaches to benchmarking, compliance flexibility, stringency adjustments, and other key design parameters. We also review market outcomes, highlighting risks such as credit oversupply and uncertainty, and distill lessons learned from each system’s implementation.
Overall, we have seen that Canadian carbon pricing systems have prevented Canada’s emissions from growing and have attracted decarbonization investment, while protecting the competitiveness of regulated industries. However, design and maintenance choices have recently undermined the effectiveness of some systems.
Several systems in Canada are currently in or at risk of credit oversupply, which is hindering the incentive for decarbonization investment. For example, in 2025 credits in Alberta’s TIER system traded with 40–80% discounts against the direct payment options for system compliance. Historically in Alberta and other Canadian systems, credits are discounted around 10–20%. Furthermore, the volatility in Alberta’s 2025 credit prices have caused concern to investors. These ongoing issues demonstrate that systems need be consistently strengthened over time to drive deeper emissions reductions. Continuous monitoring, transparent reporting and timely adjustments are needed for pricing systems to achieve stated emission reduction and economic competitiveness objectives.
États-Unis
Ce rapport soutient que les États américains doivent impérativement protéger et accroître leurs revenus fiscaux en 2026 pour contrecarrer les effets combinés des réductions fédérales de programmes sociaux et des baisses d’impôt étatiques des dernières années, sans quoi il y a un risque important de coupes dans les services publics.
State and local policymakers nationwide are facing a one-two punch entering 2026. For one, last summer’s harmful Republican megabill paired enormous tax breaks for wealthy households and corporations with historically deep cuts that will take away people’s vital health care and food assistance, all while foisting considerable new costs and responsibilities onto states and localities. The resulting damage to people and communities is expected to be significant. And it comes at a time when many states are also facing intensifying budget pressures from the second threat: their own recent policy choices, like widespread income tax cuts, costly private school voucher programs, and a growing trend of property tax cuts and caps.
This combination of significant new costs and existing fiscal strain could worsen over coming years as state and federal policies continue to phase in. Unless states and localities respond with policies that protect and raise revenue, they will have little choice but to enact steep cuts not just to health care and food assistance, but also to a broad set of public services including education, housing, child care, and infrastructure.
Ce rapport estime qu’une surtaxe locale sur les revenus passifs du capital calquée sur la Net Investment Income Tax fédérale permettrait au District de Columbia de générer au moins 121 millions de dollars annuellement, en concentrant la charge fiscale sur les ménages les plus aisés, qui représentent 9 % des contribuables locaux.
DC can raise needed revenue and address tax inequity by taxing more of the gains, or proceeds, generated by wealth such as capital gains, dividends, and other forms of passive income. DC’s tax system protects and grows wealth concentration through myriad preferences and loopholes, exacerbating racial and economic inequality. This special treatment also prevents the District from generating the revenue needed to adequately fund programs and services. Applying a surcharge on proceeds generated from wealth is a simple way for DC to raise hundreds of millions of dollars to help struggling residents withstand the local recession and drastic federal and local safety net cuts.
Ce document estime que l’ensemble des politiques fiscales de l’administration américaine en 2026 se traduit par une hausse nette d’impôt pour tous les Américains sauf les 5 % les plus riches, les ménages à faible revenu étant proportionnellement les plus touchés.
Taking all the policies of President Trump and the Republican majority in Congress into account, all but the richest Americans are paying higher taxes on average in 2026 than they did last year. These policies include:
- Dramatically increased tariffs on goods from abroad, a tax that economists widely agree is mostly borne by American consumers.
- The termination of the Enhanced Premium Tax Credit (EPTC), which had made health care more affordable for millions of people.
- The so-called One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), which overwhelmingly benefits the rich and corporations.
The combined impact of these policies in 2026 is a tax increase for the average American in all income groups except the richest 5 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The richest 1 percent, in particular, receive a noticeable tax cut compared to all other groups.
Ce document explique que la Californie fait face à des problèmes persistants de conformité dans les secteurs du cannabis et du tabac. Il souligne que les propositions budgétaires du gouverneur pour 2026‑2027 doivent être considérées comme un effort soutenu plutôt qu’un simple ajustement ponctuel, afin d’assurer un financement adéquat et mieux structurer l’application des taxes.
In this post, we discuss three Governor’s budget proposals for the Department of Tax and Fee Administration’s (CDTFA’s) cannabis and tobacco programs. Our key findings and recommendations are:
The state faces significant cannabis and tobacco compliance problems. Accordingly, we recommend that the Legislature approach the Governor’s proposals not as one‑time workload adjustments, but as components of a broader, more sustained effort to address these policy challenges. To support this sustained effort, we recommend that the Legislature set up opportunities to revisit program resources in the 2027 and/or 2028 budget processes.
The administration has been spending General Fund on cannabis tax enforcement, which should be funded exclusively by the Cannabis Tax Fund. By proposing a Cannabis Tax Fund augmentation for these costs, the administration acknowledges that spending General Fund for this purpose is not ideal. We recommend that the Legislature adopt a modified version of this proposal and consider whether new provisional language is needed to prevent such problems from recurring.
Ce document analyse en détail l’escalade des droits de douane imposés sous la présidence Trump et montre que ces mesures fonctionnent comme une hausse d’impôt pour les ménages américains, augmentent les coûts pour les entreprises et réduisent la croissance économique, tout en faisant échec à améliorer significativement la balance commerciale.
President Trump imposed IEEPA tariffs on US trading partners in 2025, including China, Canada, Mexico, and the EU. In addition, he has threatened and imposed Section 232 tariffs on autos, heavy trucks, steel, aluminum, lumber, furniture, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and copper, among others.
The Supreme Court recently ruled in a 6-3 decision in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump andO.S. Selections v. United States that “IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.”
President Trump responded by signing an executive order that would impose a 10 percent tariff on all countries under Section 122 with exemptions, effective February 24, 2026. On February 21, 2026, he threatened to increase the Section 122 rate to 15 percent, but it took effect at the announced 10 percent rate. We estimate this new tariff would apply to $1.2 trillion worth (34 percent) of annual imports. The tariff is scheduled to expire after 150 days.
In 2025, the Trump tariffs amounted to an average taxincrease per US household of $1,000. After the IEEPA tariffs were struck down, we estimate the President’s remaining new tariffs under Section 232 will increase taxes per US household by $400 in 2026. The Section 122 tariffs will increase this household burden by about $200 to $600 in 2026.
We estimate with the IEEPA tariffs being ruled illegal, the remaining Section 232 tariffs imposed in 2025 increase the weighted average appliedtariff rate on all imports to 6.7 percent in 2026, down from 13.8 percent under the IEEPA tariffs. While the 10 percent Section 122 tariffs are in effect, we estimate this rises to 10.3 percent, and then falls to 6.7 percent after the Section 122 tariffs end.
The average effective tariff rate, which reflects actual tariff revenue raised as a share of actual goods imports, was 7.7 percent in 2025, the highest rate since 1947. If the 10 percent Section 122 tariffs expire after 150 days, we estimate the average effective tariff rate will be 5.6 percent in 2026—the highest since 1972.
With the IEEPA being ruled illegal, we estimate that the remaining Section 232 tariffs imposed in 2025 and the 10 percent Section 122 tariffs will raise $660 billion in revenue from 2026-2035 on a conventional basis. The permanent Section 232 tariffs will reduce US GDP by 0.2 percent, before foreign retaliation. Accounting for negative economic effects, the revenue raised by the tariffs falls to $515 billion over the next decade. We estimate that the Section 232 tariffs raised $36 billion in net tax revenue in 2025.
The tariffs have not meaningfully altered the trade balance. The total trade deficit fell by only $2.1 billion in 2025, driven by an increase in the trade surplus of services.
Historical evidence and recent studies show that tariffs are taxes that raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for US businesses and consumers, resulting in lower income, reduced employment, and lower economic output.
Ce document montre que rendre permanentes les dispositions temporaires du Tax Cuts and Jobs Act stimulerait la croissance économique et les revenus après impôt pour une majorité de contribuables, mais alourdirait fortement le déficit fédéral et la dette publique en raison de pertes de recettes dépassant 4 500 milliards de dollars sur dix ans.
Permanently extending the expiring individual, estate, and business tax provisions would boost long-run economic output by 1.1 percent, national income by 0.4 percent, the capital stock by 0.7 percent, wages by 0.5 percent, and hours worked by 847,000 full-time equivalent jobs.
Over the 2025 through 2034 budget window, permanence for the expiring TCJA individual provisions will reduce federal tax revenue by $3.6 trillion ($3.2 trillion dynamically), the expiring estate tax provisions by $240 billion ($240 billion dynamically), and the expiring business provisions by $648 billion ($351 billion dynamically).
Overall, economic growth will offset $710 billion, or 16 percent, of the combined $4.5 trillion in revenue losses.
The $4.5 trillion reduction in tax revenues would increase the budget deficit and push up interest costs by an estimated $941 billion ($806 billion dynamically).
Added interest costs plus the revenue losses from TCJA extension result in a combined deficit increase of $5.4 trillion ($4.6 trillion dynamically) from 2025 through 2034.
Long-run debt-to-GDP would increase from its baseline projection of 184 percent in 2060 to 212 percent conventionally and 205 percent dynamically.
As a result of the tax cuts, after-tax incomes would rise by 2.9 percent (3.4 percent dynamically) in 2026 on average. The share of filers who itemize would drop from 33 percent to 13 percent, and 62 percent of filers would see a tax cut.
Cet article analyse l’impact des tarifs douaniers américains sur les recettes publiques et les ménages, estimant une charge moyenne de 1 230 $ par unité fiscale en 2026 et des recettes additionnelles de 22,3 G$ liées au tarif temporaire de 10 %.
TPC tracks tariff developments and updates this page with details and estimates of how tariffs will affect federal revenues, households, and the economy.
Starting in early 2025, President Trump expanded tariffs on goods from a wide range of countries. The US Supreme Court in February 2026 struck down IEEPA tariffs. President Trump imposed a new temporary 10 percent tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 after the Supreme Court ruling on IEEPA. TPC estimates this temporary tariff will raise an additional $22.3 billion in 2026.
TPC estimates that tariffs announced by the administration through December 4, 2025 will impose an average burden of about $1,230 per tax unit (or household) in calendar year 2026.
International
Ce document analyse comment le vieillissement rapide de la population chinoise ralentira sensiblement la croissance économique et alourdira les dépenses de retraite au cours des prochaines décennies, tout en montrant que des réformes telles que le relèvement progressif de l’âge de départ, l’ajustement des prestations à l’espérance de vie et la poursuite de l’urbanisation peuvent atténuer ces pressions et améliorer la soutenabilité budgétaire du système de pension.
China is experiencing rapid population aging and a declining workforce, posing significant economic and fiscal challenges, especially to the pension system. This paper examines the evolution of China’s pension system, assesses its gaps relative to international peers, and evaluates the macro-fiscal implications of population aging and various pension reforms. Using a calibrated overlapping generations model that explicitly incorporates the rural–urban disparities, we project that population aging alone can slow annual GDP growth by about 2 percentage points between 2024 and 2050, while pension spending can rise by nearly 10 percentage points of GDP. The 2024 retirement age reform eases some of the long-term growth and fiscal sustainability pressures, raising GDP growth by 0.2 percentage points annually and reducing pension spending from 15.3 percent to 11.9 percent of GDP by 2050. We also use the model to examine a set of policy-relevant reforms—doubling Residents Pension Scheme benefits which are currently inadequate, linking benefits to life expectancy, further increasing the retirement age, and promoting urbanization—and find significant effects on fiscal and macroeconomic outcomes.
Ce document montre que la création du Large Taxpayer Office en Géorgie a significativement accru les recettes fiscales en améliorant la conformité des grandes entreprises. Les auteurs concluent que de telles réformes administratives peuvent constituer une source importante de revenus budgétaire sans modifier les taux d’imposition.
In 2021, the Republic of Georgia established a Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) to strengthen tax administration and improve compliance among firms that contribute a disproportionate share of revenue. This paper draws on that quasi-experiment to estimate the causal impact of intensive oversight, with no change in tax rates, on taxpayer behavior and revenue collection using administrative data from 2017–2024. Our study exploits both the 2021 introduction of the LTO and the revision of eligibility thresholds in 2024. Estimating a weighted difference-in-differences design, we find that LTO assignment raised annual tax assessments by about 0.4–0.7 percent of GDP, concentrated in VAT and withholding taxes. When we examine the channels, we find that the LTO raised compliance by combining targeted enforcement with improved taxpayer services, while audits became fewer but more selective. The impacts are largest in sectors with strong third-party reporting and high transaction traceability. Our findings underscore that reforms to tax administration can deliver significant gains in fiscal capacity, generate fiscal space, and support development.
Ce document explique que le cadre fiscal du Royaume‑Uni ne parvient plus à guider efficacement la politique budgétaire. Il propose de le remplacer par un système de « feux de circulation » qui intégrerait mieux l’incertitude, réduirait les incitations perverses et renforcerait la crédibilité et la transparence des décisions publiques.
The central contention of this report is that the UK fiscal framework has some desirable features but is not delivering good outcomes. We are in a bad equilibrium.
The UK’s fiscal framework is based around a set of pass–fail, numerical fiscal rules. The fiscal debate is overly fixated on the amount of ‘headroom’ the government has against the most binding of those rules. The system incentivises the government to operate with the smallest amount of ‘headroom’ possible, with policy often fine-tuned according to the central point estimate of a highly uncertain forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility. When the forecast improves, any additional ‘headroom’ is typically spent; when the forecast worsens, Chancellors of all political hues are adept at meeting the letter of the rolling fiscal targets by promising spending cuts or tax rises for future years – or the rules simply get changed.
Put differently, the framework and the way it has come to be operated mean that when forecasts move around – as they inevitably do – policy has to respond, often in a rush and with a spurious degree of precision. This does not make for good policymaking, it does not ensure sustainable public finances, and it stretches credulity and credibility with financial markets. We are living through a tough fiscal moment, but it is hard to believe this is the best we can do.
This report argues that the UK would be better served by a new framework based around a set of ‘fiscal traffic lights’, used to monitor performance against broad fiscal objectives and principles set out in a high-profile Statement of Fiscal Strategy at the start of each parliament. The overarching aim would be to create the conditions for better fiscal policymaking and a better fiscal debate while maintaining – or building – credibility with bond market investors.
This is a proposal for the medium-to-long term, and not an argument for immediate reform. The current set-up has its shortcomings, but to abandon the current fiscal rules at the present moment would very likely be interpreted by financial markets merely as an attempt by the government to relax its fiscal constraints and borrow more – which is not the point of this proposal. Only from a position of strength and credibility – ideally having delivered a current and/or primary budget surplus – should such a change be considered. In the nearer term, a set of fiscal traffic lights could be developed and operated in parallel with the existing system over the remainder of this parliament, to iron out issues, build understanding, and facilitate a full transition at the point when the fiscal rules next come under review.
Ce document montre que si le financement du gouvernement gallois a augmenté en termes réels depuis 2020, cette dynamique va fortement ralentir et même s’inverser pour l’investissement au cours des prochaines années, ce qui obligera le prochain gouvernement à opérer des choix difficiles en matière de fiscalité et de dépenses.
The funding available to the Welsh Government determines the choices available to it – including what services to provide, and where to ask for co-payments from service recipients. Such choices especially affect households on low and middle incomes, and particularly those in poverty or with higher needs, for whom the in-kind consumption provided by public services generally represents a larger share of their overall consumption. This makes government spending – and the funding which pays for it – a more important determinant of low- and middle-income households’ living standards and life chances.
In contrast with most of the 2010s, the period since 2020 has seen real-terms increases in the Welsh Government’s funding for both day-to-day (resource) spending and investment (capital) spending. However, increases in resource funding are set to slow significantly and capital funding is set to fall over the next few years, which will mean tough choices over tax and spending allocation for the next government.
Ce rapport présente les prévisions de recettes fiscales et de dépenses publiques pour les gouvernements dévolus d’Écosse, du Pays de Galles et d’Irlande du Nord, analysant leurs marges de manœuvre budgétaires à moyen terme et les risques pesant sur leurs finances publiques.
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) was established in 2010 to provide independent and authoritative analysis of the UK’s public finances. Alongside the UK Government’s Budgets and other fiscal statements, we produce forecasts for the economy and the public finances, which are published in our Economic and fiscal outlook (EFO). As set out in the fiscal frameworks agreed between the UK Government and the Scottish and Welsh Governments, respectively, we also produce forecasts for the devolved taxes. These devolved taxes contribute to our overall UK receipts forecast, as reported in the EFO.
This document presents forecasts for the fully devolved taxes and for devolved elements of income tax, alongside illustrative projections for some taxes that are yet to be devolved. It also provides the forecasts that the UK, Scottish and Welsh Governments use as part of their agreed block grant funding mechanisms. As part of this, we provide the latest projections of the block grant adjustment and net tax positions, which reflects the difference between the tax revenue that the devolved governments receive, and the funding that is deducted from the block grant to account for the tax devolution.
Ce document analyse la suppression potentielle des exemptions de taxes liées aux ventes d’alcool et de tabac en Norvège et montre que les dépenses fiscales associées à ces exemptions sont surestimées par les méthodes conventionnelles et seraient réduites de plus d’un tiers si l’on intégrait correctement les ajustements de comportement des consommateurs.
Tax expenditures are the losses in revenue from exempting parts of the tax base from taxation. The conventional method for computing tax expenditures disregards behavioural effects. Using an empirically based demand model, we simulate two reform scenarios that repeal current tax expenditures related to on-arrival duty-free sales of alcohol and tobacco in Norway. The model includes both recorded and unrecorded consumption, tracking all demand responses and their impacts on the tax base. Our results suggest that incorporating these behavioural effects reduces tax expenditures calculated by the conventional approach by more than one third.
Ce document explique que, dans un contexte de baisse du pouvoir d’achat des ménages à faibles revenus en Australie, une réforme du Low‑Income Tax Offset permettrait d’accorder une réduction d’impôt d’environ 2 300 $ aux travailleurs à faibles revenus, financée intégralement par une taxe de 25 % sur les exportations de gaz.
Low-income workers are suffering after the largest ever fall in real wages. While real wages have grown more recently, the RBA is now expecting them to fall in 2026. While those on high incomes have more capacity to cut back their spending, low-income workers spend most of their income on essentials like rent, food, and utilities. They have far less capacity to cut back.
This paper proposes a targeted income tax cut for low-income workers by increasing the Low Income Tax Offset (LITO). The LITO is an automatic tax refund that low-income earners get when they lodge their tax return. It is effective in making sure the tax cut goes to those who need it most because it tapers down as people’s incomes rise. This means high-income earners get no benefit from the LITO.
The biggest beneficiaries of this change in the LITO would be taxpayers earning between $32,000 and $46,000 per year. They would receive a tax cut of more than $2,000 per year. Those earning between $46,000 and $70,000 would get a tax cut of between $2,000 and $1,000 per year. Those earning between $70,000 and $90,000 would get a tax cut of less than $1,000. Those on more than $90,000 would get no tax cut.
This tax cut is likely to have a significant impact on labour force participation. Low-income workers often have childcaring responsibilities and the relationship between the after-tax hourly rate of pay and the hourly cost of childcare can be a major determinant of labour supply. Increasing their take-home pay can make working additional days financially viable. This increase in the LITO can be fully paid for by a 25% tax on gas exports as proposed by the ACTU. This tax would only be payable on gas exported overseas and so would not increase gas prices paid by Australians.
This increase would be revenue positive, with the LITO changes costing $12 billion and the 25% gas export increasing revenue by $12.5 billion.
While gas companies have received extraordinary windfall profits in recent years, hardworking low-income Australians are facing a financial squeeze. This is an opportunity for more workers to receive the benefits of Australia’s resources.
The benefits of this tax cut will be of greatest help to young people and workers in rural and regional areas. Rural and provincial electorates would get the largest average benefit, with electorates currently held by the National Party benefitting the most. Regional and outer suburban crossbench electorates also benefit considerably, while inner-city electorates would get the least.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Carole Habib
- Kristine Javier
- Félix Musas
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé
- Ariane Gaboury
Note: L’intelligence artificielle générative a été utilisée dans la préparation de ce bulletin de veille.