Ce rapport présente les projections du BRF relatives à l’économie et aux finances du gouvernement de l’Ontario de 2025-2026 à 2029-2030.

La croissance du PIB réel de l’Ontario a ralenti pour s’établir à environ 1,3 % en 2025, contre 1,6 % en 2024, les tarifs douaniers américains ayant entraîné une contraction des exportations et des investissements des entreprises ontariennes. Cependant, malgré les tarifs douaniers américains, la croissance économique de l’Ontario a été soutenue en 2025 par la résilience des dépenses des ménages et une augmentation des investissements résidentiels

Sur la base des perspectives économiques du BRF pour l’Ontario, des politiques gouvernementales actuelles et des engagements annoncés, le BRF prévoit que le déficit budgétaire de l’Ontario passera de 1,1 milliard de dollars en 2024-2025 à 11,1 milliards de dollars en 2025-2026. Cette augmentation importante du déficit budgétaire résulte d’une hausse prévue de 3,2 % des dépenses, combinée à une baisse de 1,2 % des revenus, principalement due à la diminution des revenus non fiscaux. On prévoit que le déficit budgétaire atteindra 11,8 milliards de dollars en 2026-2027, pour ensuite s’améliorer graduellement au cours du reste de la période visée par les perspectives. Malgré cette amélioration, le budget devrait rester déficitaire pendant toute la période des perspectives, avec un déficit budgétaire prévu de 6,3 milliards de dollars en 2029-2030.

Le BRF prévoit que le déficit accumulé de la province, qui correspond à la différence entre le total des passifs et le total des actifs, augmentera de 44,3 milliards de dollars (17,9 %) au cours de la période visée par les perspectives, passant de 247,1 milliards de dollars en 2024-2025 à 291,4 milliards de dollars en 2029-2030, en raison des déficits budgétaires persistants. L’augmentation de 44,3 milliards de dollars en déficits cumulés, combinée à des emprunts pour financer une augmentation prévue de 76,5 milliards de dollars des actifs non financiers, lesquels sont en majeure partie des actifs d’infrastructure appartenant à la province et au secteur parapublic, entraînera une augmentation de la dette nette de la province, qui passera de 427,1 milliards de dollars en 2024-2025 à 547,9 milliards de dollars en 2029-2030, soit une augmentation de 120,9 milliards de dollars (28,3 %) au cours de la période visée par les perspectives.

Au cours de la période de cinq ans visée par les perspectives, la croissance des revenus devrait s’établir en moyenne à 2,6 % par an, soit bien en deçà de la hausse annuelle moyenne de 7,6 % enregistrée au cours des cinq dernières années. Ce ralentissement de la croissance des revenus reflète la prévision du BRF d’un ralentissement de l’activité économique par rapport aux cinq dernières années. La croissance des revenus au cours de la période visée par les perspectives est également freinée par la baisse des revenus d’intérêts et de placements ainsi que des revenus provenant des frais de scolarité des étudiants internationaux dans le secteur des collèges

Au cours de la période de cinq ans visée par les perspectives, la croissance des dépenses devrait s’établir en moyenne à 3,0 % par an, soit bien en deçà de la hausse annuelle moyenne de 6,5 % enregistrée au cours des cinq dernières années. La croissance des dépenses devrait ralentir en raison d’une inflation prévue plus faible, d’une croissance plus lente des salaires et de la population, ainsi que de l’analyse par le BRF des politiques gouvernementales actuelles et des engagements annoncés.

Les tensions géopolitiques croissantes, l’instabilité des relations internationales et l’incertitude qui règne dans le commerce mondial font peser des risques sur les perspectives économiques et budgétaires du BRF. Compte tenu de cette incertitude, le BRF a élaboré deux scénarios économiques concurrents, un scénario de « forte croissance » et un scénario de « faible croissance », basés sur des hypothèses raisonnables pour les principales variables économiques. Dans le scénario de forte croissance, le BRF prévoit un déficit budgétaire de 2,3 milliards de dollars d’ici 2029-2030, tandis que dans le scénario de faible croissance, le déficit budgétaire atteint 10,1 milliards de dollars en 2029-2030.

Ce court texte indique que le budget 2026 de la Colombie‑Britannique dissimule des mesures d’austérité et des hausses d’impôts qui réduisent les services publics et augmentent la charge fiscale des ménages à faible revenu.

Budgets are about the choices we make as a society. Politicians often make bold claims but what really shows commitment is money. There are many priorities for this year’s B.C. budget: maintaining public services, investing in people and infrastructure for the future, softening the current economic downturn, reducing inequality, fighting the key issues of the day, and improving sustainability. The budget is also about how we pay and who pays. 

Altogether, the central challenge for the budget is to translate the immense wealth of the province into collective well-being. Heading into B.C.’s 2026 budget, austerity measures were top of the agenda due to policymakers’ perceptions that B.C. has a “structural deficit” rather than a balanced position over the course of the business cycle. An austerity mindset is bad news: it means the loss of public service talent, deteriorating public services and reduced ambition to meet the challenges of our times.

On the surface, the budget appears to have dodged austerity, with the Minister of Finance boldly declaring that “this is not an austerity budget”. However, key spending areas have been given very small budget increases, spread over the three-year fiscal plan, which mean real cuts to services. In addition, the B.C. government’s tax increases will hit low- to moderate income households. Put together, the budget lays the burden of austerity on the poorest in BC.

Ce rapport analyse les effets distributifs et budgétaires des régimes d’épargne enregistrés que sont le CELI et le REER, en évaluant leur rôle comme dépenses fiscales et leurs impacts sur l’équité et les finances publiques au Canada.

Cette étude analyse de manière novatrice et détaillée l’utilisation des véhicules d’épargne enregistrés au Québec – le Régime enregistré d’épargne-retraite (REER) et le Compte d’épargne libre d’impôt (CELI) – et projette leurs effets sur les finances publiques jusqu’en 2060. Ces instruments, harmonisés avec les règles fédérales, accordent des avantages fiscaux qui entraînent des dépenses fiscales importantes. L’objectif est double : comprendre la dynamique actuelle et future de ces véhicules et évaluer l’impact de scénarios alternatifs sur la dépense fiscale. Notre analyse permet de tirer 15 constats majeurs présentés à la section suivante.

En résumé, les données administratives et démographiques montrent que le CELI est davantage utilisé par les jeunes et les personnes âgées, surtout dans les déciles de revenu élevés, tandis que le REER demeure concentré entre 35 et 60 ans chez les hauts revenus. Les rendements des CELI varient de 2 % à 4,5 % selon le revenu, et les retraits sont fréquents chez les plus jeunes et les très âgés. À l’inverse, les retraits des REER sont plus rares avant 70 ans. La projection révèle une transformation majeure : la part du REER dans l’épargne totale (REER + CELI) passera de 80 % en 2020 à 54 % en 2060, au profit du CELI, tandis que l’épargne totale augmentera légèrement de 1,5 à 1,7 fois le revenu imposable, si les comportements actuels d’utilisation de ces véhicules sont maintenus.

Sur le plan fiscal, la dépense totale liée à ces véhicules restera relativement stable en proportion de l’impôt sur le revenu, soit environ 11 %, malgré la croissance des CELI et la baisse des REER. Cette stabilité suggère qu’il semble y avoir peu de risque d’explosion des coûts à long terme pour le gouvernement du Québec. Ces dynamiques impliquent un déplacement de la dépense fiscale à long terme dû à des effets de timing. La dépense fiscale provenant de l’utilisation du REER arrive majoritairement plus tôt dans le cheminement de l’épargne (au moment de la cotisation). Les scénarios alternatifs confirment que des changements de règles peuvent avoir des effets significatifs : l’abolition des cotisations au CELI mènerait à la disparition des stocks d’ici 2048 (stock inférieur à 1 G$) et à une baisse de la dépense fiscale, tandis que l’abolition des cotisations au REER ferait chuter la dépense fiscale jusqu’à devenir négative. Les transferts de cotisations entre REER et CELI modifient aussi la dépense fiscale : un transfert vers le CELI réduit le coût global, alors qu’un transfert vers le REER l’augmente substantiellement. Enfin, une variation des taux de retrait minimum des REER (FERR) influence temporairement la dépense fiscale.

En somme, l’analyse rassure quant à la soutenabilité des mesures actuelles : la dépense fiscale demeure stable en proportion des recettes, malgré des changements importants dans l’utilisation des véhicules. Les enjeux futurs se situent davantage sur le plan redistributif et sur l’optimisation des incitatifs à l’épargne, afin de concilier équité et efficacité sans compromettre les finances publiques.

Cette note fournit une estimation du coût de certaines mesures de déduction pour amortissement accéléré et de passation en charges immédiate prévues dans le budget de 2025.

Dans son budget de 2025, le gouvernement a annoncé son intention de mettre en œuvre les mesures de déduction pour amortissement accéléré (DPA) et de passation en charges immédiate prévues dans le budget de 2024 et l’Énoncé économique de l’automne (EEA) de 2024. Le budget de 2025 a aussi annoncé de nouvelles mesures de DPA et de passation en charges immédiate.

Cet article examine l’impact potentiel de l’allocation canadienne pour l’épicerie et les besoins essentiels et montre que ce type de soutien direct pourrait atténuer l’inflation des biens essentiels pour les ménages à faible et moyen revenu tout en posant des questions sur le coût budgétaire et l’efficience de ce type de transfert comparé à d’autres outils de politique fiscale et sociale.

The federal government announced the Canada Groceries and Essentials Benefit (CGEB) on January 26, 2026. The benefit is an expansion of the existing GST/HST Credit aimed at easing affordability pressures for low- and modest-income Canadians, amid persistently high costs for food and essentials.

The measure has two parts. First, it provides a one-time top-up, equivalent to 50 per cent of a household’s 2025/26 GST/HST Credit entitlement, to be paid in spring 2026. Second, it increases the base benefit by 25 per cent for five years starting in July 2026, indexed to inflation. Government projections estimate that the CGEB would provide $3.1 billion in additional payments through the one-time top-up, and $8.6 billion over five years through the base-benefit increase. The Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) estimates that the measure will cost $12.4 billion over the fiscal years 2025/26 to 2030/31. This is a substantial fiscal commitment; design choices are therefore essential to ensure maximum impact per dollar.

Overall, it will reach more than 12 million recipients. This is an important step toward targeted affordability relief, delivered through an existing tax-based program. The CGEB was announced alongside complementary broader measures to tackle food insecurity and strengthen food supply chains in Canada, including support for food banks.

Instead of creating a new program, the CGEB builds on the existing GST/HST Credit, an established transfer delivered through the tax system. This approach supports rapid delivery and broad reach, but its distributional impact depends substantially on the GST/HST Credit’s design features. In earlier Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) analysis for the Affordability Action Council (AAC), we recommended restructuring and expanding the GST/HST Credit into a permanent Groceries and Essentials Benefit to better target support to lower-income households.

In this commentary, we answer questions Canadians might be asking about the CGEB: what it is, who is eligible, how much recipients will receive, why the benefit is needed, and how benefit design choices will affect the impact and effectiveness of the program.

Cet article examine l’évolution du droit municipal au Canada et montre que, malgré un élargissement important des pouvoirs des municipalités au cours des 40 dernières années, les écarts entre provinces et territoires demeurent marqués et le plein potentiel de ces réformes en matière d’autonomie locale reste encore à concrétiser.

Local government is a vital part of Canada’s multi-level democracy. It provides a voice for the needs, desires, and aspirations of local communities and shapes the environments in which we live. Amidst growing calls for greater local autonomy and expanded local powers and resources, this paper contributes a comparative overview of municipal law in Canada’s ten provinces and three territories. We find that Canadian municipal law has experienced a quiet evolution over the past 40 years. The scope of municipal legal authority has expanded considerably as provinces and territories have revised their general municipal acts and adopted special laws for major cities. While the overall trend has been toward more permissive authority and the recognition of municipalities as democratic, accountable, and responsible governments, there are significant variations, both in law and in practice, among and within provinces and territories. We conclude that the practical potential of this wave of legislative reform is not fully known and may be unrealized, and requires further research.

Ce mémoire analyse l’impact budgétaire et redistributif de la crise du coût de la vie au Québec et propose des mesures fiscales structurantes, notamment la bonification du crédit d’impôt pour solidarité et l’inclusion complète du gain en capital.

Rédigé dans le cadre des consultations prébudgétaires 2026-2027, le document montre que la hausse des prix a accentué les inégalités de revenu et de patrimoine, en particulier pour les ménages à faible revenu. À partir de données de Statistique Canada et de simulations réalisées avec la BD/MSPS, les auteurs estiment qu’une bonification ciblée du crédit d’impôt pour solidarité pourrait réduire significativement le déficit de couverture des besoins de base, au coût d’environ 3,7 milliards de dollars par année. Le mémoire propose également d’assurer une inclusion complète du gain en capital dans le revenu imposable, assortie d’une exemption à vie de 1 million de dollars, mesure qui pourrait générer environ 1,8 milliard de dollars annuellement au Québec. Enfin, il plaide pour un rehaussement des investissements en prévention en santé, en soulignant les effets budgétaires à long terme associés à la réduction des inégalités sociales de santé.

Ce document dresse un portrait de l’économie canadienne en mettant en évidence ses forces institutionnelles et sociales, tout en soulignant que le ralentissement de la croissance du PIB par habitant, la hausse des inégalités, la faible productivité et la crise du logement exigent une refonte des choix de fiscalité, de dépenses publiques et d’endettement afin de préserver la prospérité à long terme.

Canada ranks among the world’s most successful advanced economies, combining democratic governance, prosperity and social stability. Strong institutions, respect for the rule of law, a highly educated workforce, effective labour markets and a comprehensive social safety net are the foundations for a high quality of life in Canada. Comparative evidence shows that Canada consistently performs in the top tier of advanced economies across a range of economic and social indicators. Sound fiscal policy is crucial to sustaining these strengths. Policy is the set of government decisions regarding taxation, spending and borrowing, which, while often technical and overlooked, plays a decisive role in shaping long-run prosperity.

However, Canada faces some serious economic challenges, most of which fiscal policy will directly influence. First, growth in per capita GDP — a key measure of average living standards — has lagged behind that of Canada’s global peers for several years and has declined outright since 2022, an unusual and troubling development outside of recessionary periods. Second, income inequality has risen, with higher income households enjoying a disproportionate share of growth while many low- and middle-income Canadians must cope with stagnant pre-tax incomes. Although Canada’s tax-and-transfer system mitigates inequality, weak underlying income growth is concerning.

Third, Canada’s long-standing productivity problem continues to undermine wage growth, profitability and competitiveness. Low levels of business investment in machinery, equipment and intellectual property — relative to other advanced economies — are a big contributor to this weakness. Fourth, housing affordability has deteriorated dramatically following decades of rapid increases in prices and rents, transforming what was once a problem mainly for the lowest income Canadians into a widespread constraint affecting millions of households. Fifth, Canada faces the dual challenge of sustaining the economic benefits of natural resource development, particularly in energy, while meeting environmental and climate commitments. Three more challenges have arisen due to U.S. protectionism under President Donald Trump. Canada’s deep integration with the U.S. economy — long supported by free trade agreements — is strained by higher tariffs and increased uncertainty, raising new fears about competitiveness, diversification and economic resilience.

This paper frames a comprehensive fiscal policy agenda organized around taxation, government spending and public debt. Key tax-related questions include whether Canada needs a full-scale tax system review; how to finance new spending commitments; the growth effects of higher income tax rates; the potential benefits of shifting toward expenditure-based taxes; and the need for tax competitiveness, especially for corporations.

Ce rapport analyse un projet de loi budgétaire fédéral américain combinant réductions d’impôts et compressions de programmes sociaux, et en évalue les effets distributifs et budgétaires.

The sprawling megabill passed by the Republican-controlled Congress and signed by President Trump in July 2025 will redistribute trillions of dollars upward over the next decade, making it harder for families with modest incomes to meet their basic needs while helping those at the top accumulate more wealth.

To partially finance $4.5 trillion in tax cuts tilted to the wealthiest households, the new law (originally called the One Big Beautiful Bill Act by its proponents) imposes sweeping cuts to programs that help people with low and moderate incomes afford health care and groceries and shifts extensive new responsibilities to states and localities. Independent analyses project that the law will increase the deficit and in the long run provide only a meager boost to the economy and might in fact slow economic growth.

(Le texte est tronqué.)

Ce rapport présente les projections budgétaires américaines à moyen terme et montre que, sans changements de politique, la dette fédérale continuera d’augmenter fortement par rapport au PIB, principalement en raison de la croissance des dépenses obligatoires et des coûts d’intérêt, ce qui pose des défis importants pour la soutenabilité budgétaire future.

In CBO’s projections, the federal budget deficit in fiscal year 2026 is $1.9 trillion and grows to $3.1 trillion by 2036. Relative to the size of the economy, the deficit is 5.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026 and grows to 6.7 percent in 2036, which is greater than the 3.8 percent deficits averaged over the past 50 years. Rising net interest costs drive much of that increase. The primary deficit, which excludes those net interest costs, totals 2.6 percent of GDP this year and stays below that level through 2036, when it totals 2.1 percent.

Ce document analyse en détail le “One Big Beautiful Bill Act”, montrant que s’il stimule légèrement le PIB à long terme, il réduit fortement les recettes fédérales — de près de 5 200 milliards $ sur dix ans — et accroît sensiblement les déficits et l’endettement publics.

The Senate Finance Committee introduced its reconciliation tax legislation on June 16, 2025, addressing the expirations of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) and proposing additional changes to US tax and spending policies. On June 27, 2025, the Senate released a new version of the legislative text for the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). On July 1, 2025, the Senate passed the OBBBA after minor adjustments, and the House of Representatives passed the identical bill on July 3, 2025. President Trump signed the bill into law on July 4, 2025.

Our analysis of the major tax provisions included in the OBBBA finds it will increase long-run GDP by 0.7 percent. The major tax provisions will reduce federal tax revenue by nearly $5.2 trillion between 2025 and 2034, on a conventional basis. On a dynamic basis, incorporating the projected increase in long-run GDP of 0.7 percent, the dynamic score of the tax provisions falls by $837 billion to $4.3 trillion, meaning economic growth pays for 16 percent of the major tax cuts.

Combined with the nearly $1.1 trillion in net spending reductions estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), we estimate the OBBBA will increase federal budget deficits by $3.3 trillion from 2025 through 2034 on a dynamic basis. Further, we estimate that on a dynamic basis, increased borrowing will add $851 billion in higher interest costs over the decade, resulting in a total deficit increase of $4.1 trillion on a dynamic basis.

(Le texte est tronqué).

Cet article compare l’imposition des revenus d’entreprise au niveau de la société ou des propriétaires et soutient que les évolutions récentes, notamment l’efficacité accrue de l’impôt corporatif et la complexité grandissante des sociétés de personnes, renforcent l’argument en faveur d’une taxation plus large au niveau de l’entité.

There are two ways to tax US business income: at the entity level with a corporate tax, or at the owner level by passing business income through to individual tax returns. The choice affects how much revenue the government can raise, how hard the system is to enforce, and how strongly taxes discourage investment.

Economists and policy experts have long been skeptical of the corporate tax. But two modern trends challenge the traditional argument, as we explain in a new paper. First, the corporate tax is increasingly efficient because it has come to resemble a cash flow tax focused on economic rents. Second, partnerships, which are one type of pass-through entity, have grown into complex, sprawling structures that are extremely difficult to audit. Both trends strengthen the case for a broader use of the entity-level corporate tax, rather than pass-through taxation.

Ce document analyse la trajectoire de la dette fédérale américaine, qui pourrait dépasser 120 % du PIB d’ici 2036, en soulignant que l’augmentation des déficits accroîtra le poids des intérêts, limitera la croissance à long terme et transférera un fardeau financier important aux générations futures.

Last year’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) is projected to add at least $4.1 trillion to federal deficits over the next decade, but it is only one of many factors expected to push federal debt to more than $56 trillion, or roughly 120 percent of GDP in 2036.

As debt continues to increase, there are genuine concerns about what this trajectory means for the economy and household finances—especially the burden of rising interest costs. Although short-term fiscal policies have sometimes helped limit the severity of past downturns, there is little evidence that fiscal policy as a whole, including failure to pay for those interventions, has boosted long-term growth; if anything, the evidence points the other way.

It’s past time for policymakers to take a hard look at spending and revenues. Through higher debt and interest payments on that debt, delay only increases burdens on future generations and makes eventual adjustments more difficult.

Ce rapport analyse les nouvelles dispositions fiscales internationales adoptées en 2025 aux États-Unis et conclut qu’elles favorisent davantage l’investissement domestique et les exportations, tout en accroissant la pression fiscale sur certaines activités situées dans des juridictions à faible imposition.

This report evaluates the international tax provisions of the 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) and their effects on US and foreign multinationals. Using the Tax Policy Center’s Investment and International Capital Models, this analysis evaluates how the new net controlled foreign corporations tested income (NCTI) regime, the revised foreign-derived deduction eligible income (FDDEI) regime, and other changes impacting businesses alter incentives for domestic and foreign investment. The reforms substantially reduce marginal tax burdens on new domestic tangible (equipment and structures) and export-oriented investments, especially through permanent expensing and a broader export preference. For foreign investments, the higher NCTI rate, base broadening, and expanded foreign tax credits have mixed effects: average tax burdens change little for firms operating in high-tax jurisdictions but rise for those with income or assets in low-tax countries. Repealing the tangible-asset deduction removes a key distortion that previously encouraged marginal foreign investment in tangible assets. Remaining complexity, policy uncertainty, and persistent profit-shifting incentives, however, may limit some of the reform’s effectiveness.

Le rapport examine le rôle central des entreprises publiques au Kazakhstan, analyse comment leurs activités quasi budgétaires obscurcissent la position budgétaire réelle du pays et met en lumière les risques fiscaux importants qui en découlent.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain a cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s economy and growth model. However, SOEs’ quasi-fiscal activities conducted outside the fiscal framework obscure the overall fiscal stance, complicating macroeconomic management. This paper finds that the balance sheet expansion by major SOEs averaged about 20 percent of the state budget expenditure over the past five years. If this activity were booked as budgetary expenditure, the non-oil deficit would have been about 3.5 percentage points higher in 2024–25, indicating a larger fiscal expansion than recorded in official budget figures. Moreover, underperformance of several SOEs could create significant contingent fiscal risks. Policymakers should better align SOE investment with fiscal objectives, strengthen monitoring, and assess risks to public finances.

Ce rapport présente une analyse détaillée du Budget écossais 2026‑27, montrant que le ralentissement de la croissance des financements oblige le gouvernement à arbitrer entre hausses ciblées de dépenses et choix budgétaires plus difficiles, en particulier face aux contraintes pesant sur les investissements.

This IFS Scottish Budget Report is the first produced as part of a new partnership with Scottish Financial Enterprise (SFE).

SFE is the representative body for Scotland’s financial and professional services industry, with more than 120 members ranging from global organisations headquartered in Scotland, to international companies with substantial operations in Scotland, through to small, locally based fintechs and support companies drawn from all areas of the sector. SFE is funded entirely by its member firms and seeks to connect, convene and champion the sector in Scotland and beyond.

SFE and its member organisations bring additional expertise on issues related to the financial markets and the economy, which complements IFS expertise on public finances and public policy. It has partnered with IFS to support independent and impartial analysis of the tax, spending and public policy challenges and opportunities facing Scotland.

The authors also gratefully acknowledge the support of the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy (ES/Z504634/1).

In addition, the authors thank Helen Miller and Ben Zaranko for comments on initial drafts and both Scottish Fiscal Commission and Scottish Government officials for helpful discussions and clarifications.

IFS is an independent Research Institute. As with all our work, IFS researchers have full editorial control over the analysis they undertake and the conclusions they draw. The views expressed are those of the named chapter and section authors only and not of the institute – which has no corporate views – or of the funders of the research. Any errors or omissions are also the responsibility of the authors alone. 

Ce rapport propose de remplacer les règles budgétaires binaires du Royaume‑Uni par un système gradué de feux de circulation, afin de réduire les incitations aux ajustements de dernière minute et d’offrir une évaluation plus nuancée et réaliste de la position budgétaire du pays.

The central contention of this report is that the UK fiscal framework has some desirable features but is not delivering good outcomes. We are in a bad equilibrium.

The UK’s fiscal framework is based around a set of pass–fail, numerical fiscal rules. The fiscal debate is overly fixated on the amount of ‘headroom’ the government has against the most binding of those rules. The system incentivises the government to operate with the smallest amount of ‘headroom’ possible, with policy often fine-tuned according to the central point estimate of a highly uncertain forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility. When the forecast improves, any additional ‘headroom’ is typically spent; when the forecast worsens, Chancellors of all political hues are adept at meeting the letter of the rolling fiscal targets by promising spending cuts or tax rises for future years – or the rules simply get changed. 

Put differently, the framework and the way it has come to be operated mean that when forecasts move around – as they inevitably do – policy has to respond, often in a rush and with a spurious degree of precision. This does not make for good policymaking, it does not ensure sustainable public finances, and it stretches credulity and credibility with financial markets. We are living through a tough fiscal moment, but it is hard to believe this is the best we can do. 

This report argues that the UK would be better served by a new framework based around a set of ‘fiscal traffic lights’, used to monitor performance against broad fiscal objectives and principles set out in a high-profile Statement of Fiscal Strategy at the start of each parliament. The overarching aim would be to create the conditions for better fiscal policymaking and a better fiscal debate while maintaining – or building – credibility with bond market investors. 

This is a proposal for the medium-to-long term, and not an argument for immediate reform. The current set-up has its shortcomings, but to abandon the current fiscal rules at the present moment would very likely be interpreted by financial markets merely as an attempt by the government to relax its fiscal constraints and borrow more – which is not the point of this proposal. Only from a position of strength and credibility – ideally having delivered a current and/or primary budget surplus – should such a change be considered. In the nearer term, a set of fiscal traffic lights could be developed and operated in parallel with the existing system over the remainder of this parliament, to iron out issues, build understanding, and facilitate a full transition at the point when the fiscal rules next come under review. 

Ce rapport présente une analyse détaillée du Budget écossais 2026‑27, montrant que le ralentissement de la croissance des financements oblige le gouvernement à arbitrer entre hausses ciblées de dépenses et choix budgétaires plus difficiles, en particulier face aux contraintes pesant sur les investissements.

The funding available to a government determines the choices available to it – including what public services and benefits to provide, whether to charge co-payments for services, and if so at what level. Such choices especially affect households on low and middle incomes, and particularly those in poverty or with higher needs, for whom public services and benefit payments generally represent a larger share of their overall consumption. This makes government spending – and the funding which pays for it – a more important determinant of low- and middle-income households’ living standards and life chances. In contrast with most of the 2010s, the period since 2020 has seen real-terms increases in the Scottish Government’s funding for both day-to-day (resource) spending and investment (capital) spending. But the so-called ‘Barnett squeeze’ means that funding has grown less quickly than in England, somewhat narrowing the funding advantage from which Scotland has historically benefited. Looking ahead to the coming parliament, funding increases are set to slow, while the squeeze on funding relative to England will continue. If the next Scottish Government wishes to maintain the more comprehensive set of public services and benefits that residents of Scotland have enjoyed relative to their counterparts elsewhere in the UK, this will require some combination of higher devolved revenues and/or marked improvements in public service productivity.

Ce document présente les « taux effectifs nets du carbone » en 2023 (taxes sur le carbone, systèmes d’échange de droits d’émission et taxes sur les carburants) pour le Canada afin de comparer la couverture des émissions et le niveau de tarification carbone entre pays.

Countries balance diverse and interconnected policy objectives when deciding how to tax energy use or price carbon emissions. These country notes take stock of where Net Effective Carbon Rates stood in 2023 and are based on final emissions trading systems (ETS) estimates released in the 2025 edition of Effective Carbon Rates. They highlight rates (in EUR per tonne of CO2 equivalent) and emissions coverage (in percent) resulting from carbon taxes, emissions trading systems, and fuel excise taxes net of fossil fuel subsidies, as they apply on CO2 emissions from energy use in six economic sectors and on other greenhouse gases. The data are designed to support consistent cross-country comparisons, though estimates may differ from those produced by individual governments because of differences in data sources and methodological choices.

Ce rapport analyse l’évolution du niveau de vie des ménages non retraités au Royaume‑Uni, en montrant que des changements de prestations sociales soutiendraient surtout les revenus des ménages à faible revenu en 2026‑2027, malgré une perspective plus faible pour le reste de la décennie.

Low-income families in Britain have endured two decades of unusually weak income growth. Incomes for the poorer half of non-pensioner households – a group we refer to as ‘Unsung Britain’ – have risen by an average of just 0.5 per cent a year since the mid-2000s, far below pre-financial crisis norms, despite rising employment among these families and a huge reduction in low pay. Looking ahead, the outlook for living standards remains gloomy: the OBR expects average incomes to grow by only 0.3 per cent a year over the rest of the decade on average, even weaker than the income growth experienced over the past decade.

Against this backdrop, we present new forecasts of household-level disposable incomes, based on the economic assumptions used by the OBR and planned changes to taxes and benefits. Although the outlook for the decade is weak, the picture is much more positive over the coming year: we project that typical non-pensioner incomes will grow by 1.2 per cent in 2026-27, with much stronger gains of 4.7 per cent for families in Unsung Britain. Above-inflation increases in Universal Credit and the removal of the two-child limit are set to drive much of this improvement, with families with children seeing the largest gains and relative child poverty falling materially over the year ahead. But this progress is unlikely to last: weak real wage growth, frozen tax thresholds and rising Council Tax and housing costs mean incomes are projected to stagnate again later in the decade.

Delivering sustained improvements will require action on three fronts: reviving productivity to support stronger pay growth; reforming the tax and benefits system so gains are broadly shared; and directly easing cost of living pressures, particularly relating to energy, housing and Council Tax.

Ce document révèle que les entreprises multinationales (EMN) qui investissent dans des paradis fiscaux réduisent l’emploi domestique de 6 % dans les pays à fiscalité élevée, avec des effets concentrés principalement sur les travailleurs hautement qualifiés, établissant ainsi un lien entre l’utilisation des paradis fiscaux et la délocalisation d’emplois.

Despite their advantages, multinational enterprises (MNEs) receive significant criticism, particularly with regard to offshoring jobs and shifting profits abroad to avoid taxation. Using administrative data for the universe of Norwegian and French firms and workers, we link these two issues by documenting a negative relation between MNE investment in a tax haven and employment in the high-tax country. In particular, exploiting the 2006 European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision on the Cadbury-Schweppes case which upheld the use of EU tax havens, we are able to establish a causal link in which tax haven use lowers domestic employment by 6%. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that the effects are mainly concentrated among high-skilled workers. We further link the employment changes to the substance requirements mandated by the ECJ’s ruling and the secrecy inherent to tax havens.

Ce rapport examine de manière critique l’étude de l’ICC sur l’Article 12AA du Modèle fiscal de l’ONU, montrant que ses conclusions sur de prétendues pertes nettes pour le Sud reposent sur un modèle profondément biaisé et qu’elles sont contredites par la littérature qu’elle cite elle‑même.

The International Chamber of Commerce has published, circulated among delegates, and promoted at a side event a report claiming that the global implementation of withholding taxes under Article 12AA of the UN Model would produce net losses for the global South. The Tax Justice Network’s review finds the results to be based on a deeply flawed model, prompting us to conclude that the ICC’s report’s are meaningless at best – if not deliberate distortions to serve a lobbying agenda.