L’Édition 2025 de l’Inventaire des mesures écofiscales montre que, alors que le budget 2025-2026 du Québec a déjà annoncé le retrait de certaines mesures incitatives, le retrait de la redevance canadienne sur les combustibles risque de réduire la marge de manœuvre du Québec pour accroître l’utilisation de mesures écofiscales. Dans les circonstances actuelles, il apparaît incontournable d’expliquer le fonctionnement et de démontrer la pertinence des mesures d’écofiscalité qui trouvent application au Québec.

L’Inventaire des mesures écofiscales au Québec est une publication annuelle qui recense les principaux instruments économiques visant à contrôler la pollution et gérer les ressources naturelles dans une perspective de développement durable.

Ce recensement s’appuie sur la définition utilisée par l’OCDE et vise à identifier l’« ensemble des impôts, taxes et redevances dont l’assiette est constituée par un polluant ou, plus généralement, par un produit ou un service qui détériore l’environnement ou qui se traduit par un prélèvement sur des ressources naturelles ». Nous avons ajouté à l’analyse les dépenses fiscales favorables à l’environnement. De plus, bien qu’elles ne soient pas compilées dans les indicateurs, certaines mesures écofiscales municipales sont présentées.

Les mesures écofiscales sont regroupées sous la classification utilisée par Eurostat/OCDE (énergie, transports, pollution et ressources), ce qui permet, jusqu’à un certain point, de dresser des comparaisons internationales par base d’imposition.  Cette comparaison indique que les mesures utilisées au Québec sont relativement diversifiées, mais que leur impact, mesuré en proportion du PIB, est moins important qu’en moyenne parmi les pays de l’OCDE (moyenne non pondérée).

Ceci s’explique principalement par le niveau de recettes tirées des prélèvements sur l’énergie, qui inclut les taxes spécifiques appliquées sur les carburants. En 2023, les recettes tirées de cette base d’imposition équivalent à 0,9 % du PIB au Québec, contre 1,2 % du PIB en moyenne parmi les pays de l’OCDE.

Ce rapport projette le coût du programme des Accords d’aide financière en cas de catastrophe (AAFCC) de 2025 à 2034 et fournit une répartition des coûts selon les principaux types de catastrophes, notamment les inondations, les feux de forêt et les tempêtes.

Ce rapport  évalue la capacité des gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux du Canada à produire des rapports financiers accessibles, fiables et transparents, montrant que de fortes différences subsistent et que la fiscalité et la gestion des budgets publics manquent encore de lisibilité et de rigueur dans plusieurs administrations.

Cet article conclut que, trente ans après le référendum, le Québec est plus riche et plus égalitaire, mais il est confronté à de grands défis économiques, sociaux et de finances publiques.

Le 30^e anniversaire du référendum sur la souveraineté du Québec offre une occasion toute désignée pour jeter un regard rétrospectif sur l’évolution de plusieurs indicateurs socioéconomiques et de finances publiques.

À la Chaire de recherche en fiscalité et en finances publiques (CFFP), nous avons saisi cette occasion pour brosser un portrait des progrès réalisés et des défis persistants qui façonnent la vie des Québécoises et des Québécois.

L’exercice ne prétend pas à l’exhaustivité : les choix présentés reflètent à la fois les domaines d’expertise de la Chaire et la disponibilité des données statistiques.

Ce rapport met en lumière l’alourdissement considérable du fardeau de la dette en Colombie-Britannique, illustrant à quel point la hausse rapide de l’endettement public limite aujourd’hui les marges de manœuvre fiscales et impacte directement les possibilités de réduction de la pression fiscale pour les contribuables.

A decade ago, British Columbia was one of the lowest-debt provinces in Canada. After a period of significant spending growth, however, nominal net debt is projected to reach $155.3 billion by 2027/28—more than four times BC’s nominal net debt in 2016/17.

Government debt comes with real costs for British Columbians as taxpayer dollars are directed to paying debt interest costs rather than other opportunities, such as tax relief.

The intention of this bulletin is to illustrate the opportunity cost of BC’s debt—the value of an alternative use of taxpayers’ dollars—by assessing what the provincial sales tax (PST) rate could be in two different net debt scenarios: if net debt were zero, and if program spending grew by inflation and population growth since 2016/17 (the end of a period of relative spending restraint). If net debt was zero in 2025/26, the PST rate (7.0%) could be reduced to 3.65% while maintaining the same level of net revenue. That is equivalent to $1,228 in annual savings per unattached individual and $2,770 in annual savings for a couple with two children in 2025/26. If program spending grew by inflation and population growth since 2016/17, net debt would be significantly reduced, and the PST rate could be lowered to 5.9% while maintaining the same level of net revenue. In 2025/26, that would save each unattached British Columbian an estimated $399, and a couple with two children approximately $902.

Ce document analyse le lien entre le développement immobilier et la fiscalité foncière dans les municipalités du Québec, révélant que la croissance municipale génère un gain fiscal temporaire.

This paper examines the relationship between real estate development and property taxation in Québec municipalities. Regression analysis shows a fiscal gain associated with municipal growth in Québec. For municipalities with a population of 1,000 or more that registered higher population growth or a higher increase in the number of real estate units from 2008 to 2018, property tax rates either increased by a smaller amount or declined by a larger amount compared with municipalities that had lower levels of growth or that experienced decline. Current spending per capita in these municipalities also increased by a smaller amount over this period. However, a larger share of their revenues came from fees, permits, and development charges, which may have covered part of their current spending. Ultimately, however, this growth-related fiscal gain was temporary. The analysis also shows that municipalities with

larger populations had higher per-capita spending, financed by higher property values, which suggests that the property tax is well suited to pay for the costs associated with municipal growth.

Ce document analyse les effets des droits de douane sur la chaîne d’approvisionnement, en s’appuyant sur des données transactionnelles détaillées issues des importations américaines de vins européens. Il démontre que les consommateurs américains supportent, en moyenne, un coût supérieur au revenu tarifaire perçu par le gouvernement, en raison de la transmission amplifiée des marges le long de la chaîne de distribution, de la tarification différée et des pratiques d’« ingénierie tarifaire » de la filière vinicole.

This paper examines the effects of tariffs along the supply chain using product-level data from a large U.S. wine importer in the context of the 2019-2021 U.S. tariffs on European wines. By combining confidential transaction prices with foreign suppliers and U.S. distributors as well as retail prices, we trace price impacts along the supply chain, from foreign producers to U.S. consumers. Although pass-through at the border was incomplete, our estimates indicate that U.S. consumers paid more than the government received in tariff revenue, because domestic markups amplified downstream price effects. The dollar margins per bottle for the importer contracted, but expanded for distributors/retailers. Price effects emerge gradually along the chain, taking roughly one year to materialize at the retail level. Additionally, we find evidence of tariff engineering by the wine industry to avoid duties, leading to composition-driven biases in unit values in standard trade statistics.

Ce rapport alerte sur l’augmentation spectaculaire des primes d’assurance maladie si l’expiration des crédits d’impôt améliorés pour les assurés du marché de l’ACA aux États-Unis n’est pas évitée.

Enhancements to premium tax credits, enacted in the American Rescue Plan and extended by the Inflation Reduction Act, are helping more than 20 million people afford health coverage in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplaces. The enhancements helped spur a doubling of enrollment in the ACA marketplaces and contributed to record-low uninsured rates but are set to expire at the end of 2025. And marketplace enrollees are already starting to see the impact: insurers have finalized their 2026 premium rates, enrollees can see their 2026 premiums on marketplace websites, and open enrollment will be underway November 1. If Congress waits until the end of the year to extend the enhancements, 1.5 million more people will be uninsured in 2026 compared to an earlier extension, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates.

Ce rapport propose une refonte du modèle d’imposition de la richesse en privilégiant une approche dynamique centrée sur les “proceeds” de la richesse (plus-values, flux de capital, gains latents) plutôt que sur le patrimoine statique.

The federal tax code offers a shovel-ready definition of passive proceeds derived from wealth—such as capital gains, dividends, interest, and certain business profits—that states can use as the starting point for levying their own Wealth Proceeds Taxes on wealthy families. These taxes have the potential to raise considerable revenue.

If all states enacted a modest 4 percent Wealth Proceeds Tax, for instance, state revenues would rise by more than $45 billion a year. Under our preferred approach to apply that rate to an enhanced tax base that covers realized capital gains more comprehensively, state revenues would rise by more than $57 billion a year

Ce rapport propose une refonte du modèle d’imposition de la richesse en privilégiant une approche dynamique centrée sur les “proceeds” de la richesse (plus-values, flux de capital, gains latents) plutôt que sur le patrimoine statique.

The federal tax code offers a shovel-ready definition of passive proceeds derived from wealth—such as capital gains, dividends, interest, and certain business profits—that states can use as the starting point for levying their own Wealth Proceeds Taxes on wealthy families. These taxes have the potential to raise considerable revenue.

If all states enacted a modest 4 percent Wealth Proceeds Tax, for instance, state revenues would rise by more than $45 billion a year. Under our preferred approach to apply that rate to an enhanced tax base that covers realized capital gains more comprehensively, state revenues would rise by more than $57 billion a year

Cet article présente les réformes récentes de l’impôt sur le revenu à taux unique mises en œuvre dans plusieurs États américains et souligne que cette tendance résulte d’une volonté de simplification fiscale et d’attraction économique tout en maintenant la stabilité budgétaire.

U.S. states are increasingly moving toward flat income taxes. These reforms aim to simplify the tax code, offer equitable treatment for all taxpayers, and foster economic growth while maintaining state revenue stability. The report details state-by-state transitions and the fiscal impacts observed thus far.

Ce billet analyse l’impact budgétaire et économique des droits de douane et de la guerre commerciale des administrations Trump et Biden, montrant une baisse du PIB de long terme, des pertes d’emplois et des salaires, et un important transfert de la charge fiscale vers les ménages à revenu faible et moyen.

President Trump has imposed International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs on US trading partners, including China, Canada, Mexico, and the EU. In addition, he has threatened and imposed Section 232 tariffs on autos, heavy trucks, steel, aluminum, lumber, furniture, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and copper, among others.  

The Trump tariffs amount to an average tax increase per US household of $1,300 in 2025 and $2,000 in 2026.

Under the tariffs imposed and scheduled as of November 1 the weighted average applied tariff rate on all imports rises to 20.0 percent, and the average effective tariff rate, reflecting behavioral responses, rises to 11.4 percent—the highest average rate since 1943.

The Trump tariffs are the largest US tax increase as a percent of GDP (0.55 percent for 2025) since 1993, surpassing the tax increases enacted under President Barack Obama and President George H.W. Bush.

Trump’s imposed tariffs will raise $2.9 trillion in revenue over the next decade on a conventional basis and reduce US GDP by 0.7 percent, all before foreign retaliation. Accounting for negative economic effects, the revenue raised by the tariffs falls to $2.3 trillion over the next decade. The Trump tariffs threaten to offset much of the economic benefits of the new tax cuts, while falling short of paying for them.

The US Supreme Court will soon decide whether the president’s emergency powers under IEEPA include the power to impose tariffs.

Historical evidence and recent studies show that tariffs are taxes that raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for US businesses and consumers, resulting in lower income, reduced employment, and lower economic output.

Ce rapport montre que la déductibilité fiscale des dons de charité aux États-Unis agit comme un puissant incitatif à la générosité, mais que sa pleine efficacité dépend de la compréhension qu’en ont les contribuables, plaidant ainsi pour une meilleure information du public afin de stimuler davantage les contributions.

Under certain circumstances the US tax system subsidizes charitable contributions for taxpayers by allowing them to deduct qualified contributions from their taxable income. Decades of research demonstrate that this subsidy encourages charitable contributions. But people often underestimate the value of their subsidy because they often underestimate their tax rate. This suggests that improving public understanding of the subsidy could lead to an increase in charitable contributions.

Ce rapport met en évidence les limites et conséquences sociales d’un recours accru aux amendes et frais juridiques dans les budgets publics, montrant que ce mode de financement risque surtout d’aggraver les difficultés financières des ménages vulnérables, sans améliorer substantiellement la situation budgétaire des États et des collectivités.

Criminal legal system fines and fees are a routine source of revenue for many state and local governments. These legal financial obligations encompass both penalties imposed for civil infractions, such as traffic and parking tickets, and court- or incarceration-related costs. Recent federal policies may increase pressure on states and localities to fill budget gaps and consider options for raising additional revenue. However, expanding reliance on fines and fees may deepen financial hardships among residents without meaningfully improving state and local budgets. Using data from the Urban Institute’s December 2024 Well-Being and Basic Needs Survey, this research brief examines the prevalence of fines and fees and the ability of households to pay them. Nearly one in five working-age adults reported their households were charged fines or fees in 2024, with court and incarceration-related costs disproportionately affecting families with low incomes. One in four of those who were charged fines or fees reported owing money for unpaid fines and fees incurred in 2024 or before. Among adults who were charged court- or incarceration-related costs, more than half had unpaid fine or fee debts, and most had experienced problems affording food, housing, or health care. Despite these challenges, few were asked about their ability to pay fines and fees or offered reductions, waivers, or community service alternatives to making payments. These findings suggest revenue gains from increased assessment and collection of fines or fees may be limited. And potential efforts to increase court and incarceration-related costs, in particular, would worsen household debts and material hardships.

Ce rapport évalue les implications du changement climatique et des politiques climatiques pour les objectifs de développement de la Croatie. Il présente des réformes structurelles et fiscales, notamment celles liées au financement de la transition verte et à la mobilisation des ressources publiques pour soutenir les objectifs de neutralité carbone d’ici 2050.

This Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR) examines the implications of climate change and climate policy for Croatia’s development objectives, priorities, and pathways. It identifies opportunities for the country to achieve both its development goals and its climate commitments through a coherent set of policies. The report lays out a combination of sectoral and economy-wide policy reforms and targeted investments in near- and medium-term decarbonization and adaptation measures designed to achieve more rapid, more inclusive, and greener development. The idea is to maximize synergies between climate and development objectives, while addressing trade-offs among policy objectives and key transition challenges.

The CCDR is structured in five sections: chapter focuses on Croatia’s development context, including its priorities; its main economic challenges; the risks that climate change, disasters, and national decarbonization efforts create; and the opportunities that the climate transition opens up. Chapter 2 analyzes Croatia’s existing climate commitments and policies and analyzes the institutional framework for achieving the country’s climate and development ambitions. Chapter 3 explores pathways to achieving decarbonization and climate resilience.

Using Croatia’s commitment to climate neutrality by 2050 (net zero by 2050 [NZ2050]) as a basis, the chapter analyzes the challenges of, and opportunities for, achieving (a) its decarbonization goals associated with the energy, transport, waste, agriculture, and forests sectors by charting a representative net-zero pathway to 2050 as well as (b) resilience to climate change and natural hazards in the water, agriculture, and tourism sectors and in cities. Chapter 4 explores the macroeconomic and distributional implications of climate transition. It assesses the transition’s financial and economic costs and benefits, placing it in the context of the constrained macro-fiscal environment, and proposes options to enhance fiscal capacity to fund the transition. It also analyzes the transition’s impacts on poverty, equity, and jobs and proposes avenues for addressing these and financing the transition. Chapter 5 concludes with prioritized policy and investment packages and actions that should be emphasized over the next 3–5 years to enable Croatia to seize opportunities and reduce risks associated with climate change while achieving its development goals.

Ce document analyse la manière dont l’efficacité de l’administration fiscale influence la conformité des contribuables à la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée dans plusieurs juridictions, démontrant qu’une meilleure performance institutionnelle et une plus grande acceptabilité sociale de l’impôt contribuent à réduire l’évasion fiscale et à augmenter les recettes publiques.

This paper examines the impact of tax administration performance on tax compliance gaps across countries. Building on the Allingham and Sandmo framework, we consider institutional effectiveness and the social acceptability of the tax system as key determinants of taxpayer behavior. We use a novel panel dataset of VAT gap estimates, results of standardized tax administration diagnostic assessments (TADAT), and tax administration institutional and operational data (ISORA). Our findings reveal a robust negative relationship between tax administration effectiveness—based on TADAT scores—and VAT compliance gaps. Including spillover effects on Corporate Income Tax compliance, the total revenue gain could reach 1.3 percent of GDP.

Ce rapport analyse l’effet du renforcement des capacités administratives fiscales sur la mobilisation des recettes dans 121 pays. Il démontre que l’amélioration de l’administration fiscale, surtout dans les économies émergentes et en développement, entraîne une hausse significative des revenus fiscaux et recommande aux gouvernements de privilégier le renforcement des institutions fiscales pour optimiser la santé des finances publiques.

Building on previous studies, we propose a robust estimation strategy to uncover the causal effects of tax administration strength on tax revenue in 121 countries over the period 2014–2022. Our novel approach utilizes a unique expert survey to construct an Operational Strength Index of tax administration, using the International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA), and employs an instrumental variable strategy based on the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department’s Capacity Development programs. We find that strengthening tax administration significantly boosts tax revenue, particularly in emerging and developing economies, and especially in countries with lower levels of informality, stronger institutions, and higher financial development. These findings carry important policy implications for governments and development partners aiming to enhance tax administration capacity and strengthen public finances overall.​

Ce rapport présente une analyse détaillée des perspectives économiques et budgétaires du Royaume-Uni à la veille du Budget d’automne 2025. Il examine les défis structurels auxquels la Chancelière fait face, notamment la détérioration des finances publiques, les risques de récession et les options fiscales envisageables pour restaurer la stabilité budgétaire tout en soutenant la croissance à long terme.

The economic backdrop to this Budget is a difficult one. Following a positive start to the year, growth is decelerating, and the growth we have seen has been driven disproportionately by the public sector and net trade, as opposed to private domestic demand. The unemployment rate has risen 0.5 percentage points in the past 12 months and is now the highest it has been since 2016, outside of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the official Labour Force Survey suggests that employment growth has been strong, we think a broader set of indicators points to a much weaker assessment. Meanwhile, inflation remains well above the Bank of England’s 2% target, and higher than that of international peers. This is making the Monetary Policy Committee cautious about further cuts to interest rates, which remain in restrictive territory. Against this backdrop, the Chancellor is likely to need to find a sizeable fiscal consolidation at the Budget to meet her fiscal rules.

The outlook in the very near term is one of economic softening. We forecast growth will decelerate further in the second half of this year, with the economy growing at half the rate it did in the first half. Consumption and business investment will likely be muted, as uncertainty remains elevated, monetary policy has remained in restrictive territory and households continue to build savings. Surveys suggest businesses remain cautious, and dissuaded from investing by squeezed margins and high financing costs.

We expect the Bank of England to continue reducing interest rates to the point where they are no longer acting as a headwind to the economy. Our forecast assumes Bank Rate reaches 3.5% in the first half of 2026. Inflation is likely to have peaked already in September 2025, spurred by a combination of energy price base effects, food price inflation, and changes in taxes and prices set by government. Headline CPI inflation should drop back to target in the first half of next year as the effect of the tax changes announced in last October’s Budget drops out of the calculation. As monetary policy easing starts to feed through more meaningfully, we should see a cyclical rebound in activity in 2026 and 2027 as the economy starts to absorb existing slack. In our baseline scenario, the unemployment rate is forecast to peak at 5.1% in 2026 before gradually falling.

We expect the Chancellor to be able to make the required consolidation at the upcoming Budget with relatively limited damage to real GDP growth (–0.25% at peak) and mild disinflation. However, this is predicated on her doing so without applying measures that, mechanically or otherwise, add substantially to near-term inflation. We model a scenario in which the Chancellor delivers a fiscal consolidation through an increase in VAT, raising inflation at a point when inflation is already high enough – and central bank credibility under enough scrutiny – that monetary policymakers are not comfortable looking through the temporary price-level shock for fear of second-round inflationary effects. In this scenario, we find that the negative effect on GDP would be twice as big at its peak as if the same consolidation was done through non-inflationary taxation, and interest rates would remain higher for longer, requiring a more aggressive easing cycle in 2027.

Ce rapport du Royaume-Uni analyse les recettes fiscales, les emprunts et la dette publique sur les six premiers mois de 2025-26, montrant un emprunt de £99,8 milliards, soit £7,2 milliards de plus que prévu, et souligne les risques de dette élevée dans un contexte de croissance faible.

Public sector net borrowing was £99.8 billion in the first six months of 2025-26, £11.5 billion (13.1 per cent) above the same period last year and £7.2 billion (7.8 per cent) above forecast. Net debt in September stood at 95.3 per cent of GDP, up 1 per cent of GDP on a year earlier.

Cet article analyse la fiscalité des salariés au Royaume‑Uni et conclut que, si la charge fiscale des employés typiques n’est pas anormalement élevée, le système demeure biaisé contre eux par rapport à d’autres formes de revenus.

In the weeks surrounding the Budget we’re likely to hear a lot of tax discussion. That reflects a deterioration in the public finances – with an IFS estimate of £22 billion – and still more will be needed if the Chancellor wants to build extra headroom or spend on her policy priorities. Our recent paper set out specific suggestions to help fill this gap in the least damaging ways, but this Spotlight steps back and explores the context of current levels and methods of income taxation in particular.

Overall, partly driven by the need to fund much higher interest costs, taxes as a share of GDP are set to rise over this Parliament to all-time highs of over 37 per cent, up from 35 per cent last year and 33 per cent in 2019-20. This puts us mid-table across the G7, with the UK having a lower tax to GDP ratio than recent levels in France, Italy or Germany, but higher than in the US, Canada or Japan.

Zooming in on personal taxes (and this Spotlight includes the effects of payroll taxes), we show that the tax wedge for an average full-time earner in the UK was the lowest in the G7 in 2024, and will very likely remain below the OECD average even once 2025’s employer National Insurance (NI) rise is incorporated into estimates. UK effective tax rates for low- and middle-earning employees – including employer NI – have reached their highest points since the early 2010s, but remain below pre-financial-crisis levels.

While some elements of the tax system, like the personal allowance, have risen and then fallen back – driving those tax trends – the make-up of taxation has changed in important ways. For a typical employee, employer NI is now a record-high share of their tax wedge. This has important implications, particularly for the tax difference between employee and self-employment income. A typical employee will now pay a record 55 per cent more tax than an equivalent self-employed worker, and could be just as well off in a self-employed role even if this were 13 per cent less productive. Overall, the cost of the self-employment tax break has now topped £9 billion a year. Policy change at the Budget would be wise to stop this growing further.