Bulletin de veille du 20 mai 2025

Québec/Canada
Ce texte montre que l’échec prolongé du Canada à restreindre l’évitement fiscal — notamment par la stratégie de la dette intra-groupe — s’explique en partie par une porosité structurelle entre les élites publiques et privées, qui contribue à une normalisation politique et culturelle de ces pratiques, affaiblissant ainsi la capacité de l’État à préserver ses bases fiscales.
Au Canada, les plus hautes fonctions de l’État ont été occupées par des individus qui ont siégé à un moment ou à un autre de leur carrière à un ou plusieurs CA d’entreprises canadiennes pratiquant l’évitement fiscal depuis le Luxembourg : gouverneur général, premiers ministres fédéraux et provinciaux, juges à la Cour suprême, etc.
La porosité entre le secteur privé et public sur le plan de l’évitement fiscal pose un obstacle aux réformes législatives porteuses. En 2007, le ministre des Finances du Canada a mis sur pied un comité d’experts chargé d’émettre des recommandations sur l’évitement fiscal dont la présidence était assurée par un administrateur d’une entreprise privée pratiquant diverses stratégies d’évitement fiscal.
La persistance de l’évitement fiscal s’explique moins par des facteurs juridiques que par des dynamiques politiques et culturelles. Au Canada, l’évitement fiscal fait l’objet d’une normalisation par des acteurs en position de le réglementer.
Ce bulletin souligne que l’économie de l’Ontario connaît une stagnation plus longue et plus marquée que celle du reste du Canada depuis 2000, en raison d’un net ralentissement de la croissance du PIB par habitant et de l’investissement des entreprises, ce qui a entraîné un recul des niveaux de vie relatifs et soulève des enjeux fiscaux liés à la performance économique régionale et à la capacité à générer des revenus publics.
Canada’s recent economic stagnation has been the subject of substantial analysis and concern. This bulletin examines these problems through a regional lens, examining Ontario’s economic performance. We show that Ontario has experienced a longer and deeper period of stagnation than the rest of the country.
Ontario’s stagnation began around the turn of the millennium, nearly a full decade before the rest of Canada. As a result of this longer period of stagnation, Ontario’s economy has underperformed the rest of the country since 2000. Real per-capita GDP growth in Ontario averaged just 0.55% annually from 2000 to 2023, compared to 0.91% in the rest of Canada.
As a result, living standards in Ontario have fallen behind the rest of the country taken as a whole. In 2000, GDP per capita in Ontario was $63,146 (in 2023 dollars), 4.9% higher than the rest of Canada. By 2023, Ontario’s GDP per capita was $71,659, which was 3.2% lower than in the rest of the country.
Had Ontario maintained its 1981–2000 growth trajectory, GDP per capita in 2023 would have reached $93,957—$22,298 (or 31.1%) higher than the actual
figure.
If Ontario had merely matched the rest of Canada’s modest post-2000 growth rate, GDP per capita would be $77,725 today—$6,066 (or 8.5%) higher
than is currently the case.
We also examine developments surrounding business investment in Ontario in recent decades. Business investment per worker in Ontario grew at a robust 4.5% annual rate from 1981 to 2000, compared to 1.8% in the rest of Canada. From 2000 to 2023, investment growth in Ontario collapsed to just 0.71% annually—similar to the rest of the country (0.67%).
Ce bulletin plaide contre la taxation des gains en capital sur une base nominale, soutenant que cette méthode surestime artificiellement les revenus imposables en période d’inflation, ce qui entraîne des effets injustes, inefficaces et économiquement dommageables, notamment en réduisant l’investissement, l’entrepreneuriat et la croissance — et propose plutôt l’indexation des gains en capital à l’inflation pour assurer une fiscalité plus équitable et neutre.
Around the world, capital gains taxation rules are normally based on taxing nominal gains, which means that the gains are not adjusted to account for the effects of inflation. More specifically, nominal capital gains taxation means that investors subject to capital gains tax pay more tax in years when inflation is higher and less tax in years when inflation is lower.
Arguments in favour of taxing nominal capital gains focus on the additional tax revenues generated and say that it only affects a minority of people in society. But these arguments fail to recognize the negative economic consequences of taxing capital gains this way.
Taxing capital gains nominally is unfair, arbitrarily gives rise to inconsistent tax rates from year to year, and is economically inefficient. Moreover, it worsens entrepreneurial entry, dampens venture capital finance, and slows stock market growth.
Taxing capital gains nominally also leads to inefficient investment decisions and distorted decisions about whether to invest and in what form. It creates a less prosperous society that discourages productive investment and savings.
Simply put, taxing nominal capital gains is akin to taxing fictitious income, which over time leads to less investment, fewer job opportunities, and lower wages and growth.
Ce bulletin soutient que l’élargissement des règles de report d’imposition sur les gains en capital pourrait stimuler significativement le financement entrepreneurial au Canada, mais avertit que ces reports doivent éviter de créer des distorsions fiscales en limitant certains types de titres, d’investisseurs ou de formes juridiques, sous peine de freiner la croissance des entreprises et l’efficacité des politiques fiscales.
Capital gains taxes are normally levied at a lower rate than income taxes to give investors and entrepreneurs incentives to undertake risky actions that could generate higher incomes and raise overall economic growth.
Many economies around the world, including Australia and the United States, allow rollover exemptions for capital gains taxes.
A capital gains tax rollover enables an entrepreneur or investor to defer capital gains taxes by reinvesting the proceeds from the sale of one asset into a new similar asset within a specific period of time. The entrepreneur benefits by paying tax at a later date, enabling additional entrepreneurial activities and savings.
A capital gains tax rollover would have a material positive impact on entrepreneurial finance in Canada for angel investors, equity crowdfunders, and venture capital and private equity funds.
The rollover should not be applied to some types of investors or investments but not others. In addition, rollovers should not be introduced with any distortions to the types of shares or forms of ownership. Finally, the rollover should not have size limitations as those limitations would encourage investors and companies to leave Canada once they have grown beyond a certain level.
États-Unis
Ce document brosse un portrait détaillé de la richesse des ménages californiens, révélant que malgré un patrimoine médian plus élevé qu’ailleurs aux États-Unis, les écarts de richesse sont extrêmes et persistent le long de lignes raciales et éducatives, ce qui appelle à des politiques fiscales et sociales mieux ciblées pour soutenir la sécurité économique et la mobilité intergénérationnelle.
Households in California typically have more wealth than those in other states, despite holding more debt. Estimated median household net worth in California is $288,000, compared to $180,000 elsewhere. Although this difference reflects high home values in the state, Californians also tend to have more liquid assets than households in the rest of the US.
- Variation across households is substantial, and those near the bottom of the distribution often have minimal wealth. Those near the top of the wealth distribution (80th percentile; estimated $1.3 million) have net worth over 100 times higher than those near the bottom (20th percentile; estimated $12,000). Latino and Black/other households disproportionately have low wealth, as do those with lower levels of educational attainment. Wealth is higher among older households, who have had time to build assets and pay down debts.
- Demographic groups hold different portfolios of assets . . . Checking and savings accounts, retirement accounts, home equity, and vehicle equity are the most common assets, and become larger and more common with age and higher levels of education. Homeownership rates and equity are low among Latino households, driven largely by their younger age profile and lower education levels. In contrast, Black/other homeownership rates are low even after we account for factors like age, income, and education levels.
- . . . and different types of debt. Three in four households owe some money on unsecured debts (those without collateral), like credit cards, student loans, and/or medical bills. Older households are less likely than others to hold any unsecured debt, as are white, Asian, and immigrant households. Latino households are more likely to carry credit card debt and Black/other and Latino households are more likely to carry education-related debt than white and Asian households.
Ce rapport montre que les revenus fiscaux des États américains ont stagné au quatrième trimestre de 2024, avec des baisses marquées des impôts sur le revenu des sociétés et de vente, tandis que la croissance reste inégale entre les États, accentuant l’incertitude budgétaire face aux réformes fiscales fédérales imminentes, notamment la potentielle fin du plafond de déduction SALT, qui pourrait bouleverser les stratégies fiscales des contribuables et les recettes publiques.
The fiscal outlook for most states remains bleak, as tax revenue growth continued to lag in the first half of fiscal year 2025. This sluggish performance is partly attributable to widespread tax rate reductions and other relief measures enacted in recent years. Compounding these challenges are recent federal policy decisions—such as cuts to federal funding, new tariffs, and reductions in federal employment—which are expected to further strain state and local budgets.
International
Cet article montre que les exemptions de taxe sur la valeur ajoutée (TVA) ont des effets fiscaux non transparents et souvent contre-productifs, car elles augmentent les coûts de production via la TVA « encastrée » (non récupérable), nuisent à la compétitivité des exportations et entraînent des effets de cascade dans les prix finaux — concluant que leur usage devrait être limité à des raisons pragmatiques, comme les services financiers à marge ou les petites entreprises.
The value-added tax (VAT) has proved to be a highly effective tool at raising revenue in developed and developing countries alike. However, the effective operation of the VAT breaks down in the presence of exemptions. Unlike zero rates, exemptions deny input tax credits, thereby increasing production costs and resulting in VAT being embedded within the prices of goods and services. This paper develops a VAT model based on input-output table and household budget survey data for 29 European countries to examine the effects of VAT exemptions on final prices and to assess the merits of their use. Simulation results show that exemptions suffer from the same targeting problems as reduced VAT rates, but, in addition, they are non-transparent and have unpredictable and counterproductive indirect effects. These effects are in addition to the well-known distortionary impact of exemptions on production decisions, and their creation of incentives to self-supply. The paper concludes that the use of exemptions should be limited to addressing pragmatic concerns, such as the disproportionate compliance costs of small businesses and the practical difficulty in taxing margin-based financial services.
Ce rapport de la Cour des comptes conclut que les 243 taxes à faible rendement en vigueur en 2024, souvent mal connues et dispersées, alourdissent inutilement le système fiscal français, avec des recettes marginales (5,98 G€), mais une complexité élevée, et recommande une rationalisation ambitieuse afin de simplifier la fiscalité, améliorer sa lisibilité et dégager des marges de manœuvre budgétaires sans perte significative de revenus.
En marge des principaux impôts que constituent les prélèvements sociaux, la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée, l’impôt sur le revenu ou l’impôt sur les sociétés, les contribuables assujettis en France acquittent un large éventail de taxes et d’impôts de natures diverses qu’il est convenu de rassembler sous le terme de « taxes à faible rendement ». Représentant des enjeux économiques modestes en comparaison des autres prélèvements obligatoires, ces taxes à faible rendement sont longtemps demeurées un angle mort de l’analyse de la fiscalité en France, en dépit de leur foisonnement et de leur pertinence discutable pour un grand nombre d’entre elles. La Cour des comptes, saisie d’une demande d’initiative citoyenne, publie une nouvelle enquête sur les 243 taxes dont le rendement est inférieur à 175 M€ en 2024. Elle estime nécessaire d’engager la rationalisation de ce patchwork fiscal et propose pour ce faire trois scénarios cumulatifs susceptibles de déboucher sur une simplification radicale, sans pertes de recettes pour les administrations publiques.
Ce rapport du FMI examine la gouvernance des données fiscales aux Îles Salomon et conclut que, malgré des réformes engagées, des retards persistants dans la production et la diffusion des données budgétaires nuisent à la transparence et à la crédibilité budgétaire, soulignant l’urgence d’aligner les pratiques comptables et de gestion financière sur les normes internationales pour améliorer la gestion des finances publiques et attirer les bailleurs de fonds.
Solomon Islands faces challenges in fiscal data governance despite reforms. While the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) of 2013 aimed to enhance transparency, inconsistent implementation and resource constraints persist. This paper highlights key issues and recommendations, including adherence to public finance management good practices, enhanced and regularly disseminated financial reporting, and better utilization of the current Financial Management Information System. Strengthening coordination and capacity building is crucial for robust fiscal governance, fostering transparency and investor confidence. Addressing these challenges can enhance public finance management and long-term economic stability.
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the role of landfill taxes in reducing landfill waste and promoting recycling. We focus on the impacts of the 2017 landfill tax law reform in Catalonia, a Spanish region, which increased the tax rate from 18 to 47 euros per tonne over the period 2017–20. Using municipality-level data for Catalonia from the 2013–20 period, we contrast municipalities that differed in the use of door-to-door waste collection by the beginning of our study period. As door-to-door waste collection is advocated as especially efficient at reducing landfill waste, we hypothesise that municipalities that had not yet adopted this system had greater leeway in responding to the tax changes. Based on a two-way fixed effects design, our findings reveal large differential responses to the tax hike. Compared with municipalities that had implemented door-to-door waste collection by 2013, we estimate that those that had not done this responded to the tax hike by reducing landfill waste by an additional 12 per cent, reducing total waste by 4 per cent, and increasing the share of recycled waste and waste that is sorted as organic by 6 and 2.5 percentage points, respectively. We provide suggestive evidence that the adoption of door-to-door waste collection is the main mechanism driving these responses.
We present the extent of divergence in the literature on the stylised facts about income redistribution in rich countries. Analytical choices that underpin this divergence are then identified and investigated empirically using microdata for 30 European countries. In terms of direct redistribution via cash transfers and direct taxes, whether social insurance pensions are treated as redistribution – the conventional approach – or as market income – as in some recent studies – is seen to be critical. When the analysis is extended to include indirect taxes and non-cash benefits from state spending, they work in opposite directions and generally have only a limited net redistributive impact. Being able to attribute the benefits of such spending to households in more satisfactory ways is a priority. Whether household survey data are ‘corrected’ to include missing incomes at the top as well as imputed rent of owner-occupiers and undistributed profits of companies is also seen to have a substantial impact on the scale of measured redistribution. Finally, extending the scope of redistributive analysis to include all of national income, as in recent studies from a Distributional National Accounts perspective, is investigated. This underlines the implications of including state spending on collective goods such as security and infrastructure, without a clear rationale for how it is meaningfully allocated across households.
Top incomes tend to be under-represented in survey data, making survey income distributions unrepresentative of the true ones in terms of the amount of total income and, if some of its components (sources) are missing relatively more than others, in terms of the structure of total income by components. Since the correct structure is important for some analyses, correction is warranted. Using Croatian survey and tax records data, we show that the survey correction method of Blanchet, Flores and Morgan (2022), based on reweighting and replacement of top incomes using tax records data – which corrects total income – can fail to correct its structure by components. This happens when some income components – in our case, primarily capital income – are missing much more than others, making the structure substantially different from the correct one and difficult to correct through reweighting and replacement of total income. As a solution, we propose a pre-correction and a post-correction, each involving income replacement based on tax records data, as supplements to the Blanchet et al. method. Either supplement substantially improves the correction of both total income and its structure by source.
Using data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, we provide the first estimates of intra-occupation sectoral hourly remuneration differentials in Britain. Focusing on healthcare, we find that public sector remuneration differentials for comparable workers vary substantially across occupations, with benchmark estimates from a premium of 34 per cent for care workers to no significant differential for medical secretaries. This variation, as well as differences in trends in intra-occupational estimates, illustrates the insights from intra-occupation estimates for government pay setting. Indeed, in stark contrast to national estimates of a relatively small public sector differential, we find sizeable and robust public sector premiums for doctors, auxiliary nurses and care workers.
In this paper, we analyse the potential impact of policies aimed at fostering fiscal sustainability on citizens’ preferences. A survey specifically designed for this purpose quantifies citizens’ knowledge and concern about fiscal imbalances and the institutional framework that addresses them in Spain, and their possible electoral reactions to public spending cuts and tax increases. Using both ordered and unordered multinomial probit models, we corroborate that citizens tend to disapprove of retrenchment policies. However, the effect on citizens’ voting intentions varies depending on their political ideology. We confirm that left-wing voters supporting the incumbent coalition parties prefer austerity policies based on the revenue side of the budget, while right-wing voters tend to approve retrenchments based on the expenditure side to a larger extent.
Ce document propose une nouvelle méthode pour estimer la répartition des ressources au sein des ménages à partir des données sur l’emploi du temps, révélant que les inégalités intraménages — notamment entre hommes et femmes — sont substantielles mais invisibles dans les mesures traditionnelles, et qu’une meilleure compréhension de cette répartition permettrait d’ajuster les politiques fiscales pour cibler plus justement les individus vulnérables à la pauvreté.
Estimating intra-household sharing is crucial to understanding overall inequality. Standard measures of consumption inequality only take into account inequality between, and not within, households, because expenditure surveys are generally available only at the household level. I develop a new approach to estimating intra-household sharing, which is both grounded in a general collective household model, and simple to implement with widely available data. I propose using individual-level variation from time-use data to identify the way households share resources between members. For UK working couples, my methodology reveals substantial intra-household inequality, and the poverty rate is 20.59% higher for women than men.
Cette note illustre que la concurrence fiscale entre pays européens s’est déplacée d’une logique de réduction des taux vers une prolifération de réformes rétrécissant l’assiette de l’impôt des sociétés, ce qui a entraîné une baisse marquée du taux effectif d’imposition des multinationales malgré les efforts de lutte contre l’évasion fiscale, et pose un défi à l’équité et à la soutenabilité des finances publiques à l’ère de l’impôt minimum mondial.
This policy note highlights the main conclusions of the Working Paper entitled “Declining Tax Rates of Multinationals: The Hidden Role of Tax Base Reforms” (2025) by EU Tax Observatory researchers Sarah Godar and Jules Ducept. The effective tax rate of multinational companies declined by 2.7 percentage points in
the European Union between 2014 and 2022, shows a new EU Tax Observatory analysis of a decade of corporate tax reforms. The decline was exacerbated by tax
competition between Member States. During that period, corporate tax reforms generated a tax revenue loss equivalent to 3.5% of tax collected from sample firms. The analysis reveals that Member States are shifting away from the traditional “cut rate – broaden base” corporate tax policy towards base-narrowing tax policies. The contribution of statutory rate reforms to the decrease in effective tax rates is estimated to be 0.9 percentage points. Despite multiple anti-avoidance reforms adopted to protect the tax base against erosion, the net contribution of base reforms represents an additional reduction by 0.6 percentage points.
The implementation of the Global Minimum Tax is likely to accelerate the shift towards base-narrowing tax policies. Public announcements by governments show
countries inside and outside Europe are increasingly reforming their incentive regime to be compliant with the Global Minimum Tax. This will require an inclusive conversation on the nature and the extent of tax incentive policies in the context of fair tax competition.
Ce rapport présente une vue d’ensemble comparative des administrations fiscales dans 58 pays, montrant que, malgré des progrès notables dans la numérisation des services et la gestion proactive des risques fiscaux, de forts écarts subsistent en matière d’efficience, de gouvernance et de transparence, soulignant l’importance de renforcer les capacités administratives pour sécuriser les recettes fiscales dans un contexte économique incertain.
Ce rapport est la douzième édition de la série Administration fiscale de l’OCDE. Riche de données et d’informations provenant de 58 juridictions, il est destiné aux analystes de l’administration fiscale afin de leur permettre de comprendre la conception et la gestion des systèmes fiscaux d’autres juridictions et d’établir des comparaisons. Bien qu’il soit principalement destiné aux analystes, il peut également constituer un outil utile pour les cadres supérieurs de l’administration fiscale ou pour les fonctionnaires des ministères des Finances lorsqu’ils envisagent des changements dans l’administration fiscale. L’édition 2024 comprend des données, des ratios et des tendances relatifs à la performance jusqu’à la fin de l’exercice 2022. Pour la première fois depuis 2019, cette édition examine également plus en détail les pratiques administratives, opérationnelles et organisationnelles des administrations fiscales participantes. Enfin, il contient un dossier spécial qui explore la manière dont les administrations fiscales estiment les manques à gagner fiscaux. Les données sous-jacentes à ce rapport proviennent de l’Enquête internationale sur l’administration des recettes et, dans certains domaines, il utilise également des informations provenant de l’Inventaire des initiatives sur l’utilisation de la technologie à des fins fiscale.
Ce rapport fournit un commentaire consolidé sur les règles du modèle mondial de lutte contre l’érosion de la base fiscale (GloBE) dans le cadre du Pilier 2, visant à garantir que les grandes multinationales paient un impôt minimum dans chaque juridiction où elles exercent des activités, ce qui marque un tournant majeur pour l’équité fiscale internationale et la protection des assiettes fiscales nationales à l’ère du numérique.
A key part of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project is addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. In October 2021, over 135 jurisdictions joined a ground-breaking plan to update key elements of the international tax system which is no longer fit for purpose in a globalised and digitalised economy. The Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules are a key component of this plan and ensure large multinational enterprise pay a minimum level of tax on the income arising in each of the jurisdictions where they operate. More specifically, the GloBE Rules provide for a co-ordinated system of taxation that imposes a top-up tax on profits arising in a jurisdiction whenever the effective tax rate, determined on a jurisdictional basis, is below the minimum rate. The Commentary to the GloBE Rules was originally released by the Inclusive Framework in March 2022. The Commentary explains the intended outcomes under the GloBE Rules, clarifies the meaning of certain terms and illustrates the application of the rules to certain fact patterns. This Consolidated Commentary incorporates Agreed Administrative Guidance that has been released by the Inclusive Framework since March 2022 up until March 2025. It provides tax administrations and taxpayers with guidance on the interpretation and application of the GloBE Rules in order to promote a consistent and common interpretation and application of those that will facilitate coordinated outcomes for both tax administrations and MNE Groups.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Alyson Auger-Collette
- Mirlyn-Daphney Brutus
- Kristine Javier
- Louis Lemay
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé
Note: L’intelligence artificielle générative a été utilisée dans la préparation de ce bulletin de veille pour la préparation de certaines des phrases résumées (en gras) des documents.