Dans cette nouvelle édition, l’analyse présente l’effet de la hausse du salaire minimum sur le revenu disponible de 8 types de ménages qui travaillent au salaire minimum. On y compare aussi la situation de ménages similaires entre les provinces et enfin, un regard comparatif à l’international s’ajoute.

La hausse du taux du salaire minimum le 1^er mai 2025 est de 0,35 $, le faisant passer à 16,10 $ l’heure.

Encore cette année, l’objectif du présent Regard CFFP est de mesurer l’effet de la hausse sur le revenu disponible de ménages qui travaillent au salaire minimum. Ainsi, en tenant compte du salaire, de la fiscalité et des prestations offertes, il est possible de mesurer si la situation financière des ménages considérés s’améliore et de combien.

Est également incluse dans la publication, l’analyse croisée des caractéristiques des personnes travaillant au salaire minimum, jusqu’à 110 % puis jusqu’à 125 % du salaire minimum, offrant un portrait plus contrasté de la population qui travaille à ces niveaux de salaire.

Puis, les résultats pour des ménages similaires dans les autres provinces canadiennes sont présentés, permettant une comparaison qui va au-delà de la simple comparaison du salaire minimum horaire. Enfin, un regard comparatif à l’international est jeté.

Ce document analyse et compare les principaux engagements budgétaires des partis fédéraux dans le cadre des élections de 2025, en évaluant leur incidence sur les finances publiques du Canada à partir d’une base de référence commune établie par le Directeur parlementaire du budget (DPB), afin d’éclairer les électeurs sur les effets des plateformes électorales sur les revenus, les dépenses, la dette et le solde budgétaire fédéraux.

Comme lors des dernières campagnes électorales, la Chaire produit une synthèse des cadres financiers qui recense les principaux engagements des partis qui ont une incidence budgétaire.

L’exercice consistant à la préparation et à la publication des cadres financiers par les partis dans une campagne électorale est utile et pertinent. Il s’agit d’un exercice exigeant pour les partis, mais qui a le mérite de les forcer à chiffrer leurs promesses, que ce soit l’ajout ou le changement d’un programme ou d’un impôt. Ils doivent alors montrer comment ces promesses s’inscrivent dans un cadre budgétaire.

La présente synthèse indique les principaux engagements touchant les revenus et les dépenses et rappelle les positions des partis sur certains sujets prédominants de la campagne. Elle présente également, avec comme point de départ les chiffres du cadre de référence du directeur parlementaire du budget, une comparaison des effets des engagements sur divers indicateurs de finances publiques (revenus, dépenses, solde et endettement) en ayant d’abord la volonté de s’assurer que les données soient comparables.

Il convient ici de préciser que la présentation ne porte aucune appréciation de la pertinence des mesures ni de la faisabilité à les mettre en œuvre.

Enfin, rappelons que dans le cadre de la campagne électorale fédérale 2025, la Chaire a aussi organisé un débat électoral sur les enjeux de fiscalité et de finances publiques qui s’est tenu le 15 avril 2025.

Cet article étudie comment la proximité de revenu entre individus influence les effets des comparaisons sociales sur le bien-être subjectif, concluant que les écarts de revenu importants avec des pairs plus riches réduisent le bien-être, tandis que dépasser des pairs autrefois plus aisés améliore ce bien-être, soulignant ainsi l’importance des dynamiques de comparaison et de la distribution des revenus dans la conception des politiques économiques et fiscales.

The present study investigates the role of proximity in shaping social income static  and dynamic comparisons and their impact on well-being, measured in terms of self-assessed health. Using the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (2002-2017), the study examines how individuals compare their income trajectories with those of their peers, considering varying degrees of proximity. The findings reveal that well-being is negatively impacted by static comparisons only in the case of a significant income gap with richer individuals. However, when dynamic comparisons are introduced, individuals experience an improvement in their subjective well-being when comparing to individuals who previously earned more but now earn less, as long as they drop at a certain distance. Consequently, no effect is observed when comparing with individuals in closer proximity, and effects emerge when the degree of proximity is low.

Cette étude présente le revenu viable 2025 au Québec, montrant que les fortes hausses de loyers maintiennent la pression sur les ménages à faible revenu et que le seuil de la MPC est insuffisant pour refléter les coûts réels, d’où la nécessité d’adopter le revenu viable comme référence plus réaliste en matière de politique fiscale et sociale.

Bien que le coût du transport ait diminué entre 2024 et 2025 pour les ménages qui possèdent une voiture, sortir de la pauvreté continue de coûter plus cher par rapport à l’an dernier pour la plupart des ménages. Les loyers, qui augmentent encore à un rythme plus élevé que l’inflation, sont en cause. Alors que plusieurs parlent de « crise » du logement, force est d’admettre que la situation actuelle n’est plus exceptionnelle et que les hausses de loyer récurrentes représentent un problème structurel qui empêche les ménages d’atteindre une vie exempte de pauvreté.

Cette étude analyse l’évolution des investissements directs étrangers (IDE) au Canada de 1990 à 2024, concluant que si le pays est redevenu plus attractif après 2020, notamment grâce à des subventions massives pour les projets liés à l’énergie propre et aux véhicules électriques, cette performance repose sur un soutien fiscal important qui soulève des questions de pérennité budgétaire et d’efficacité économique à long terme.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a specific form of cross-border capital flow in which an investor in one country has ownership or management control of
an enterprise located in another country.

Inward FDI has significant economic benefits for the host economy. In Canada’s case, the federal government actively encourages foreign-owned companies to invest in Canada.

However, earlier studies have shown that Canada has become less attractive for inward FDI relative to the United States after 2010, and particularly from
2015 to 2017, which also corresponds to periods of weakness in domestic investment.

This study finds that Canada became modestly more attractive to foreign direct investors after 2020 compared to the US and Australia. The improvement might be due in large part to substantial federal and provincial government subsidies to foreign companies involved in the electronic vehicle (EV) value chain and in the creation, production, and distribution of clean energy.

Government financial subsidies to specific foreign investors are arguably not sustainable or efficient initiatives to improve Canada’s business investment
environment in the long run. Tax and regulatory reforms should be the main focus of policies to promote business investment by both foreign and domestically owned businesses.

Ce rapport soutient que le travail de type « économie de plateformes »  est largement surestimé au Canada, représentant moins de 10 % du marché du travail, et que la plupart des participants y voient un avantage fiscal et personnel en raison de la flexibilité qu’il offre, rendant ainsi toute réforme fiscale ou réglementaire potentiellement nuisible à l’emploi et aux revenus volontaires.

Despite widespread concerns that gig work is becoming a dominant part of our economy, most studies find it is not an important part of Canada’s labour market and its growth is embraced by most workers.

There is no consensus on its precise definition, most research shows gig work involves less than 10 percent of the labour force.

Moreover, most definitions of the gig economy—as with related concepts such as nonstandard and precarious work—include well-off people, such as self-employed professionals as well as people who prefer flexible work, such as truckers, dockworkers, students, and older people looking to supplement their incomes.

Contrary to much of the rhetoric around this issue, many participants in the gig economy are attracted by its flexibility and freedom, rather than being forced into such jobs by a weak labour market.

Current labour market data does not indicate the need for government intervention for gig work considering tenure has risen steadily, quit rates remain near historic lows, and surveys show most Canadians are content with their working conditions.

Indeed, there is a risk such intervention could limit opportunities for affected people to earn extra income and remain active in the labour force.

The disconnect between the relatively benign reality of Canada’s labour market and advocates who insist work is becoming more precarious reflects fundamental problems in the agenda for labour economics.

Ce document évalue l’effet de six mesures fiscales sur la taille de la classe moyenne au Québec et au Canada, concluant que certaines politiques redistributives, comme l’Allocation canadienne pour enfants et l’Allocation famille, ont significativement contribué à faire croître la classe moyenne, notamment en permettant à de nombreux ménages à faible revenu de franchir le seuil d’entrée dans cette catégorie.

Cette étude s’intéresse à l’effet redistributif de certaines mesures fiscales sur les classes sociales au Québec et au Canada. La Base de données et Modèle de simulation de politiques sociales de Statistique Canada est utilisée pour simuler l’effet de six mesures sur la taille des classes sociales en 2018. La répartition des bénéficiaires au sein de chaque classe et les caractéristiques sociodémographiques des principaux bénéficiaires sont également analysées.

Ce rapport propose une refonte du système fiscal américain pour remédier aux inégalités économiques et au creusement des déficits, en recommandant d’abolir les réductions d’impôt de 2017 pour les plus riches, de renforcer les crédits d’impôt pour les ménages à faible revenu (comme le crédit d’impôt pour enfants et l’EITC), et de mieux financer l’IRS afin d’augmenter les recettes publiques sans alourdir le fardeau fiscal des ménages modestes.

This year presents an opportunity to enact tax policy changes that would ease the strain on household budgets that people in low-paid jobs and their families face and allow them to invest in their future, while ensuring that the nation’s wealthiest pay more of their fair share in taxes. Expiration is approaching for a number of provisions in the 2017 tax law — which showered expensive tax cuts on the wealthy and failed to deliver on promised benefits for economic growth and workers’ earnings — so the time is ripe for a new direction.

But the economic agenda the Trump Administration and congressional Republicans are pursuing would double down on the 2017 law’s flaws by extending its skewed taxed cuts, which would further balloon deficits and deliver another trickle-down failure. And to help pay for those tax cuts, House and Senate Republicans are planning massive cuts that would take health care and food assistance away from, and make college less affordable for, millions of people with low and middle incomes. 

Ce document démontre que la mise en œuvre généralisée du Pilier 2 de l’OCDE entraînera une hausse significative de l’impôt sur les bénéfices étrangers des multinationales américaines engagées dans le transfert de profits, notamment en réduisant l’efficacité du régime GILTI actuel et en imposant une taxe minimale pays par pays, ce qui augmentera les recettes fiscales internationales.

In 2013, the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) set up the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. The goal of the BEPS project was to evaluate the current taxation of multinationals, and to develop a framework for member countries to negotiate and implement new tax laws to
combat tax avoidance. The efforts resulted in model rules divided between two pillars. Pillar 1 focuses on reallocating a fraction of reported profits from very large multinationals, based on where their consumers are. Pillar 2 establishes a global minimum tax of 15 percent and developed several tools and mechanism for
implementation. Pillar 2 is now effective in many jurisdictions.

Although the US has indicated it will not join the global tax deal, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) implemented broad changes to the taxation of US multinationals’ foreign income, some of which helped design key elements of Pillar 2. Notably, it established a minimum tax on foreign earnings, called the global intangible low-tax income (GILTI) regime. In 2025, the GILTI regime imposes a tax rate of 10.5 percent on pooled foreign income, allows specific deductions for investment in tangible capital, and allows most foreign taxes as foreign tax credits that can reduce or eliminate a firm’s GILTI tax liability.

Ce document conclut que la réforme fiscale américaine de 2017 (TCJA) a globalement réduit la charge fiscale sur les investissements étrangers des multinationales américaines, mais sans réduire de manière significative les incitatifs au transfert de profits, ce qui limite les gains en matière de lutte contre l’érosion des assiettes fiscales.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) was the most sweeping reform of US corporate and international tax policy since 1986. In this report, we find that the TCJA reduced tax burdens on foreign investment for many multinationals, but its impacts vary widely and result in low effective tax rates on foreign investment.

The TCJA was intended to simplify the tax treatment of multinationals and reduce tax burdens, while also imposing a minimum tax on foreign earnings of US-based multinationals and encouraging firms to locate economic activity and profits in the US. Before the TCJA, the statutory rate for US-based corporations was 35 percent, and one of the highest in the world, but foreign income was only taxed when repatriated to the US. The tax code allowed many forms of profit-shifting and deferral that resulted in low effective rates for many US multinationals. The TCJA lowered the statutory tax rate to 21 percent and exempted foreign income from the US corporate tax to align with most developed countries and incentivize investments. The TCJA also introduced a minimum tax on foreign income, called the global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI), to lower incentives for firms to shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions and to combat aggressive tax avoidance by increasing the tax burden on low-taxed foreign income.

Did the TCJA achieve these goals? The Tax Policy Center’s (TPC’s) updated International Investment and Capital Model provides new insights on how the TCJA affected tax burdens for different types of multinational firms, investments, and behaviors. 

Cette étude explore les effets budgétaires et distributifs d’un élargissement permanent du crédit d’impôt pour les travailleurs sans enfants à charge (EITC) aux États-Unis, tout en proposant des solutions pour atténuer les pénalités fiscales au mariage que cet élargissement pourrait accentuer.

In 2021, Congress temporarily increased the earned income tax credit (EITC) for workers not raising children at home—often called the childless EITC—and temporarily broadened it to include youngadult workers and workers over age 64. Evidence indicates the expansion reduced economic hardships and a larger and more broadly available childless EITC may also increase employment. The expansion drew criticism, however, for increasing marriage penalties in some cases (i.e., providing lower benefits if two workers marry than if they remain unmarried) thereby enlarging inequities based on marital status. That the expansion actually affected marriage rates (or would do so if reinstated) is supported by little evidence, but opposition to such increases in marriage penalties may pose a
significant barrier to expansion of the credit in the future. This brief reviews the costs and benefits of the 2021 childless EITC and analyzes two options to expand the current childless EITC while reducing the marriage penalties that could result if two workers not raising children at home marry. A simple reinstatement of the 2021 expansion would cost $14.0 billion in fiscal year 2026. Combining that expansion with the first of the marriage-penalty relief options outlined here would cost $14.7 billion, while combining the expansion with the second option would cost $13.7 billion.

Ce rapport souligne que, face à des perspectives économiques incertaines, les pays d’Asie du Sud doivent améliorer leur politique fiscale ainsi que leur administration fiscale afin de combler des écarts de recettes supérieurs à la moyenne des pays en développement et de renforcer leur résilience budgétaire.

Growth prospects for South Asia have dimmed. The global economic environment has become more challenging and is a source of heightened downside risks. After a decade of repeated disruptions, South Asia’s buffers to cushion new shocks are slim. Tackling some of its greatest inefficiencies and vulnerabilities could help South Asia navigate this unusually uncertain outlook: unproductive agricultural sectors, dependence on energy imports, pressures from rising global temperatures, and fragile fiscal positions. For most South Asian countries, increased revenue mobilization is a prerequisite for strengthening fiscal positions. Even taking into account the particular challenges of collecting taxes in South Asian economies—such as widespread informal economic activity and large agriculture sectors—South Asian economies face larger tax gaps than the average emerging market and developing economy (EMDE). This suggests the need for improved tax policy and administration. Until fiscal positions have strengthened, the burden of climate adaptation will disproportionately fall on the private sector. If allowed sufficient flexibility, private sector adaptation could offset about one-third of the likely climate damage by 2050. This may, however, require governments to remove obstacles that prevent workers and firms from moving across locations and activities. As growth prospects dim, the challenge grows to create jobs for South Asia’s rapidly expanding working-age population. South Asia’s large diasporas could become a source of strength if their knowledge, networks, and other resources can be better tapped for investment and trade.

Ce rapport examine les obstacles limitant l’accès des municipalités des pays en développement au financement remboursable et propose des solutions pour renforcer leur capacité à mobiliser des ressources privées en complément des financements publics.

Municipalities in low- and middle-income countries confront financing needs that greatly exceed available flows. Currently, most investment in municipal infrastructure is financed directly from public fiscal sources, but needs cannot be met by existing public and international development sources alone. Much greater use of private and repayable financing will be required. This report is intended to address this development challenge. It provides a snapshot of repayable finance flows to municipalities in developing countries, showing that such flows have been extremely restricted in recent years. It then identifies the chief factors that contribute to these restricted flows, along three dimensions: municipalities’ effective demand for finance, the supply of finance, and the intermediating regulatory environment. It offers recommendations for municipalities, national governments, and development partners to address these constraints.

Cette étude évalue l’incidence redistributive de la politique fiscale au Pakistan et montre qu’en 2019, le système fiscal a légèrement augmenté la pauvreté et peu réduit les inégalités.

This study assesses the impact of fiscal policy in Pakistan – taxes, social expenditures, and subsidy expenditures – on poverty and inequality using the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Methodology. Results show that fiscal policy increased the national poverty headcount and left inequality largely unchanged during fiscal year 2019 (spanning July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019). The net effect of the fiscal system is to increase the poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line by approximately two percentage points. Overall, the combination of direct and indirect taxes paid, cash or near-cash transfers received, and subsidy benefits captured leaves most households as net payers into the fiscal system; only the poorest decile are net recipients in cash terms from the fiscal system. Taxes, transfers, and subsidies have a muted impact on inequality: the Gini coefficient index falls from 29.0 to 28.6 from pre-fiscal to post-fiscal income. The most effective expenditure-side instrument for either poverty or inequality reduction is the BISP social protection program; the revenue-side instruments that shield poor and vulnerable households most effectively are the personal income tax and the urban property tax. The revenue-side instrument most effective at reducing inequality is the personal income tax. Indirect taxes and subsidy expenditures – which are far larger in fiscal magnitude than direct taxes or social transfers (respectively) in Pakistan in fiscal year 2019 – are not particularly effective at reducing poverty or inequality. In-kind transfers of public health and education services also have an insignificant impact on inequality.

Ce texte présente une approche méthodologique pour estimer la sensibilité des recettes fiscales à l’activité économique, notamment lors de l’analyse de systèmes fiscaux nationaux, comme dans le cadre de la rédaction d’un examen des finances publiques.

Medium-term fiscal sustainability relies on accurate projections of revenue mobilization. Assessing whether a government aligns tax mobilization with economic activity is important for prudent spending choices. Revenue projections depend on assumptions about how revenues will respond to changes in economic growth in the future, and the two concepts of tax elasticity and tax buoyancy are most used to assess this. While closely related, these two concepts are different and produce different outcomes. The objective of this note is to recommend a methodological approach for country economists to estimate buoyancy when analyzing a country’s tax systems, for example, when writing a Public Finance Review (PFR). The note presents theoretical underpinnings and describes alternative econometric approaches and data for estimating short-run and long-run tax buoyancy. Results and practical implementation of the proposed methodology are displayed.

Ce texte évalue le potentiel fiscal du Niger et propose des réformes fiscales concrètes en matière de TVA, de droits d’accise, de fiscalité foncière et du renforcement de l’administration fiscale.

Niger faces significant challenges to mobilize revenue, with one of the lowest tax revenue to GDP ratios in the region. This paper estimates the tax revenue gap, which reflects the difference between the actual and the potential tax revenue given economic and institutional context. The tax revenue gap reached 3.4 percent of GDP in 2022 due to gaps in the collection of taxes on goods and services, and international trade taxes. To enhance revenue mobilization, it is essential to rationalize VAT exemptions and the reduced rates on specific products, reform excise and property taxes, and strengthen tax administration.

Ce rapport examine les perspectives économiques mondiales et souligne l’importance d’un environnement commercial stable, d’une coopération internationale renforcée et de réformes structurelles visant à stimuler la croissance et alléger les pressions budgétaires.

After enduring a prolonged and unprecedented series of shocks, the global economy appeared to have stabilized, with steady yet underwhelming growth rates. However, the landscape has changed as governments around the world reorder policy priorities and uncertainties have climbed to new highs. Forecasts for global growth have been revised markedly down compared with the January 2025 World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update, reflecting effective tariff rates at levels not seen in a century and a highly unpredictable environment. Global headline inflation is expected to decline at a slightly slower pace than what was expected in January.

Intensifying downside risks dominate the outlook, amid escalating trade tensions and financial market adjustments. Divergent and swiftly changing policy positions or deteriorating sentiment could lead to even tighter global financial conditions. Ratcheting up a trade war and heightened trade policy uncertainty may further hinder both short-term and long-term growth prospects. Scaling back international cooperation could jeopardize progress toward a more resilient global economy.

At this critical juncture, countries should work constructively to promote a stable and predictable trade environment and to facilitate international cooperation, while addressing policy gaps and structural imbalances at home. This will help secure both internal and external economic stability. To stimulate growth and ease fiscal pressures, policies that promote healthy aging and enhance labor force participation among older individuals and women could be implemented, as discussed in Chapter 2. Additionally, productivity growth can be fostered with better integration of migrants and refugees and mitigation of skill mismatches, as detailed in Chapter 3.

Ce texte analyse le cadre budgétaire du Liechtenstein, mettant en évidence une consolidation réussie après la crise financière et suggérant qu’une hausse des investissements publics pourrait relancer une productivité en stagnation.

This paper analyzes Liechtenstein’s fiscal framework, highlighting its successful consolidation following the global financial crisis. The study examines the budget balance rule that anchors fiscal policy, benchmarking key fiscal indicators against European peers. Findings reveal Liechtenstein effectively implemented frontloaded fiscal consolidation through revenue and expenditure measures, improving the fiscal balance by 4.1 percent of GDP during 2014-18. Despite maintaining low tax rates, Liechtenstein operates with a lean government structure, evidenced by low public employment levels and wage bills. The analysis concludes that increased capital investment could boost productivity, which has stagnated over the past two decades despite being higher than Switzerland’s.

Ce rapport conclut que les pays doivent mettre en œuvre des ajustements budgétaires progressifs dans des cadres crédibles à moyen terme afin de réduire la dette et de constituer des réserves en cas d’incertitude accrue. 

As the global economy faces increasing fiscal challenges, multilateral surveillance of fiscal developments has become an important part of the IMF’s surveillance responsibilities. The Fiscal Monitor series provides an overview of latest public finance developments, updates the medium-term fiscal outlook, and assesses fiscal implications of policies relevant to the global economy.

The Fiscal Monitor is prepared twice a year by the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. Its projections are based on the same database used for the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR). The fiscal projections for individual countries have been prepared by IMF desk economists, and, in line with the WEO guidelines.

Le rapport Les impôts sur les salaires 2025  montre qu’en 2024, la majorité des pays de l’OCDE ont vu la charge fiscale nette augmenter pour les salariés célibataires, qui atteint en moyenne 34,9 %. 

Cette publication annuelle contient des informations détaillées sur les impôts payés sur les salaires dans les pays de l’OCDE. L’édition de cette année se concentre sur la décomposition de l’impôt sur le revenu des personnes physiques et sur le rôle des allègements fiscaux, qui peuvent prendre la forme de déductions fiscales ou de crédits d’impôt sur les taxes prélevées par les différents niveaux de gouvernement. Pour l’année 2024, le rapport couvre également les impôts sur le revenu et les cotisations de sécurité sociale payés par les salariés, les cotisations de sécurité sociale et taxes sur les salaires versés par leurs employeurs, et les transferts en espèces perçus par les travailleurs. L’objectif est de montrer comment ces taxes et prestations sont calculées dans chaque pays membre et d’examiner leurs impacts sur le revenu des ménages. Les résultats permettent aussi de faire des comparaisons internationales quantitatives des coûts de main-d’œuvre et de la situation globale vis-à-vis de l’impôt et des prestations des célibataires et des familles à différents niveaux de revenus. Cette publication présente des taux effectifs moyens et marginaux d’imposition sur les coûts de main-d’œuvre pour huit types de ménages représentatifs dont le niveau du salaire et la composition diffèrent (célibataires, parents isolés, couples avec un ou deux salaires et avec ou sans enfant). Les taux moyens d’imposition mettent en évidence le pourcentage de la rémunération brute ou des coûts de main-d’œuvre représenté par les impôts et les prélèvements sociaux, avant et après transferts en espèces, et les taux marginaux d’imposition correspondent à la partie d’une augmentation minime de la rémunération brute ou des coûts de main-d’œuvre reversée sous la forme d’impôts.

Ce rapport met en évidence que, malgré une augmentation de plus de 100 milliards de livres en investissements publics depuis 2024, le Royaume-Uni demeure confronté à un sous-investissement chronique, en particulier dans les infrastructures sociales telles que la santé, le logement et les prisons, et que des choix fiscaux difficiles s’imposent dans un contexte de contraintes budgétaires persistantes pour maximiser les effets sur la croissance économique et les conditions de vie.

In this report we put the big investment decisions facing the Government at the Spending Review in context. It examines the UK’s long history of chronic under-investment, evaluates the recent welcome announcement of £100 billion additional capital spending and sets out how limited resources should be prioritised to support growth and improve living standards. Despite significant funding top-ups, public investment is set to fall slightly as a share of GDP by the end of the decade, with only £20–£50 billions of discretionary capital spending for the Government to play with if it wants to avoid cuts to existing budgets.