Ce document analyse les impacts de la pauvreté au Manitoba. Les auteurs y calculent notamment le coût de celle-ci pour la province.

This report quantifies the damaging costs of poverty for the first time in Manitoba. It demonstrates the economic burden imposed by poverty and the urgency for the Manitoba and Canadian governments to act to end poverty. Inaction on poverty is tremendously costly in terms of loss of productivity and costs to the health and justice systems, which Manitoba taxpayers are paying for.

This research is the first study into the cost of poverty in Manitoba. It is based on three measurable components: remedial costs, opportunity costs, and intergenerational costs of poverty.

The total cost of poverty in Manitoba in 2019, the latest year for which complete data are available, was $2.5 billion a year, which amounts to 3.4 percent of Manitoba’s GDP.

This is a conservative estimate. Other costs of poverty, such as intergenerational costs, are not included in our analysis. The costs documented in this report could be reallocated to preventing poverty, yielding larger financial and other benefits if poverty were eliminated. They were calculated using the Market Basket Measure (MBM) of poverty, the federal and provincial governments’ official poverty line.

The provincial government, in particular, has the power to do more as it holds jurisdictional responsibility for key policy areas to address poverty, including health, justice, social assistance, education and action on the TRC Calls to Action and the MMIWGTS+ Calls to Justice. 4 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives–MB

The COVID pandemic showed that governments can respond quickly and boldly to crises. The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) cut the poverty rate in half in Canada (Prosper Canada 2023). Provincial governments also acted quickly to provide help to those in need during the pandemic, for example the B.C. government provided $300 per month extra for those on social assistance and disability, which lowered poverty rates. The experience with COVID shows that when governments are motivated, change can come quickly.

Directing funding to bold investments to help people escape poverty and urgent needs from low-income Manitobans for sufficient income transfers within a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy would finally make substantive improvements on poverty in Manitoba.

Ce document conclut que, afin de soutenir l’acceptabilité de l’écofiscalité, il est pertinent de s’intéresser à l’utilisation des recettes prélevées. Parmi les options disponibles, le Québec fait le choix de verser ces recettes vers des fonds spéciaux dédiés au financement d’initiatives vertes. Il s’agit d’un choix pertinent. Cependant, l’expérience récente du Québec en la matière révèle certaines lacunes et une adoption non systématique des bonnes pratiques.

Les enjeux environnementaux auxquels nous sommes confrontés militent pour une utilisation accrue de l’écofiscalité, qui encourage la substitution de la consommation et de la production vers des biens et des services moins dommageables sur le plan environnemental. Toutefois, malgré sa pertinence, le rehaussement des prélèvements écofiscaux peut entraîner son lot de mécontentement.

Afin de soutenir l’acceptabilité de l’écofiscalité, il est pertinent de s’intéresser à l’utilisation des recettes prélevées. Parmi les options disponibles, le Québec fait le choix de verser ces recettes vers des fonds dédiés au financement d’initiatives vertes. Il s’agit, en théorie, d’un choix pertinent en vue de rendre l’écofiscalité plus acceptable et de maximiser les retombées environnementales positives. Cependant, l’atteinte des bénéfices attendus nécessite le respect de conditions préalables et le déploiement de ressources administratives considérables. Or, l’expérience récente du Québec en la matière révèle certaines lacunes et une adoption non systématique des bonnes pratiques dans la gestion des fonds spéciaux à portée environnementale. Des manques ont notamment été observés en matière d’information financière diffusée, de justification des retombées et d’évaluation de la pertinence des dépenses.

Après avoir dressé certains constats quant aux caractéristiques et à la gestion des fonds spéciaux à portée environnementale au Québec, les auteurs proposent certaines pistes en vue de rendre ces outils plus performants, ce qui implique entre autres de se pencher sur leurs impacts redistributifs.

Cette publication mesure, par une analyse des dépenses publiques, la taille du gouvernement de chaque province pour l’année 2022.

This bulletin measures the size of government in Canada, by province, based on total government spending as a share of the economy, as well as public sector employment as a share of total employment, between 2007 and 2022. Research shows that the size of government (relative to the economy) has an effect on economic growth and social progress. This makes it important to measure and track—especially given the scope of government spending and intervention during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, the size of government relative to the economy among the provinces ranged from a high of 63.0 percent in Nova Scotia to a low of 26.8 percent in Alberta. For Canada as a whole, the size of government represented 40.5 percent of the economy. From 2007 to 2022, government spending as a share of the economy increased in eight out of ten provinces. Furthermore, seven provinces experienced an increase in the size of government since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.  For Canada as a whole, public-sector employment represented 21.2 percent of total employment. From 2007 to 2022, public-sector employment as a share of total employment increased in every province. Provinces in the Maritimes tended to have larger governments relative to the economy, which employed a higher share of total workers, than provinces in western Canada. However, the size of government in general has been increasing across the country.

Ce rapport cherche à répondre aux questions fondamentales sur le partage des avantages financiers liés aux minéraux critiques et stratégiques pour la transition énergétique et numérique.

Are current fiscal approaches and policies aligned with national strategies, including ensuring that mineral-rich developing countries collect an appropriate share of the financial benefits from critical minerals value chains? If not, what needs to change?

This report seeks to answer these fundamental questions about financial benefit sharing in relation to critical and strategic minerals for the energy and digital transition.

While the financial benefit-sharing challenges and opportunities in extracting and processing critical minerals are not fundamentally different from the commonly known challenges facing mining revenue collection in general, some nuances require further investigation. This report seeks to identify these nuances in the key features of critical minerals and the new challenges and opportunities they present to fiscal regulation.

Cette analyse met en évidence le rôle des dettes des ménages dans l’accentuation des inégalités au Québec.

La dette des familles moins nanties est principalement constituée de dettes à la consommation (74 %), tandis que pour les familles plus aisées, la dette est principalement hypothécaire (78 à 86 %). Le prêt hypothécaire est crucial pour accumuler de la richesse pour de nombreux ménages au Québec, avec une augmentation significative de la dette hypothécaire et de la valeur des actifs immobiliers entre 1999 et 2019.

L’accès au crédit est inégal, avec environ 1 personne sur 5 ayant déjà vu sa demande de crédit refusée, notamment chez les hommes, les personnes autochtones, les personnes racisées et celles à faible revenu. Les personnes sans accès au crédit traditionnel se tournent parfois vers des prêts alternatifs à des taux d’intérêt plus élevés, touchant particulièrement les femmes, les personnes racisées et autochtones.

Environ 28 % des personnes endettées rencontrent des difficultés de remboursement, surtout celles ayant eu recours au crédit en raison de situations difficiles comme une perte d’emploi ou une maladie. Les ménages utilisant le crédit pour des dépenses courantes ont souvent une santé générale plus mauvaise que ceux qui n’y ont pas recours. Le niveau de stress associé au remboursement des dettes est élevé, augmentant considérablement lorsque le remboursement est difficile.

Cet article propose une analyse quantitative de la viabilité du régime de retraite de l’Alberta en comparaison avec le Régime de pensions du Canada.

Un régime de retraite propre à l’Alberta (RRA) fait l’objet depuis peu d’un regain d’attention. Dans cet article, la viabilité à long terme de ce régime est évaluée, en utilisant à la fois un modèle quantitatif détaillé et des approches simples et intuitives. La marge de manœuvre pour modifier les niveaux de prestations et les taux de cotisation par rapport au Régime de pensions du Canada (RPC) est modeste. Plus précisément, le taux de cotisation minimum au RRA est de 8,2 %, comparativement à 9,5 % pour le taux de base du RPC. En tenant compte d’un coussin de 0,4 point de pourcentage, le même que pour le RPC, le taux de cotisation imposé au RRA par la loi passerait alors à 8,6 %. Ce chiffre contraste fortement avec un rapport récent commandé par le gouvernement (LifeWorks 2023), qui calcule un taux de cotisation de 5,9 %. Cet écart dépend en grande partie de la façon dont on interprète la formulation imprécise de la Loi sur le Régime de pensions du Canada. Il y a également plusieurs risques pertinents. Par exemple, les flux migratoires nets positifs de l’Alberta constituent près des deux tiers de son avantage en matière de pensions. Et, selon l’horizon prévisionnel choisi, les risques d’investissement pourraient éliminer entièrement son avantage. Dans l’ensemble, cet article constitue une base actualisée non seulement pour évaluer les forces et les faiblesses du RRA, mais aussi pour comprendre, plus généralement, la viabilité des régimes de retraite.

Ce rapport étudie les conséquences fiscales et politiques de la modernisation de l’État dans l’empire colonial espagnol en Amérique latine.

We study the fiscal and political consequences of state modernization in the Spanish colonial empire in Latin America. We focus on the introduction of a new corps of provincial governors called intendants in the late 18th century. Leveraging the staggered adoption of the reform and administrative fiscal microdata, we show that the intendancy system sizably increased Crown revenue by strengthening state presence in the periphery and disrupting local elite capture. Politically, the reform reduced rebellions by previously exploited indigenous peoples. However, naming patterns reveal that the intendants heightened anti-Spanish sentiment among Creole elites, plausibly contributing to the nascent independence movement.

Cette étude signale que des recherches et des données accablantes démontrent que le transfert international abusif de bénéfices reste omniprésent malgré plusieurs dispositions de la loi fiscale fédérale américaine de 2017 visant à l’endiguer.

To reduce their federal corporate income taxes, every year large multinational corporations shift hundreds of billions of dollars in profits earned in the United States onto the books of subsidiaries formed in foreign tax havens like Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and Ireland. Because nearly all state corporate taxes are based on the taxable profits a corporation reports on its federal return, each year states lose at least $10 billion — and perhaps as much as $15 billion — of revenue due to this profit- shifting, estimates suggest. This is substantial revenue states could be using to provide K-12 teachers with better pay and smaller class sizes, low-income college students with more adequate financial aid, uninsured individuals with health coverage, residents and businesses with better road maintenance, and other critical services.

Ce document explore la relation entre le Pillier 1 de l’OCDE et la taxe sur les services numériques aux États-Unis.

If Congress chooses not to adopt Pillar 1 of the OECD/G20 proposal to allocate some taxing rights to market countries, digital services taxes (DSTs) will likely continue and proliferate. DSTs are taxes imposed by other countries on the revenue of large firms, and they are alleged to target U.S. multinationals that provide digital products. Adopting Pillar 1 would likely shift the right to tax some profits of these multinationals to market countries, increase U.S. firms’ taxes, and lose U.S. revenue, but would reduce the number of DSTs. These two options (i.e., adopting or not adopting Pillar 1) have different economic consequences, which are relevant to this choice. In addition, not adopting Pillar 1 may trigger the imposition of retaliatory tariffs on imports from certain countries imposing DSTs that are currently on hold.

Selon ce rapport, la discrimination raciale persiste dans le marché immobilier.  Les prêts hypothécaires créent des écarts significatifs au niveau des bénéfices de la déduction des intérêts hypothécaires entre les familles noires et hispaniques d’une part, et les familles blanches d’autre part.

A legacy of racial discrimination—in the housing market and mortgage lending industry, among other sectors—has led to lower rates of homeownership among Black and Hispanic families than among White families. One consequence of the lower homeownership rates is that Black and Hispanic families do not benefit as much from the home mortgage interest deduction as White families. Using the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center’s microsimulation model, we find that Black and Hispanic families received just 54 percent and 38 percent, respectively, of the average benefit for all families in 2019. In contrast, White families got 21 percent more than the average. Expiration of the individual provisions in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) will more than double the share of families who claim the deduction in each group, in large part due to the reduction in the standard deduction amounts. Although the average benefit will rise for all groups, the relative disparities will not change substantially. A surprising result is that in the top income group, Black taxpayers receive a disproportionately larger benefit relative to White taxpayers under TCJA, but that relationship will be reversed after the expiration of the individual income tax provisions.

Ce document présente les trajectoires budgétaires pour la période 2025-2027 en Belgique dans la foulée la réforme du cadre juridique européen de la gouvernance économique.

Cet avis s’inscrit dans le cadre de la mission confiée à la Section par l’Accord de coopération conclu entre l’État fédéral et les entités fédérées, et vise à fournir des trajectoires budgétaires pour la période 2025-2027. En raison de la réforme du cadre juridique européen de la gouvernance économique, le présent avis se concentre sur une simple mise à jour des recommandations de l’année précédente, en utilisant les Perspectives économiques 2024-2029 du Bureau fédéral du Plan du 15 février dernier comme base. La grande incertitude économique actuelle a nécessité une prudence accrue dans les choix politiques, et la mise en œuvre de la mission de la Section dans le cadre du Plan de relance et d’investissements sera détaillée dans un document distinct.

Ce texte souligne l’importance pour un État d’adopter les règles GloBE en tant que filet de sécurité, lequel se veut complémentaire à un impôt sur les bénéfices bien conçu.

Pillar Two rules of the Inclusive Framework agreement on a minimum corporate tax (known as ‘Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules’, for short GloBE) have important implications for the design of the corporate income tax. This chapter discusses these implications particularly from the perspective of low-tax jurisdictions. It argues that it is not possible to design a system that always guarantees generating exactly the bare minimum tax intended by the rules and motivates that this should not be the policy objective anyway. Importantly, if no profit tax already exists, countries need to consider whether to adopt one, and if yes, in what form. There is a case for introducing a general profit tax beyond the GloBE rules, together with a qualifying GloBE domestic minimum top-up tax as a backstop. The familiar alternatives of efficient economic rent tax designs, however, are no longer equivalent under the GloBE. In practice, given the specifics of the rules, an efficient rent tax on in-scope multinationals cannot be combined with a statutory tax rate below a certain cutoff, because the minimum tax becomes always binding. Under the GloBE, immediate expensing particularly maintains the time-value of fully deducting the cost of investment, without impacting the GloBE effective tax rate.

Cet article de blogue postule que la hausse des taux d’intérêt réels à long terme, le ralentissement de la croissance et l’augmentation de la dette pèseront sur les tendances budgétaires à moyen terme et sur la stabilité financière globale.

Inflation-adjusted interest rates are well above post global financial crisis lows, while medium-term growth remains weak. Persistently higher interest rates raise the cost of servicing debt, adding to fiscal pressures and posing risks to financial stability. Decisive and credible fiscal action that gradually brings global debt levels to more sustainable levels can help mitigate these dynamics.

Cette étude propose l’adoption d’une TVA progressive qui rembourse en temps réel les ménages à faible revenu, éliminant la régressivité et offrant des avantages en termes de conformité et de minimisation des obstacles politiques et sociaux.

This paper presents a novel approach to addressing VAT regressivity, by proposing the adoption of a progressive VAT: a single-rate, broad-base, VAT, whereby tax paid on consumption is re-paid to lower income households in real-time, at the moment of purchase. Such a system can effectively eliminate regressivity, while minimizing the political economy, cash-flow, and welfare stigma obstacles that are often associated with standard welfare transfers used in modern VAT systems. It would also have other significant advantages, particularly in terms of compliance incentives.

Cette publication met de l’avant les exonérations fiscales pour les étudiants étrangers qui fréquentent les universités en Australie.

The total value of the tax exemption, in terms of revenue foregone, from not levying company tax rates on the net income (revenue less related expenses) from international students attending Australian universities over the period 2010-11 to 2020-21, is estimated to be around $7.1 billion. A breakdown of the estimate by year is outlined in Attachment A. Attachment A also contains the applicable company tax rates and turnover thresholds over the period 2010-11 to 2020-21. While this response provides an estimate of the revenue foregone, this value of the exemption applies only to the specific scope of this response and does not factor in any tax offsets that universities may have employed had such a policy been in effect over the analysis period. The value of the exemption is highly uncertain, particularly because the value of universities’ expenditure related to international students is not possible to ascertain directly from universities’ financial data. The revenue foregone estimate does not factor in any interactions with other tax offsets. The Department of the Treasury’s Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement1 notes that in relation to the income tax exemption for prescribed entities, “The benchmark tax treatment is that income tax is paid on the taxable income of an entity for an income year at its applicable rate of tax.” In particular, the extent to which universities may have sought to claim research and development (R&D) expenses through the R&D Tax Incentive Offset would potentially fully offset the additional revenue from company tax against international students’ activities. Further information on the impact of the R&D Tax Incentive Offset is available at Attachment B.

Ce document présente les gagnants et les perdants de la nouvelle année financière en Grande-Bretagne en matière de changements fiscaux et d’avantages sociaux.

The beginning of April marks the start of a new tax year, bringing several policy changes affecting taxes, benefits, and wages. Benefit levels are returning to pre-pandemic levels, but threshold freezes continue to draw more people into paying taxes. However, the tax rate on every additional pound earned will decrease to a record low.

These changes create winners and losers depending on income, age, and location. Higher earners benefit more from National Insurance cuts than they lose from threshold freezes, while the end of Cost of Living payments reduces support for many households. Additionally, Council Tax will increase for everyone in England and Wales.

On April 1st, the minimum wage celebrates its 25th anniversary with an increase to £11.44 per hour, benefiting low-paid workers. Benefit increases on April 8th aim to catch up with rising living costs, but the end of additional support provided during the pandemic will offset some gains.

Rent support will increase for over 1.3 million households, but more families will be affected by benefit caps. While National Insurance cuts benefit some, frozen tax thresholds disadvantage taxpayers, and Council Tax rises continue. Overall, the new fiscal year affects individuals differently, creating both celebrations and challenges.

Cet article démonte les arguments utilisés par les facilitateurs de secret pour instrumentaliser les droits à la vie privée contre les mesures de transparence.

After decades of slow but steady transparency progress, secrecy promoters have found a new strategy to turn back the clock on hard-fought transparency advances. The core of this strategy is weaponising the rights to privacy and data protection to block public access to beneficial ownership information and possibly other transparency measures. The biggest success so far under this approach came in late 2022, when the European Court of Justice deemed public access to beneficial ownership registers to be a violation of privacy and barred it. Efforts to replicate this success elsewhere should be expected.

This paper looks at the implementation of this strategy and seeks to expose the falsehoods and weaknesses of arguments used to weaponise privacy rights against beneficial ownership transparency. The paper covers arguments and topics that fall into four areas.

1. Rights to privacy and personal data protection 
2. Rights that are put at risk by a lack of public transparency 
3. Arguments about increased risks of harm and crime 
4. Arguments about who should access beneficial ownership information 

The paper also elaborates on how the effect of these arguments ultimately enables the rich and powerful to escape the rule of law that applies to everyone.

Ce document analyse le progrès, pays par pays, en lien avec l’éradication de l’extrême pauvreté d’ici 2030, un des principaux objectifs du développement durable. 

In 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals set the eradication of extreme poverty by 2030 as a universally agreed objective. This paper analyses the prospects for achieving this goal country by country. Without a reduction in inequality, even with a very optimistic annual growth rate of 7% between 2022 and 2030, 3% of humans would still be living in extreme poverty in 2030. National capacity to eradicate poverty is then measured using the concepts of antipoverty cap or antipoverty tax required to finance poverty eradication, and income floor (financed by a given income tax). With credible annual growth of 3%, even capping incomes at $7 a day cannot eradicate extreme poverty in 5 low-income countries. In other words, neither growth alone nor growth combined with radical domestic redistribution could eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. By contrast, a transfer of just 0.14% of global income could achieve this goal.