Bulletin de veille du 7 novembre 2023
Québec/Canada
Des difficultés constantes ont retardé la transformation des systèmes utilisés pour le versement de prestations essentielles à la population canadienne.
Le programme de Modernisation du versement des prestations d’Emploi et Développement social Canada est le plus vaste projet de technologie de l’information entrepris à ce jour par le gouvernement fédéral. Le programme comportait deux objectifs clés :
• la migration du programme de la Sécurité de la vieillesse, du régime d’assurance-emploi et du Régime de pensions du Canada vers une plateforme infonuagique moderne;
• la transformation du versement des prestations et de l’expérience d’utilisation afin de mieux répondre aux besoins de divers groupes, notamment les personnes âgées, les personnes vivant en région éloignée, les Autochtones et les personnes réfugiées.
Les systèmes de technologie de l’information actuellement utilisés pour le versement de ces prestations à la population canadienne datent d’entre 20 et 60 ans et risquent de tomber en panne. Une défaillance de ces systèmes pourrait toucher les plus de 10 millions de Canadiennes et de Canadiens qui en dépendent pour répondre à leurs besoins quotidiens.
Nous avons constaté que, face à des retards persistants, à l’augmentation des coûts et aux difficultés en matière de dotation, le Ministère avait fait preuve de souplesse, en modifiant son approche qui consistait à travailler sur les deux objectifs du programme à la fois afin d’accorder la priorité à la migration des systèmes vieillissants pour réduire le risque de défaillance. Toutefois, cette approche impliquait de retarder la transformation du versement des prestations, volet indispensable du programme, qui vise l’amélioration de la façon dont les personnes reçoivent ces prestations et y accèdent, ainsi que la réduction du nombre de paiements inexacts. Plus de la moitié du temps est écoulé selon le calendrier du programme initialement prévu, et les trois programmes de prestations fonctionnent toujours sur des systèmes désuets et limités.
Alors que le temps passe et que les coûts estimés continuent de grimper, nous nous préoccupons du fait que les décisionnaires pourraient réduire ou éliminer la composante de transformation du versement des trois prestations, ce qui donnerait lieu à un produit final qui ne tient pas compte des besoins des millions de Canadiennes et de Canadiens qui en dépendent. Le programme de Modernisation du versement des prestations est l’occasion pour le gouvernement fédéral de démontrer la façon dont il pourrait améliorer la planification et la réalisation de grands projets de technologie de l’information échelonnés sur plusieurs années.
Les résultats des auteurs indiquent qu’une baisse effective des frais de scolarité aurait sans doute un effet nul sur les besoins d’emprunt des individus et que cette baisse n’aurait à peu près aucun impact sur la situation financière des individus vers l’âge de 30 ans.
Dans ce rapport, nous évaluons les effets à court et à moyen terme d’une variation exogène du coût des études post-secondaires (ÉPS) générée à partir d’un soutien financier offert aléatoirement au Québec et dans le reste du Canada. Ces effets sont mesurés à l’aide de variables économiques observées dans la phase initiale du cycle de vie et mesurant la qualité de la transition études-travail vers l’âge de 30 ans.
Une augmentation du niveau de soutien financier (par rapport à celui déjà rendu disponible par les programmes d’aide financière québécois et canadien) a-t-elle un impact sur la décision d’entreprendre des études supérieures ? Et si oui, pour qui ? Cette augmentation a-t-elle un impact sur les trajectoires de revenus des jeunes qui poursuivront des ÉPS ? Le soutien financier se substitue-t-il au soutien financier des parents ou vient-il simplement s’ajouter aux soutiens existants, voire encourager plus de soutien des parents ? C’est à ce type de questions que l’étude tente de répondre.
Pour ce faire, nous combinons les données provenant (i) de l’expérience de terrain « Volonté d’emprunter » (Willingness to Borrow) à laquelle ont participé 1248 élèves en dernière année de secondaire en Ontario, au Manitoba ou en Saskatchewan, ou inscrits dans un Cégep au Québec en 2008-2009, et (ii) d’une enquête de suivi exécutée entre 2019 et 2021 auprès de ces mêmes participants. L’expérience originale visait principalement à estimer la valorisation du soutien financier aux ÉPS et incluait des paiements de soutien « randomisés » qui nous permettent d’utiliser un protocole « Contrôle vs. Traitement », afin d’estimer l’effet causal d’une variation exogène des frais de scolarité au Québec et dans le reste du Canada. Nos résultats montrent que l’augmentation du soutien financier générée par l’expérimentation doit être considérée comme un soutien financier ex ante tous programmes confondus. Elle nous permet donc de déterminer ce qui adviendrait dans le cas où l’état décidait de réduire le coût des études supérieures. Cela veut aussi dire que les résultats présentés ci-dessous ne peuvent être utilisés pour évaluer l’impact de politiques plus ciblées telles que certaines mesures récemment introduites par le Gouvernement du Québec dans le cadre du programme « Bourses Perspective Québec » puisque ce dernier a pour but d’inciter les étudiants à choisir des filières spécifiques.
Ce texte se prononce sur le caractère ambitieux de la cible d’élimination de l’écart de richesse avec l’Ontario, cible énoncée par le gouvernement du Québec. Il identifie également des actions à mettre en place pour que cet objectif s’imbrique réellement avec les autres objectifs du gouvernement.
Depuis le Point sur la situation économique et financière de l’automne 2021, le gouvernement du Québec s’est donné un objectif de créer de la richesse et d’accroître le potentiel économique du Québec.
Le texte illustre d’abord le caractère ambitieux de la cible d’élimination de l’écart de richesse avec l’Ontario. Puis, il identifie des actions à mettre en place pour que cet objectif s’imbrique réellement avec les autres objectifs du gouvernement et termine se conclut par une série de réflexions autour de la notion d’enrichissement collectif.
Le PIB réel par habitant est régulièrement utilisé comme mesure de niveau de vie et indirectement, comme approximation d’une mesure de bien-être. Or, cet indicateur est remis en question quant à sa valeur pour permettre de mesurer le progrès d’une société. Partant de cela, le Regard CFFP fait une incursion parmi des indicateurs de bien-être permettant de résumer certaines caractéristiques de ces derniers et de se positionner quant à quelques initiatives et à la mesure qu’est le PIB réel par habitant.
C’est dans le cadre de la préparation d’une analyse sur l’écart de niveau de vie du Québec avec l’Ontario que s’est posé la question de l’indicateur à privilégier comme mesure de niveau de vie et indirectement de bien-être.
Régulièrement, dans la documentation budgétaire et du ministère des Finances, l’indicateur de niveau de vie utilisé est le PIB réel par habitant. Or, cet indicateur est remis en question quant à sa valeur pour permettre de mesurer le progrès d’une société, ou son bien-être.
Ainsi, partant d’une brève analyse du PIB réel par habitant, le texte fait une incursion parmi des indicateurs de bien-être permettant de résumer certaines caractéristiques de ces derniers et de se positionner quant à quelques initiatives et à la mesure qu’est le PIB réel par habitant.
La motion M-92, Crise climatique et vie abordable, déposée par le député Mike Morrice, propose que soit appliqué immédiatement le dividende pour la relance au Canada aux profits des entreprises de combustibles fossiles exploitant au pays.
La motion M-92, Crise climatique et vie abordable, déposée par le député Mike Morrice, propose que soit appliqué immédiatement le dividende pour la relance au Canada aux profits des entreprises de combustibles fossiles exploitant au pays. Le dividende pour la relance au Canada imposé aux groupes de banques et d’assureurs-vie consiste en un impôt unique de 15 % s’appliquant au revenu imposable moyen de 2020 et 2021 de sociétés établies au Canada dépassant 1 milliard de dollars.
Conformément à l’objet de la motion, on présume que l’impôt unique sera perçu sur le revenu imposable au‑delà de 1 milliard de dollars gagné par une entreprise de combustibles fossiles pour l’année d’imposition 2022. L’impôt sera payable en versements égaux au cours des cinq exercices suivants. Le directeur parlementaire du budget (DPB) estime que cette mesure permettra de générer des recettes de 4,2 milliards de dollars de 2023‑2024 à 2027‑2028.
Les auteurs font la revue de la façon dont les grandes administrations canadiennes informent les contribuables quant à la manière dont ils taxent et dépensent leur argent. Certains gouvernements fournissent des informations utiles et opportunes, alors que d’autres ont des progrès à faire, comme démontré par les notes obtenues par ces derniers dans le bulletin 2023.
Canadians and their elected representatives know too little about how Canada’s senior governments tax and spend. The fiscal impact of COVID-19 has made transparency in government budgets and financial statements more important than ever. As grades ranging from A+ to C– in this report card indicate, some governments provide useful and timely information, but too many present information that is opaque, misleading and late.
In this year’s report card – which covers year-end financial statements for fiscal year 2021/22, and budgets and estimates for 2022/23 – Alberta and Saskatchewan topped the class with grades of A+ and A–, respectively. Yukon earned a B+, while Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick each earned a B. Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario and British Colombia all earned grades of B–. Nunavut earned a C+. Manitoba and the Northwest Territories earned a C. At the bottom of the class were the federal government and Newfoundland and Labrador with grades of C–.
In many respects, the fiscal transparency of Canada’s senior governments has improved. Two decades ago, none used consistent accounting in their budgets and financial statements; now, presentations consistent with public sector accounting standards are the rule. Exceptions still occur, however, and budgets, estimates and financial statements should be clearer and more timely. This annual report card hopes to encourage further progress and discourage backsliding. Canadians can get more transparent financial reporting and better fiscal accountability from their governments, if they demand it.
L’analyse fournit des informations importantes qui peuvent éclairer les perspectives fédérales, provinciales et territoriales sur la loi fédérale sur les soins de longue durée sécuritaires et la prestation de vieillissement à domicile, ainsi que les délibérations futures sur les paiements de transfert fédéraux.
Canada’s long-term care system faces enormous challenges, which are expected to get worse in coming years. Over the next two decades, the number of Canadians over the age of 85 is projected to grow by 145 per cent. The Canadian Medical Association predicts the cost of providing long-term care and home care will reach $58.5 billion by 2031, almost double the level it was in 2019.
Even now, with the full force of population aging yet to be felt, the system isn’t working well. There are long waiting lists to access long-term care facilities across the country. The quality of care provided leaves much to be desired, as was made painfully clear during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Publicly funded home care is difficult to access, but privately purchased home care is costly. Instead, the system relies to a great degree on spouses, adult children and other caregivers, who report providing long hours of unpaid care, and feeling tired and overwhelmed.
The situation leaves Canadians with three choices: raise taxes and/or cut spending to finance improvements in the quality of long-term care while meeting growing demand; maintain current financing levels and witness the human cost of declining care; generate new sources of revenue by building on long-term financing models used elsewhere.
This study focuses on the third option. It evaluates how long-term care is financed and allocated in Canada in comparison to several international approaches. Contrary to common perceptions, much of Canada’s long-term care system is privately financed in the form of unpaid care provided by family members, privately purchased personal care and homemaking services, and privately funded assisted-living facilities. Publicly funded services are tightly rationed and the amount available falls far short of care needs.
Entre 2011 et 2021, 59 entreprises canadiennes, dont 33 ayant leur siège social au Québec, ont transféré des profits de 119,8 G$ vers le Luxembourg à des fins fiscales. Durant cette période, ces transferts de bénéfices ont cru en moyenne de 20 % par année. Ce faisant, les entreprises n’ont fait que profiter du laxisme dont ont fait preuve depuis 30 ans les gouvernements à l’endroit des paradis fiscaux.
Les pertes fiscales des trésors publics à travers le monde sont en partie le fait de stratagèmes tout à fait légaux. Le terme « évitement fiscal », qui se distingue de « l’évasion fiscale », désigne des stratégies de planification fiscale qui, tout en respectant la lettre de la loi, contreviennent néanmoins à son esprit en diminuant grandement les obligations fiscales d’un contribuable. Ces stratégies aboutissent à la violation du principe fiscal fondamental selon lequel la perception de l’impôt doit se dérouler là où les activités économiques ont lieu. Cette recherche recense les états financiers des filiales luxembourgeoises d’entreprises canadiennes et démontre l’étendue des pratiques d’évitement fiscal accomplies.
Un examen des subventions accordées aux consommateurs de véhicules électriques au Canada montre que les subventions gouvernementales pour l’achat de véhicules électriques sont un moyen extrêmement coûteux de réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre au Canada.
Globally, the market for electric vehicles (EVs) is expanding rapidly. Last year, worldwide EV sales exceeded 10 million for the first time, representing 14 percent of all new vehicles purchased, up from less than 5 percent in the late 2010s. Rising EV market penetration reflects greater efficiency in EV and related parts manufacturing, improvements in the battery and storage technologies that underpin EVs, and the impact of government policies to encourage the development of the EV industry and boost consumer demand.
This essay looks at EV purchase subsidies in Canada, which have been introduced to accelerate market uptake of these vehicles as part of governments’ efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that contribute to climate change. Transportation accounts for almost one-quarter of Canada’s total GHG emissions, so it is not surprising that Canadian policymakers are focusing on emissions from this sector.
The subsidies examined in this paper consist of a national $5,000 EV incentive adopted by the federal government and separate incentives implemented by several of the provinces. We evaluate these incentives through three lenses: efficiency, the impact on carbon emissions from the passenger transportation segment, and equity considerations.
It is important to note that apart from subsidizing the purchase of EVs, governments in Canada have enacted other policies intended to reduce transportation-based GHG emissions. These policies include a minimum national carbon levy, the establishment of electric vehicle production mandates requiring that EVs account for a rising share of all new vehicle sales (reaching 100 percent by 2035), and direct government financing to accelerate the roll-out of EV charging stations and supporting infrastructures. There are also large and rapidly growing government subsidies in Canada for the production of EV batteries and the vehicles themselves, which are not reviewed in this essay.
Our examination of existing EV consumer incentives finds that they are an inefficient way to reduce emissions judged by the cost of abatement, particularly compared to the national carbon levy legislated by the federal government that applies across Canada and is set to climb from $65/tonne in 2023 to $170/tonne by 2030. The inefficiency is partly because some portion of consumer EV purchases would be made absent any subsidy. Of greater concern, the EV purchase incentives in place in Canada today have a cost per ton of GHG abated that substantially exceeds both the national backstop carbon price and most estimates of the broader “social cost of carbon.”
The impact of EV incentives on emissions depends on the types of electric vehicles sold in the domestic market, the “life-cycle” emissions of EVs, and—most importantly—the source of the electricity produced in the various provinces. Increasing EV market penetration is expected to result in lower Canadian emissions in the vehicle segment, but not in a uniform way given the varying fuel mix in the provinces’ electricity sectors. Specifically, in provinces like Alberta and Saskatchewan, where electricity generation heavily relies on fossil fuels, a higher number of electric vehicles on the roads could potentially increase the demand for fossil-fuel-powered electricity, thereby undermining the expected GHG reduction benefits.
Finally, equity considerations are also relevant to assessing EV subsidies. The US academic literature indicates that up to 90 percent of EV purchase incentives adopted by the federal government have flowed to the richest one-fifth of households. To date, most EV buyers in the US and Canada have had incomes well above the respective national average. As more EVs at lower price points enter the market, the picture is likely to change. Unlike the federal government’s EV incentive program, British Columbia’s provincial subsidy includes an income threshold test to help address equity concerns.
We conclude that consumer EV incentives make little sense in Canada. In contrast to the United States, Canada maintains a robust carbon pricing regime which will encourage the shift to lower-carbon energy sources, production methods, and consumption choices. Layering EV purchase subsidies on top of the existing national carbon tax increases the overall cost of carbon abatement and adds to the fiscal burden shouldered by Canadian taxpayers.
Une histoire du modèle économique unique du Danemark révèle que, malgré les perceptions erronées courantes, les travailleurs danois de la classe moyenne paient des impôts relativement élevés à l’État danois, dont la taille est importante.
Despite common misperceptions, middle-class workers in Denmark pay relatively high taxes for Denmark’s large government.
Indeed, Denmark has a large welfare state paid for by some of the highest personal income and consumption taxes in the industrialized world.
For example, when they buy goods (e.g. groceries) and services, Danes pay a 25 per cent value-added tax (VAT), similar to Canada’s GST, which is the second-highest among high-income countries.
And Denmark’s top personal income tax rate (57 per cent), which is among the highest in the world, kicks in at a comparatively low level of income—roughly US$91,500 compared to US$176,672 in Canada and US$536,000 in the United States. In other words, it’s not just wealthy Danes who pay the top personal income tax rate.
Finally, according to polling data released in 2023, Canadians overwhelmingly reject higher personal income taxes for the middle class and a higher GST to finance higher levels of government spending.
Cette note a présenté les principales tendances qui caractérisent les écarts de richesse globale au Québec. Ce portrait est un préalable à l’exploration de l’incidence que ces écarts peuvent avoir sur les inégalités sociales de santé.
Cette note d’analyse dresse un portrait des inégalités contemporaines de patrimoine au Québec. Elle est la première d’une série explorant le lien entre le patrimoine et les inégalités sociales de santé dans le contexte québécois.
États-Unis
Les auteurs ont examiné la distribution des vérifications réalisées par l’IRS en tenant compte de l’origine ethnique et du niveau de revenu des contribuables. Une tendance plus marquée de la part de l’IRS à auditer les contribuables issus de la communauté afro-américaine a été observée par rapport à d’autres groupes, malgré l’absence de collecte d’informations sur l’origine ethnique des contribuables par l’IRS.
Consulter le document »
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforces the federal tax code. Among the ways it does so is by conducting audits to verify the information on a taxpayer’s return is accurate and the correct amount of tax has been paid. Some in Congress have expressed concern about who is audited and how that has changed over time.
Less than 1% of individual income tax returns are selected for audit each year. The audit rate has fallen for all income groups since 2010, but it has declined most for high-income taxpayers. While the IRS still audits a greater share of high- income filers than low-income ones, low earners who claim the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) face much higher audit rates than other taxpayers with similar incomes. Research also shows that the IRS is more likely to audit Black taxpayers than those of other races, even though the IRS does not collect information on taxpayer race.
Les gouvernements ont le pouvoir de réduire les inégalités raciales en matière de richesse en limitant ou en éliminant certains avantages fiscaux, plus particulièrement ceux relatifs au gain en capital. Afin de réduire ces inégalités, les auteurs proposent notamment d’augmenter le taux d’imposition du gain en capital et d’imposer les gains au fur et à mesure qu’ils sont réalisés, plutôt qu’au moment de la disposition des actifs qui les génèrent.
The supermajority of wealth in DC and the nation is concentrated in the hands of the few, with Black residents holding very little wealth compared to white residents. The concentration of white wealth stems from centuries of racist and extractive policies and practices that have systematically stripped Black people of wealth they produced while allowing white people to amass extreme wealth and grow it across generations. District policymakers can advance wealth equity by fixing our tax system, which rather than being a tool to reduce racial wealth inequities, protects and grows wealth concentration through myriad tax preferences and loopholes. Eliminating or limiting these preferences would make DC’s tax code more progressive and push back against economic inequality.
The federal and DC governments tax income from wealth more favorably than income from work. This preferential treatment means we under tax the most well-off, tax their wealth less often, and, in some cases, allow them to accumulate fortunes and pass vast sums of wealth to heirs tax-free. The favorable treatment of capital gains income—profits generated from wealth such as stocks and real estate—is particularly egregious and benefits white households the most. DC taxes capital gains income at the same rate as income from work, unlike the federal government, which taxes capital gains at a lower rate than income from work. DC, however, follows federal policy allowing the wealthy to defer paying taxes on appreciating assets for years and sometimes decades until they are sold and exempts a lifetime of untaxed capital gains income upon death, costing tens of millions a year. DC’s tax code also includes a bevy of other advantages for wealth. […]
Ce nouveau rapport approfondi explique l’apport des crédits d’impôt remboursables sur le revenu gagné (EITC) permettant d’augmenter les revenus et de réduire les impôts des travailleurs et des familles à revenus faibles et modérés.
Local governments play an essential role in fostering conditions that enable residents to live thriving, healthy lives. Cities, counties, and towns act as the front line in shaping economic opportunity, public health and safety, and the success of future generations. Investments in education, health, infrastructure, and other services have long formed the foundation of this commitment. But communities and local leaders are increasingly recognizing the need to look deeper. To directly address inequities holding residents back, localities are uncovering the transformative potential of investing directly in people themselves.
Tax credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC, offer one promising path forward. The EITC boosts the after-tax income of households by providing an annual tax credit targeted to workers with low and moderate incomes. It’s an approach with a powerful track record of lifting workers and families from poverty, promoting upward mobility, and rebalancing upside-down tax systems.
The federal EITC, in place since 1975, reaches approximately 25 million households in every corner of the country, directly raising incomes and helping to offset some of the taxes these households pay.2 Thirty-one states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico offer their own credits as well, typically matching a certain percentage of residents’ federal EITC. 3 Crucially, the federal EITC and most state credits are refundable, meaning households can receive the credit regardless of how much they owe in income tax.
At the local level, three leading localities — Maryland’s Montgomery County, New York City, and San Francisco — invest in their people through their own refundable EITCs. These credits deliver an added boost for financially vulnerable community members, together lifting the incomes of approximately 700,000 households by more than $350 million each year
Les auteurs analysent les politiques en matière de protection d’emploi et leur impact sur les travailleurs âgés, s’intéressant à l’enjeu du « bois mort » (ou main d’œuvre non productive). Il se base sur le cas suédois pour analyser les implications de ce type de politiques.
We study the role of employment protection legislation (EPL) in boosting employment among older workers. Our analysis juxtaposes the quantitative employment gains with the qualitative “deadwood labor” problem that such gains entail. We do so by conducting a comprehensive analysis of the sharp and complete elimination of EPL that occurs at age 67 in Sweden, as well as reform-driven shifts in this age cutoff. First, focusing on direct separation effects, we find that 8% of jobs separate in response to the elimination of EPL. Effects stem from jobs with stronger initial EPL (long-tenure, firms subject to “last in, first out” rules), and those in the public sector. Separations appear involuntary to workers, with firms targeting plausibly unproductive (sick) workers. Second, we focus on effects of continuing jobs. While wages appear rigid to EPL, we uncover novel, sizable intensive-margin hours reductions among continuing jobs, and an 8% drop in earnings conditional on staying on the job. Third, we estimate total equilibrium effects at the cohort level, where separations fully pass through into employment to population rate effects, with no offsetting effect from hiring. On a per-capita basis, total earnings of older workers causally drop by 21.5% due to EPL elimination. We validate these local effects by leveraging a reform-driven shift in the age cutoff from 67 to 68.
Le State Business Tax Climate Index de la Tax Foundation permet aux chefs d’entreprise, aux décideurs politiques et aux contribuables de comparer les systèmes fiscaux de leurs États. Alors qu’il existe de nombreuses façons d’indiquer le montant des impôts perçus par les gouvernements des États, l’indice est conçu pour montrer dans quelle mesure les États structurent bien leur système fiscal et fournit une feuille de route pour l’améliorer.
The absence of a major tax is a common factor among many of the top 10 states. Property taxes and unemployment insurance taxes are levied in every state, but there are several states that do without one or more of the major taxes: the corporate income tax, the individual income tax, or the sales tax. Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming have no corporate or individual income tax (though Nevada imposes gross receipts taxes); Alaska has no individual income or state-level sales tax; Florida has no individual income tax; and New Hampshire and Montana have no sales tax.
This does not mean, however, that a state cannot rank in the top 10 while still levying all the major taxes. Indiana and Utah, for example, levy all the major tax types but do so with low rates on broad bases.
The states in the bottom 10 tend to have a number of afflictions in common: complex, nonneutral taxes with comparatively high rates. New Jersey, for example, is hampered by some of the highest property tax burdens in the country, has the highest-rate corporate income taxes in the country, and has one of the highest-rate individual income taxes. Additionally, the state has a particularly aggressive treatment of international income, levies an inheritance tax, and maintains some of the nation’s worst-structured individual income taxes.
Malgré l’absence de références explicites à la race ou à l’ethnicité dans les lois fiscales américaines, l’impôt sur le revenu peut créer des disparités raciales lorsque les facteurs qui affectent l’assujettissement à l’impôt sont associés à la race.
This paper links these results to racial differences in income, relative spousal earnings, and the presence of dependents, and examines two policy reforms.
Our results support Brown’s (2021) hypothesis that, controlling for income, penalties are more frequent and larger for Black couples than white couples. We link these results to racial differences in relative spousal earnings, the presence of dependents, and the level of income. We show that marriage rates are much higher among white adults than Black adults, which implies that two policy reforms we examine end up benefiting a greater share of white adults than Black adults.
There is no perfect solution to the tax treatment of marriage, and the byzantine system that has emerged reflects policymakers’ struggles to reconcile a variety of conflicting goals. Our findings, along with Brown (2021), Alm et al. (2023) and other emerging research, suggest the need to add one more consideration into the discussion: the impact on racial equity.
L’affaire Moore v United States : Une décision en faveur des actionnaires d’une société étrangère pourrait bouleverser des décennies de règles visant à limiter l’évasion fiscale sur les marchés internationaux et les marchés de capitaux.
In Moore, U.S. shareholders in a “controlled” foreign corporation object to having been taxed on income they had not yet received as a cash distribution. They hope to breathe new life into Macomber, 2 a 1920 Supreme Court decision requiring income be “realized” to be taxed, even though that decision has been eroded by later rulings by the Court (as recognized by lower courts and commentators) over the ensuing century.
In deciding Moore, the Court should correspondingly exercise care and recognize the powers and practices of Congress.
Upending our tax code and reopening loopholes would be disastrous to our country’s financial health. As a matter of fiscal prudence and good practice, Congress must be able to craft tax laws that keep pace with increasingly sophisticated markets without fear of judicial reproach.
L’auteure cherche à comprendre comment le crédit d’impôt élargi pour enfants a réduit la pauvreté et les difficultés de subsistance en 2021.
The Census Bureau estimates that 12.4 percent of children were living below the poverty line in 2022, a tremendous jump from the 5.2 percent of children living in poverty in 2021. The jump in child poverty from 2021 to 2022 was largely driven by the expiration of policies enacted in the American Rescue Plan Act, including an expanded Child Tax Credit. The expanded Child Tax Credit was a powerful tool for reducing child poverty and related hardships because it delivered the full benefit of the credit to families with very low incomes.
International
Ce rapport met de l’avant la situation économique de l’Algérie avant la pandémie et après la pandémie jusqu’à 2022 en abordant PIB et inflation.
Le PIB de l’Algérie a retrouvé son niveau prépandémique en 2022, tandis que les prix élevés du pétrole et du gaz ont permis d’améliorer sensiblement les soldes extérieur et budgétaire. Après une chute du PIB de 5,1 % en 2020, la production d’hydrocarbures a retrouvé son niveau de 2019 en 2021, tandis que la production hors hydrocarbures l’a retrouvé en 2022. Malgré cette reprise en niveau, le PIB n’a pas encore retrouvé sa trajectoire prépandémique. Les déficits du compte courant et budgétaires atteignaient en moyenne plus de 10% du PIB avant la pandémie, mais l’augmentation progressive des prix du pétrole et du gaz après 2020 a permis au déficit du compte courant de se réduire en 2021 et d’afficher un excédent record en 2022, alors que le déficit budgétaire atteignait son niveau le plus bas en dix ans, permettant de reconstituer les réserves de change et l’épargne du Trésor. Dans le même temps, l’inflation s’est accélérée de 2,4% en 2020 à 9,3 % en 2022, sous l’effet de la hausse des prix des produits alimentaires.
Les pays devraient appliquer le régime de TVA standard et effectuer les remboursements en temps voulu en réformant les mécanismes de remboursement de la TVA . Cela permet de maintenir l’intégrité du système global de TVA, d’éviter d’imposer un fardeau à l’investisseur et de donner au gouvernement la possibilité d’augmenter les mécanismes fiscaux plus neutres.
Consulter le document »
Lower capacity countries often struggle to administer the Value Added Tax (VAT) in the extractive industries, partly due to the large VAT refunds needs of this capital and export-intensive sector. Assuming that the first-best policy (apply the standard VAT to the extractive industry) is not possible in the medium-term, what should countries do? This paper systemically analyzes second-best VAT policy designs considering the impact of the VAT on three key stakeholders: the investor, domestic suppliers, and the tax administration. The analysis concludes that the generally preferred policy is to provide a VAT exemption for imports and either fully tax or exempt domestic supplies, although country characteristics (and, specifically the relative weighting of stakeholders) matter. Moreover, governments should make efforts to shorten refund delays and transition to a standard VAT over the longer-term.
Ce document propose une approche générale pour guider la politique budgétaire à différents horizons. Il s’agit de formuler une stratégie à long terme et des principes généraux pour la gestion des ressources, de renforcer la capacité à identifier et mesurer les risques, et de concevoir un cadre à moyen terme qui guide les processus budgétaires annuels de manière à protéger les finances publiques et l’économie contre les chocs, en particulier ceux liés à la forte volatilité des prix des matières premières.
Consulter le document »
This paper revisits the debate on the design of fiscal rules in resource-rich countries. Its main objective is to assess alternative systems of rules against their policy objectives, while taking into account country characteristics. One of the contributions of the paper is to propose fiscal frameworks that are centered around the principle of insurance against shocks and less reliant on estimating precisely resource wealth, which tends to be highly volatile.
Ce rapport propose une vue d’ensemble de la réforme Work Capability Assessment (WCA) que le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a mis en place.
More than 3 million working-age adults in the UK receive health-related benefits. The government has announced plans to first tighten, and then scrap entirely, the Work Capability Assessment – one of the two assessments used for determining eligibility to these benefits. The short-term reform to tighten the Work Capability Assessment will mean some individuals who would previously have been judged as unable to work will lose out on £390 a month and have to carry out work-related activities to keep receiving benefits. This may deliver some savings for the government, although previous reforms of a similar nature have been less effective at doing this than expected. The proposal to scrap the Work Capability Assessment entirely is a more radical change. It would mean moving to a system without a benefit explicitly related to an individual’s capacity for work. The idea is that breaking the link between ability to work and benefit entitlement will encourage individuals with health conditions to move into employment. As a result of this second reform, some working-age people currently receiving health-related benefits because of having limited capability to work would lose them if they are not judged to have a disability that leads to extra costs associated with their daily living. Others who can work and are already receiving health-related benefits because they are judged to have such costs could qualify for additional benefits under the changes. We estimate that, before accounting for any change in behaviour, 320,000 individuals will see their entitlements rise, typically by £390 per month (£1.5 billion a year additional spending), and 520,000 will see them fall by the same amount (£2.4 billion a year less spending). Overall, this would be a £900 million spending cut. For context, official figures suggest that, in real terms, spending on benefits for working-age individuals with health conditions is forecast to rise by £11.9 billion from £61.6 billion in 2023–24 to £73.5 billion in 2027–28. Scrapping the Work Capability Assessment would change people’s financial incentives to work – with 1.8 million seeing their incentives strengthened and 440,000 seeing them weakened. Within Jobcentres, work coaches would need to decide the extent to which individuals should engage in work-related activities as a condition of receiving their benefits. This could help more people into paid work, but it comes with the risk of requirements being inconsistently applied and the potential for hardship if they are applied inappropriately. The reform would base benefit entitlement on the assessment of mobility and ability to do daily living tasks that is used for PIP eligibility – the part of the system that has been growing most quickly for years. This runs the risk of faster growth in spending on health-related benefits in the future.
Ce document étudie comment le système d’imposition et de transfert atténue les inégalités de revenus au cours de la vie, ce qui peut conduire à des disparités de niveau de vie.
Individuals vary considerably in how much they earn during their lifetimes. This study examines the role of the tax-and-transfer system in mitigating such inequalities, which could otherwise lead to disparities in living standards. Utilizing a life-cycle model, we determine that taxes and transfers offset 45% of lifetime earnings inequality attributed to differences in productive abilities and education. Additionally, the system insures against 48% of lifetime earnings risk. Implementing a lifetime tax reform linking annual taxes to previous employment could improve the system’s insurance capabilities, albeit at the cost of a lower employment rate.
L’éducation et l’accès aux études supérieures sont des sujets très importants et qui touchent une grande partie du globe. Toutefois, le coût rattaché aux études est un élément pouvant freiner un bon nombre de citoyens désirant se spécialiser ce qui pousse les gouvernements à innover afin d’augmenter la fréquentation de leurs établissements d’enseignement. Ce document évalue l’impact d’une réforme qui a remplacé les bourses de base universelles par des prêts conditionnés par le revenu sur les inscriptions dans l’enseignement supérieur néerlandais.
This paper evaluates the impact of a reform which replaced universal basic grants by income-contingent loans on enrolment in Dutch higher education using administrative data of ten complete student cohorts. Estimates of differences between cohorts show no negative effect of the policy on enrolment. Moreover, difference-in-differences estimates exploiting variation in eligibility for supplementary grants show no negative effect on enrolment. These findings suggest that a system of income-contingent loans can facilitate an increase of private contributions without harming access to higher education.
L’évasion fiscale est un enjeu auquel chaque pays ayant un taux d’imposition élevé se butte au fil des ans motivant, par le fait même, un grand nombre de chercheurs à se pencher sur la question. Les auteurs de cette publication réalisent un rapport sans précédent sur les succès et les échecs de la lutte contre l’évasion fiscale au cours de la dernière décennie dont les résultats s’appuient sur les travaux de plus de 100 chercheurs dans le monde.
Over the last 10 years, governments have launched major initiatives to reduce international tax evasion. Yet despite the importance of these developments, little is known about the effects of these new policies. Is global tax evasion falling or rising? Are new issues emerging, and if so, what are they? This report addresses these questions thanks to an unprecedented international research collaboration building on the work of more than 100 researchers globally.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à l’évolution de l’écart croissant entre le montant de l’impôt sur le revenu payé par personne en Écosse et au Pays de Galles par rapport à l’ensemble du Royaume-Uni.
This paper takes a comprehensive look at the evolution of the significant and widening gap in the amount of income tax paid per person in Scotland and Wales relative to the UK as a whole, exploring the drivers behind the changes in order to identify trends that should be factored into our devolved income tax forecasts covering the 14-year period from 2007-08 onwards. We split this into four different income sources and then decompose year-on-year changes into changes in overall and taxpayer populations, and in income tax per taxpayer. For employment income, the biggest driver of the changes, we also assess the respective roles of average earnings and their tax-richness, and composition by sector, age and highest qualification.
Overall, our analysis is supportive of our current approach to forecasting Scottish and Welsh income tax revenues in primarily focusing on employment income via HMRC’s monthly real time information (RTI) on PAYE earnings. As there are few supporting information sources on the other forms of income, this therefore remains a source of uncertainty for our forecasts. Other areas for further investigation include monitoring the emerging data on the composition of employee earnings in Scotland and Wales compared to the UK as a whole, and exploring whether changes in UK Government policy have contributed to the divergence in income tax paid per person.
Le ratio moyen des impôts au PIB de l’Afrique était de 15,6 % en 2021, inchangé par rapport à l’année précédente et restant inférieur à ses niveaux d’avant la pandémie.
This annual publication compiles comparable tax revenue and non-tax revenue statistics for 33 countries in Africa: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda. The report extends the well-established methodology on the classification of public revenues set out in the OECD Interpretative Guide to African countries, thereby enabling comparison of tax levels and tax structures not only across the continent but also with the OECD, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. Data on African countries presented in this publication are also included in the OECD’s Global Revenue Statistics database, which is a fundamental reference for analysis of domestic resource mobilisation. This edition includes a special feature on the VAT Digital Toolkit for Africa. The publication is jointly undertaken by the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, the OECD Development Centre, the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), with the financial support of the European Union.
Ce rapport combine les données budgétaires du Commonwealth, des États et des territoires afin d’examiner les perspectives budgétaires à tous les niveaux du gouvernement australien.
With all state and territory 2023-24 Budgets now released, the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) has consolidated the forecasts from these budgets with the Australian Government’s budget – released in May 2023 – to provide an aggregated outlook for the national fiscal position.
The national fiscal outlook has improved since our last report in October 2022, reflecting a stronger COVID-19 recovery than expected in most jurisdictions. Higher than expected commodity prices in 2022-23 improved budget balances, particularly for the Commonwealth, Western Australia (WA) and Queensland (Qld). The introduction of new revenue measures in other jurisdictions such as Victoria’s COVID debt levy and the increase in coal royalty rates in New South Wales (NSW) are also expected to increase revenue. The total state net operating balance is expected to be in surplus from 2024-25.
Stronger budget balances have reduced national net debt compared to last year, but national public debt interest payments have increased, reflecting changes in interest rates. Per capita net debt continues to increase with national net capital investment per capita approaching a peak.
For the first time, the PBO has expanded its’ fiscal sustainability analysis to apply to the national level. Using a dynamic framework, it shows that in most scenarios, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to trend downwards in the longer term. This suggests the national fiscal position is likely to remain sustainable, given prudent fiscal management, providing sufficient fiscal space to address key risks.
Les coûts des politiques sont intrinsèquement incertains – ils peuvent changer au fil du temps, souvent dans des proportions assez importantes. Ce document explique pourquoi les coûts d’une même politique peuvent changer en raison de la révision des prévisions économiques ou de l’utilisation de périodes différentes.
A costing is an estimate of how a policy change (what the Budget papers call a ‘measure’) will affect the budget in the future. It represents the difference between the financial impact of an existing policy – for instance, the amount of revenue raised by a particular tax, or the cost of a program – and the financial impact of the new policy. Costings take into account economic forecasts, which will change over time.
New government measures are usually reported over the ‘forward estimates’ period – that is, the budget year and the following 3 years (4 years in total). Sometimes the impact may be announced for a longer period, such as the ‘medium term’, which includes 7 additional years past the forward estimates period (11 years in total).
For example, the government may announce a new policy which is expected to cost $20 million each year. This may be referred to as costing ‘$80 million over the forward estimates’ ($20 million by 4 years). Alternatively, the policy could be announced as costing $220 million over the medium term ($20 million by 11 years). This is the same policy and the same annual cost, just added up over a different time frame.
The most appropriate costing period depends on the nature of the policy. The impact of some policies may not be fully realised for several years, sometimes until after the end of the 4-year forward estimates. This may be due to lags in the collection of taxation receipts, or the time taken to set up and implement certain programs.
As an illustration, the 2023-24 Budget measure Better targeted superannuation concessions is estimated to increase tax receipts by $950 million over the forward estimates (see Figure 1). The description of the costing in the budget states that the measure will raise $2.3 billion in 2027-28. This is the first year outside the forward estimates period and the total is significantly more than the final year of the forward estimates. In cases like this, looking solely at the forward estimates period does not fully capture the ongoing impact of a policy.
Taxe d’habitation au Royaume-Uni : déplacer la charge fiscale vers les régions les plus riches du pays?
Recent trends show how exposed households are to high asset price volatility that redistributes wealth arbitrarily between different households and generations. Policy makers could take steps to insulate households against some of these risks, for example through measures to dampen house price volatility and rebuild mechanisms for sharing more pension risks across cohorts.
Better taxation – particularly in the case of the UK’s biggest wealth-related tax, Council Tax – would also help by shifting the tax burden towards the wealthier parts of Britain. Scotland and Wales have taken modest steps to make Council Tax fairer and more progressive, but England still has a long way to go.
Utiliser le financement mixte pour catalyser l’investissement privé : le Royaume-Uni en retard par rapport aux États-Unis et l’Union européenne
The UK Government has an opportunity to mobilise far greater amounts of private investment for public policy priorities than is the case now. Blended finance, deployed well, offers a tried and tested pathway for public and private investors, with different outcome, risk and return expectations, to work effectively together. This paper provides examples from the UK which can be replicated to crowd in multiples of private investment for every £1 contributed by the taxpayer. The UK is losing out globally against its peers in the US and the European Union, which are using blended finance to catalyse private investment, particularly into climate finance.
This paper demonstrates the scale of the opportunity now available to UK policy-makers to follow suit, and the practical path to implementation, through a series of policy and regulatory enablers. By implementing the approaches outlined here, the next five to 10 years could potentially see a far greater percentage of pension and insurance assets, as well as other pools of capital, directed at productive investment for resilient and sustainable economic growth in the UK.
Les auteurs se demande notamment si le fait d’être une femme, d’être issue d’un milieu non anglophone ou d’être handicapée a une incidence sur l’avancement professionnel dans la fonction publique australienne.
We examine promotion and separation in the Australian Public Service (APS) from 2001 to 2020 by gender and for two other Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) groups – people with a disability and people from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB). We use the universe of personnel records of the APS and estimate logit models of the probability of promotioimf.org/…/A-New-Fiscal-Framework-for-Resource-Rich-Countries-541132n and the probability of separation. The data allow us to identify membership in an EEO group and to control for observable characteristics related to productivity and employment.
Our results help deepen our understanding of the composition of the public service, EEO representation, its evolution over time and the degree to which it reflects the diversity of Australia.
Cette étude indépendante réalisée par On Think Tanks présente une évaluation des 20 années d’existence du Tax Justice Network.
This independent study by OTT presents an assessment of the Tax Justice Network’s 20-year history by way of a retrospective study and includes a series of outcome stories that highlight three of its significant impacts on the tax justice space.
The report identifies nine pivotal moments in the recent history of tax justice, selecting those moments with special relevance for narrative, movement, and policy change.
Subsequently, it determines if and how the Tax Justice Network exerted any influence on their occurrence, with special attention given to the mechanisms that triggered change. By discerning the mechanisms that drive change, the report seeks to offer valuable insights for future action.
Les auteurs réalisent une comparaison entre les cas de la Chine et de la France à l’aide d’enquêtes expérimentales pour étudier les points de vue sur l’équité et les préférences en matière de redistribution. Ce document de travail reflète la première partie de cette analyse et utilise une enquête expérimentale en ligne auprès d’un échantillon national représentatif de la Chine pendant sa transition vers une économie plus orientée vers le marché.
This paper explores the factors that influence redistributive preferences in the context of significant economic transformation, focusing on the transition premium and growth. Using an online survey experiment with a nationally representative sample from China, we find that priming getting rich via relatively less meritocratic, yet representative ways under market transition in post-reform China reduces redistributive support, specifically for policies that aim to take from the rich and the belief in the government’s duty to redistribute, indicating the presence of a set of fairness views in China that deviate from the conventional meritocratic paradigm. Heterogeneous treatment effects analyses reveal that such non-meritocratic fairness views are a general phenomenon, and self-interest in the form of subjective economic pressure only serves as a secondary concern. While people feel that the rich are more deserving and demand less redistribution regardless of subjective economic pressure, only those under less economic pressure exhibit decreased support for policies that aim to help the poor. These representative ways of getting rich under market transition are similarly fair compared to winning a lottery, far less fair than a self-made entrepreneur, but much more legitimate than acquiring wealth through corruption. Priming China’s growth story does not result in statistically significant changes in redistributive support. Additionally, we rule out the influence of three relevant confounders: low tax salience, preference falsification under authoritarianism, and misperceptions about relative income positions and intergenerational occupational mobility. We argue that such non-meritocratic fairness views are particularly salient in societies that break away from a centrally-planned economic system in the past and transition towards a high-growth market economy, where economic opportunities are becoming more inclusive.
Les auteurs réalisent une comparaison entre les cas de la Chine et de la France à l’aide d’enquêtes expérimentales pour étudier les points de vue sur l’équité et les préférences en matière de redistribution. Ce document constitue la deuxième publication de cette recherche qui porte sur une expérience de redistribution incitative auprès d’étudiants universitaires d’élite en Chine et en France.
Recent empirical evidence contends that meritocratic ideals are mainly a Western phenomenon. Intriguingly, the Chinese people appear to not differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, despite their rich historical legacy of meritocratic institutions. We propose that this phenomenon might be due to the Chinese public’s greater adherence towards the status quo. In order to test this hypothesis, we run an incentivized redistribution experiment with elite university students in China and France, by varying the initial split of payoffs between two real-life workers to redistribute from. We show that Chinese respondents consistently and significantly choose more non-redistribution (playing the status quo) across both highly unequal and relatively equal status quo scenarios than our French respondents. Additionally, we also show that the Chinese sample does differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, and does not redistribute less than the French absent status quo conformity. Ultimately, we contend that such a phenomenon is indicative of low political agency rather than apathy, inattention, or libertarian beliefs among the Chinese. Notably, our findings show that Chinese individuals’ conformity to the status quo is particularly pronounced among those from families of working-class and farming backgrounds, while it is conspicuously absent among individuals whose families have closer ties to the private sector.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Léa Béliveau
- Pierre-Alexandre Bernier
- Gabrielle Gosselin
- Anne-Sophie Paquet
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé