Bulletin de veille du 14 février 2023
Québec/Canada
En Ontario, une baisse de la croissance économique est prévue en 2023. Par contre, le BRF prévoit un surplus budgétaire de près de 1G$ pour l’année 2023-2024.
L’économie de l’Ontario s’est vite rétablie après la pandémie, le PIB réel ayant grimpé de 5,2 % en 2021 et on estime que ce taux sera de 3,7 % pour 2022. Toutefois, en raison du fort taux d’inflation, des taux d’intérêt élevés et d’un environnement mondial plus fragile, il est prévu que la croissance économique de l’Ontario ralentira dramatiquement en 2023 pour n’atteindre que 0,5 % pour se rapprocher par la suite des moyennes historiques jusqu’à la fin de la projection.
Le BRF prévoit un déficit budgétaire de 2,5 milliards de dollars en 2022-2023, considérablement moins important que la projection de déficit de 12,9 milliards de dollars que fait le gouvernement dans l’ÉÉA. Cette différence de 10,4 milliards de dollars s’explique principalement par la projection que fait le BRF de dépenses moins élevée et de revenus légèrement supérieurs pendant l’année. Comme la croissance des revenus projetée surpasse celle des dépenses de programmes pour la période, le BRF prévoit un excédent budgétaire de 1,0 milliard de dollars en 2023-2024, qui croîtra pour atteindre 7,6 milliards de dollars en 2026-2027. Le gouvernement prévoit une embellie des déficits pour la période visée de trois ans.
En Colombie-Britannique, une forte augmentation du prix des logements et de la nourriture exerce une pression sur la population. Dans cette analyse, des mesures sont proposées pour diminuer cette pression, comme l’aide au logement.
The living wage is the hourly wage that two parents working full-time need to earn to support a family of four. While the rates are an important benchmark for measuring the income families require to meet their needs, the living wage is also a tool for policymakers to understand how public programs and services can make life more affordable. For example, policy changes in BC focused on child care affordability offset increases to living wage rates in 2019. Other policy initiatives like the elimination of MSP premiums in 2020 also helped improve affordability.
This year the rising cost of food and transportation alongside the ongoing lack of affordable housing contributed to significant living wage increases around the province. As CCPA–BC senior economists Iglika Ivanova and Alex Hemingway point out in this issue, policies that tackle housing affordability play a critical role in making life more affordable in our province, while also reducing the pressure on wages for employers.
This year’s report, released in November, received a lot of media attention—see page 3. And if you’re interested in diving deeper into affordability, on page 11 you will find a synopsis and link to a recording from a recent webinar with economist Jim Stanford that looked at inflation, rising interest rates and what a progressive response by governments should look like.
L’entente multilatérale entre le Canada, le Mexique et les États-Unis est maintenant échue depuis deux ans. Plusieurs procès d’envergure sont présentement en cours sur le sujet pourrait apporter certaines modifications à la taxation des transactions entre ces trois pays.
International investment treaties and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) play increasingly prominent roles in debates about the climate crisis and government efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Around the world, states and international governance bodies are warming to the understanding that investment treaties threaten progress on decarbonization, sustainable development, and the achievement of human rights. Even in places where countries have taken steps to roll back ISDS, as in North America with the passage of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USCMA), corporate lawsuits against democratically enacted energy and climate policies continue to put a chill on government action.
This report looks at three such cases launched in the past two years against Canada, the United States, and Mexico under the expiring ISDS process in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These disparate cases include: TC Energy’s $15 billion challenge to the Biden administration’s cancellation of the Keystone XL tar sands pipeline; a dispute from Koch Industries involving the cancellation of cap-and-trade in the Canadian province of Ontario; and about a half dozen energy- and mining-related ISDS cases from Canadian and US firms against Mexico, of which we will highlight the Finley Resources case.
What unites these ISDS cases, besides their links to energy and climate policy, is that they should not have been possible to begin with. They can only move forward because of a “legacy” provision that temporarily extended NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investment provisions in the replacement USMCA.
As such, these cases—and the Keystone XL dispute in particular—provide a lesson for countries seeking to exit investment treaties and free trade agreements containing ISDS: unless unreasonable sunset periods are rolled back or canceled alongside ISDS, the threat of investment arbitration to climate action will linger.
Les auteurs favorisent un système de retraite flexible qui permet aux travailleurs de faire débuter leur rente à n’importe quel moment entre 60 et 75 ans, période durant laquelle chacun pourra faire une transition entre le travail à temps plein et une pleine retraite. Les Québécois pourraiennt ainsi choisir une combinaison de revenu d’emploi, d’épargne personnelle et de rente(s) de retraite afin d’assurer leur sécurité financière.
Ce document est le mémoire présenté à la Commission des finances publiques dans le cadre de la Consultation publique sur le Régime de rentes du Québec. Les auteurs de ce texte étaient membres du comité d’experts sur l’avenir du système de retraite québécois dont le rapport a été rendu public en 2013.
La dizaine de propositions élaborées dans le mémoire touchent les divers aspects de la consultation. Elles ont comme point commun d’offrir davantage de flexibilité, notamment en permettant aux travailleurs de faire débuter leur rente du RRQ à n’importe quel moment entre 60 et 75 ans, période durant laquelle chacun pourra faire une transition, à son choix, entre le travail à temps plein et une pleine retraite.
Le DPB estime que la taxe proposée de 2 % sur les rachats d’actions permettra de générer trois G$ de dollars au cours des cinq premiers exercices suivant son entrée en vigueur.
Dans l’Énoncé économique de l’automne de 2022, le gouvernement a annoncé son intention d’instaurer une taxe sur les sociétés de 2 %, qui s’appliquerait à la valeur nette de tous les types de rachats d’actions par des sociétés publiques au Canada à compter du 1er janvier 2024. Les détails de cette nouvelle taxe devraient être annoncés dans le budget de 2023. Le DPB entend par « tous les types de rachats d’actions par des sociétés publiques au Canada » tous les rachats nets d’actions par des sociétés cotées en bourse qui paieraient de l’impôt sur leur revenu au Canada.
FINANCES OF THE NATION. « The Federal Fiscal Monitor data for November 2022 », 31 janvier 2023, 6 p.
Pour l’année fiscale jusqu’à novembre 2022, les revenus du gouvernement fédéral ont augmenté d’environ 35 G$, ce qui est principalement dû à une hausse des revenus provenant de l’impôt des sociétés et de l’impôt des particuliers.
The federal government reports monthly revenues and expenses through its Fiscal Monitor. This post summarizes recent developments in the Fiscal Monitor data to help Canadians better understand recent developments in public finances. In addition, we use the monthly data to construct projections for total federal revenue, expenses and the budget balance by the end of the fiscal year.
La Fondation canadienne de fiscalité fait paraître un nouveau numéro de la Revue fiscale canadienne, incluant une section sur la politique fiscale spécifique au logement.
- Hugh Woolley, « Policy Forum : Reflections on the Greater Vancouver Real Estate Market – A No-Win Situation for Government Policy », pp. 89-100.
L’auteur s’attarde à l’impact des mesures fiscales en lien avec le logement introduites dans le budget 2022 dans la région du Grand Vancouver et conclut que celles-ci n’ont pas grande influence sur l’abordabilité des logements de cette région.
Cet article offre un point de vue non universitaire sur le marché du logement du Grand Vancouver et sur les récentes tentatives du gouvernement fédéral de s’attaquer à l’abordabilité du logement, y compris les diverses mesures fiscales contenues dans le budget de 2022. L’auteur explique pourquoi les facteurs macroéconomiques sont bien plus pertinents que la politique gouvernementale pour déterminer l’abordabilité dans une région où le coût moyen de tous les types de logements dépasse 1,2 million de dollars.
- Paul Kershaw, « Policy Forum : Revisiting the Principal Residence Exemption and Public support for Reducing the Home Ownership Tax Shelter », pp. 101-117.
L’exemption pour résidence principale est la cause de certains comportements contribuant à la hausse des coûts des logement au Canada. L’auteur estime toutefois qu’une modification de l’impôt foncier serait plus efficace qu’un retrait d’une telle exemption pour la réduction des inégalités en lien avec le logement.
Cet article examine brièvement les multiples incitatifs culturels et économiques problématiques que génère l’exemption pour résidence principale (ERP) aux fins de l’impôt sur les gains en capital. Il met en évidence plusieurs défis qui se posent lors de la révision de l’ERP en tant que stratégie visant à réduire l’abri fiscal qu’elle crée pour l’accession à la propriété, si de tels changements sont présentés comme principal mécanisme pour remédier à l’inégalité et à l’inabordabilité produites par des décennies d’inflation immobilière. L’auteur fait plutôt remarquer qu’il serait désormais plus judicieux de remédier à ces préjudices en ajoutant de la progressivité à l’impôt foncier annuel. Quel que soit le levier politique privilégié, un changement de politique est nécessaire pour réduire l’abri fiscal pour l’accession à la propriété. La majeure partie de l’article examine les données de février 2022 relatives à l’opinion publique canadienne pour trouver des preuves du soutien du public à ce changement de politique. Ces données révèlent un soutien public plus important que ne le sousentend souvent le discours politique canadien.
- Thomas Davidoff, Paul Boniface Akaabre et Craig Jones, « Policy Forum : The Prevalence of Low Income Tax Payments Among Owners of Expensive Homes in Vancouver and Toronto », pp. 117- 133.
Un impôt minimum sur le revenu en fonction de la valeur des logements d’un propriétaire génèrerait environ 3 milliards de dollars pour la région du Grand Vancouver et de 2 milliards pour la région métropolitaine de Toronto.
En 2018, les 5 pour cent des logements du Grand Vancouver dont la valeur était la plus élevée avaient une valeur médiane de 3,7 millions de dollars, mais le propriétaire médian d’un logement de ce groupe avait payé uniquement 15 800 $ en impôt sur le revenu. À l’aide des données du Programme de la statistique du logement canadien, les auteurs analysent la relation qui existe entre les paiements d’impôt sur le revenu des propriétaires et la valeur de leurs logements. Dans la région métropolitaine de Toronto, l’élasticité des impôts sur le revenu payés par les propriétaires non constitués en société par rapport à la valeur foncière semble correspondre à celle de nombreuses villes américaines, soit environ 0,7. (Une augmentation de 10 pour cent de la valeur foncière est généralement associée à une augmentation de 7 pour cent de l’impôt sur le revenu payé.) Dans la région métropolitaine de Vancouver, cette même élasticité atteint seulement environ 0,3 ou 0,5, selon que l’élasticité est calculée par rapport aux médianes ou aux moyennes, et se situerait au bas de l’échelle des régions métropolitaines américaines. Ces résultats remettent en question la progressivité globale de l’imposition dans le Grand Vancouver. Nous présentons des preuves contradictoires concernant le rôle des acheteurs étrangers dans la faiblesse de la relation entre l’impôt sur le revenu et la valeur des logements à Vancouver. Contrairement aux autres régions métropolitaines canadiennes et américaines, la relation entre l’impôt sur le revenu et la valeur des logements était particulièrement faible à Vancouver entre 2011 et 2016. Un petit impôt minimum sur le revenu établi en fonction de la valeur du logement pourrait rapporter des milliards de dollars par an dans les régions métropolitaines de Vancouver et de Toronto.
- Frances Woolley, « Policy Forum : Who Needs Property Tax Deferral? », pp. 135-158.
En Colombie Britannique et dans certaines autres provinces canadiennes, malgré des programmes de report des taxes foncières destinés principalement aux aînés, ce sont souvent les contribuables les plus nantis qui en profitent, alors que ceux-ci ont d’abord pour objectif de bénéficier aux personnes âgées à plus faible revenu, ce qui diminue la progressivité de ce mode d’imposition.
Il y a de bonnes raisons de prélever des impôts fonciers sur les logements occupés par leur propriétaire. Pourtant, le vieillissement de la population et la baisse du taux d’accession à la propriété chez les jeunes Canadiens signifient qu’un nombre croissant de logements appartiennent à des Canadiens âgés, dont beaucoup ont des revenus modestes. Cela soulève la question suivante : « Comment ces personnes âgées ont-elles les moyens de payer leurs impôts fonciers ? » La Colombie-Britannique, l’Alberta et certaines autres juridictions ont réagi à cette question en mettant en place des programmes de report de l’impôt foncier. Ces programmes permettent de reporter l’impôt foncier jusqu’à la vente de la résidence, avec des intérêts sur le montant reporté généralement inférieurs aux taux du marché. La province ou la municipalité s’assure que les impôts reportés seront remboursés en se réservant un privilège sur la propriété. On pourrait s’attendre à ce que le report de l’impôt foncier intéresse les personnes âgées, car il leur permet généralement de puiser dans la valeur nette de leur résidence à un faible coût et de maintenir leur niveau de vie en vieillissant. Pourtant, les (rares) preuves disponibles laissent entendre que les taux de participation aux programmes de report de l’impôt foncier sont « extrêmement faibles ». Cet article expose la raison d’être du report de l’impôt foncier et décrit les programmes canadiens actuels. L’auteur aborde les options politiques, en soutenant que la mise en place de programmes de report de l’impôt foncier est justifiée et qu’il est possible de les remanier de manière à ce qu’ils profitent à ceux qui en ont besoin.
- Bertrand Achou, Yann Décarie, Luc Godbout et al., « Finances of the Nation : Mitigating the Economic Impact of Population Aging on Growth and Public Revenues – Can the Tax Mix Help? », pp. 159-167.
Le vieillissement de la population canadienne pourrait avoir un impact sur les finances publiques étant donné la baisse de revenu provenant des impôts sur le revenu. Au Québec, le passage de 1% des revenus provenant de l’impôt sur le revenu à celui provenant des taxes à la consommation en 2020 pourrait générer 14 millions de revenus pour le gouvernement en 2030.
In this article, the authors address concerns about the impact that the aging of Canada’s population over the coming decades could have on economic growth and, consequently, growth in government revenues. They explore how revenue-neutral changes in the tax mix today could mitigate those concerns and raise more revenue than is projected in current forecasts with a status-quo scenario. Using data for Quebec, the authors show that a shift in the relative share of total revenues from personal income taxes to consumption taxes could be quite effective over the next four decades. A revenue-neutral shift equivalent to 1 percent of the province’s consumption tax revenues today would result in an increase in revenues ranging between 0.3 percent and 1.0 percent by 2060, while a shift equivalent to 25 percent of consumption tax revenues would generate additional revenues of 1.4 percent to 4.8 percent.
Au Québec, selon cette analyse, une diminution de l’impôt des entreprises pourrait apporter davantage d’investissement en productivité et amoindrir les besoins en main-d’œuvre.
La pénurie de main-d’œuvre figure fort probablement parmi les plus importants défis auxquels les entreprises québécoises sont actuellement confrontées. Tous les secteurs d’activité doivent à présent composer avec la rareté de la main-d’œuvre, et les employeurs doivent redoubler d’efforts et d’imagination pour attirer des employés et les retenir. Cette Note économique propose au lecteur de transcender les solutions habituelles qui gravitent autour du recrutement et d’envisager des hausses de productivité et l’allègement du fardeau fiscal comme moyens efficaces pour contourner le problème de la pénurie de travailleurs et, ultimement, assurer la prospérité économique.
En Alberta, les revenus tirés de l’exploitation des ressources ont augmenté dans le passé, les gouvernements précédents ont augmenté les dépenses, ce qui a entraîné des déficits importants lorsque les revenus tirés de l’exploitation des ressources ont diminué. L’augmentations récente des revenus représente, selon les auteurs, une excellente occasion pour l’Alberta de renforcer les finances et l’économie de la province à long terme.
Due largely to a record high windfall in resource revenue—worth an expected $28.1 billion in 2022/23—Alberta is projected to run a $12.3 billion budget surplus in 2022/23 with additional surpluses anticipated over the next two fiscal years. History has shown that spending these surpluses only leads the province back into deficits when resource revenues inevitably decline, which sets the province up for hard times down the road. Instead of wasting this extraordinary opportunity by spending away the temporary surpluses, the provincial government could use them to improve Alberta’s finances and economy for the long-term. This essay series presents three such options, all of which are preferable to spending away the windfall.
University of Calgary economist Trevor Tombe suggests the provincial government consider using the surpluses to eliminate the province’s debt. Professor Tombe argues that debt elimination is an attractive option as for the first time in well over a decade government borrowing rates are projected to exceed the expected return on investment savings. In other words, the cost of provincial debt (estimated by long-run bond yields) is expected to exceed the return on investments (such as those in the Alberta’s Heritage Savings Trust Fund). Given mounting global economic and geopolitical risks, the financial gains from lowering debt—in the form of reduced interest payments for Albertans—provide welcomed certainty where financial investments may not. Professor Tombe finds that if the provincial government holds growth in program spending to its plan in Budget 2022 (updated for 2022/23 in its first quarter update) and to inflation and population growth thereafter, Alberta could eliminate its debt by 2030. Eliminating provincial debt within a decade could save nearly $20 billion in cumulative interest costs by 2030, costs that Albertans are ultimately responsible for paying.
Alternatively, argue Fraser Institute economists Tegan Hill and Joel Emes, the province should consider using the current surpluses to re-establish the rainy-day account based on the previous Alberta Sustainability Fund (ASF) so as to avoid future deficits when commodity prices and thus resource revenues are lower. The first step is to determine a “stable” amount of resource revenue to be included in the budget annually, which limits the amount of money available for spending. As Hill and Emes explain, any resource revenue above the stable amount for the budget is automatically saved in the ASF to be withdrawn in the future to cover any shortfall when resource revenue falls below the stable amount. Put differently, savings in the ASF during periods of relatively high resource revenue (as Alberta is currently experiencing) are used to support the stable amount of resource revenue in the budget during periods of relatively low resource revenue, which would help avoid deficits. In this way, the ASF could prevent another substantial run-up in provincial debt in the future. Moreover, once the ASF is adequately funded, Hill and Emes argue that additional surplus funds, if available, should be allocated in their entirety to the Heritage Fund to provide long-term economic and financial benefits to the province.
Finally, economist and professor at the University of Calgary Jack Mintz suggests another option for consideration: using Alberta’s surpluses to improve tax competitiveness and stimulate economic growth. Mintz specifically recommends reducing and simplifying personal income taxes to attract highly skilled workers, entrepreneurs, and business owners, while generally encouraging more work, savings, and risk-taking. Mintz includes two main proposals in his essay: returning to a single-rate tax of 8 percent, or levying an 8 percent basic personal income tax rate with a second 12 percent tax rate on income of more than $131,220. Either of these options would use up no more than roughly a third of Alberta’s projected surplus this fiscal year. Mintz argues the provincial government could use other revenues to cover the lost personal income tax revenue as needed, rather than rely on volatile oil and gas revenues. This could include repatriating the federal consumer carbon tax for a made-in-Alberta approach, introducing variable health premiums to fund health care, and/or levying an Alberta sales tax of 3 percent on the federal GST for an 8 percent HST.
The provincial government has an incredible opportunity to introduce significant policy changes for the benefit of Albertans today and in the future. Among the alternatives that the authors in this series provide are using the current windfall to eliminate Alberta’s debt, reintroducing a rainy-day account and saving for the long-term, or improving Alberta’s tax competitiveness. All avoid the main risk of simply increasing government spending as has occurred in the past, which sets the province up for yet another boom-bust cycle. Avoiding spending increases and limiting the growth in spending over the next few years while pursuing any of the reforms outlined in this series would strengthen the provincial economy and establish a path for Alberta’s improved long-term prosperity.
À l’aide de plusieurs données reliées aux salaires, les auteurs se penchent sur l’écart salarial entre le secteur privé et public au Québec.
Using data on individual workers from January to December 2021, this report estimates the wage differential between the government and private sectors in Quebec. It also evaluates four non-wage benefits for which data are available to quantify differences in compensation in the two sectors. After controlling for factors like gender, age, marital status, education, tenure, size of firm, job permanence, immigrant status, industry, occupation, and full- or part-time status, the authors found that workers in Quebec’s government sector (federal, provincial, and local) enjoyed a 7.8% wage premium, on average, over their private-sector counterparts in 2021. When the wage difference between unionized and non-unionized workers is accounted for, the wage premium for the government sector declines to 4.9%.
The available data on non-wage benefits suggest that the government sector enjoys an advantage over the private sector. For example, 93.5% of government workers in Quebec are covered by a registered pension plan, compared to 23.7% of private-sector workers. Of those covered by a registered pension plan, 95.1% of government workers enjoyed a defined-benefit pension compared to 54.6% of private-sector workers.In addition, government workers retire earlier than their private-sector counterparts— about 2.8 years on average—and are much less likely to lose their jobs (4.2% annual job loss rate in the private sector compared to 0.7% in the public sector).Moreover, full-time workers in the government sector lost more work time in 2021 for personal reasons (16.4 days on average) than their private sector counterparts (12.0 days).
À l’aide de plusieurs données reliées aux salaires, les auteurs se penchent sur l’écart salarial entre le secteur privé et public en Ontario.
Using data on individual workers from January to December 2021, this report estimates the wage differential between the government and private sectors in Ontario. It also evaluates four non-wage benefits for which data are available to quantify compensation differences between the two sectors. After controlling for factors like gender, age, marital status, education, tenure, size of firm, job permanence, immigrant status, industry, occupation, and full- or part-time status, the authors found that workers in Ontario’s government sector (federal, provincial, and local) enjoyed a 10.9% wage premium, on average, over their private-sector counterparts in 2021. When unionization status is factored into the analysis, the wage premium for the government sector declines to 8.8%. The available data on non-wage benefits suggest that the government sector enjoys an advantage over the private sector. For example, 83.9% of government workers in Ontario are covered by a registered pension plan, compared to 25.1% of private-sector workers. Of those covered by a registered pension plan, 94.5% of government workers enjoyed a defined benefit pension compared to 36.9% of private-sector workers. In addition, government workers retire earlier than their private-sector counterparts— about 2.5 years on average—and are much less likely to lose their jobs (5.5% annual job loss rate in the private sector compared to 1.3% in the public sector). Moreover, full-time workers in the government sector lost more work time in 2021 for personal reasons (14.0 days on average) than their private-sector counterparts (8.8 days).
Selon l’auteur, le Canada ne s’est pas distingué par ses performances en matière d’innovation par rapport aux autres économies avancées. Sa performance relativement faible en matière d’innovation est cohérente avec son environnement fiscal peu compétitif.
The relationship between a nation’s tax policy and its standard of living has been a longstanding topic of debate. While many economists and policy analysts argue that higher taxes discourage real economic growth, others reject the argument or claim that taxes are a relatively unimportant influence on standards of living compared to other determinants such as physical infrastructure. Empirical studies document the critical role that technological change plays in improving the productivity of labour and capital, while improved productivity underlies increases in the real incomes of domestic factors of production. Technological change is broadly equivalent to innovation, where the latter can be thought of as the creation, introduction, and widespread commercial use of new knowledge that takes the form of new products, new production and distribution techniques, and new ways of organizing production and distribution activities.
Les auteurs estiment que l’une des priorités du gouvernement en matière fiscale serait de maintenir la compétitivité fiscale de la province, en restructurant le système d’imposition actuel, notamment avec la venue d’une taxe de vente harmonisée qui permettrait de générer 1,14 G$ par point de taxe.
The Alberta government has made important and sometimes challenging decisions to position the province well for the future. Spending has been reduced, health care and post-secondary education have been restructured and a mix of tax cuts, regulatory reform, and innovative training and retraining initiatives have led to economic growth, diversification of the economy and high levels of in-migration into the province. However, more needs to be done. […]
The distinctive feature of Alberta’s finances is the remarkable swings in revenues the province must deal with due to volatile oil and gas prices. To help counter that volatility and to control spending, the province must develop “fiscal anchors” whereby both politicians and the public understand: no deficits, a target level of debt relative to GDP and limiting growth in spending to population and prices. Further, the province’s government should reduce volatility in its budgeting by paying down debt or investing its non-renewable resource revenues into an Alberta Health Plan that would operate similarly to an endowment fund with a fixed percentage of assets distributed to the provincial budget.
The province must also address its high personal income tax rates, which discourage work effort, investment, and risk-taking, all of which are particularly important for an economy that relies on entrepreneurship and highly skilled labour. Alberta has made strides in improving corporate tax competitiveness, but personal tax competitiveness has been eroded by higher the rates that the federal government and the province introduced in 2015, which has in turn led to the disappearance of many of Alberta’s high-income taxpayers and discouraged low-income Albertans from working. Without compromising its fiscal anchors, the province could reform its taxes by repatriating the federal fuel charge and levying its own made-in-Alberta carbon pricing system. The alternative would be to raise revenues by levying a health premium or an Alberta sales tax harmonized with the GST.
La faible croissance et le vieillissement de la population en plus de l’impact de la COVID-19 affectent négativement les finances des villes albertaines. Dans l’analyse présentée, plusieurs solutions sont proposées comme la collaboration intermunicipale pour ainsi diminuer les dépenses des villes.
Challenges facing municipalities in Alberta have emerged at both local and regional scales,such as slower growth and aging populations, constrained finances, a shifting economic base and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 In response, Alberta Municipalities, an organization that advocates on behalf of 250+ urban municipalities in the province, has commissioned several reports to address these concerns. We were tasked to assess the current state of Alberta’s local governance model and investigate if changes to government structure might offer some remedy to the deficiencies uncovered in our assessment. This policy brief intends to do the following: 1) impart a set of principles to guide strategic efforts for local governance reform; 2) provide an evaluation of regional governance in Alberta; and 3) offer several recommendations for Alberta Municipalities to consider and for the government of Alberta to implement.
États-Unis
Aux États-Unis, les contribuables les plus riches évitent l’impôt des états avec une planification nommée ING. La présente analyse illustre la mécanique de cette planification et les impacts négatifs sur les recettes des États.
For well over a decade, tax advisers have promoted a state income tax avoidance strategy called INGs — incomplete non-grantor trusts — among their wealthy clients. While INGs don’t enable wealthy people to avoid federal income taxes, their promoters promise that they can “avoid state income tax altogether” on income and gains from intangible property (financial assets such as stocks, bonds, and passive ownership shares in unincorporated businesses) that are transferred to a properly structured ING.Leaked IRS records reveal that half of the country’s wealthiest people use some type of trust for tax avoidance.
Aux États-Unis, le supplément alimentaire d’assistance d’urgence (SNAP) sera réduit dans près de 32 États de plus en mars 2023. Concrètement, les ménages devront s’attendre à une réduction d’au moins de 95$ par mois.
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program’s (SNAP) emergency allotments (EAs) — temporary benefit increases that Congress enacted to address rising food insecurity and provide economic stimulus during the COVID-19 pandemic — will end after February 2023 issuances. This will result in a benefit cut for every SNAP household in the jurisdictions that still are paying EAs ― 32 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Every household in those states will receive at least $95 a month less; some households, who under regular SNAP rules receive low benefits because they have somewhat higher, but still modest incomes, will see reductions of $250 a month or more. The average person will receive about $90 a month less in SNAP benefits.
Le LAO estime que la garantie minimum de financement des établissements d’enseignements en Californie pourrait diminuer de plus de 2 G$ de plus que les estimations présentées au Governor’s Budget, mais qu’une hausse des revenus provenant des impôts fonciers locaux pourrait palier une partie cette baisse.
Each year, the state calculates a “minimum guarantee” for school and community college funding based upon a set of formulas established by Proposition 98 (1988). Compared with the level in the 2022‑23 enacted budget, the Governor’s budget estimates the guarantee is down $3.4 billion in 2022‑23 and $1.5 billion in 2023‑24. We think the guarantee is likely to decline further—under our best estimates of General Fund revenue, the guarantee would be roughly $2 billion below the Governor’s budget level in each year. Higher local property tax revenue, however, could offset some of this drop.
Despite the lower estimates of the guarantee, the Governor’s budget has about $5.2 billion available for new K‑12 spending. This funding is due to lower baseline costs for the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) and the expiration of various one‑time grants funded in the June 2022 budget. The largest K‑12 proposal in the budget is an 8.13 percent statutory cost‑of‑living adjustment (COLA), but the Governor also proposes several smaller initiatives. Since these proposals together would exceed the available funding, the Governor proposes to (1) use $1.4 billion in one‑time funds to pay for ongoing LCFF costs and (2) reduce one of the discretionary block grants the state approved last year by $1.2 billion. We recommend the Legislature commit to less ongoing spending so that the K‑12 budget does not rely upon one‑time funds. Our brief outlines several options to consider, including (1) funding a lower COLA, (2) avoiding new ongoing proposals, and (3) reducing certain existing programs. Modifying the budget in this way would better position the state to address a lower guarantee emerging in May or future years.
L’auteur met de l’avant la compétitivité entre les États américains qui concerne le taux d’imposition des particuliers, considérant les allégements vécus en 2021 et 2022 dans la majorité d’entre eux.
Forty-three states adopted tax relief in 2021 or 2022—often in both years—and of those, 21 cut state income tax rates. It’s been a remarkable trend, driven by robust state revenues and an increasingly competitive tax environment. But many observers doubted the trend could, or should, continue into 2023. It can. It should. It will. Lawmakers in upwards of a dozen states are seriously contemplating individual income tax cuts in 2023. In many states, these proposals would either accelerate or build upon rate reductions adopted in the past two years. But not all. Four newcomers could join the fold—Kansas, North Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia—which could lead to half the states (and 25 of the 43 that taxed some sort of income) cutting individual income tax rates in three years.
L’augmentation des coûts du programme Medicare aux États-Unis dépasse les revenus projetés du gouvernement fédéral; parmi les solutions proposées par les auteurs, la création d’une taxe sur la valeur ajouté de 1% engendrerait des revenus sur les 10 prochaines années d’environ 1000 G$.
Medicare faces serious short-term and long-term financial pressures. This report examines the revenue and distributional effects of options to increase revenues for Medicare and discusses their relative pros and cons. We use the Tax Policy Center microsimulation model to estimate the effect of each option on revenues over ten years and on the distribution of after-tax income in one year. The options include increasing Medicare tax rates, increasing individual income tax rates, broadening the tax base, increasing corporate income tax rates, and enacting a value-added tax.
En comparant les réponses des gouvernements américain et britannique à la COVID-19, les auteurs soulignent que les politiques plus universelles comme l’expansion du Child Credit Tax (CTC) américain étaient plus efficace que les politiques visant les travailleurs du gouvernement britannique, qui ne permettaient pas d’alléger les personnes âgées ou ne pouvant pas travailler.
Both the US and the UK experienced dramatic slowdowns in economic activity in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Each enacted large-scale responses targeted at workers, and in addition, the US extended direct cash aid broadly through economic impact payments (EIPs) and then to most parents with an expanded child tax credit (CTC). UK policies generally kept workers more connected to the workforce and their employer, expediting returns to work. US policies relied on workers disconnecting from the labor force in many cases, which subsequently disrupted health insurance for many. Conditioning aid on employment left some households exposed to broad economic harms of the pandemic unrelated to job loss. US policies that allowed for support without regard to employment status had a powerful effect on reducing child poverty and supporting populations, such as the elderly and disabled, who were both at elevated risk for sickness and death from the COVID-19 virus.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à l’impact de la composition des familles sur les crédits d’impôts et estiment qu’un changement dans la composition d’une famille tel un divorce, un mariage ou un enfant supplémentaire dans le ménage entraînerait des variations substantielles (plus de 2000$) des crédits d’impôts.
Benefits from the earned income tax credit (EITC) and child tax credit (CTC) play an important role in the financial lives of low- and moderate-income families. Determining how much credit a family qualifies for can be complicated, depending primarily on the number of eligible children, income, and marital status of the tax unit. For a growing share of families with children, these factors change throughout the year and from one year to the next—sometimes in ways that are unpredictable. Among low-income households interviewed in two consecutive years for the Current Population Survey (CPS), we find:
- 39 percent saw their EITC drop by at least $500.
- About 20 percent of low-income families saw their CTC drop by at least $500.
- Hispanic families with low-income were more likely to see a reduction in their EITC and CTC from one year to the next than non-Hispanic White families and non-Hispanic Black families.
These findings can inform efforts to advance tax credits based on prior years’ income by showing how accurate advanced tax credit payments are likely to be, what sort of protections should reasonably be put in place for people whose credits decrease, and how many people would likely need those protections.
International
La TVA doit rester un impôt de rendement avec pour objectif prioritaire le financement des services publics.
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La taxe sur la valeur ajoutée (TVA) est un impôt général sur la consommation directement facturé aux clients sur les biens qu’ils consomment ou sur les services qu’ils utilisent en France. Dans un contexte économique marqué par la crise sanitaire, le retour de la guerre en Europe avec ses conséquences sur le coût de l’énergie et l’inflation, et les préoccupations croissantes pour des enjeux de long terme tels que le changement climatique, le Conseil des prélèvements obligatoires (CPO) estime que la TVA doit rester un impôt de rendement ayant pour objectif prioritaire le financement des services publics. Il déconseille l’utilisation de baisses de TVA, générales ou ciblées, pour répondre aux conséquences des crises actuelles et aux enjeux économiques et sociaux de long terme.
Selon le FMI, la réforme sur l’imposition des sociétés au niveau international permettrait de hausser les revenus provenant de l’impôt des sociétés de 6%, soit, soit approximativement 0,15% du PIB mondial, et pourrait même être davantage étant donné la baisse de pression au niveau de la compétitivité et des transferts de bénéfices.
To relieve the pressure on the outdated international corporate tax system, an ambitious reform was agreed at the Inclusive Framework (IF) on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in 2021, with now 138 jurisdictions joining. It complements previous efforts to mitigate profit shifting by addressing the challenges of the digitalization of the economy through a new allocation of taxing rights to market economies (Pillar 1) and tax competition through a global minimum corporate tax (Pillar 2). This paper concludes that the agreement makes the international tax system more robust to tax spillovers, better equipped to address digitalization, and modestly raises global tax revenues.
Dans sa mise à jour sur du « World Economic Outlook », le FMI incite les gouvernements à abandonner les mesures fiscales plus larges et plus générales et à les remplacer par des politiques temporaires ciblant spécifiquement les contribuables plus vulnérables, quitte à prélever des taxes uniques de solidarité chez les ménages et les sociétés à haut revenu pour générer des revenus.
Global growth is projected to fall from an estimated 3.4 percent in 2022 to 2.9 percent in 2023, then rise to 3.1 percent in 2024. The forecast for 2023 is 0.2 percentage point higher than predicted in the October 2022 World Economic Outlook (WEO) but below the historical (2000–19) average of 3.8 percent. The rise in central bank rates to fight inflation and Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to weigh on economic activity. The rapid spread of COVID-19 in China dampened growth in 2022, but the recent reopening has paved the way for a faster-than-expected recovery. Global inflation is expected to fall from 8.8 percent in 2022 to 6.6 percent in 2023 and 4.3 percent in 2024, still above pre-pandemic (2017–19) levels of about 3.5 percent.
The balance of risks remains tilted to the downside, but adverse risks have moderated since the October 2022 WEO. On the upside, a stronger boost from pent-up demand in numerous economies or a faster fall in inflation are plausible. On the downside, severe health outcomes in China could hold back the recovery, Russia’s war in Ukraine could escalate, and tighter global financing costs could worsen debt distress. Financial markets could also suddenly reprice in response to adverse inflation news, while further geopolitical fragmentation could hamper economic progress.
In most economies, amid the cost-of-living crisis, the priority remains achieving sustained disinflation. With tighter monetary conditions and lower growth potentially affecting financial and debt stability, it is necessary to deploy macroprudential tools and strengthen debt restructuring frameworks. Accelerating COVID-19 vaccinations in China would safeguard the recovery, with positive cross-border spillovers. Fiscal support should be better targeted at those most affected by elevated food and energy prices, and broad-based fiscal relief measures should be withdrawn. Stronger multilateral cooperation is essential to preserve the gains from the rules-based multilateral system and to mitigate climate change by limiting emissions and raising green investment.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à l’impact de l’inflation sur les distorsions fiscales et constatent que l’inflation peuvent faire augmenter ces distorsions, mais que certaines solutions telles l’ajustement des paramètres de bases du système en fonction de l’inflation ou encore utiliser davantage l’impôt anticipé permettrait de remédier à cette problématique.
Expected inflation has few real effects in purely private economies, but this is not the case when the tax system is not neutral with respect to inflation. In practice, tax systems are not neutral—though some have attempted to be so in the past—and this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the most relevant non-neutralities drawing both on existing literature and showing new illustrations and evidence of the effects. The paper shows, for example, how taxing inflationary gains can have tremendous impact on effective tax rates—even at relatively low rates of inflation. It also shows how partial adjustment—for only some types of incomes—can create additional distortions. A new empirical analysis reveals how the erosion of the value of depreciation allowances through inflation affects investment. Finally the paper discusses policy options to address such non-neutralities.
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux coûts des programmes de soutien au crédit et programmes de prêts des gouvernements européens à la COVID-19 et constatent que l’impact de ces programmes sur les soldes budgétaires semble artificiellement moindre que les mesures fiscales traditionnelles, mais que dans certains pays, ces programmes auraient tout de même pu affecter la viabilité budgétaire.
Advanced economies made available more than 5 trillion USD through government-supported credit guarantee and direct loan programs to provide lifelines to firms in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Notwithstanding the unprecedented scale of credit made available, an in-depth analysis of the fiscal consequences is missing, and the costs of these programs are not recognized in a transparent way. In this paper, we fill in an important aspect of the fiscal picture by estimating the subsidies that were provided by the largest credit guarantee programs introduced in 2020 in seven advanced economies. We estimate the subsidies on a fair value basis that provides a consistent and comprehensive upfront measure of cost. We explain the logic behind applying a fair value framework in a government context and compare it to alternative approaches. For the programs that we examine, total credit extended totaled 1.7 trillion USD. The subsidy element (cash-equivalent subsidy) is estimated to be 67 percent of loan principal on average (37 percent, excluding the US PPP), with a wide range across programs, from 12 to 100 percent. The variation is explained by differences across programs including eligibility criteria, loan terms, compensation to lenders, and other program design choices.
Au Royaume-Uni, le système d’imposition des revenus de pension est plus favorable aux contribuables à haut revenu, tout en incitant ceux qui s’attendent aux plus hauts revenus de pension à épargner davantage pour leur retraite. Les mesures proposée par les auteurs permettrait une baisse des impôts liées aux pensions à faible coût pour le gouvernement.
Pensions are the biggest component of household wealth and are treated favourably by the tax system. That means getting pensions tax design right matters. It matters for people’s well-being in retirement, especially if it can support the pension saving of those at risk of undersaving for their retirement. It also matters for taxpayers. Overly generous tax subsidies will be expensive, while insufficient generosity could lead to undersaving placing upwards pressure on state support for pensioners in the future.
En Écosse, malgré une hausse des taxes immobilières (council tax) de 5%, le financement des autorité municipale sera de sera 0,3% plus faible en 2023-2024 qu’en 2022-2023, car une telle hausse ne compense pas la baisse de financement.
After health, funding for Scottish councils is the second largest item in the Scottish Government’s Budget. In the original 2022–23 budget as passed by the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government allocated £10.6 billion to councils as part of the main local government portfolio, with further funding from other portfolios increasing the amount initially provided in the annual local government finance settlement for resource (i.e. non-capital) spending to £12.0 billion.
This funding supports a range of service areas including schools, early-years education and childcare, adults’ and children’s social care, environmental and regulatory services, local transport, leisure and cultural services, planning and local economic development, and housing advice and regulation. Additional funding is raised by councils themselves through council tax and sales, fees and charges, and via contributions from public sector bodies such as the National Health Service (NHS).
The 2010s saw cuts to councils’ funding and spending, but more recently funding has been increasing again. This chapter of the report therefore first looks at how Scottish councils’ spending on local services changed during the 2010s, splitting spending into spending on schools and spending on other services to allow for easier comparisons of trends in England (although differences in data and responsibilities mean these comparisons are somewhat rougher for the ‘other services’ category). It then looks forward to 2023–24 and 2024–25, looking at the outlook for overall council funding including for schools, and how this compares with England.
Au Royaume-Uni, la majorité des prestations gouvernementales ont pour cible les travailleurs; cependant, leur effet sur l’incitation au travail peut être insignifiant, étant donné que ces crédits et prestations nécessitent seulement des emplois à temps partiels, sans inciter à chercher un emploi de meilleur qualité.
Spending on cash transfers for those of working age – the focus of this chapter – has generally grown in the UK, both in real terms (from an average of £1,000 per working-age adult per year in the late 1970s to £2,500 just before the pandemic (in today’s prices)) and as a share of national income. But over the period of austerity between 2010 and the pandemic, the working-age benefits bill fell both relative to national income and per person.
The targeting of support on different demographic groups has changed radically. Over the long term, the UK’s cash transfer system has increasingly oriented itself towards pensioners and those with children. The growing priority given to support for pensioners is an important part of the backdrop behind trends in the working-age system, especially for the tight squeeze on the working-age benefits budget since 2010. In 1990–91 the basic support for a single person with no other source of income was 32% higher for those just over pension age than for those just under, but that figure has now grown to 137%. Within the working-age population, too, there have been big shifts. In 1975–76 an out-of-work lone parent with two children would get just 12% more than a couple without children in otherwise-similar circumstances, but by the eve of the pandemic they would get almost double.
Major policy reforms over the past 25 years have repeatedly followed a pattern of encouraging people into paid work (using both carrots and sticks) – especially if they do not live with another working adult. Such work is usually part-time, and often associated with very low earnings. The tax credit expansions of the early 2000s, which offered income top-ups for low-earning households, mostly expanded support for working 16 hours per week but often implied strong financial disincentives to go further. Imposing job-search requirements on an increasingly large fraction of lone parents on out-of-work benefits did push many into employment, but essentially all of it was part-time and on weekly earnings less than the 40th percentile. The switch to universal credit – the current flagship reform of means-tested benefits in the UK – especially increases financial incentives to do so-called ‘mini-jobs’ at very low hours, and makes little difference to the incentive to shift from full- to part-time work.
Les auteurs examinent l’effet de diverses exigences de “recherche d’emploi” dans le cadre des mesures d’aides sociales disponible aux chômeurs, et constatent que ces exigences ont très peu d’impacts sur les revenus fiscaux du gouvernement britannique et sur la diminution des ces mesures d’aide.
Proponents of work search requirements for out-of-work welfare claimants argue they are effective in inducing individuals to work and delivering fiscal savings. In this paper, we provide a much more comprehensive assessment than has been available to date, exploiting a UK reform introducing full-time work search requirements for single out-of-work parents. Using the policy’s staggered roll-out, we show that the reform reduced the number of single parents claiming welfare by a quarter, partly by discouraging eligible individuals from beginning a claim in the first place. However, only about half of the reduction in the number of claimants is explained by higher employment, and almost all of that is in part-time, low paid jobs – the median marginal job pays around the 13th percentile of the UK earnings distribution, so even those that get into work pay little in tax and receive significant (in-work) transfers. Most of the rest of the effect is accounted for by individuals substituting to – more generous – incapacity and disability benefits. As a result, the policy produces fiscal savings indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, we find negative effects on the mental health of individuals who remained out-of-work, though positive effects for those pushed into work.
L’augmentation du financement disponible au gouvernement écossais pour les dépenses non liées à différentes prestations a augmenté de 1,5G$ pour 2023-24 par rapport aux estimations de mai 2022, avec 50% de cette augmentation causée par une augmentation du revenu net provenant des taxes administrées par le gouvernement écossais (devolved taxes).
The Scottish Government’s overall budget depends both on funding from the UK government, which is determined largely via the Barnett formula, and on its own devolved revenues, borrowing and reserves, which are governed by the Fiscal Framework. This chapter of the report looks at the funding outlook in the short term (2022–23 and 2023–24), medium term (2024–25 to 2027–28) and beyond, drawing on Scottish Government and Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) figures.
En Écosse, les revenus fiscaux supplémentaires liés aux récentes réformes fiscales entreprises par le gouvernement écossais sont diminués par la lente croissance de l’assiette fiscale par rapport au reste du Royaume-Uni .
Since the partial devolution of income tax to Scotland, revenues have disappointed. For example, whereas increases in tax rates and changes to tax bands are – before accounting for behavioural responses – estimated to have generated over £600 million in 2020–21, revenues were only £96 million more than the amount subtracted from the Scottish Government’s block grant funding (the block grant adjustment, or BGA) to account for devolution. This is because the underlying tax base grew less quickly in Scotland than in the rest of the UK (rUK), 1 offsetting most of the revenue generated by the Scottish Government’s tax changes.
Forecasts suggest that this trend has continued into the current year. In particular, the Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) has forecast that the Scottish Government’s tax changes will raise the equivalent of £850 million this year (again before accounting for behavioural responses), yet revenues will be around £100 million lower than the BGA. In other words, slower tax base growth is expected to more than offset Scotland’s higher tax rates.
In both December 2021 and May 2022, the SFC was forecasting the trend to continue in the medium term. However, the forecasts published last month are for a significant reversal of this trend, with revenues set to exceed the BGA by £1.1 billion by 2026–27, and £1.3 billion by 2027–28. This is an important change, providing a notable boost to the Scottish Budget (see Chapter 2).
This chapter of the report therefore looks at what we know about why Scotland’s tax base has grown more slowly so far since devolution, and discusses the SFC’s explanation for the partial catch-up expected over the next few years.
En Angleterre, le rapport des prévisions constate une sous-estimation de l’augmentation du PIB, ce qui a eu pour effet de surestimé les emprunts de prêt de 258G$. Plusieurs autres différences sont illustrées dans le bulletin.
The focus of this year’s Forecast evaluation report (FER) is the performance of our forecasts for the financial year 2021-22. This was the year in which the economy and public finances began recovering from the historic, pandemic-induced shock that saw output tumble and the deficit soar in 2020-21. The pandemic resulted in record year-ahead differences between our forecast and outturn for GDP growth and borrowing, which we explored in our December 2021 FER. This report therefore focuses on the accuracy of our forecast for the economic recovery from the pandemic and its impact on the public finances in 2021-22.
Overall, 2021-22 was characterised by a sharp recovery in demand, in the UK and across advanced economies, as vaccines were rolled out and consumers and businesses adapted to the lifting of public health restrictions. But this stronger-than-expected recovery in demand bumped up against domestic and international supply bottlenecks through the autumn and winter, which were compounded by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and associated sharp rise in European gas prices toward the end of the financial year.
The unexpected strength and speed of the recovery in demand, underestimation of the constraints on supply, and spike in European energy prices meant that we significantly underestimated inflation. Subsequent downward revisions to the level of GDP in 2020-21 mean that we also underestimated real GDP growth in 2021-22 as the economy bounced back from a deeper downturn than previously estimated. The resulting faster-than-expected growth in nominal GDP, coupled with its concentration in tax-rich parts of the income distribution and the economy, explain much of our £108.6 billion overestimate of borrowing in 2021-22 – a difference second only in absolute terms to the £258.0 billion underestimate of borrowing in our March 2020 pre-pandemic forecast for 2020-21.
Afin de participer à une transition rapide à l’énergie à basse émission de carbone, les ministères des finances mondiaux devraient graduellement taxer les différentes sources d’énergie en proportion de la quantité de carbone qu’elles contiennent, et, à plus long terme, pourraient taxer les surplus économiques engendrées par des technologies faibles en carbone, ce qui permettrait d’augmenter l’assiette fiscale.
With a war, a pandemic, an energy crisis, inflation, slower economic growth and a possible global recession in 2023, it is no surprise that the Collins Dictionary 2022 word of the year was “permacrisis”. These acute crises and their economic symptoms are related to an unchecked and endless erosion of our social and natural capital. Declines in social capital have reduced trust and exacerbated geopolitical tensions. Declines in natural capital have increased the risk of pandemics such as COVID-19, as environmental and climate changes increase interactions between human and non-human species (Carlson et al, 2022; Romanello et al, 2022). The climate crisis, and its associated impacts in floods, fires, droughts and other extreme weather events is already destroying physical capital and is testing the resilience of key systems, such as food production. It is increasingly obvious that unless we rethink our systems and institutions we will remain in permacrisis, with the impacts likely continuing to worsen over time. As observed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, “our multiple crises are not the result of a failure or failures of the system. Rather, the system itself…is the cause of many of these failures” (Stiglitz, 2010). So while 2023 may not appear to be a year for great optimism, necessity is the mother of invention and the need for change is increasingly obvious. The payoff for innovation is also now as high as ever. Across a range of areas in technology, economics and finance, there are opportunities for mission-led innovation to reverse the depreciation of our social and natural capital.
En Australie, les avantages fiscaux découlant des régimes de retraite sont la troisième dépense du gouvernement en termes de coûts.
Tax breaks for superannuation will cost the Federal Budget $52.5 billion in 2022-23, almost equal to the $55.3 billion spent on the aged pension. Super concessions benefit the rich, while the pension is important for the poor. Major reform is overdue.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Léa Béliveau
- Frédéric Deschênes
- Tatiana Duval
- Alena Mulay-Benaissa
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé