Bulletin de veille du 31 janvier 2023
Québec/Canada
Au Canada, une inflation importante a fait profiter certains secteurs de l’économie comme les services financiers. Une des mesures proposée par l’auteur pour diminuer le coût pour le contribuable moyen est la mise en place d’une surtaxe sur les profits importants.
What’s driving inflation in Canada? Between 2020 and 2022, business prices increased by a whopping 19 per cent in the country on average. Where did those dollars go?
CCPA senior economist David Macdonald breaks down the numbers using new data which shows that, of every dollar spent on higher prices in the last two years, 47 cents was converted into corporate profits in four industries—led by mining, oil and gas extraction. Corporate profits are eating up the vast majority of the extra inflation dollars, far-outpacing increased labour costs or other expenses.
As politicians, central banks, and technocrats work to end inflation by triggering and economic slowdown, understanding the source of increased prices is key. The data is clear—the largest driver of inflation is corporate profits.
Au Québec, les travailleurs prennent plus rapidement leur retraite qu’ailleurs au Canada. Pour allonger la présence sur le marché du travail, l’analyse propose des ajustements à certaines mesures fiscales pour favoriser le travail des personnes plus âgées.
Ce rapport propose une analyse des relations entre la prolongation de la vie active et la retraite au Québec pour les personnes de 45 ans et plus. À partir des documents gouvernementaux de référence publiés sur environ deux décennies, nous avons d’abord retracé des analyses et des propositions dans ce domaine destinés à orienter les politiques publiques de l’emploi au Québec. Le document propose ensuite une analyse des données de l’enquête canadienne sur le revenu et des statistiques fiscales des personnes concernant les principales sources de revenus pour les personnes de 45 ans et plus, en abordant notamment la question du cumul emploi-retraite. La dernière partie du document contient des pistes de réflexion et d’intervention dans le domaine des politiques publiques de l’emploi sur l’enjeu de la prolongation de la vie active.
La Colombie-Britannique est à la traîne sur le plan économique dans sa région. Le présent bulletin a cherché à mesurer l’ampleur de l’écart de prospérité entre la Colombie-Britannique et ses homologues du Canada et des États-Unis.
By global standards, British Columbia is prosperous. British Columbians enjoy a living standard and access to opportunities that most of the world would envy. Within its own economic region, however, BC is a laggard.
This bulletin compares overall prosperity in BC (measured as Gross Domestic Product per person) to that of neighbouring Alberta and six US states.
We show that BC has the third lowest GDP per capita of the 8 jurisdictions we analyze. We also show that there is a large gap between BC and the four US states that have a higher GDP per capita than BC, whereas the province’s advantage over the two other states—Montana and Idaho—is much smaller.
We also analyze a second measure of prosperity—median employment income. This measure indicates the strength of labour markets and the economic well-being of each jurisdiction’s residents. BC performs even worse on this indicator than on GDP per capita. BC’s median employment income is the lowest of the eight jurisdictions examined.
Of the seven other jurisdictions measured in this analysis, BC’s growth rate was lower than any of the six US states between 2010 and 2019. Its growth rate exceeded only Alberta’s.
The substantial and growing prosperity gap between BC and most of its neighbours should concern British Columbians generally and policymakers particularly.
Dans les villes américaines, la plupart des grandes variations de la santé fiscale peuvent s’expliquer par des changements dans la capacité des villes à collecter des recettes propres ou par des changements dans les aides publiques plutôt que par des besoins en dépenses.
Municipal fiscal health can be measured in different ways. In a new paper for the Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance (IMFG), Howard Chernick and Andrew Reschovsky develop a measure of fiscal health that allows them to assess the ability of major American central cities to provide their residents with a standard bundle of public services at reasonable rates of taxation. They analyze 148 U.S. central cities between 2000 and 2014 using a specially developed fiscally standardized cities (FiSC) database. By accounting for the revenues and spending of all governments that provide public services within cities – municipal governments, school districts, counties, and special districts – Chernick and Reschovsky are able to compare municipal finances across cities with widely different governance structures.
The authors conclude that a substantial number of U.S. cities illustrated weak fiscal health, because their revenue-raising capacity, including intergovernmental transfers, falls short of their expenditure needs, leading to a fiscal gap. Fiscal disparities, measured as the variation in these gaps across cities, were large in both 2000 and 2014 and increased over that period. Moreover, on average, own-source revenue-raising capacity, such as taxes, fees and user charges, grew much faster than intergovernmental transfers. The largest single contributor to the increase in fiscal disparities was the uneven growth in own-source revenue-raising capacity across cities. Targeted increases in federal and state grants could help improve the fiscal health of U.S. central cities and reduce fiscal disparities.
En Amérique du Nord, la mise en place d’une bourse du carbone pourrait permettre l’atteinte des objectifs régionaux et pourrait mettre en place des balises pour de prochaines actions politiques, ce qui est plus difficile avec une taxe sur le carbone.
Mexico, the United States and Canada are three of the world’s most productive, diverse and interdependent economies in the world. In terms of energy systems, however, the three countries are incompletely interconnected and integrated in terms of infrastructure, reserves, operations and standards. This imposes costs, performance and security risks that affect GDP, labour and financial markets that could be mitigated through closer co-operative energy systems planning and interdependence.
Future energy challenges facing the three countries, individually and collectively, are formidable. These include rising costs and increasing relative scarcity of both domestic and imported energy supplies, as well as environmental externalities associated with energy production and consumption. The three nations collectively possess a wide range of hydrocarbon reserves, underused non-renewable and renewable energy resources and untapped production and utilization technologies necessary for meeting future energy needs and mitigating the increasing impacts of climate change.
Some co-operation is emerging between nations, such as the commitments from all three countries under the UN Climate Accord. Signed and announced in 2021, the commitments include 2030 targets on the path to net-zero emissions by 2050. While the adoption of global and sectoral carbon reduction goals by all three jurisdictions is positive, these commitments, supported by a tri-national carbon trading exchange, would incentivize the greater integration of North America’s energy markets through increased use of the lower carbon energy resources and technologies available in each jurisdiction. The result can be a more resilient energy sector, capable of meeting future demands for transportation, industry, heating and lighting loads that displace historically conventional energy supplies with renewable generation and alternatives that can support a future decarbonized region and world economy.
L’auteur explique pourquoi les titres acquis dans le cadre de l’assouplissement quantitatif ont un impact fiscal différent de celui des achats normaux de titres par la Banque du Canada.
Les achats de titres effectués par la Banque du Canada dans le cadre de l’assouplissement quantitatif reviennent à échanger une dépense à taux d’intérêt fixe contre un taux variable payé sur certains éléments du passif de la Banque du Canada. Ils impliquent également que le gouvernement du Canada demeure responsable des pertes potentielles sur ces actifs. La part de la dette publique fédérale financée sur le marché monétaire s’en trouve fortement accrue, ce qui expose le gouvernement du Canada à un risque de taux d’intérêt plus élevé que celui indiqué dans les documents budgétaires et qui s’est traduit par des pertes importantes à ce jour. La sortie de l’assouplissement quantitatif dans un contexte de lutte contre l’inflation pose des défis importants pour la politique monétaire et laisse entrevoir une situation budgétaire difficile.
The Bank of Canada’s purchases of securities under quantitative easing are tantamount to an exchange of a fixed interest rate expense for a floating rate paid on certain liabilities of the Bank of Canada. They also imply that the Government of Canada remains liable for potential losses on these assets. This significantly increases the proportion of federal government debt financed in the money market, exposing the Government of Canada to higher interest rate risk than indicated in the budget documents and has resulted in significant losses to date. The exit from quantitative easing in an anti-inflationary environment poses significant challenges for monetary policy and points to a difficult fiscal situation.
L’auteur, en se basant sur la réanalyse de l’expérience MINCOME, prétend que le mieux que l’on puisse dire avec confiance est que les données ne permettent pas de conclure que MINCOME a réduit les coûts hospitaliers.
Dans « The Town with No Poverty: The Health Effects of a Canadian Guaranteed Annual Income Field Experiment » (publié dans Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de politiques en 2011), la professeure Evelyn Forget analyse les effets sur la santé communautaire et l’éducation de l’expérience MINCOME, réalisée au Manitoba dans les années 1970, qui portait sur le revenu annuel minimum garanti. Réévaluant les données sur les visites à l’hôpital utilisées dans Forget (2011), je soutiens que les données relatives de la communauté traitée de Dauphin présentent, avant l’intervention, des tendances négatives statistiquement significatives par rapport aux communautés de contrôle. La tendance préexistante, combinée à des périodes de préanalyse et de traitement courtes, remet sérieusement en question l’utilité de ces données qui, dans la mesure où elles sont réellement utilisables, montreraient plutôt les effets positifs de l’expérience MINCOME sur les visites à l’hôpital dans un contexte normalisé. J’en conclus que les données de la MINCOME ne soutiennent pas l’affirmation qu’un revenu annuel minimum garanti réduit le cout des soins de santé.
L’auteur défend les conclusions de son étude sur l’expérience MINCOME affirmant que cela a réduit les coûts hospitaliers et critique la réanalyse effectuée par David Green dans le même numéro de la revue.
David Green (2022) défend l’idée que les données de l’expérience MINCOME ne soutiennent pas l’affirmation selon laquelle un revenu annuel minimum garanti réduit le cout des soins de santé. Je maintiens les conclusions tirées dans mon article « The Town with No Poverty » (2011) : la MINCOME est corrélée avec une dominution importante des taux d’hospitalisation chez les sujets traités par rapport à leurs équivalents de contrôle. La critique de Green dépend fortement des données de 1974 et 1975, données biaisées par l’annonce anticipée de la MINCOME. Elle s’appuie également sur des présupposés implicites et discutables concernant le fonctionnement des hôpitaux, en particulier dans les régions rurales et éloignées du Canada, et l’influence des déterminants sociaux, notamment le revenu, sur les résultats en santé. Je fournis des données qui corroborent les choix analytiques et soutiennent la conclusion de mon article original.
États-Unis
Aux États-Unis, les dépenses pour la santé sont plus élevées que dans la majorité des pays industrialisés, mais la majorité de la population n’est pas assurée. En comparant les systèmes de santé de plusieurs pays comme le Canada, l’Allemagne et l’Angleterre, l’étude offre plusieurs pistes de solutions.
The United States spends substantially more on health care than most developed countries, yet leaves a greater share of the population uninsured. We suggest that incremental insurance expansions focused on addressing market failures will propagate inefficiencies and are not likely to facilitate active policy decisions that align with societal coverage goals. By instead defining a basic bundle of services that is publicly financed for all, while allowing individuals to purchase additional coverage, policymakers could both expand coverage and maintain incentives for innovation, fostering universal access to innovative care in an affordable system.
Cette analyse présente l’utilisation des fonds reçus par les États en compensation des impacts de la pandémie de COVID-19.
Every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico are using the $198 billion in Fiscal Recovery Funds (FRF) created under the federal American Rescue Plan to address the COVID-19 pandemic’s harmful economic and health effects. Our review of these spending decisions shows that many states are using these funds constructively: to offset declines in their revenue collections; to address the health, economic, and fiscal impacts of the pandemic and contribute to the economic recovery; and to start new long-term investments to address racial and economic inequities. Decisions in some states are not constructive. All offer important lessons for how states should use the more than $25 billion in remaining funds, which will be critical to addressing the pandemic’s ongoing damage and useful for stabilizing state budgets in the event of a recession in 2023.
Dans ses projections de juillet 2021 pour l’exercice 2022, le CBO a sous-estimé les recettes de 10 % et les dépenses de 5 %. La projection du CBO concernant le déficit du budget fédéral pour 2022 était supérieure au montant réel de 0,8 % du PIB.
After each fiscal year has ended, the Congressional Budget Office reviews its projections of federal revenues and outlays and the government’s budget deficit and compares them with actual budgetary outcomes for that year. By assessing the quality of its projections and identifying the factors that might have led to under- or overestimates of particular categories of federal revenues and outlays, CBO seeks to improve the accuracy of its work.
To review its projections for fiscal year 2022, CBO focused on its July 2021 budget projections and updated them to include the estimated effects of subsequently enacted legislation. Together, those adjustments—which reflect the estimated budgetary effects reported in cost estimates that CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) prepared when the legislation was enacted—reduced CBO’s projections of revenues by $9 billion (or 0.2 percent) and increased its projections of outlays by $57 billion (or 1 percent).
Selon l’auteure, trois raisons sont avancées pour décourager les rachats : (1) ils réduisent l’investissement et augmentent la dette, ce qui conduit au profit immédiat au détriment de l’investissement à long terme; (2) ils profitent aux dirigeants en augmentant le bénéfice par action et les primes des cadres ou en donnant plus de valeur aux options sur actions ; et (3) ils sont fiscalement plus avantageux que les dividendes.
The law commonly known as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-169) includes a 1% excise tax on stock repurchases by publicly traded corporations. Stock repurchases are a way to distribute income to shareholders and, compared to dividends, have favorable tax treatment. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates this provision to raise $74 billion over the FY2022- FY2031 period
Dans son Governor’s Budget de 2023-2024, l’administration californienne estime que la remise en place de la taxe sur les organismes de gestion des soins (Managed Care Organization Tax) pourrait en 2022-2023, générer 300M$ d’économie pour le fonds consolidé et qu’elle générerait environ 2G$ d’économie en 2024-2025.
Both our office and the administration project that the state faces a manageable budget problem this year. The Governor addresses the budget problem primarily with spending-related solutions, as shown in the figure below. Notably, the Governor does not propose using any reserves. This approach is prudent given the downside risk to revenues posed by the current heightened risk of recession. We recommend the Legislature maintain this approach during its own planning process.
Recommend Legislature Plan for Larger Budget Problem. Our estimates suggest that there is a good chance that revenues will be lower than the administration’s projections for the budget window, particularly in 2022-23 and 2023-24. Given this risk, we recommend the Legislature: (1) plan for a larger budget problem and (2) address that larger problem by reducing more one-time and temporary spending. Taking these steps would allow the state to mitigate the heightened risk of revenue shortfalls. The Legislature need not adopt the Governor’s spending solutions, however. Recent budgets have allocated or planned tens of billions of dollars for one-time or temporary spending purposes in 2021-22, 2022-23, and 2023-24. The Legislature can select an entirely different set of spending solutions to address the budget problem. To develop its budget, we recommend the Legislature evaluate recently approved augmentations and only maintain those augmentations that meet certain criteria.
Recommend the Legislature’s Budget Not Include Future Deficits. While the Governor’s budget is balanced under the administration’s estimates for 2023-24, this is not the case for future years. Specifically, the administration forecasts operating deficits ranging from $4 billion to $9 billion over the multiyear period. We recommend the Legislature avoid enacting a budget that plans for future deficits. To maintain budget balance, the Legislature could convert some spending-related delays to reductions instead. Alternatively, the Legislature could add new out-year trigger reductions—in which spending triggers off under certain conditions—or by using other budget solutions, such as revenue increases or cost shifts.
L’auteur se penche sur le retour de l’impôt sur la fortune proposé par les législateurs des sept États qui possèdent jusqu’à 60% des richesses du pays, compromettant les enjeux d’investissements et d’établissement de nouvelles entreprises.
In a coordinated effort, lawmakers in seven states that collectively house about 60 percent of the nation’s wealth—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New York, and Washington—are introducing wealth tax legislation on Thursday.
L’auteur s’intéresse à la question de la progressivité de l’impôt aux États-Unis en mesurant notamment le revenu gagné par le quintile à revenu le plus faible. Il compare les nouvelles données de 2019 avec les données historiques remontant à 1979 pour constater que le revenu gagné après impôt et les transferts du dernier quintile a augmenté.
In a coordinated effort, lawmakers in seven states that collectively house about 60 percent of the nation’s wealth—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New York, and Washington—are introducing wealth tax legislation on Thursday.
Étant donné l’incertitude actuelle au niveau de l’économie, les États américains pourraient considérer l’utilisation de crédits d’impôts remboursables afin de favoriser les contribuables à faible et moyens revenus, qui n’ont majoritairement pas profité d’allègement fiscaux dans les dernières années.
Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia passed significant tax cuts in calendar year 2022. However, the design and effect of those tax cuts varied significantly. Using the Tax Policy Center state income tax model, we analyzed three major types of individual income tax cuts—tax rate cuts, refundable tax credits, and one-time tax rebates—by examining tax legislation in Connecticut, Delaware, Mississippi, Utah, and Vermont. As state policymakers prepare to navigate an uncertain economic and fiscal future, they should understand how previous tax cuts affected state revenue collections and benefited, or did not benefit, different types of households.
International
Les programmes de divulgation volontaire sont plus effectifs et génèrent plus de revenus pour le gouvernement lorsqu’ils ne sont pas anticipés par les contribuables. De plus, ceux-ci génèrent plus de revenus lorsque les pénalités sont plus basses, puisque davantage de contribuables déclarent leur opérations.
This paper develops a simple model to explore whether a higher detection probability for offshore tax evaders—e.g. because of improved exchange of information between countries and/or due to digitalization of tax administrations—renders it optimal for governments to introduce a voluntary disclosure program (VDP) and, if so, under what terms. We find that if the VDP is unanticipated, it is likely to be optimal for a revenue-maximizing government to introduce a VDP with relatively generous terms, i.e. a low or even negative penalty. When anticipated, however, the VDP is neither incentive compatible nor optimal, as it induces otherwise compliant taxpayers to evade tax. A VDP can then only be beneficial if tax evasion induces an external social cost beyond the direct revenue foregone, e.g., due to adverse effects on overall tax morale. In contrast to the common view that VDPs should come along with additional enforcement effort, we find that governments should relax enforcement if the VDP itself provides more powerful incentives to come clean.
En Espagne, les politiques de prix de carbone (incluant les taxes sur le carbone) ont un impact certain sur le marché de l’emploi. Utiliser les revenus provenant des taxes sur le carbone pour réduire la fiscalité du travail serait positif pour le marché de l’emploi.
We provide a tractable framework for assessing the labor market impact of policies that support the green transition of the Spanish economy, taking into account input-output linkages. We present illustrative examples that quantify changes in sectoral employment, occupations and skills stemming from two different green policies: (i) the announced green investments in the recovery plan; and (ii) an increase in carbon pricing and an expansion of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). Our analysis shows that the labor market impact of these two policies is net positive, although the results depend on the design of the green policies, particularly on the use of the proceeds from the increase in carbon pricing. Strengthening active labor market policies, with a focus on training, and complementing them with education policies such as the expansion of vocational training, would facilitate the transition of workers from shrinking to expanding sectors.
Le Haut Conseil rappelle que le retour à des niveaux de dette permettant à la France de disposer de marges de manœuvre suffisantes est nécessaire pour faire face à l’avenir à des chocs macroéconomiques ou financiers et aux besoins d’investissement public liés notamment aux enjeux climatiques. La réforme des retraites ne suffit pas, à elle seule, à atteindre un tel objectif.
Le Gouvernement a saisi le Haut Conseil des finances publiques du projet de loi de financement rectificative de la sécurité sociale (PLFRSS) pour 2023 portant réforme des retraites.
Le Haut Conseil note le caractère étroit de la saisine. Il est en mesure d’analyser les conséquences du projet de réforme des retraites sur les finances publiques en 2023. Avec un coût net de l’ordre de 0,4 Md€, elles sont peu importantes. Compte tenu du caractère incomplet des informations qui lui ont été transmises par le Gouvernement, le Haut Conseil n’est pas en mesure d’évaluer l’incidence de moyen terme de la réforme des retraites sur les finances publiques.
De surcroît, le Haut Conseil relève que l’absence d’adoption du projet de loi de programmation des finances publiques ne lui permet pas de vérifier la cohérence des prévisions de finances publiques des textes financiers avec la loi de programmation. Au-delà, cette absence, contraire aux engagements européens de la France, prive les finances publiques d’une boussole indispensable à leur bonne gestion et à la préservation de la soutenabilité de la dette publique.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à la question de la population vivant avec un handicap au Royaume-Uni et à leur vulnérabilité devant l’augmentation du coût des produits de première nécessité.
The cost of living crisis has shone a harsh light on different groups’ ability to deal with fast- rising prices. In this briefing note, we focus on the living standards of people with disabilities, including results from a new survey of just under 8,000 working-age adults, over 2,000 of whom reported a long-term illness or disability, to offer insight into their experience of the current crisis. We focus on people with disabilities for two good reasons. First, disability is on the rise in Britain. The share of the working-age population with a disability has risen from 17 to 23 per cent since 2013, a rise of over 2.6 million people. Second, people with disabilities are more vulnerable to rising costs of essentials because energy and food make up a greater share of their budgets, on average, than for the non-disabled, in part because of additional needs caused by underlying health problems.
Cet article décrit et analyse de manière critique le rôle des collectivités locales en Australie, avec une référence particulière aux rôles de l’État et des collectivités locales en Nouvelle-Galles du Sud. Il s’attarde notamment à la manière de prélever les impôts.
This paper discusses the role of local government in the three-tiered system of government in Australia, with special reference to the roles of state and local government in New South Wales. Drawing on public finance principles, Section 2 finds that local government should be the primary provider of local public goods and services and have a substantial role in the provision of social welfare services. The following two sections are descriptive. Section 3 outlines the current nature and size of local government across Australia along with some international comparisons. Section 4 describes the legal basis and nature of local government in NSW. Section 5 introduces the major local council issues which are discussed in the following sections. These include the optimal structure of local councils, local council governance, financial and economic issues, land use planning, provision of local infrastructure, environmental services and policies,
and the provision of social and community services. A constant theme is the roles of the three levels of government, with local councils subject to the regulations set by the relevant state government. Although much of the detailed analysis draws on NSW, many of the issues and findings apply nationally. The paper concludes that, notwithstanding that local government is a relatively small third tier of government in Australia, local government is an important provider
of local public services of all kinds, including local infrastructure and welfare services and should be granted more autonomy.
En Australie, la venue de l’industrie du coton dans le Northern Territory (NT) ne permettrait pas de générer des revenus fiscaux supplémentaire pour les NT, autant en termes d’impôt des sociétés qu’en termes de retenues à la source.
NT water policy changes are aimed at expanding irrigation, particularly cotton production.
Government and industry claims that cotton expansion would create significant employment and tax payments are not supported by data. Census figures show that cotton is one of the least jobs intensive sectors in the economy. According to the Australian Tax Office, major cotton companies make minimal tax payments. An NT cotton industry is unlikely to bring any significant economic benefit.
En Inde, les individus les plus fortunés sous-estiment parfois leur revenu. L’analyse illustre les possibles raisons de cette sous-estimation et tente de quantifier les revenus manquants aux déclarations des plus riches.
The income reporting behaviour of different wealth groups is a critical public finance issue that has remained under-researched in the Indian and international contexts. We model and estimate the relationship between wealth and reported income for individuals and families across different wealth groups. We use a new dataset based on affidavits filed by election contestants, the Forbes List of billionaires, and the statistics published by the Indian Tax Department. We show that the wealthier the individual or the family, the lesser is reported income relative to wealth. On average, a 1% increase in family wealth is associated with a decrease of more than 0.5% in the reported income as a ratio of wealth. The total income reported by the bottom 10% of families in the data amounts to more than 188% of their wealth; in contrast, the wealthiest 5% [respectively 0.1%] of families reported incomes that were just 4% [respectively 2%] of their wealth. The total income reported by the wealthiest Forbes list families is less than 0.6% of their wealth. From another perspective, the total income reported by the wealthiest 0.1% of families is only about a fifth of the returns from their capital, and at least 80% of their capital income goes unreported in the income tax returns. For the Forbes-listed 100 families, more than 90% of the capital returns do not figure in their reported incomes! The income-wealth ratios for affluent individuals exhibit very similar patterns. We discuss the processes responsible for the “missing” income of the wealthy groups and show that this “missing” income leads to an underestimation of income inequality. Furthermore, it reduces the tax liability of the wealthiest percentile group to a mere 1% of their wealth. The tax liability of the wealthiest 0.1 centiles and the Forbes-listed families is less than one-tenth of their capital income. Tax paid by these groups relative to their wealth is smaller than the relative tax liability for middle-wealth groups. Finally, we show that ceteris paribus, women report lower incomes than men, and that individuals exposed to greater media and civil society scrutiny report relatively high incomes. Our analysis suggests that recent measures taken by the Indian central government against illicit income and wealth hoarding have delivered the intended results.
Tous les individus contribuent aux émissions, mais pas de la même manière. Les 10 % les plus importants des émetteurs mondiaux de carbone génèrent près de la moitié des émissions de gaz à effet de serre.
The climate crisis has begun to disrupt human societies by severely affecting the very foundations of human livelihood and social organisation. Climate impacts are not equally distributed across the world: on average, low- and middle-income countries suffer greater impacts than their richer counterparts. At the same time, the climate crisis is also marked by significant inequalities within countries. Recent research reveals a high concentration of global greenhouse gas emissions among a relatively small fraction of the population, living in emerging and rich countries. In addition, vulnerability to numerous climate impacts is strongly linked to income and wealth, not just between countries but also within them.
The aim of this report is twofold. It endeavours first to shed light on these various dimensions of climate inequality in a systematic and detailed analysis, focusing on low- and middle-income countries in particular. It then builds on these insights, together with additional empirical work and interviews with experts, to suggest pathways to development cooperation, and tax and social policies that tackle climate inequalities at their core.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Léa Béliveau
- Frédéric Deschênes
- Tatiana Duval
- Alena Mulay-Benaissa
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé