Bulletin de veille du 22 mars 2022
Québec/Canada
Le BRF présente ses prévisions concernant les finances du gouvernement de l’Ontario pour les 30 prochaines années.
Les perspectives budgétaires à long terme présentent les projections du BRF sur la position financière du gouvernement au cours de la période allant de 2021-2022 à 2050-2051. Ce rapport constitue une évaluation de la viabilité financière à long terme de l’Ontario fondée sur quatre indicateurs budgétaires clés. Ensuite, nous discutons des facteurs qui toucheront les dépenses de programmes gouvernementaux et le rendement en matière de revenus au cours des trois prochaines décennies. Enfin, des détails sur les projections économiques du BRF sont présentés, y compris une analyse des tendances démographiques sous-jacentes au cours de la période de projection. Globalement, le BRF prévoit que les finances de l’Ontario seront gérables au fur et à mesure que sa position financière s’améliorera au cours des années 2020. Cependant, la souplesse budgétaire du gouvernement sera limitée à long terme, tandis que les dépenses courantes en soins de santé feront augmenter la croissance des dépenses de programmes au-delà des gains en matière de revenus.
L’Alberta figure dans les quatre juridictions en Amérique du Nord exportant le plus de capital par habitant. Face à un tel constat et en raison de la compétitivité fiscale à l’international, l’article analyse la position que devrait adopter l’Alberta, en considérant les différents impératifs politiques tel que l’atteinte de la carboneutralité, afin d’être davantage résiliente.
The Canada West Foundation and the Business Council of Alberta (BCA) have released two reports as part of BCA’s Define the Decade project. These reports, which represent Chapter 2 of BCA’s four-part project, are an honest exploration of the challenges, trends, forces, and opportunities that Albertans face as they plan for the future.
The Business Council of Alberta’s report, Global Trends and Forces Impacting Alberta, dives into four major global forces that are changing how our world looks and works—from digital disruption to climate change—and explores 10 key implications of these forces for Alberta.
Alberta’s Place in the World, CWF’s report, which was written for BCA, is a thought piece looking at nine major but less obvious changes in the global trade environment that may directly influence who and how we approach international business and investment attraction.
L’auteur analyse l’écart entre les prévisions budgétaires provinciales pour l’année 2020-2021 et la réalité, suggérant qu’il pourrait s’expliquer par les mesures d’aide généreuses du fédéral.
Much attention has been focused on the economic recovery that has been underway throughout the second half of 2021. However, relatively little attention has been paid to its effect on provincial government finances. Provincial economic bases and population sizes are very different, yet their economic recovery experiences have been remarkably similar: the economic recovery in 2021 has smashed the dour revenue projections that all provinces initially predicted. Despite having carried deficits over the past two years, many provinces are projecting surpluses this year or next. Much lower interest rates have meant that the interest paid, adjusted to GDP, and the direct impact of debt on the provinces’ balance sheets is now lower than it was in 2009–10 after the Great Recession.
L’auteur évalue l’impact de l’hyper-inflation due en grande partie à la pandémie de COVID-19 et propose certaines politiques fiscales par lesquels les gouvernements, notamment celui du Manitoba, pourraient diminuer l’importance de ces impacts pour les contribuables.
Media headlines and price tags alike are sending the message loud and clear: The cost of living is increasing, with price inflation being higher than we’ve seen in decades. The most recent data on prices of goods and services show an annual increase of 5.1% in Canada, when compared to prices in January of 2021. Rising prices of goods and services can be particularly stressful for those with low and fixed incomes, and those living off of limited savings. Higher inflation then can be a pressing issue for workers and unions struggling to ensure that working people do not fall behind and can maintain a decent standard of living. Given this stress and burden for often already struggling households, inflation can have important implications for public policy advocacy. What should workers, lower-income households and allied organizations including unions, consumer protection organizations, and community-based social service providers, be calling on governments to do about higher inflation? This is an important political and economic question, as inflation does not impact everyone equally and can have mixed impacts across the income spectrum. For example, while those with low and fixed incomes are most at risk of not meeting their basic needs due to the affordability issues, inflation can also reduce debt burden if wages are also rising, helping reduce wealth inequality.
Le chapitre traite des aspects fiscaux dans l’incitation au travail au Québec dans le contexte de la pénurie de main-d’œuvre et des changements structurels du marché du travail, en particulier de comment les mesures fiscales déployées par les gouvernements fédéral et provincial agissent pour inciter au travail. Ce texte décrit les principales mesures en place et avance quelques pistes pour accroître leur caractère incitatif.
En vue d’inciter à participer au marché du travail, les gouvernements du Québec et fédéral ont mis en place des crédits d’impôt qui haussent le revenu disponible de certains travailleurs. Ainsi, l’Allocation canadienne pour les travailleurs, bonifiée dans le cadre du budget fédéral 2021, s’adresse aux travailleurs touchant un revenu faible et moyen, tout comme la Prime au travail du gouvernement du Québec. Dans certains cas, il est possible de bénéficier de ces deux mesures. De plus, en fonction de leur situation et de leur âge, les travailleurs québécois peuvent avoir également accès au Bouclier fiscal ainsi qu’au Crédit d’impôt pour prolongation de carrière. Dans un contexte de rareté de main-d’œuvre et de changements structurels du marché du travail, un regain d’intérêt envers les mesures fiscales déployées par les gouvernements fédéral et du Québec pour inciter au travail apparaît. Ce texte décrit les mesures en place visant à hausser le revenu disponible de certains groupes de travailleurs et avance quelques pistes pour accroître leur caractère incitatif sous l’angle financier.
Le présent rapport porte sur le plan des dépenses du gouvernement et le Budget principal des dépenses pour 2022-2023, qui appuie les deux premiers projets de loi de crédits visant à faire approuver par le Parlement des dépenses totalisant 190,3 milliards de dollars de dépenses budgétaires.
Le Budget principal des dépenses du gouvernement pour 2022-2023 prévoit des autorisations de dépenses budgétaires de 397,6 milliards de dollars. Les autorisations votées, que le Parlement doit approuver, se chiffrent à 190,3 milliards de dollars. Les autorisations législatives, pour lesquelles le gouvernement a déjà obtenu l’approbation du Parlement de dépenser, totalisent 207,3 milliards de dollars.
Comme dans les budgets de dépenses antérieurs, les sommes transférées aux autres ordres de gouvernement, aux particuliers et aux autres organismes représentent la majorité des dépenses prévues dans le Budget principal des dépenses, soit 243,1 milliards de dollars (61,1 %).
Parmi les grands postes de dépenses dans le Budget principal des dépenses, mentionnons :
- les prestations aux aînés (68,3 milliards de dollars);
- le Transfert canadien en matière de santé (45,2 milliards de dollars);
- l’indemnisation versée aux enfants des Premières Nations (environ 20 milliards de dollars).
En prévision du budget fédéral de 2022, cet article analyse les incidences associées au fait que le gouvernement fédéral a dépensé plus qu’afin de simplement répondre à la situation d’urgence entraînée par la Covid-19, notamment quant à une difficulté accrue d’adresser les défis économiques auxquels le Canada est confronté.
The federal government needs to get serious about preparing Canada to meet future challenges by focusing on achieving growth and fiscal sustainability in its 2022 budget, according to the C.D. Howe Institute’s latest Shadow Budget.
Authors William B.P. Robson, Don Drummond and Alexandre Laurin examine the federal government’s financial position and propose a change of course, from free-spending ways to fiscal responsibility and support for economic growth. Notably, their fiscal plan would put the federal government on a path to a balanced budget within three years and, beyond the five-year budget horizon, restore its debt-to-GDP ratio to its pre-pandemic level within 12 years.
Specifically, the Shadow Budget’s initiatives would reduce the ratio of net debt to GDP from about 48 percent this year to 42 percent in 2026/27. From a deficit of $148 billion this year, the bottom line would swing to a $15 billion surplus by the end of that period.
L’IRÉC publie la 51e issue de son bulletin de la retraite, discutant notamment des travailleurs étrangers temporaires dans le domaine agricole.
Les politiques publiques concernant l’immigration sont rarement abordées du point de vue de la retraite. Or, des questions légitimes se posent à cet égard : de quelle couverture financière les personnes immigrantes bénéficieront-elles au moment de prendre leur retraite ? Les mécanismes de financement prévoient-ils des dispositions pour ces personnes ? Comment fonctionnent les ententes internationales en matière de revenus de retraite ? Ces questions sont d’autant plus importantes à poser que des secteurs entiers de l’économie, comme l’agriculture, bénéficient de l’apport croissant des travailleurs étrangers temporaires. Bien qu’ils cotisent à des régimes publics comme le Régime de rentes du Québec, l’accès aux rentes auxquelles ces cotisations donnent droit demeure très laborieux. Le présent Bulletin de l’Observatoire vise à présenter un survol des relations entre travailleurs étrangers temporaires et la retraite.
L’auteur s’intéresse à l’efficacité de la baisse des taxes sur l’essence, à titre de mesure fiscale visant à donner un répit financier aux contribuables québécois.
Si les gouvernements veulent remettre de l’argent dans la poche des contribuables, ils doivent et peuvent procéder autrement. Suite à la hausse récente du prix de l’essence, le premier ministre de l’Alberta Jason Kenney annonçait lundi qu’il suspendra la taxe albertaine sur les carburants à compter du 1er avril. Le lendemain, le chef du Parti conservateur du Québec Éric Duhaime proposait de faire de même au Québec. Réduire les taxes sur les carburants est-il la meilleure façon de donner un répit aux contribuables ? L’examen de quelques éléments essentiels permet de répondre à cette question.
Selon l’auteur, les cinq principaux défis du budget 2022 du Québec sont les suivants : 1) l’organisation de la santé; 2) la lutte aux changements climatiques; 3) le retour à l’équilibre budgétaire; 4) la transition démographique et 5) la rareté de la main-d’œuvre.
La santé, le climat, l’équilibre budgétaire, la démographie et la rareté de main-d’œuvre sont les incontournables du dernier budget avant les élections. Le 22 mars prochain, le ministre des Finances Éric Girard présentera son 4e budget, le dernier avant les élections générales d’octobre 2022. Certains le soupçonneront de vouloir présenter un budget électoraliste. Mais en dépit du cycle électoral ce budget sera important, car le Québec doit affronter simultanément plusieurs défis déjà présents et qui le resteront dans les prochaines années.
Dans cet article, portant sur la diversification de l’économie Albertaine, les auteurs démentent quatre mythes soit que l’Alberta est une province uniquement pétrolière, que la diversification de l’économie est nécessaire pour des finances publiques stables, que des efforts de diversification provenant uniquement du gouvernement sont suffisants et que la diversification est intrinsèquement bonne.
Despite frequent calls for intentional diversification, Alberta’s economy is approximately as diversified as the rest of the provinces, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.
[…]Despite misperceptions, oil and gas production in the province does not dominate economic activity or employment in Alberta to the point that the provincial economy is notably less diversified than other provinces or even other advanced, industrial economies like Germany or Japan. In fact, with respect to employment, Alberta’s was the most diversified provincial economy in Canada in 2020.
As far as overall economic diversification goes, Alberta is strikingly similar to most other provinces, as the economy isn’t unusually concentrated in any given industry. In fact, Alberta in 2020 was the fourth most diversified provincial economy in Canada as measured by GDP concentration – more diversified than Ontario or British Columbia.
Furthermore, Alberta’s history provides several examples of unsuccessful top-down diversification attempts that resulted in taxpayer resources being wasted.
[…]Cet article, faisant une analyse comparative de la croissance de la productivité et de l’amélioration des conditions de vie en Australie et au Canada conclut que l’économie australienne a dépassé l’économie Canadienne depuis le milieu des années 1990.
From roughly the early 1950s to 2008, Canadians enjoyed a higher standard of living (as measured by per-person GDP, after adjusting for inflation) than Australians—but that advantage has been reversed since 2009, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.
[…]Between 1973 and 1995, Canadians (on average) enjoyed $2,668 in higher per-person GDP compared to Australians—the gap peaked in 1988 at $3,640.
Since 2009, however, Australians have enjoyed higher living standards (again, as measured by per-person GDP). Specifically, Australia’s per-person GDP was (on average) $1,718 higher than Canada’s between 2009 and 2019 (note the analysis uses inflation-adjusted standardized U.S. dollars).
Both countries undertook significant economic reforms including removing barriers to more open trade and improving competitiveness. However, Australia has been more successful in increasing productivity, which has led to a higher level of per-person GDP than Canada.
According to the study, higher levels of investment are key to Australia’s success. Between 1995 and 2020, Australia’s total investment was 26 per cent of GDP compared to 22 per cent in Canada.
[…]Cet article analyse la taille des gouvernements des différentes provinces du Canada basé sur les dépenses totales en proportion de l’économie entre 2007 et 2019. La taille est un aspect important puisqu’elle influence la croissance économique et les progrès sociaux.
The combined size of the federal, provincial, and municipal governments increased in all but two provinces over the 2007 to 2019 period relative to the sizes of their economies, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.
[…]The study measures federal, provincial, and local government spending in each province as a share of the economy (GDP) from 2007 to 2019, the most recent year of comparable data. Both 2007 and 2019 preceded a recession and thus provide an opportunity to compare like-years.
It finds that government size grew in every province except Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island during that period. In 2019, the size of government relative to the economy as a whole across Canada ranged from a low of 29.7 per cent in Alberta to a high of 60.2 per cent in Nova Scotia, and was 40.4 per cent for Canada as a whole.
Previous research has shown that the size of government (as a share of the economy) to maximize economic growth and social progress is between 26 and 30 per cent of the economy (GDP). When governments exceed that size, it imposes negative effects on the economy, such as crowding out private sector investment, but without providing proportionate benefits such as greater social progress. Crucially, the data used in the analysis is prior to COVID-19 and recession-related spending, meaning the size of government already exceeded the optimal size prior to the current spike in spending.
[…]Les auteurs présentent les différentes modalités et la taille de la dépense fiscale liée au congé fiscal sur le carburant du gouvernement de l’Alberta.
On March 7, 2022 — in response to rapidly rising energy prices triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on top of inflation already at generational highs — the Government of Alberta announced it will suspend provincial fuel taxes as of April 1, 2022. In addition, it will provide a $150 credit on households’ electricity bills. What do these policy moves mean for Alberta families? Will they “reverse” the federal carbon tax, as Premier Kenney claimed in the announcement? We focus on the fuel tax ‘holiday’ as this is the largest change. The current fuel tax is $0.13/L on gasoline and diesel, and $0.04/L on marked (farm) fuel. These fall to zero between April 1 and June 30, with a quarterly review thereafter. Any reintroduction of the tax will depend on the price of West Texas Intermediate remaining below $90 per barrel, with full reinstatement at $80 per barrel.
États-Unis
L’auteur présente les conséquences potentielles des baisses d’impôts envisagées par certains états ayant engendré des surplus grâce aux mesures d’aide fiscale du gouvernement fédéral américain.
Policymakers in at least 14 states are using temporary budget surpluses to call for costly and permanent tax cuts targeted more to wealthy people and profitable corporations than to those who need help. That’s a bad choice. States should be careful to protect their long-term ability to provide funding for high-quality schools, access to affordable health care, and other public services, which these tax cuts would badly erode. Instead of permanent tax cuts, states should use the surpluses for needed one-time supports for people and businesses or to seed longer-term investments, especially those targeted to the communities most harmed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The surpluses largely reflect substantial — but temporary — federal funding provided in relief bills enacted in 2020 and 2021; those relief bills also boosted state economies and thus state revenues as well, further improving state fiscal conditions. Many of these federal relief efforts have ended, including stimulus payments and expanded unemployment benefits. States have appropriated much of the direct fiscal aid they received from the federal government, which must be spent within five years.
L’auteur analyse l’impact de l’élargissement de l’admissibilité au Child Tax Credit sur la population de Puerto Rico
The American Rescue Plan’s expansions of the Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) are expected to significantly reduce poverty in Puerto Rico, according to two studies published by organizations based in Puerto Rico. The two credits combined could provide more than $2 billion to Puerto Rico families in 2022 as they file their 2021 taxes. The expansions are critically important for Puerto Rico, which has among the highest poverty rates in the country: 44 percent for its general population and an even higher 57 percent for children. Moreover, the measures are welcome relief following years of economic decline, an ongoing bankruptcy process, devastating natural disasters, and the pandemic. Last March’s Rescue Plan permanently fixed a long-standing flaw that limited the Child Tax Credit to families with three or more children in Puerto Rico. Now, for the first time in nearly 20 years, families with one or two children can claim the credit — a move that makes roughly 89 percent of, or 304,000, families with children in the territory newly eligible. That’s according to a study by the Youth Development Institute (YDI), a public policy institute focusing on child poverty in Puerto Rico, which also found that a full 97 percent of families in the territory are now eligible for the credit.
Discours du vice-président aux politiques fiscales des états du CBPP devant le comité sur la réforme et la surveillance.
Chairwoman Maloney, Ranking Member Comer, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Michael Leachman, Vice President for State Fiscal Policy at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a nonpartisan research and policy institute in Washington, D.C. I will provide an overview of the historic gains achieved by the federal government’s robust COVID-19 relief efforts, including the American Rescue Plan. I’ll then explain how the American Rescue Plan’s State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds, in particular, are helping states, localities, tribal governments, and U.S. Territories respond to the pandemic, assist people and businesses to recover from it, and support a stronger economic recovery. I’ll also offer some thoughts about providing federal fiscal aid to these governments in future recessions.
Cet article, fondé sur des études auprès de la population aux États-Unis, analyse la façon dont les contribuables et les entreprises estiment l’inflation ainsi que les manières dont les décideurs publics peuvent influencer la variation des taux d’inflation.
This paper reviews theory and evidence on how consumers and firms form their expectations about inflation and how monetary policymakers might influence that process; both of those factors have implications for the Congressional Budget Office’s baseline projections and policy analyses.
Inflation expectations are important because they affect decisions that determine actual inflation. Surveys of consumers and business managers provide especially useful data for studying the process of forming expectations. Empirical evidence suggests that economically meaningful information frictions exist in the process of forming expectations and that the structure of those information frictions is such that realizing more persistent inflation or increasing the incentive to collect information on inflation—perhaps as the result of ongoing supply disruptions, such as the ones precipitated by the coronavirus pandemic—would reduce them.
There is also empirical evidence of substantial biases in individual-level inflation forecasts, which possibly amplify trends in the realized inflation data. Surveys reveal that, before the onset of the pandemic, firm managers did not pay much attention to aggregate inflation dynamics and were not well informed about the objectives or actions of monetary policymakers. If the observed level of information frictions decreased enough at the same time that individual decisionmakers’ inflation forecasts continued to amplify trends in the realized inflation data, then aggregate measures of inflation expectations might begin to amplify those trends as well.
Robert Jay Dilger et Anthony A. Cilluffo, « Small Business Administration 504/CDC Loan Guaranty Program », 4 mars 2022, 33 p.
Zhe Li, « Social Security: The Government Pension Offset (GPO) », 7 mars 2022, 19 p.
Anthony A. Cilluffo et Robert S. Kirk, « Potential Impacts of a Federal Gasoline Tax Moratorium », 9 mars 2022, 3 p.
Jane G. Gravelle, « International Tax Proposals Addressing Profit Shifting: Pillars 1 and 2 », 10 mars 2022, 3 p.
Gary Guenther, « Tax Treatment of Research Expenses: Current Law and Policy Issues», 11 mars 2022, 3 p.
Margot L. Crandall-Hollick et Molly F. Sherlock, « The Charitable Deduction for Individuals», 14 mars 2022, 3 p.
À l’aide d’une nouvelle base de données des taux d’imposition macroéconomiques effectifs couvrant 150 pays depuis 1965, les auteurs tentent de déterminer en quoi la mondialisation a affecté la taxation relative du travail et du capital. Les résultats de leur analyse mènent à quatre constatations principales. En outre, des différences entre les pays développés et en développement peuvent être relevés : alors que le taux effectif d’imposition du capital a baissé dans les pays de l’OCDE (soit l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques), il a augmenté dans le reste du monde lors de la période d’hyper-mondialisation post-1995.
How has globalization affected the relative taxation of labor and capital, and why? To address this question we build and analyze a new database of effective macroeconomic tax rates covering 150 countries since 1965, constructed by combining national accounts data with government revenue statistics. We obtain four main findings: (1) The effective tax rates on labor and capital converged globally since the 1960s, due to a 10 percentage-point increase in labor taxation and a 5 percentage-point decline in capital taxation. (2) The decline in capital taxation is concentrated in high-income countries. By contrast, capital taxation increased in developing countries since the 1990s, albeit from a low base.(3) Consistently across a variety of research designs, we find that the rise in capital taxation in developing countries can be explained by a tax-capacity effect of international trade: Trade openness leads to a concentration of economic activity in formal corporate structures, where capital taxes are easier to impose. (4) At the same time, international economic integration reduces statutory tax rates, due to increased tax competition. In high income countries, this negative tax competition effect of trade has dominated, while in developing countries the positive tax-capacity effect of international trade appears to have prevailed.
Bien qu’il soit compréhensible que les décideurs politiques souhaitent diminuer le prix de l’essence à la pompe et plusieurs États américains aient des revenus permettant de réduire la taxe sur l’essence, les auteurs de cet article concluent qu’il y a de meilleurs moyens afin de réduire la charge fiscale des contribuables.
With gas prices soaring in March, Florida is preparing to give drivers a gas tax holiday—in October. A cynic might wonder why the gas tax holiday aligns so closely with election season (lawmakers cite other reasons), but in many respects, the timing is the least of the issues with Florida’s pending suspension of the gas tax.
There’s also the fact that much of the relief may never wind up in drivers’ pockets. That it severs the link, at least temporarily, between the act of driving and the upkeep of roads. That it incentivizes more driving during a time of inflation and scarcity (now, at least; for October, who can say?). And that it puts Florida on a collision course with the federal government.
Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) originally proposed an indefinite suspension of the gas tax, and then a five-month suspension beginning with the new fiscal year in July, but lawmakers pared that down to one month. They also agreed to suspend the tax in October, ostensibly because it comes after peak tourist season and lawmakers didn’t want to share the benefits of this tax relief with tourists. The delay, however, calls into question whether the policy does much to help Floridians currently struggling under the burden of high gas prices.
[…]L’arrivée de la Covid-19 a fait naître un désir aux États-Unis de rapatrier les entreprises du secteur manufacturier, afin de rivaliser avec le secteur des services, qui avait délesté ce pays en raison des tarifs et d’une pénalité élevée pour les entreprises hautement capitalisées, bien que des exceptions existaient afin de réduire les effets pour les entreprises non concernées. Les auteurs suggèrent ainsi davantage de neutralité fiscale.
Policymakers on both the left and right have brought industrial policy back into focus after slow growth over the past few decades and growing concern over the state of America’s manufacturing sector.
In the context of the tax code, industrial policy usually comes in the form of non-neutral subsidies for specific industries or sectors, or taxes on imports (i.e., tariffs) of particular goods to protect a specific domestic industry.
The existing tax code is biased against capital-intensive manufacturers, as it prevents companies from deducting capital costs the same way they deduct labor costs.
Fixing the bias against capital investment is preferable to pursuing industrial policy through the tax code, as subsidies tend to be ineffective and tariffs often weaken protected domestic industries and harm downstream industries
L’auteure analyse les recouvrements d’impôts des différents États composant les États-Unis. Selon elle, le fait que les revenus aient été plus élevés qu’anticipé pendant la pandémie s’explique en partie par l’injection de billions de dollars dans l’économie par le gouvernement fédéral.
The global pandemic caused an unprecedented economic disruption across the nation. But two years in, state and local tax revenues are growing by double digits, much faster than state and local economies. The large gap between growth in revenues versus economic activity is an indication that some of this strength is related to temporary factors or adjustments and not necessarily indicative of likely continued growth. The recent surge in state tax revenues is largely attributable to factors such as the robust stock market, the record number of initial public offerings (IPOs), higher inflation, the boost in spending on taxable goods, and anticipation of (possible) federal tax hikes. The longer-term outlook for state and local budgets remains uncertain.
Les auteurs présentent un résumé du travail effectué par un groupe d’étude fiscale, chargé d’analyser l’efficacité et l’équité du système fiscal du Colorado, aux États-Unis. Parmi les faits pertinents mis en lumière par ce groupe d’experts, ils relèvent qu’en ce qui a trait aux recettes générales, le Colorado a perçu 19% de redevances, 17% d’impôts fonciers, 14% de taxes de vente générales et 14% d’impôts sur le revenu des particuliers en 2018, ce qui correspond à peu près aux moyennes nationales.
At the start of 2020, Governor Jared Polis organized a Tax Study Group and charged it with analyzing the efficiency and equity of Colorado’s tax system. Over the course of the year, the Tax Study Group held five learning sessions. Throughout this process, the Urban Institute’s State and Local Finance Initiative, a project of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, shared its research expertise, microsimulation model data, and national and state policy perspectives with the group. This report summarizes that work.
Dans le cadre d’un témoignage portant sur la réforme de la déduction caritative devant le Comité des finances du Sénat des États-Unis, l’auteur a partagé son avis selon lequel une déduction universelle sans plancher coûterait 17 M $ de plus qu’une déduction universelle avec un plancher de 1%, tout en ne générant que 2 M $ supplémentaires pour les bénéficiaires caritatifs.
Institute Fellow C. Eugene Steuerle testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance on options for improving the lives of charitable beneficiaries through reform of the charitable deduction. The testimony outlines ways to create a more effective charitable incentive and makes recommendations on evaluating trade-offs for reform of the charitable deduction.
Selon l’auteur, de nombreuses familles à faible revenu risquent de ne pas bénéficier de l’intégralité du crédit d’impôt pour enfants parce qu’elles ne remplissent pas de déclaration de revenus.
From July to December, the IRS delivered advanced payments of the 2021 expanded child tax credit (CTC) to the families of over 61 million children. Most received half of their credit but will need to file a tax return to get the rest. However, a new Urban Institute survey finds that some eligible families, especially those who did not receive the advance payments, may not file a tax return this year and will therefore miss out on the credit entirely.
Aux États-Unis, en 2020, 4,2 millions de déclarations de revenus ont été déposées via Free File. C’est le chiffre le plus élevé de ces dix dernières années, mais cela ne représente encore qu’environ 4 % des personnes susceptibles d’être éligibles (celles dont les revenus sont inférieurs au seuil de 69 000 dollars fixé pour 2020, soit environ 70 % de tous les déclarants).
Most of us dread filing tax returns—it’s too complicated, too confusing, and often too expensive. The Free File Program eased some of those burdens for a few million tax filers each year, including me. But its future is uncertain. Less than 5 percent of eligible tax filers use Free File and the two biggest tax prep companies that partnered with the IRS to operate it have quit the program.
International
Cet article analyse les risques fiscaux inhérents aux entreprises détenues par l’État, qui bénéficient d’un plus grand laxisme du gouvernement quant aux problèmes fiscaux auxquels elles peuvent être confrontées et propose des solutions afin de régler les problématiques spécifiques de ces entreprises, notamment des méthodes de gestion des risques standardisées.
Infrastructure is critical to economic development. When infrastructure companies are owned and operated by the government, however, they create significant sources of fiscal risk. These fiscal risks can be sizable, but they are often preventable with proper planning, risk assessment, and strict rules and procedures for corporate and fiscal governance. This paper examines fiscal risk stemming from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the infrastructure sector in a sample of 135 firms in 19 countries from an original database of SOE financials for 2009–18. The paper develops a typology of fiscal risks and their determinants, builds new measures of fiscal injections to SOEs, and documents them using the novel database. The results show that governments support SOEs through a remarkably wide range of fiscal instruments. The fiscal cost of supporting infrastructure SOEs is usually below 1 percent of gross domestic product. Support is more prevalent and frequent than previously thought. The findings show that fiscal risk stems not only from “tail risk,” but also from the everyday operation of infrastructure SOEs. The paper calculates the Altman Z” score (a measure of default risk) and shows that it can be used to forecast the need for fiscal injections in SOEs.
Suivant l’objectif de rendre les entreprises d’infrastructure détenues par le gouvernement (SOEs) compétitives avec les entreprises privées de ce même secteur, les auteurs concluent que, dans l’état actuel, les SOEs sont moins efficaces, représentent une plus grosse portion du PIB, ont de plus grandes responsabilités et des coûts d’emploi plus élevés ainsi que des retours moindres sur le capital investi.
This paper examines the performance of infrastructure companies owned by the state, using the newly created World Bank Database of Infrastructure State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The data cover 19 countries and 135 SOEs between 2000 and 2018. The analysis reveals that infrastructure SOEs are large and have weak financial performance that generates significant fiscal risk. The paper introduces new measures of financial performance net of fiscal transfers and examines previously uncovered patterns of subsidies by sector. It examines the effect of state ownership by comparing the firms in the database with hundreds of comparable private firms, using coarsened exact matching. The findings show that relative to comparable private firms, infrastructure SOEs are less efficient, represent a larger share of gross domestic product, have larger liabilities as a share of gross domestic product and larger employment costs as a share of revenues, and yield lower returns on assets.
Les auteurs s’intéressent au lien potentiel qui existe entre les inquiétudes financières des ménages au Royaume-Uni et la propension marginale à consommer lors de la pandémie de COVID-19. Selon les résultats de leur analyse, lors d’un transfert fiscal, les ménages préoccupés par leur situation financière présentent une propension marginale à la consommation qui est de 20% supérieure à celle des ménages qui ne sont pas inquiets de leur capacité à acquitter leurs dettes.
We study how household concerns about their future financial situation may affect the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) during the COVID-19 pandemic. We use a representative survey of UK households to compute the MPC from a hypothetical transfer of £500. We find that household expectations play a key role in determining differences in MPCs across households: households concerned about not being able to make ends meet have a 20% higher MPC than other households. Our findings suggest that policies targeted to vulnerable and financially distressed households may prove more effective in stimulating demand than providing stimulus payments to all households.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à l’adéquation ainsi qu’à l’efficacité du cadre budgétaire de l’UEMOA (soit l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, en anglais : « WAEMU ») sous l’angle de trois piliers qui se sont avérés efficaces pour soutenir la discipline budgétaire dans les unions monétaires. Selon eux, l’un des aspects importants de la réforme consiste à renforcer la coordination fiscale grâce, entre autres, à la révision de certaines directives fiscales régionales afin de limiter l’utilisation d’incitations fiscales.
This paper assesses the adequacy and effectiveness of the WAEMU fiscal framework along three pillars that have proven to effectively support fiscal discipline in monetary unions—common fiscal rules (including adequacy of numerical ceilings as well as elements of design and enforcement), shared public financial management systems, and coordination mechanisms for decentralized fiscal policies. We undertake a calibration of regional debt and fiscal deficit ceilings taking into account different macroeconomic tradeoffs and risks and conclude that numerical ceilings that prevailed before the suspension of the fiscal rules remain adequate and strike the right balance between growth and fiscal sustainability. The paper also proposes reform options to strengthen the WAEMU regional fiscal surveillance framework, with a view to more effectively supporting fiscal discipline.
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux divers mécanismes internationaux visant à intensifier l’action mondiale en ce qui a trait à l’atténuation des changements climatiques et des lacunes politiques dans ce domaine. Selon eux, l’application des propositions politiques récentes visant l’instauration d’un prix plancher du carbone aurait pour effet d’atténuer les changements climatiques à faibles coûts macroéconomiques, à condition que les investissements énergétiques nécessaires se matérialisent.
This paper discusses and analyzes various international mechanisms to scale up global action on climate mitigation and address the policy gap in this area. Despite the new commitments made at COP 26, there is still an ambition and a policy gap at the global level to keep temperature increases below the 2°C agreed in Paris. Avoiding the worst outcomes of climate change requires an urgent scaling up of climate policies. Recent policy proposals include the idea of common minimum carbon prices, which underlie the IMF’s international carbon price proposal (Parry, Black, and Roaf 2021) and the climate club proposal of the German government. While global carbon prices are not a new idea, the new elements are the use of carbon price floors—which allow countries to do more if they wish—and the differentiation of carbon price floors by level of development. In the absence of international coordination, countries with ambitious climate policies are considering introducing a border carbon adjustment mechanism to prevent domestic producers from being at a competitive disadvantage due to more ambitious domestic climate policies. An interesting question from the global perspective is whether border carbon adjustment would deliver substantial additional emissions reductions or incentivize other countries to join a carbon price floor agreement.
Ce court texte examine les changements fiscaux annoncés par le gouvernement britannique en les mettant en perspectives avec les changements fiscaux effectuée par les différents premiers ministres depuis 1970.
Next week, on 23 March, the Chancellor will deliver the 2022 Spring Statement. In the just over two years since taking office, Mr Sunak has presided over four major fiscal events. During that time, his tax policy has been characterised by large temporary tax cuts – targeted primarily at providing immediate support to sectors hit hardest by the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic – coupled with even larger (and permanent) tax rises, backloaded to the final years of the parliament.
If current plans are enacted, the scale of the tax increases will be large by historic standards. These will start this April with an increase in rates of National Insurance Contributions and a cash freeze in income tax thresholds, and be followed by an increase in corporation tax rates in April 2023. The overall impact will be to gradually ramp up the UK tax burden by an eventual 2% of GDP, according to the Treasury’s own scorecard – equivalent to around £46 billion in today’s money.
In this observation, we briefly examine the tax changes announced by this government so far, before placing them in the wider context of 50 years of fiscal policy by comparing to the tax changes made by Prime Ministers and Chancellors since 1970.
Cette note aborde les inégalités de richesses en Russie et fournit des solutions pour s’attaquer à la forte évasion fiscale des richesse russes vers des paradis fiscaux.
Cette note fournit des données sur l’inégalité des richesses en Russie et plaide en faveur d’un registre européen des actifs. La Russie présente les plus fortes inégalités de richesse en Europe. En outre, les ressortissants les plus riches de Russie dissimulent une grande partie de leur patrimoine dans des paradis fiscaux. L’architecture actuelle du système financier mondial empêche d’obtenir des informations complètes sur les bénéficiaires effectifs pour tous les types d’actifs et toutes les juridictions. Sous le toit d’un registre européen des actifs, les informations déjà existantes mais actuellement dispersées pourraient être rassemblées. Cela changerait la donne, ce qui se traduirait par des sanctions mieux ciblées et des outils efficaces pour lutter contre le blanchiment d’argent, la corruption et l’évasion fiscale. L’Union européenne pourrait jouer un rôle de pionnier en franchissant la prochaine étape vers une plus grande transparence financière.
Cet article, portant sur la situation au Royaume-Uni, analyse les incidences de la guerre en Ukraine, de l’augmentation drastique des prix à la pompe et de la faible augmentation du revenu d’emploi quant au revenu des ménages pour les années à venir, ce qui devra être palier un interventionnisme fiscal étatique accru.
This is our fourth Living Standards Outlook, exploring how household incomes and inequalities may change over the next five years, based on the latest economic forecasts and Government policy. We explore how Covid-19 has buffeted incomes over the last two years; what exceptionally high inflation, the conflict in Ukraine and policy changes will mean for UK living standards this year; and the longer-term prospects for recovery. Our projections use Bank of England and Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts for prices, wages, employment and more, but our modelling looks beyond averages to show what these aggregate forecasts could mean for real living standards across society.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Samuel Carbonneau
- Florence Lemire Jeune
- Jean-Nicolas Tremblay
- Camille Turgeon
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé