Bulletin de veille du 16 novembre 2021
Québec/Canada
L’auteure analyse les nouvelles données de revenu viable parues pour la Nouvelle-Écosse, mettant notamment en lumière le rôle des crédits d’impôt et des transferts.
This living wage report provides living wage rates for Nova Scotia. Living wage rates were calculated for the entire province by regions defined according to Statistics Canada’s economic regions: Halifax ($22.05), Cape Breton ($18.45), Annapolis Valley ($21.30), Southern ($21.03), and Northern ($19.20). For the two communities that can be compared to previous year’s calculations, the wage rates have increased, for Halifax by 1% and for Cape Breton by 4%. These increases are due to a combination of cost increases (in shelter in particular), methodological changes, and because there was little improvement in tax credits or income transfers. The living wage is calculated to arrive at an hourly rate at which a household can meet its basic needs (the expenses in the living wage budget), once government transfers have been added to the family’s income (such as federal and provincial child benefits) and deductions have been subtracted (such as income taxes and Employment Insurance premiums). In Cape Breton, for example, increases in the employment income needed to cover expenses this year meant the income exceeded the threshold to qualify for the GST credit and resulted in less child benefit.
Les auteurs analysent les nouvelles données de revenu viable pour la région métropolitaine de Vancouver, discutant des plafonds de revenu des crédits d’impôt disponibles aux britanno-colombiens et illustrant l’impact du projet de garderies à 10$ par jour proposé par le gouvernement Trudeau sur les résultats.
The Metro Vancouver living wage was first calculated in 2008 by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, First Call: BC Child and Youth Advocacy Coalition and Victoria’s Community Social Planning Council. In 2008, the living wage for families was $16.74 per hour in Metro Vancouver and $16.39 per hour in Metro Victoria. That full report, detailing the principles, rationale, methodology, data sources and business case for the living wage, can be found at policyalternatives.ca/livingwage2021. Since 2008, of course, the cost of living has increased significantly and government taxes and transfers have changed so we update our calculation regularly. Notably, the 2021 living wage is $1.02 per hour higher than it was two years ago in 2019 (we did not update the living wage calculation in 2020 because the global COVID-19 pandemic caused unprecedented disruptions and temporary shifts in regular family expenses and employment patterns). Although the cost of living—and particularly the cost of housing—continues to rise, the 2021 Metro Vancouver living wage is slightly lower than it was in 2018 ($20.91). This is a result of public policy changes since 2018, notably significant child care investments, the new BC Child Opportunity Benefit and the elimination of MSP premiums, among other small changes to government transfers and taxes. These changes have more than offset the increase in family expenses since 2018, improving affordability for modest- and middle-income families with young children (read more about this on page 5). This demonstrates the power of good public policy to make life more affordable for families and reduce pressure on employers having to pay higher wages.
Le CCPA publie la 26e édition de son budget fédéral alternatif intitulé : « Mission essentielle, une reprise juste et équitable », présentant entre autre des moyens de préparer la fiscalité canadienne à financer les dépenses majeures liées à la crise climatique, ainsi que des alternatives afin de la rendre plus équitable pour tous.
Alors que la pandémie de COVID-19 continue de perturber notre vie et de mettre à rude épreuve tous les systèmes dont nous dépendons, il est essentiel que tous les gouvernements fassent front commun pour piloter une reprise juste et équitable menée par les pouvoirs publics. Le Canada ne manque pas de défis et de crises : dans certains cas, nous tirons la sonnette d’alarme depuis des années. La crise de la COVID-19 a braqué les projecteurs sur plusieurs de ces préoccupations. Et les défis sont loin d’être terminés. L’incertitude est la nouvelle certitude. À travers le monde, les chaînes d’approvisionnement demeurent fragiles. Les emplois précaires et atypiques continuent d’aggraver l’insécurité alimentaire et financière d’un trop grand nombre de travailleurs. Les loyers et le prix des logements étant incroyablement élevés, de nombreuses personnes se retrouvent dans une situation financière difficile et sont surendettées. Les systèmes de santé de l’Alberta et de la Saskatchewan sont en plein chaos. Les inégalités en matière de santé ont été mises en évidence et exacerbées par la pandémie, mais elles existent depuis longtemps au Canada. Depuis son tout premier Budget fédéral alternatif (BFA) dans les années 1990, le Centre canadien de politiques alternatives (CCPA) tire la sonnette d’alarme sur des inégalités de revenu et de richesse profondément enracinées au Canada, en particulier en ce qui touche les femmes et les genres marginalisés, les communautés racialisées et immigrantes, les Peuples Autochtones et les personnes handicapées.
Le crédit d’impôt pour prolongation de carrière apparaît peu efficace pour son coût important et il gagnerait à être amélioré.
Cette note d’analyse évalue l’effet d’une amélioration du taux d’emploi des travailleurs expérimentés (60 à 69 ans) sur les finances publiques québécoises de 2021 à 2050. En comparaison avec un scénario où le taux d’emploi par âge et par niveau de scolarité reste stable, la prolongation de la croissance du taux d’emploi des 60 à 69 ans observée au cours des dernières années entraîne une augmentation des revenus de 1,9 G$ en 2030 (en $ constants de 2021) et une diminution de la dette brute en % du PIB de 2,4 points la même année. L’atteinte d’un taux d’emploi de 50 % chez les 60 à 69 ans, en 2030, augmente quant à elle les revenus de 2,6 G$ cette année-là et diminue la dette brute de 3,3 points de % du PIB. Cette note montre toutefois qu’une telle hausse serait difficile à atteindre par des incitatifs fiscaux, comme en témoigne le crédit d’impôt pour travailleurs expérimentés dont nous montrons le peu d’effet malgré l’investissement de sommes importantes. Pour finir, la note propose trois mesures visant à accroître le taux d’emploi des travailleurs expérimentés et qui pourraient faire l’objet d’études.
Une recension de mesures destinées aux entreprises afin de stimuler la participation des travailleurs expérimentés au marché du travail.
Alors que la pandémie de COVID-19 continue de perturber notre vie et de mettre à rude épreuve tous les systèmes dont nous dépendons, il est essentiel que tous les gouvernements fassent front commun pour piloter une reprise juste et équitable menée par les pouvoirs publics. Le Canada ne manque pas de défis et de crises : dans certains cas, nous tirons la sonnette d’alarme depuis des années. La crise de la COVID-19 a braqué les projecteurs sur plusieurs de ces préoccupations. Et les défis sont loin d’être terminés. L’incertitude est la nouvelle certitude. À travers le monde, les chaînes d’approvisionnement demeurent fragiles. Les emplois précaires et atypiques continuent d’aggraver l’insécurité alimentaire et financière d’un trop grand nombre de travailleurs. Les loyers et le prix des logements étant incroyablement élevés, de nombreuses personnes se retrouvent dans une situation financière difficile et sont surendettées. Les systèmes de santé de l’Alberta et de la Saskatchewan sont en plein chaos. Les inégalités en matière de santé ont été mises en évidence et exacerbées par la pandémie, mais elles existent depuis longtemps au Canada. Depuis son tout premier Budget fédéral alternatif (BFA) dans les années 1990, le Centre canadien de politiques alternatives (CCPA) tire la sonnette d’alarme sur des inégalités de revenu et de richesse profondément enracinées au Canada, en particulier en ce qui touche les femmes et les genres marginalisés, les communautés racialisées et immigrantes, les Peuples Autochtones et les personnes handicapées.
Les auteurs s’intéressent au Programme d’embauche pour la relance économique du Canada (PEREC). Selon eux, le PEREC améliore les possibilités d’évitement fiscal pour les petites entreprises. Ils relèvent également que certains effets du PEREC semblent aller à l’encontre des objectifs de promotion des offres d’emploi et d’amélioration des résultats sur le marché du travail pour les travailleurs actuellement sans emploi ou inactifs
The Canada Recovery Hiring Program (CRHP) is a 50% wage subsidy for employers and the new centrepiece of federal job support programs. CRHP is targeted at employers who hire new workers or expand hours worked, which should make it more cost-effective than the previous federal wage subsidy. But the restriction of the program to private corporations and the lack of guardrails to prevent abuse could be a problem. We propose reforms that would make the program better targeted at increasing employment and raising workers’ pay.
L’auteur se penche sur l’évolution des dépenses injectées dans le système de soins de santé du Canada. Il souligne que bien que le débat sur les dépenses se concentre souvent sur la durabilité, la question la plus importante, soit l’optimisation des dépenses, est souvent oubliée.
In the end, it is not only how much or how little you spend but what you spend it on and what you get for it. Canadian health care is not bad, but it could be better, given the amount of money being spent. Canada is one of the biggest spenders in the world on health, both per capita and as a share of GDP. Yet, it often appears that there are never enough resources for health care at a time of ever-increasing need. Long wait times, short-staffed hospitals, problems in long-term-care homes and federal-provincial wrangling over funding models have plagued the sector for years. It was a long road over many decades that got us to this point – and it’s important to understand how this occurred. There is also obvious room for improvement, even if there is not a consensus on what needs to be done.
L’auteur s’intéresse à la meilleure manière pour le Canada d’atteindre ses objectifs climatiques. Selon lui, la transition du système énergétique du Canada nécessite bien plus que de mettre moins l’accent sur les combustibles fossiles par le biais de politiques telles que la tarification du carbone et la norme promise pour l’électricité propre.
Tax breaks and preferential financing for lower carbon options aren’t working. Governments must work with all economic sectors to reduce emissions. September’s federal election followed a singularly hot summer and the publication of the latest United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report that was unequivocal about the need to redouble efforts to avoid the worst climate outcomes. The Liberals campaigned on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to at least 40 per cent below 2005 emission levels by 2030, on the way to reaching net-zero GHG emissions by 2050. The electricity sector’s net-zero goal comes 15 years sooner, by 2035.
L’auteure analyse le fonctionnement actuel et les conséquences du programme de chèques emplois-services et propose des pistes de solutions afin de le moderniser le système et de réduire la précarité de la situation pour les travailleurs.euses en soins de santé à domicile.
Dès le début de la pandémie de COVID-19, la politique québécoise de services et de soins de longue durée s’est révélée inadéquate tant pour le bien-être de ses usager·ère·s que pour celui du personnel. Les allocations directes (ou cash-for-care) — par lesquelles l’État verse une somme d’argent directement aux personnes — sont parfois perçues comme un des moyens simples d’entreprendre un virage vers les services et les soins à domicile.
Cette fiche propose un état des lieux critique des allocations directes à partir de l’analyse du programme chèque emploi-service (CES).
Les auteurs évaluent la pertinence du crédit pour le captage, l’utilisation et le stockage du carbone prévu en 2022 par le gouvernement fédéral et suggèrent des améliorations qui pourraient le rendre plus compétitif avec des mesures similaires aux États-Unis.
Les cibles d’émissions sont susceptibles de devenir plus ambitieuses à la suite de la prochaine Conférence des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques (COP 26). Comme il s’agit de la seule technologie actuellement disponible qui puisse produire des émissions négatives, le captage, l’utilisation et le stockage du carbone (CUSC) est un outil essentiel de la stratégie climatique du Canada. Le CUSC est reconnu par le gouvernement canadien et le secteur privé comme une occasion en or tant pour l’économie que pour la protection de l’environnement. Cependant, il convient d’accorder une attention particulière à l’élaboration des politiques publiques visant à encourager ces technologies de manière à ce qu’elles soient aussi efficaces que possible.
Bien que le Canada se classe parmi les pays de l’OCDE ayant les systèmes de soins de santé universels les plus dispendieux, il fait piètre figure en matière d’accessibilité financière et de disponibilité des ressources médicales comparativement aux autres pays de l’OCDE dont il devrait donc s’inspirer.
Despite spending more on health care than most other developed countries with universal coverage, Canada has some of the lowest numbers of doctors, hospital beds, and medical technologies—and the longest wait times, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.
[…]The study compares 28 universal health-care systems in developed countries, spotlighting several key areas including cost, availability and use of resources, access to care, clinical performance and quality, and the health of Canadians.
In 2019, the latest year of comparable data, Canada’s health-care spending as a share of GDP (11.3 per cent) ranked second highest (after adjusting for population age) behind only Switzerland.
But despite Canada’s high level of spending, availability and access to medical resources is generally worse than in comparable countries (its performance in terms of utilization and quality is mixed).
[…]Crucially, among the 10 comparable universal health-care countries that measure wait times, Canada ranks last with the lowest percentage (38 per cent) of patients who waited four weeks or less to see a specialist, and the lowest percentage of patients (62 per cent) who waited four months or less for elective surgery.
“Canada’s relative lack of critical resources and struggle with long wait times for treatment precede the COVID-19 pandemic” said Mackenzie Moir, Policy Analyst and co-author of the report.”
Dans les prochaines années, la règle de l’arrimage de la péréquation à la croissance exercera une pression à la hausse sur le programme alors que les disparités fiscales entre provinces riches et pauvres se sont réduites durant la COVID-19 et au cours des dernières années. Sans cette règle, initialement conçue pour fixer un plafond, les paiements devraient diminuer.
Due to a design flaw in Canada’s equalization program, “have not” provinces will receive $8.9 billion in overpayments by 2025/26, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.
“This design flaw means billions in additional equalization spending in the years ahead, despite the shrinking gap between richer and poorer provinces,” said Ben Eisen, senior fellow at the Fraser Institute and coauthor of Why Is Equalization Still Growing? 2021 Update.
Despite a shrinking gap in the incomes of richer and poorer provinces, the study shows that due to a design flaw in the equalization program, costs will continue to rise each year. Specifically, equalization spending is projected to reach an estimated $25.1 billion in 2025/26 compared to only $16.2 billion if the flawed rule didn’t exist, an “overpayment” in excess of 50 per cent.
Moreover, under the flawed rule, projections show Ontario becoming a recipient or “have not” province by 2025/26 and receiving billions of extra dollars each year because of the program’s design.
“As the gap between richer and poorer provinces shrinks, policymakers should review the equalization program to ensure the formula is sensitive to changing fiscal and economic conditions,” Eisen said.
En raison des impacts économiques causés par la COVID-19 et la population vieillissante de l’Ontario, qui représentera environ 24% de la population en 2043, le gouvernement ontarien devra instaurer de nouvelles politiques afin d’éviter une sérieuse détérioration de la santé financière de la province.
Ontario’s senior population will reach nearly 24 per cent of the total population by 2043, leading to persistent budget deficits and increased health-care spending, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.
“Ontario’s aging population will only put more pressure on provincial finances in the coming years,” said Jake Fuss, senior economist at the Fraser Institute and co-author of The Implications of an Aging Population for Government Finances in Ontario.
For example, the study finds that health-care expenditures will increase by an estimated 4.1 per cent annually (on average) from now until 2040/41. Consequently, Ontario’s health-care spending is projected to increase from 7.1 percent of GDP in 2019 to 7.6 percent of GDP by 2040.
While the Ontario government currently expects to run budget deficits until at 2029/30, the study finds the aging population will cause further challenges and the province may not balance its budget until at least 2040/41 unless it makes changes to its spending.
The risk of future recessions, rising interest rates, and other unexpected events will only compound problems further.
[…]Dans un avenir rapproché, l’économie canadienne devra s’adapter aux changements climatiques et à l’évolution technologique en déployant des politiques fiscales afin de stimuler les investissements privés et réglementant, entre autres par des incitatifs fiscaux, les incidences climatiques et les incidences des nouveaux produits technologiques.
Canadian governments are counting on strong economic growth to reduce debt burdens that ballooned during the pandemic. But realizing that growth depends on how well Canadian businesses adapt to rapidly changing market realities.
In the near term, Canada’s economic recovery looks promising as business activity bounces back.
In the longer term, however, Canada’s economy faces strong headwinds that are not being factored into government projections. Canada’s economic challenges go beyond slowing labour force growth and modest productivity gains. Fiscal recovery forecasts do not consider the probability of more frequent and costly natural disasters or the implications of the global economic transformation to stave off the worst effects of climate change.
Accelerating international climate action, investors awakening to climate risks and rapid technological change are combining in ways that will shift trade patterns and upend markets. Canada has a choice: Lead, follow or be left behind.
Les gouvernements provinciaux et fédéraux, rapportant présentement des dépenses et des revenus plus élevés que leurs prévisions budgétaires, se doivent d’être davantage transparents et responsables envers la population canadienne dans leurs politiques fiscales, leur permettant ainsi d’être davantage préparés pour faire face aux pressions fiscales.
Over the course of 20 fiscal years, Canada’s federal, provincial and territorial governments routinely overshot their annual budget targets, says a new report from the C.D. Howe Institute.
Authors William B.P. Robson and Miles Wu find that since 2000/01, Canada’s senior governments have overshot budgeted expenses by a cumulative $119 billion and overshot budgeted revenue by $143 billion. They went into the COVID-19 crisis spending $3,100 more per Canadian, and taxing $3,800 more, than they would have if they had met their past budget commitments.
The authors note that annual revenue and spending overshoots tend to coincide. That would not happen if governments responded to booms and busts with normal stabilization policies. It suggests that governments reacted to accidental or engineered revenue overshoots with in-year spending, or otherwise manipulated their reported numbers to achieve a predetermined bottom line.
Le Canada doit s’assurer que son crédit d’impôt à l’investissement, s’avérant un outil clé afin de déployer stratégie de captage, d’utilisation et de stockage de carbone (CUSC), soit compétitif et en mesure d’attirer le capital nécessaire à l’implantation de cette stratégie afin de respecter les cibles climatiques de 2030.
In Canada, businesses, public institutions and consumers all have a role. Canada’s public and private sectors need to work closely to foster development, commercialization and widespread adoption of the innovative technologies that can ensure continued economic prosperity and environmental excellence at the same time.
Carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) is one of Canada’s most promising opportunities. It holds immense potential to reduce emissions globally considering that approximately 40 percent of the world’s electricity is still coal-generated. The International Energy Agency has concluded that “reaching net zero will be virtually impossible without carbon capture utilization and storage.” Canada’s Industry Strategy Council recently identified CCUS as a source of exportable expertise that can help position the country as a world leader in clean energy and technology.
The federal government has pledged to develop a comprehensive CCUS strategy and promised a CCUS investment tax credit in its last budget. This tax credit is expected to apply to investments beginning next year, suggesting CCUS will be central to helping Canada meet its ambitious 2030 target (40- to 45-percent reduction in GHG emissions) and net zero aspirations.
Norway and the United States are already moving quickly to facilitate CCUS projects while supporting the long-term competitiveness of their energy industries. These policies can de-risk the substantial investments required to launch CCUS, and leverage the capital, networks and energy industry knowledge to realize emerging growth opportunities.
Now is the time for Canada to do the same.
Les auteurs analysent les données disponibles et réévaluent la quantité de personnes sans-abri dans 49 communautés canadiennes et suggèrent des mesures fiscales mieux adaptées afin de diminuer ce nombre.
In 2018, the federal government coordinated point-in-time counts in 61 Canadian communities. These counts, all conducted over the course of a few nights during the months of March and April, revealed that 25,216 people were experiencing homelessness. Of those, 20,803 slept in emergency shelters while 4,481 slept on the streets, in cars, or in some other unsuitable place.
Reviewing the data for 49 of those 61 communities, this paper examines the impact of community-level conditions on the prevalence of homelessness. The structural determinants of both sheltered and unsheltered homelessness are examined. The analysis shows that more expensive low-quality rental units have a strong positive relationship with the numbers of people staying in homeless shelters. A higher percentage of people in a community living in poverty is also related to increased numbers of people having to make use of homeless shelters. Increases in social assistance income, which undoubtedly improved the well-being of recipients, had no significant relationship with the number of people experiencing homelessness. This latter result is consistent with individuals and families with low income having a small income elasticity of housing demand. For these individuals and families, marginal additions to income are first used to relieve constraints on their budgets for food, utilities, and other necessities rather than being used to finance improvements in † Data on point-in-time counts were made available to us by Employment and Social Development Canada. The opinions and interpretations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Employment and Social Development Canada or the Government of Canada. We thank Rachel Campbell, Patrick Hunter, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations are solely the responsibility of the authors. 1 housing conditions. The fraction of the population that self-identifies as Indigenous is positively related to both sheltered and unsheltered homelessness, a result consistent with claims of discrimination in housing markets. Finally, a milder climate is associated with higher numbers of people experiencing unsheltered homelessness.
Carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) is one of Canada’s most promising opportunities. It holds immense potential to reduce emissions globally considering that approximately 40 percent of the world’s electricity is still coal-generated. The International Energy Agency has concluded that “reaching net zero will be virtually impossible without carbon capture utilization and storage.” Canada’s Industry Strategy Council recently identified CCUS as a source of exportable expertise that can help position the country as a world leader in clean energy and technology.
The federal government has pledged to develop a comprehensive CCUS strategy and promised a CCUS investment tax credit in its last budget. This tax credit is expected to apply to investments beginning next year, suggesting CCUS will be central to helping Canada meet its ambitious 2030 target (40- to 45-percent reduction in GHG emissions) and net zero aspirations.
Norway and the United States are already moving quickly to facilitate CCUS projects while supporting the long-term competitiveness of their energy industries. These policies can de-risk the substantial investments required to launch CCUS, and leverage the capital, networks and energy industry knowledge to realize emerging growth opportunities.
Now is the time for Canada to do the same.
Les auteurs évaluent le potentiel de la production de l’électricité basée sur l’hydrogène afin de remplacer l’énergie carbone en Alberta et discutent de sa viabilité en fonction des allocations gouvernementales prévues.
In roughly two years, and well ahead of schedule, Alberta is expected to have completely transformed its electrical grid from being largely powered by coal to instead being powered by natural gas, hydroelectricity, wind and solar. By 2030, however, it is likely that another fuel source will compete with natural gas as a major part of Alberta’s power grid: namely hydrogen.
Fully decarbonizing Alberta’s electric power sector as Canada works to achieve its goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions will be challenging due to the lack of significant hydroelectric or any nuclear power in the province. However, Alberta has many advantages that make hydrogen feasible as a pathway to decarbonizing its power grid. First, the steam and combustion turbines that are powered by natural gas today to produce electricity in Alberta can be adapted to use hydrogen. Second, Alberta has vast amounts of natural gas that can be used to produce hydrogen, and ample geology for underground carbon capture and storage for the greenhouse gases emitted in producing hydrogen. And third, in periods where the province’s renewable energy sources produce excess electricity, that power can be used to produce hydrogen, which can be stored for later use when renewable energy is less available.
États-Unis
Les auteurs analysent le potentiel et les impacts de la réduction temporaire de la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée faite en Allemagne jusqu’en janvier 2021 afin de stimuler la consommation chez les citoyens, dans le but de déterminer si cette politique fiscale inhabituelle pourrait accélérer l’économie en période de crise.
We exploit the unexpected announcement of an immediate, temporary VAT cut in Germany in the second half of 2020 as a natural experiment to study the spending response to unconventional fiscal policy. We use survey and scanner data on households’ consumption expenditures and their perceived pass-through of the tax change into prices to quantify its effects. The temporary VAT cut led to a substantial relative increase in durable spending of 36% for individuals with a high perceived pass-through. Semi- and non-durable spending also increased. According to our preferred estimates, the VAT policy increased aggregate consumption spending by 34 billion Euros.
Les auteures évaluent dans quelle mesure la bonification du service Medicaid proposée par le plan de législation Build Back Better de l’administration Biden permettrait d’en faciliter l’accès aux citoyens sous le seuil de la pauvreté.
The new House Build Back Better legislation would make meaningful progress in covering millions of people who lack health coverage by closing the Medicaid coverage gap and reducing premiums for people buying coverage through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplaces. While these provisions are temporary, both would last through 2025 and would provide a strong foundation to further expand coverage, address racial and ethnic health inequities, and improve people’s health and economic well-being. Under the proposal, more than 2 million uninsured adults with incomes below the poverty line would be able to enroll in ACA marketplace plans beginning in January 2022 without paying any premiums. By quickly making coverage available to this group — 60 percent of whom are people of color and none of whom currently have a path to coverage because they live in states that have refused to adopt the ACA’s Medicaid expansion — Build Back Better would achieve a top priority of civil rights and health equity leaders, who have emphasized its importance in reducing persistent racial inequities in health care and health outcomes. 1 Closing the coverage gap is a key component of efforts to reduce high and increasing rates of deaths and severe health complications among Black people who give birth.2 And it will deliver coverage to large numbers of older adults and people who have disabilities and chronic health conditions.
Les auteurs évaluent les mesures de taxation des individus et des sociétés à très haut revenus proposées par le plan de législation Build Back Better de l’administration Biden et discutent de certaines facettes du plan qui seraient à améliorer.
The Build Back Better (BBB) legislation before the House would raise a reported $1.85 trillion over ten years to pay for critical investments to reduce child poverty; make health care, child care, and housing more affordable; and address climate change. Moreover, while many of the BBB investments are temporary, the bulk of the tax provisions are permanent and so would continue raising revenue after ten years. The legislation would raise revenue in three main ways: requiring people with high incomes to pay a fairer amount of tax, reducing unwarranted tax advantages for profitable corporations (particularly large multinationals), and improving enforcement of the nation’s tax laws to close the roughly $600 billion annual gap between taxes legally owed and taxes paid — a gap disproportionately due to high-income filers’ noncompliance with the law. Together, these measures would make the tax code more equitable and adequate
L’auteure analyse les mesures proposées par le plan de legislation Build Back Better de l’administration Biden ayant pour objectif de réduire la faim chez les enfants en âge d’aller à l’école par le biais de subventions gouvernementales aux familles testées pendant la pandémie.
The Build Back Better (BBB) legislation being considered by the House includes historic investments in proven child nutrition programs that would transform nutrition assistance for our nation’s low-income schoolchildren. 1 BBB’s nutrition provisions aim to address a long-standing problem that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed and exacerbated: some children face periods of food hardship, which is disproportionately experienced by Black and Latino children, and can have lasting impacts on children’s health and learning. The nutrition proposals in BBB could usher in a new era in which food hardship is much rarer among school-age children, reducing the risk of longterm adverse consequences associated with even short periods of food insecurity during childhood.
- « Proposed Tobacco Excise Tax Changes in H.R. 5376 », the Reconciliation Bill, 6 octobre 2021
- « Corporate Tax Reform: Issues for Congress », 8 octobre 2021
- « Issues in International Corporate Taxation: The 2017 Revision (P.L. 115-97) », 13 octobre 2021
- « Federal Excise Taxes: Background and General Analysis », 15 octobre 2021
- « Financial Literacy and Financial Education Policy Issues », 18 octobre 2021
- « Recent Changes in the Estate and Gift Tax Provisions », 19 octobre 2021
- « Pandemic Relief: The Emergency Rental Assistance Program », 20 octobre 2021
- « Tax Changes for Estates and Trusts in the Build Back Better Act (BBBA) », 22 octobre 2021
- « U,S. Climate Change Policy », 28 octobre 2021
- « Mark-to-Market Taxation of Capital Gains », 28 octobre 2021
- « An Excise Tax on Stock Repurchases and Tax Advantages of Buybacks over Dividends », 2 novembre 2021
- « The Child Tax Credit in the November 3 Modified Version of the Build Back Better Act: Summary Table », 4 novembre 2021
- « Tax Provisions in the Build Back Better Act: Rules Committee Print 117-18 », 9 novembre 2021
- « Small Business Tax Benefits: Current Law », 10 novembre 2021
- « FY2022 NDAA: Budgetary Context », 10 novembre 2021
- « Child Care in the “Build Back Better Act” » , 10 novembre 2021
Considérant que ce sont les grandes villes américaines qui sont responsables de 50% du rendement économique des États-Unis, ce rapport s’intéresse aux menaces financières auxquelles font face les métropoles et aux impacts fiscaux qu’ont entre autres la baisse potentielle de la valeur des biens immobiliers commerciaux à l’issue de cette pandémie.
A small number of large core cities and their larger metro areas account for fully half of all economic output in the U.S. (see the picture below for 2013) For cities to continue to play this vital role, they must be both economically robust and fiscally healthy, with revenues sufficient to provide the essential services that businesses and residents rely on, and financed by competitive tax rates. The stakes are high, as lasting change in the economic fortunes of big cities cores poses a long-term threat to the economy.
By combining data on employment, earnings, and city fiscal structure with estimates of the potential decline in commercial real estate values, this research helps to pull back the curtain on the black box of the pandemic threat to cities and their finances.
Ce rapport examine l’inscription des consommateurs du Département des services de développement de la Californie à Medi-Cal, un programme de couverture de santé gratuit ou à faible coût offert aux résidents californiens qui remplissent les conditions d’éligibilité. Les auteurs sont d’avis que l’augmentation du recours au Programme ainsi qu’à des services additionnels offerts à des groupes spécifiques d’individus (Medi-Cal waivers) se traduirait par des économies modestes de l’État dans son budget.
This report examines Medi-Cal enrollment of Department of Developmental Services (DDS) consumers and the fiscal effect that additional Medi-Cal enrollment would have on the DDS budget and on state costs overall. DDS can draw down federal funding for many of the services it provides to DDS consumers if the consumer is enrolled in Medi-Cal, has legal immigration status, lives in a community-based setting, and receives at least one RC-coordinated service. Currently, eight in ten out of about 320,000 total DDS consumers already are enrolled in Medi-Cal. Among adults, we find little potential for additional Medi-Cal enrollments or additional federal funding for DDS services. We find that the potential to draw down additional federal funding in DDS rests largely with children who would qualify for Medi-Cal through an eligibility pathway referred to as “institutional deeming.” This eligibility pathway—available to certain higher-needs children—considers only the child’s (not the family’s) income in determining Medi-Cal income eligibility. We estimate there is the potential to enroll up to 7,000 additional children in Medi-Cal through this eligibility pathway.
Les auteurs présentent les résultats d’un sondage qui s’intéresse au bien-être économique des Californiens. Selon ce sondage, une importante majorité de démocrates et d’indépendants sont en faveur d’un financement accru pour les programmes de garde d’enfants ainsi que de l’expansion des crédits d’impôt sur le revenu gagné, alors qu’environ 6 républicains sur 10 s’opposent aux deux.
While job conditions and economic circumstances have been recovering from the COVID-19 crisis over the past year, glaring disparities in economic well-being have taken center stage in policy discussions. Many lower-income Californians continue to struggle to make ends meet while higher-income Californians have seen their fortunes rise. Meanwhile, changes in federal leadership coupled with a large increase in state revenues have set the context for a renewed focus on expanding educational opportunities and safety net programs to improve the lives and future prospects of lower-income Californians.
Plutôt que de s’appuyer sur des alternatives complexes, dont la réinstauration de l’impôt minimum de remplacement pour les entreprises, les taxes sur les rachats d’actions et l’imposition annuelle au prix du marché des biens générant des gains en capitaux afin de générer les revenus nécessaires au Build Back Better Agenda, le Congrès devrait prioriser l’élargissement de l’assiette fiscale et éliminer les dépenses fiscales fédérales non significatives.
Tax reform should simplify the tax code. Instead, Congress is debating new ways to raise revenue that would make the tax code more complex and more difficult to administer. The new proposals—imposing an alternative minimum tax on corporate book income, applying an excise tax on stock buybacks, levying a surcharge on higher earners, and, at one point this week, a tax on unrealized capital gains for billionaires—are unreliable and highly complex ways to raise revenue.
Instead of leaning on complicated ways to raise revenue, lawmakers should prioritize broadening the tax base and eliminate tax expenditures unrelated to cost recovery, international taxes, and deferral. Revenue increases can be structured to improve the tax code by making it simpler and more neutral across industries and households.
Bien que seulement six (6) États américains octroient une déduction pour l’impôt fédéral payé, l’auteur appuie la position qu’il faudrait éliminer cette déduction en raison des conséquences qu’elle engendre et plutôt la remplacer par des taux d’imposition étatiques inférieurs.
At the federal level, the state and local tax (SALT) deduction has emerged as a hot-button political issue ever since the deduction was capped at $10,000 under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017. The SALT deduction has defenders as well as detractors, but a peculiar inversion of it—a state deduction for federal taxes paid—exists in only six states. Despite the best of intentions, it is bad news for taxpayers. Fortunately, three states are on track to eliminate the policy within the next few years. The other three should join them.
L’impôt minimum de remplacement corporatif était un fardeau important sur les investissements, empêchait plusieurs déductions légitimes et était une source de revenus inefficace. Ainsi, plutôt que de le réinstaurer, dans l’optique où le Congrès souhaite accorder des allègements d’impôts à certaines entreprises, il devrait faire des politiques réduisant directement les dépenses fiscales des entreprises en question.
The latest version of the Biden administration’s Build Back Better reconciliation package reintroduces a policy that has been tried before—and abandoned: a corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT). It would be a mistake to revive this complex and poorly designed policy. Instead, lawmakers should consider directly reducing corporate tax expenditures.
L’auteur invite les économistes des finances publiques à explorer plus en profondeur les questions raciales afin de comprendre principalement les effets de politiques inéquitables et inefficaces. Il est d’avis que le fait d’aborder les aspects économiques du racisme crée une opportunité pour les économistes de confronter et d’améliorer un problème crucial pour la société, en plus de démontrer la vitalité ainsi que l’utilité de l’économie.
Mainstream public finance research has largely ignored racial issues. This paper calls on public finance economists to explore racial issues more extensively. The obvious reasons are to understand the effects of inequitable and inefficient policies, help develop remedies, and ensure that public finance is addressing the issues most salient to society. The less obvious reason is that public finance has tools and frameworks that can provide useful insights into the economics of racism. As economists search for issues that are both amenable to analysis and important for society, the pervasive effects of racism stand out in both regards.
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux caractéristiques des bénéficiaires du Advance Child Tax Credit (CTC) aux États-Unis, ainsi qu’à la manière dont les paiements ont été utilisés. Ils notent cependant que les personnes ayant les revenus les plus faibles déclarent les taux de réception les plus bas à ce crédit. Selon eux, le fait que bon nombre de ces ménages n’est pas tenu de produire des déclarations de revenus fédérales pourrait expliquer qu’ils soient plus susceptibles d’avoir manqué les paiements anticipés de la CTC.
The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP) temporarily increased the child tax credit (CTC), made the credit fully refundable, and authorized the IRS to issue up to half the credit as an advance monthly payment beginning in July 2021. The IRS reports that nearly 61 million children received the payments in August 2021, which constitutes a large share of the target population but falls short of the estimated number of children eligible for the credit. In this brief, we use nationally representative data from the US Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey collected between July and September 2021 to examine receipt and use of the advance CTC payments among adults living with children under 18, including how these vary by race, ethnicity, and household income. Though advance CTC payments are helping households with children cover basic expenses and improve their financial circumstances, the payments are not reaching many households likely eligible for them, and people with the lowest incomes report the lowest rates of receipt. Federal and state agencies, local officials, schools, and community organizations can support outreach and assistance to eligible households who have not received or claimed the credit. As Congress considers extending the ARP’s changes to the CTC, it should also consider ways to lessen the administrative burden of claiming the credit for families with very low incomes.
International
Présentant les assises principales d’une gestion des risques climatiques, d’une préparation financière afin de faire face aux risques climatiques et détaillant les éléments augmentant la résilience financière, cet article s’inspire des régimes financiers adoptés par les divers pays de l’Union Européenne afin d’établir les façons de se préparer aux incidences économiques des catastrophes naturelles.
Natural disasters have caused, and will continue to cause, significant losses in the EU Member States. Moreover, climate change is expected to amplify the frequency and intensity of most natural disasters. Governments step-in to cover the disasters-related costs such as emergency relief, recovery and reconstruction. Public authorities also act as insurer of last resort, in particular in those countries where insurance coverage is low. They make payments for legal commitments to cover the costs of disasters, and when there is a moral obligation to provide financial assistance. Natural disasters and climate change thus represent a real and increasing challenge for public finances, adding to fiscal sustainability issues such as a high debt level and an ageing population. There is little evidence on how EU Member States pre-arrange disaster financing and on past disasters financing. This discussion paper aims to provide an overview of relevant concepts for the design of a disaster risk financing strategy. It provides evidence from EU and Member States on disaster financing with a view to inform the debate on strengthening disaster financial resilience.
Les pays pouvant être confrontés à plusieurs défis lors de l’implantation de pratiques d’écologisation budgétaire, variants selon leurs spécificités économiques, cet article propose un cadre général et identifie les éléments principaux afin d’appliquer et d’intégrer de telles pratiques dans un budget gouvernemental.
Budgets are a crucial instrument for climate action and the green transition. Faced with the imminent environmental threats, governments are increasingly deploying or planning to deploy green budgeting to better align their policies with climate and environmental commitments. Green budgeting means using the tools of budgetary policymaking to help achieve climate and environmental goals. These tools are part of a country’s annual and multiannual budgetary processes.
To support European governments in their development of green budgeting practices, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development worked jointly to define main elements and features of these practices, on the basis of existing green budgeting frameworks. This work is presented in this paper.
While green budgeting can be pursued in various ways, some key components can ensure its effectiveness. More specifically, green budgeting is more efficient when:
- it is inserted in a strategic framework laying out a country’s national plan and mission on climate change and the environment;
- it uses budgetary policy tools that contribute to evidence-based decision-making;
- it relies on an institutional design with clearly-defined responsibilities and a timeline for actions;
- it makes use of transparent reporting and independent oversight to ensure openness and accountability.
The paper also describes various tools that are being used to bring climate and environmental considerations into budgetary policy-making.
[…]Finally, elements of a sound institutional set-up are described, with particular attention to independent oversight. When feasible, the paper provides specific examples from the EU and OECD countries, as an illustration of what can be done and how.
Cet article s’intéresse à l’effet qu’ont les conflits violents dans les pays sub-sahariens sur la capacité des États à collecter des taxes, et incidemment, l’impact qu’on ces conflits sur les recettes fiscales. L’auteur base son analyse sur des conflits survenus dans 42 pays africains.
This article explores the relationship between violent conflicts and tax revenue in Sub-Saharan countries. In a first stage, I estimate the effects of conflicts for 42 countries using panel data analysis. I find that an outbreak of violent conflict leads to an average 1.5 percent loss of tax revenue per capita. The results show that due to the outbreak of violence, government cannot successfully raise revenue, and because the conflict also negatively affects key macroeconomic variables, the tax base shrink and the overall loss is higher. The results also point to an important role of some specificities of Sub-Saharan countries such as ethnic division and natural resource endowment. Drawing on these results, I conduct case study for Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo Republic, Guinea and Guinea Bissau in a second stage using synthetic control method. The results show that the 2002 conflict in Cote d’Ivoire and the 1998 conflict in Guinea-Bissau led to significant drop in tax revenue. The outbreak of conflict did not have significant effects on tax revenue for the remaining three countries.
Les auteurs effectuent une analyse empirique des effets des mesures de politique budgétaire dans 52 pays pendant la pandémie de COVID-19. Ils sont d’avis que bien que les annonces de politique budgétaire semblent être efficaces pour stimuler l’activité économique, leur effet varie en fonction du type de mesure et des caractéristiques propres à chaque pays.
This paper empirically examines the effects of fiscal policy measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, using a novel database of daily fiscal policy announcements—classified by type of fiscal measure—and high-frequency economic indicators for 52 countries from January 1 to December 31, 2020. The results suggest that fiscal policy announcements have been effective in stimulating economic activity, boosting confidence, and reducing unemployment, but their effect varies by type of measure and country characteristics. Emergency lifeline measures (which form the bulk of below-the-line measures) are more effective when containment policies are stringent, providing cashflow support to firms and households. Demand-support measures (which comprise most of above-the-line measures) are more effective when containment measures are relaxed.
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux résultats d’une enquête englobant les réponses de 159 administrations fiscales nationales ou fédérales couvrant les informations de profil, les performances et les pratiques en matière fiscale pour les années 2018 et 2019. Ils rapportent que les juridictions à revenu élevé sont plus en avance que les juridictions à petit et à faible revenu dans la mise en œuvre de bonnes pratiques et la mise en place de bonnes bases structurelles.
The International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA) collects tax administration data from national or federal tax administrations. It surveys tax administration operations and other characteristics based on common questions and definitions agreed by four international organizations: the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations (IOTA), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These four Parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing the administration and management of this worldwide survey. This publication presents the results of the International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA) 2018, encompassing responses from 159 national or federal tax administrations spanning profile information, performance, and practices in fiscal years 2018 and 2019. For ISORA 2018, the ISORA Parties partnered with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to provide assistance to its members who were participating in the survey.
L’auteur s’intéresse au taux de désendettement et d’épargne des ménages de différents pays. Il est d’avis que le désendettement des ménages n’augmente pas les taux d’épargne ni ne réduit la croissance de consommation, contrairement à ce qui est avancé par plusieurs décideurs politiques.
Historically high household debt in several economies is calling for a deleveraging, but according to some economists, this adjustment can slow GDP growth by weighing on consumption. Using a sample of advanced and emerging market economies, this paper finds evidence of a negative relationship between changes of household debt-to-income ratios and saving rates. This relationship is however asymmetric, being significant only for debt build-ups. Declining debt ratios and saving are significantly related in some economies, but the relationship is driven by consumer credit, not by mortgages. Results therefore suggest that the economic cost associated with household deleveraging may be overestimated and motivate a deleveraging via lower mortgages.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à un cadre qui permettrait de quantifier les implications de transitions liées au climat sur la stabilité financière de la Colombie. Ils sont d’avis qu’une augmentation progressive de la taxe carbone étalée sur plusieurs années aurait l’avantage de permettre un ajustement plus fluide à une taxe plus élevée pour les parties prenantes.
This paper builds a framework to quantify the financial stability implications of climate-related transition risk in Colombia. We explore risks imposed on the banking system based on scenarios of an increase in the domestic carbon tax by using bank- and firm-level data. Focusing on the deterioration of firms’ balance sheets and the exposure of banks to different sectors, we assess the extent to which such policy shock would transmit from nonfinancial firms to the banking system. We observe that sectors are affected unevenly by a higher carbon tax. Agriculture, manufacturing, electricity, wholesale and retail trade, and transportation sectors appear to be the most important in the transmission of the risk to the banking system. Results also suggest that a large increase in the carbon tax can generate significant but likely manageable financial stability risks, and that a gradual increase in the carbon tax to meet a higher target over several years could be preferable in terms of financial risks. A gradual increase would also have the benefit of allowing for a smoother adjustment to higher carbon tax for stakeholders.
Les auteurs s’intéressent à la contribution apportée par les chercheurs et les organisations internationales quant à l’analyse du caractère « vert » de la réponse de la politique budgétaire des plus grandes économies du monde des suites de la pandémie. Ils sont d’avis que la méthodologie intuitive utilisée s’accompagne de limitations sérieuses qui doivent être prises en considération.
In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, governments around the world announced unprecedented fiscal packages to address the economic impact of the crisis. The unusually large scale of the packages was accompanied by widespread calls for “greening” them to meet the dual goals of economic recovery and environmental sustainability. In response, several researchers and international organizations attempted to assess the “greenness” of the fiscal policy response of the world’s largest economies. This paper takes stock of the contributions made by these various trackers, identifies strengths and weaknesses of their methodologies, and draws lessons for assessing the climate impact of fiscal policy going forward. It finds that: trackers provided useful assessments of the (generally low) level of greenness and raised awareness; trackers’ methodologies, while valid and innovative, varied significantly with some important, if currently largely unavoidable, weaknesses; and the way forward should involve tracking the greenness of entire government budgets, rather than just their response to the COVID-19 crisis.
À la suite de la réforme fiscale adoptée par 136 pays sous le BEPS, cet article se penche sur la nécessité de cet accord ainsi que ses limites quant à sa capacité à contrer la concurrence fiscale et l’évitement fiscal.
On 8 October 2021, 136 countries agreed to a set of global tax reforms under the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), an initiative led by the Group of 20 (G20) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The reforms, which have been developed over several years, were initially intended to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, but have wider implications for both digital and non-digital businesses in countries around the world.
In this paper, we look at why a global deal was needed, explain how the reforms are likely to work in practice and set out the potential impacts of the global deal, with a focus on lowerincome countries. We find that the reforms are significant but do not fundamentally change the international tax system, as other proposals would have done. The revenue impacts are uncertain but could be relatively modest. Tax competition and tax avoidance will continue. Lower-income countries can benefit from the reforms but will need to continue to build capacity to tackle international tax avoidance.
Cet article suggère comment l’amélioration des politiques fiscales entourant l’utilisation de véhicules motorisés pourraient avoir de nombreux impacts positifs dans les pays africains.
Although vehicle ownership rates in sub-Saharan Africa are, on average, only 10% of the global average, the number of cars and motorcycles in the region is growing fast – particularly in countries where incomes are rising and the middle class is growing fast.
Motorisation allows individuals and businesses to connect over greater distances in less time, but the vehicles on African roads also carry huge costs. Time lost sitting in traffic jams costs major African cities like Lagos and Nairobi around 5% of local GDP, compared to less than 1% for London and New York. Deaths per capita from air pollution in sub-Saharan Africa are 60% higher than the global average, and deaths from road accidents are 75% higher.
Governments need to design policies to manage these costs alongside the potential benefits of motorisation. Effective regulation and infrastructure investment have a role to play, but as we set out in a recent report, there is also a strong case for using taxes, since congestion, pollution and road accidents represent social costs that result from decisions taken by individual drivers. For example, somebody driving onto a busy road typically does not consider the fact that they slow down everyone else’s journey. Motoring taxes provide a way of putting a price on these social costs, effectively forcing drivers to take into account the negative effects of their driving.
These taxes also raise revenue. Most African governments have a need to raise substantial additional revenues to meet their development goals, especially post-COVID. Taxes on vehicles and fuel are a highly progressive source of revenue in the vast majority of countries in the region, as vehicle ownership is heavily concentrated among richer households.
Indeed, motoring taxes already do raise a substantial amount of revenue in some sub-Saharan African countries. In a sample of countries where we could compile revenue data, fuel and vehicle purchase taxes raise revenues equivalent to 0.5%-2.2% of GDP (Figure 1). Some countries in the region, such as Liberia and Angola, have low tax rates on both vehicle and fuel purchases; in such cases, there is likely to be untapped revenue potential.
En se référant à l’Ethiopie et au Ghana comme études de cas, ce bref article examine les opportunités et les risques liés à l’introduction de taxes sur le carbone dans les pays en développement à un moment où la tarification de carbone est l’un des sujets les plus discutés au COP26.
Carbon pricing will be one of the most talked about policy options at COP26. The idea of carbon pricing is that putting a price on the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to reflect the social costs of climate change should provide producers and consumers with strong incentives to reduce such emissions. In this observation, we consider the opportunities and risks from introducing carbon taxes in developing countries, with reference to Ethiopia and Ghana as case studies.
L‘OBR publie ses prévisions pour les revenus d’impôt de l’Écosse et du Pays de Galles jusqu’à l’année d’imposition 2025-2026.
Scottish income tax (SIT) and the Welsh rates of income taxes (WRIT) are levied on non-savings, non-dividend (NSND) income, assessed on a liabilities basis. This includes earnings from employment, self-employment, pensions and property. Income tax on savings and dividends is reserved to the UK Government and accounts for around 10 per cent of total income tax revenue at the UK level, and somewhat less than that in Scotland and Wales. 2.2 Income tax has been partially devolved to Scotland since April 2016. Since April 2017 the Scottish Government has received full NSND income tax liabilities from taxpayers in Scotland. The Scottish Parliament has the power to vary all rates and thresholds separately (other than the personal allowance) and to create new bands paying different rates. 2.3 The Welsh rates of income tax have been devolved since April 2019. The existing basic, higher and additional rates of income tax levied by the UK Government are reduced by 10p in the pound for those individuals defined as Welsh taxpayers. The Welsh rates levied on top of these reduced UK rates are set by the Welsh Senedd. The Welsh rates were kept at 10p for each band of income tax for 2021-22, thereby keeping income tax at the same overall rates as are paid by taxpayers in England and Northern Ireland. 2.4 This chapter presents our approach to forecasting SIT and WRIT revenues and presents our latest forecasts for each of them.1 Throughout the chapter we compare our October 2021 forecasts to our March 2021 forecasts.
Une analyse comparative entre les entreprises australiennes contrôlées à l’étranger et les entreprises australiennes domestiques cotées à la bourse ne démontre pas que les mesures adoptées par le programme BEPS de l’OCDE réduisent efficacement les transferts de bénéfices transfrontaliers (cross-border profit shifting).
In this study, we investigate two cross-border profit shifting channels of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Australia and assess the effectiveness of the related measures adopted by the Australian Parliament to combat base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). Specifically, we use propensity score matching (PSM) and coarsened exact matching (CEM) to match a group of foreign-owned Australian companies (FOACs) that are subsidiaries of foreign MNEs and have strong incentives to shift profits out of Australia to avoid Australian tax (the treatment group) with a group of predominantly domestic-owned listed Australian companies (DOLACs) that have little incentives to do so (the control group) to identify cross-border profit shifting activities using two channels: intra-group transfer pricing and debt financing and/or interest expense loading. We further use the difference-in-differences approach to compare the extent of cross-border profit shifting by FOACs between the pre-BEPS period (2007 to 2012) and the post-BEPS period (2013 to 2020) to evaluate the effectiveness of the related Australian BEPS countermeasures. Overall, we find that FOACs uses tax-induced intra-group transfer pricing and interest expense loading arrangements to shift profit out of Australia in the entire 14-year study period from 2007 to 2020. However, up to 2020 we cannot find any significant evidence indicating that the related Australian BEPS countermeasures are effective in reducing cross-border profit shifting. Perhaps it takes time for the effects of these measures to be reflected in the financial reports of FOACs due to administrative time lags.
Les auteurs critiquent les plans d’expansion massive de la production de charbon et de gaz de l’Australie, qui sont en contradiction avec l’objectif zéro émission nette que le pays s’est fixé d’ici 2050. Ils sont d’avis que plutôt que d’utiliser la reprise économique post-pandémie comme opportunité d’inverser la tendance des subventions aux combustibles fossiles, le gouvernement a, en outre, renforcé le la production de combustibles fossiles en centrant ses plans de relance économique sur le gaz.
Australia’s target of net zero emissions by 2050 is inconsistent with its plans to massively expand coal and gas production. New fossil fuel projects under development in Australia would result in 1.7 billion tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions each year – equivalent annual emissions of over 200 coal-fired power stations, twice as much as global aviation. The Net Zero 2050 Plan is riddled with shortcomings. The net zero target will not be legislated, no short- or medium-term targets are included, it relies on speculative technological breakthroughs and offsets, and is based entirely on previously announced policies. However, by far the most egregious aspect of the Net Zero 2050 Plan is that it facilitates the expansion of fossil fuel production in Australia. While many international jurisdictions are turning their attention to winding-down fossil fuel production in an orderly, just, and equitable way,3Australia is making no such plans. Not only does Australia lack the policies and commitment to a planned transition from fossil fuel production, but it is also opening vast new fossil fuel reserves.
Les auteurs s’intéressent au plan économique global du gouvernement Morrison en Australie, qui a pour but d’atteindre zéro émission nette d’ici 2050 sans changements de politique, sans introduction de taxes et sans introduction de nouvelles règlementations ou d’objectifs législatifs. Ils sont s’avis qu’une proportion importante de la réduction des émissions est due au déclin du secteur foncier plutôt qu’à des actions positives du gouvernement.
The Morrison Government has released a ‘whole of economy plan’ to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. While they are yet to reveal the underlying economic modelling on which the plan was based, it is still possible to consider the plausibility of the results of the modelling even when the assumptions behind the modelling remain concealed. This paper focuses on the plausibility of the Morrison Government’s belief that the course of the Australian economy can be significantly altered without changes in policy, without the introduction of taxes and without the introduction of new regulation or indeed legislated targets. In short, the Morrison Government’s ‘whole of economy plan’ is based on the idea that it is possible to bend the trends in the economy without pulling on any of the traditional policy levers. Evidence is presented to suggest the plan is fanciful.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Samuel Carbonneau
- Florence Lemire Jeune
- Jean-Nicolas Tremblay
- Camille Turgeon
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé