Bulletin de veille du 21 septembre 2021
Québec/Canada
Parmi les contribuables qui cotisent à un REÉR, une plus grande part ne possède pas de RPA, mais une large part contribue tout de même aux deux régimes simultanément. Les cotisations à un REÉR augmentent avec l’âge. Ce faisant, les déclarants réduisent le cumul de leurs cotisations inutilisées à l’approche de la retraite. La cotisation REÉR moyenne de ceux qui n’ont pas accès à un RPA (7 659 $) est en moyenne 55 % plus élevée que celle des contribuables qui cotisent aussi à un RPA (4 935 $). Toutefois, cet écart varie considérablement selon les groupes d’âge. Par exemple, il atteint 73 % entre 25 et 44 ans alors que son point le plus élevé se situe à 82 % chez les 70 ans et plus.
Le régime enregistré d’épargne-retraite (« REÉR ») et le régime de pension agréé (« RPA ») sont de puissants mécanismes d’accumulation d’épargne-retraite.
Pour le gouvernement du Québec seulement, ces deux types de régimes de retraite génèrent un manque à gagner annuel en recettes fiscales de près de 9 G$ en 2019, soit respectivement 3,9 G$ pour le REÉR et 5 G$ pour le RPA. Parmi l’ensemble des dépenses fiscales relatives à l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers au Québec, il s’agit des deux plus importantes.
Au-delà de leur coût fiscal, il s’avère pertinent de s’intéresser au profil des cotisants à un REÉR et à un RPA. Est-ce que ce sont deux clientèles différentes qui
ne cotisent qu’à l’un ou à l’autre des régimes, ou est-ce que ce sont les mêmes contribuables qui cotisent aux deux régimes?
Les auteurs étudient deux réformes possibles au programme d’aide financière aux études, soit une réduction de la contribution étudiante ou une augmentation du seuil de revenu à partir duquel cette contribution s’applique.
Nous examinons deux réformes possibles au programme d’aide financière aux études : une réduction de la contribution étudiante ou une augmentation du seuil de revenu à partir duquel cette contribution s’applique. Nous présentons une analyse théorique et empirique des deux options. Nous montrons que toutes les deux réduisent les incitatifs au travail, bien que la réduction de la contribution étudiante ait moins d’impact. La réduction de la contribution étudiante cible davantage ceux dans le besoin, bien qu’elle accorde trop d’aide aux étudiants à revenu trop élevé. Nous estimons ainsi que la réduction de la contribution étudiante, si elle est limitée à un intervalle approprié de revenu, pourrait être la plus sensée.
Les résultats suggèrent que la littératie financière est un déterminant important de l’efficacité de l’utilisation des régimes d’épargne enregistrés.
Tax deductions on contributions to registered savings vehicles are a common policy tool used by governments in many industrialized countries to encourage people to save for retirement. However, these plans do not typically lock in funds, which means savers may also withdraw before retirement when their marginal tax rates are still high and forgo the tax benefit. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which pre-retirement savings withdrawals respond to
changes in the net-of-tax benefit of withdrawing and whether such behavior depends on the saver’s financial literacy. To that end, we link respondents of a nationally representative financial capability survey from Canada to over 15 years of administrative tax data. Our results show that the correlation between savings withdrawals and the effective marginal tax rate is negative for those with higher financial literacy, but much weaker and sometimes statistically insignificant for those with lower financial literacy. The findings suggest that financial literacy is an important determinant of the extent to which tax-deductible savings plans are used efficiently.
Ce Regard CFFP permettra de garder une trace de la campagne électorale fédérale 2021 en présentant une recension des principaux engagements des partis politiques qui modifient le cadre financier du gouvernement fédéral : effets sur les revenus, sur les dépenses, sur le solde et sur l’endettement.
Dans le cadre de la campagne électorale fédérale 2021, la Chaire a organisé un débat électoral sur les enjeux de fiscalité et de finances publiques qui s’est tenu le 10 septembre 2021. En parallèle de cette activité, la Chaire recense les principaux engagements des partis politiques modifiant le cadre financier du gouvernement fédéral.
Les auteurs du Regard CFFP considère que l’exercice consistant à la préparation et à la publication des cadres financiers par les partis dans une campagne électorale est utile et pertinent. Il a le mérite de forcer les partis à chiffrer leurs promesses, que ce soit l’ajout ou le changement d’un programme ou d’un impôt. Ils doivent alors montrer comment ces promesses s’inscrivent dans un cadre budgétaire de court et de moyen terme.
La présente synthèse indique les principaux engagements touchant les revenus et les dépenses. Évidemment, il convient de souligner que la présentation ne porte aucune appréciation de la pertinence des mesures ni de la faisabilité à les mettre en œuvre. En comparaison avec les chiffres du cadre de référence du Directeur parlementaire du budget, des graphiques permettent de mesurer l’effet des engagements des partis sur les revenus, les dépenses, le solde et l’endettement.
Depuis 2015, les stocks de capital par travailleur du Canada ont stagné ou diminué et ses taux d’investissement brut par travailleur ont été faibles, écrivent les auteurs. De plus, l’investissement des entreprises a été faible par rapport à l’investissement aux États-Unis et dans d’autres pays, un contraste qui semble s’être aggravé pendant la période COVID-19.
Recent figures on Canada’s stock of capital and new business investment are worrying. Canada’s capital stock is not keeping pace with its workforce. New business investment per worker is declining. Not only have areas of traditional strength in Canadian business investment – non-residential and engineering structures – fallen in recent years, but the categories most associated with innovation and future productivity – machinery and equipment (M&E) and intellectual property (IP) products – are weaker yet.
After improving against international competitors during the 2000s and early in the 2010s, business investment per available worker in Canada slipped badly after 2014 and appears to have dropped further during the pandemic. This weakness is both a likely effect of weak productivity growth in the present and a harbinger of weak productivity growth in the future. It means that Canadian workers will have less capital – less nonresidential building and engineering, less M&E and less in the way of IP products – with which to produce goods and services, earn incomes and fund public services in the years to come.
Public policy can and should help. Measures to boost business’s desire to invest, such as productivityenhancing competition, and measures that increase the supply of investment capital, such as tax reforms, can help Canadian workers get more of the tools that will raise their future incomes and living standards.
Le PLC, le PCC et le NPD présentent tous des plates-formes avec des ratios dette/PIB et des dépenses en baisse, mais les nuances des plans des partis ont un impact sur leur score de crédibilité fiscale. Le PLC présente un plan qui tient compte du risque et de l’exposition fiscale limitée dans ses engagements simples. Le plan du PCC, tout aussi direct, propose une réduction des dépenses, mais présente un écart important en ce qui concerne la gestion et les risques budgétaires. Le plan du NPD propose des mesures visant à élargir considérablement le rôle de l’État. Bien qu’il prenne en compte les risques économiques et fiscaux, son plan présente une lacune importante en matière de transparence, étant donné qu’il ne tient pas compte de la mise en œuvre et de l’impact de ses propositions.
Elections are about choices. To frame positions – and potentially, inform voter choice at the ballot box – political parties define their governing plans and priorities in platforms. For the past three decades, political platforms have been part of election time discussion and debate in Canada. Platforms are relevant for anticipating government behaviour, signalling party priorities, and are an important tool to hold a newly elected government to account.
Platforms can be analyzed and assessed against a number of criteria, from policy relevance to implementation feasibility to credibility. The fiscal credibility of electoral platforms are another dimension that we, at IFSD, consider of critical importance. Using fiscal credibility as a lens, the internal consistency of platform narratives can be tested, by aligning declared priorities to proposed economic and fiscal assumptions, revenues, and expenditures.
Ahead of the 2019 election, IFSD developed principles and scoring criteria to assess the fiscal credibility of political platforms. The assessments are designed to teswww.DeepL.com/Translator (version gratuite)t for the realism of economic and fiscal assumptions, responsible fiscal management, and transparency. Platforms are political documents and are expected to provide reliable and realistic proposals, making them different than budgets or government documents that have different requirements for accuracy, realism, and transparency.
Le fardeau fiscal à vie des Canadiens découlant de l’accumulation de la dette fédérale révèle que les Canadiens âgés de 16 à 35 ans paieront 205,1 G$ de plus en impôt sur le revenu des particuliers (soit 61,7 % du fardeau total imposé à tous les groupes d’âge) au cours de leur vie en raison de l’accumulation supplémentaire de la dette fédérale.
Federal debt has risen substantially during the COVID-19 pandemic and is projected to continue rising for the foreseeable future. Large deficits come with costs and Canadians will have to pay for our borrowing today through additional taxation implemented at a later date.
This bulletin demonstrates that Canadians aged 16 to 80 in 2025 can expect to pay an additional $332.5 billion in personal income taxes over their lifetimes (on a present value basis) to pay for the projected federal debt accumulation since 2019. On average, Canadians between the ages of 16 and 80 will each pay $10,498 in additional taxes.
Younger Canadians will bear a disproportionately large amount of the burden to pay for the increase in federal debt. For instance, individuals aged 16 to 25 are expected to collectively pay an additional $117.9 billion in personal income taxes over their lifetimes. This translates to 35.5 percent of the total burden imposed on all age groups.
On a per-person basis, all individuals who are 16 to 25 can expect to pay a lifetime tax burden of at least $20,000 as a consequence of the increase in federal debt. This means that, while the growth of the public debt should be a concern for all Canadians, it should be a special concern for younger Canadians.
There is also a significant risk for Canadian taxpayers due to the potential for higher interest rates in the future. Specifically, rising interest rates could increase federal debt accumulation and impose a larger tax burden on all Canadians relative to our baseline projections.
Le Canada pourrait poursuivre ses réformes de l’impôt des sociétés en abaissant les taux et en élargissant les assiettes fiscales. Toutefois, si l’objectif est simplement de se situer au niveau ou en dessous de la moyenne de l’OCDE, une réforme fiscale de ce type aurait des effets limités pour stimuler l’investissement.
Canada is already at a disadvantage with lagging growth and productivity even before the massive economic destruction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the pandemic hit, Canada’s corporate tax system was already becoming uncompetitive in attracting highly profitable investments relative to other developed countries. Canada’s general corporate tax rate, averaging 26.1 per cent, is within spitting distance of the highest rates in the OECD. While some industries may benefit from special preferences, the corporate tax has become increasingly inefficient and complex with targeted measures, and in some cases impeding the allocation of capital to growth industries like communications and services.
This was having a serious effect on Canada’s economic health before COVID-19. Business investment in Canada has lagged that of many countries since 2015, well before the pandemic. Productivity has been weak and wages for workers have been depressed, particularly for unskilled labour.
Additionally, the corporate tax system currently distorts the allocation of capital in the economy, favouring some sectors over others. In fact, some of
the sectors least-favoured by the tax system — including retail and tourism, which face an eight-point tax disadvantage compared to the governmentfavoured manufacturing sector — are the very ones that had the roughest time during the pandemic and face a more difficult road to recovery.
If Canada is going to “build back better,” as some politicians claim to want, it will need investors willing to build things. That will require governments focusing on policies that stimulate economic growth, including tax reform.
While it is politically popular for some parties to push for higher corporate tax rates, that won’t solve our investment problem. Some limited benefit can be realized by reducing tax rates and broadening the corporate base elsewhere but Canada’s unwieldy corporate income tax has become too serious for those measures to sufficiently address the problem. A broader approach to corporate tax reform will be required to ensure that Canada is able to recover to good economic health after the COVID-19 pandemic.
Les études suggèrent que la pandémie peut générer des avantages à long terme pour les femmes et les hommes. Les femmes pourraient voir leurs responsabilités ménagères réduites si les hommes continuent d’assumer une plus grande part des tâches parentales. En revanche, de nombreux hommes reconnaissent aujourd’hui les avantages de passer plus de temps avec leurs enfants. Ces changements peuvent être durables si la pandémie a rendu les entreprises plus disposées à offrir des arrangements de travail flexibles, tant en termes de temps que de lieu de travail. En effet, si ces tendances tendances se poursuivent, la participation future au marché du travail pourrait s’améliorer davantage des femmes ayant de jeunes enfants qui, bien avant le COVID-19, assumaient de manière disproportionnée la charge de la production domestique.
On March 5, 2020, Alberta reported its first case of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Shortly after, extensive measures were taken to “flatten the epidemic curve” and contain the spread of the virus: schools and daycares closed on March 15, a state of public health emergency was declared on March 17, and the closure of nonessential businesses and services was mandated on March 27. The impacts of these social distancing efforts on Alberta’s labour market were large and immediate. In a year-over-year comparison, data from April 2020 shows that employment in Alberta declined by 15.5 per cent, while the unemployment rate increased to 13.4 per cent (Alberta Treasury Board and Finance 2020).
As the government started to relax public health restrictions over the summer months, Alberta’s labour market showed promising signs of recovery (Business Council of Alberta 2020). However, by mid-September 2020, COVID-19 cases began to rise again, with Alberta’s COVID-19 cases reaching new daily record highs throughout fall 2020 (see Figure 1). A second state of public health emergency was declared on November 24,1 which was followed by further social and economic restrictions on December 8.2 Similar to the first round of social distancing measures, these restrictions brought further turmoil to Alberta’s
labour market, including reduced working hours, increased unemployment, or complete non-participation in the labour force all together.
In this chapter, we use data from Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey (LFS) to explore the health of Alberta’s labour market amid the twin-crises of low energy prices and the crippling COVID-19 pandemic. To get a sense of the differential impacts of these crises across socioeconomic groups, we examine their impact on employment, hours worked, part-time employment and labour force participation across gender, parental status, and age. Because researchers and policymakers in Canada have been particularly concerned about the potential gendered effects of the COVID-19 crisis (Alon et al. 2020; Montenovo et
al. 2020; Stevenson 2020; Qian and Fuller 2020)3, in our main analysis, we focus on whether and to what extent the pandemic produced differential labour market effects for women versus men (with and without children).
We first present a descriptive analysis of labour market outcomes before and during the COVID-19 pandemic by age, gender, education, parental status, and geography. While labour market losses are widespread, our analysis shows that women, individuals aged between 15 and 29, individuals with lower educational achievement, and residents of the tourism and hospitality-heavy regions in the Rockies were disproportionately impacted by the COVID-19 economic shutdowns. Second, we perform a regression analysis showing that: i) women were more adversely impacted than men at the onset of the pandemic; ii) differences between men and women stabilized in the summer months; and iii) the stabilization of gender differentials persisted into December 2020. Crucially,
for policymakers, we also find that parents with young children in Alberta experienced a large deterioration in employment during both the first and second waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, we provide evidence of a staggering decline in cumulative formal, paid hours worked for parents, irrespective of gender.
États-Unis
Pour combler le déficit fiscal, il faudra que l’IRS dispose d’informations plus solides pour identifier et recouvrer les impôts impayés.
Consulter le document »
The major economic recovery legislation Congress is developing will make investments to reduce child poverty, address climate change, and increase economic opportunity and security for families across the country. These investments will be paid for in part by asking wealthy people and profitable corporations to pay a fairer amount of tax. In addition, a key source of revenue will flow from collecting more of the taxes that high-income people and businesses already owe under current law. This “tax gap” — taxes owed but not collected — is now roughly $600 billion annually with fully $160 billion annually just from unpaid taxes of the top 1 percent, as a new Treasury report highlights.[1] Closing the tax gap will require, in part, more robust information the IRS can use to identify and collect those unpaid taxes.
Ce document décrit la méthode utilisée par le CBO pour mesurer les effets distributifs d’une taxe sur les émissions de carbone et les raisons pour lesquelles l’agence a choisi cette méthode, tout en la comparant à la méthode antérieure du CBO et aux méthodes utilisées par d’autres chercheurs.
Consulter le document »
Putting a price on emissions of carbon dioxide, either by taxing them or by establishing a cap- and-trade program, is one policy that lawmakers could consider to address climate change. Although such a policy could encourage cost-effective reductions in emissions throughout the economy, lawmakers have expressed concern about whether it would disproportionately affect lower-income households.
Determining the distributional effects—that is, the effects on households at different income levels—of a policy that would price carbon emissions (referred to in this paper as a carbon tax) is challenging, and the results would vary substantially depending on how the effects were measured. Using a method that allocates the burden to households on the basis of their income rather than their consumption, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the burden on households in the lowest income quintile, measured as a percentage of income before transfers and taxes, would be roughly twice as large as that imposed on households in the highest income quintile. The burden on households appears less regressive if measured as a percentage of income after transfers and taxes, largely because of the progressivity of the existing federal transfer and tax system.
This paper describes CBO’s current method for measuring distributional effects and its rationale for choosing that method, while also comparing it to CBO’s prior method and methods used by other researchers. Compared with CBO’s prior method, the agency’s updated method better reflects the tax burden on annual income and accounts for differences between consumption and income that are due to life-cycle patterns of households’ spending, and it better facilitates a comparison between the burden of a carbon tax and the burden of other existing federal taxes.
We also describe the limitations of CBO’s updated method relative to CBO’s prior method and the methods used by some other researchers. Compared with CBO’s updated method, the method the agency used in 2012 better captured the burden that the tax would impose on households consuming out of accumulated wealth and better aligned the revenues raised in a given year with the burden that households incur in that year.
In addition, CBO’s updated method and prior method share limitations that are common to all methods that measure the tax burden using data on consumption and income from a single year. Specifically, they do not account for the effect of the tax on households at different points in their life cycle, some of the interactions between the carbon tax and the existing tax system, the additional tax burden on saving if the tax rate increases over time, the macroeconomic effects of the tax, and differential behavioral responses to the tax across income groups.
Le CBO décrit comment deux lois promulguées en décembre 2020 et mars 2021 en réponse à la pandémie de coronavirus de 2020-2021 affecteront les dépenses fédérales, les revenus et le déficit.
Consulter le document »
In December 2020 and March 2021, two major laws were enacted in response to the 2020–2021 coronavirus pandemic. In this publication, the Congressional Budget Office summarizes their estimated effects on federal spending, revenues, and budget deficits. CBO then provides more detail about discretionary outlays from appropriations in the laws and how the laws affect mandatory spending, revenues, and mandates imposed on the private sector. The information is drawn from CBO’s cost estimates for the two laws.
Le Congrès des États-Unis a une occasion de régler les problèmes créés en 2017 par le TJCA et d’aller encore plus loin pour s’assurer que les entreprises paient leur part de la facture.
Consulter le document »
Congress is considering legislative changes that would increase federal corporate income taxes partly by closing or limiting the special breaks and loopholes that companies use to avoid taxes. The following explains flaws in the federal corporate income tax that Congress should address.
Corporate tax avoidance mainly benefits wealthy Americans and foreign investors who own most of the shares in American corporations. When corporations pay lower taxes, these shareholders receive larger dividends from their stocks and obtain larger gains when they sell their stocks.
It is reasonable for corporations (and, indirectly, their shareholders) to pay taxes to support the government investments that make their profits possible, such as the highways that facilitate the movement of goods and people, the education and health care systems that provide a productive workforce, the legal system and the protection of property, all of which are vital to commerce. Corporate tax avoidance allows wealthy and powerful individuals to reap enormous benefits from these investments without contributing their fair share to support them.
Aux États-Unis, dans l’ensemble, les recettes fiscales des États ont été plus importantes pendant la pandémie que ce que l’on craignait initialement, en partie grâce aux généreux plans de relance fédéraux qui ont injecté des milliers de milliards de dollars dans l’économie. Toutefois, les États doivent encore faire preuve de prudence dans leur budget et leurs prévisions en raison du niveau élevé d’incertitude qui subsiste en ce qui concerne les conditions économiques et de santé publique.
Consulter le document »
States reported strong revenue growth in the first quarter of 2021, but there is still large variation in revenue performance across states. Over a 12-month period (April 2020 through March 2021), state total tax revenues increased 0.6 percent compared to the same period one year earlier. Preliminary figures for the second quarter of 2021 indicate nearly 65 percent growth in total state tax revenues but this largely reflects the steep declines in revenues in the second quarter of 2020 caused by the beginning of the pandemic as well as delayed income tax due dates.
Overall state tax revenues were stronger during the pandemic than initially feared, in part due to the generous federal stimulus packages that have injected trillions of dollars into the economy. However, states still need to be conservative in their budget and forecasting because of the high level of uncertainty still remaining related to both economic and public health conditions.
International
L’étude basée sur la République dominicaine montre que les effets dissuasifs sur les comportements de conformité sont renforcés lorsque l’administration fiscale fait un usage explicite et actif des informations des contribuables, que le cadre de facturation soit sur papier ou électronique.
Invoices document economic transactions and are thus critical to assess tax liabilities. We study a reform in the Dominican Republic that aimed to integrate invoice management into a broader, more comprehensive, risk-based compliance strategy. By rationing authorized invoices based on an extra scrutiny of each taxpayer’s compliance history, the reform led to significant and persistent improvements on filing, payment, and information reporting obligations and a modest increase in reported tax liabilities. Our study shows that deterrence effects over compliance behaviors are strengthened when the tax administration makes explicit and active use of taxpayers’ information, no matter if the invoicing framework is paper-based or electronic.
Les données relatives à l’impôt sur le revenu sont utilisées pour mesurer l’inégalité dans les colonies françaises et britanniques. Les auteurs constatent que seule une minorité d’autochtones pouvait concurrencer les colons européens en termes de revenus. L’inégalité entre les Européens était similaire à celle des métropoles. Après l’indépendance, les structures dualistes perdent leur dimension raciale mais persistent.
We assess income inequality across French and British colonial empires between 1920 and 1960, exploiting for the first time income tax tabulations. As measured by top income shares, inequality was high in colonies. Europeans comprised the bulk of top income earners, and only a minority of autochthons could compete income-wise. Top income shares were no higher in settlement colonies, those territories were wealthier and the average European settler was less rich than the average expatriate. Inequality among autochthons was moderate, and inequality among Europeans was similar to that of the metropoles. The post-WWII fall in income inequality can be explained by the one among Europeans, mirroring that of the metropoles, and does not imply that the European/autochthon income gap was very much reduced. After independence, the mass recruitment of state employees induced a large increase in inequality among autochthons. Dualistic structures lost their racial dimension and changed shape, yet persisted.
Les personnes dont les parents sont riches ont tendance à être elles-mêmes plus riches. À l’âge de 30 ans, les personnes nées dans les années 1970 et 1980 dont les parents faisaient partie du quintile le plus riche des parents du même âge disposaient d’un patrimoine net moyen (hors patrimoine de retraite) de 107 000 GBP, soit environ six fois plus que les 18 000 GBP détenus par ceux dont les parents faisaient partie du quintile le plus pauvre.
Why do the children of wealthy parents accumulate more wealth than children from poorer backgrounds? Does parental wealth have a role in determining young people’s earnings, saving choices, returns to wealth and access to homeownership? How much wealth do parents give directly to their children? What other channels are involved in the persistence of wealth from one generation to the next?
As wealth has grown compared with earnings, questions about the role of wealth in determining living standards and the transmission of wealth inequalities across generations have come to the fore. This report sheds light on why wealth inequalities persist across generations in the UK, using data that measure the wealth of parents and their adult children. We assess the role of education, earnings, saving decisions, portfolio decisions, access to homeownership and partners’ earnings in transmitting inequalities in wealth across generations.
En Afrique, subsaharienne, les coûts administratifs des systèmes de tarification de la congestion sont presque certainement prohibitifs, sauf dans les plus grandes villes. Ailleurs, les taxes et les permis de stationnement pourraient constituer un moyen plus simple, mais à forte intensité de main-d’œuvre, de lutter contre la congestion et la pollution urbaines.
Over the last 20 years, sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have experienced significant economic growth and consequently growing levels of motorisation. Though overall levels of motorisation in SSA are still relatively low, with a high number of poor-quality vehicles concentrated in large cities, social and environmental problems associated with motoring are becoming more pressing. Because individual drivers do not consider the wider social impacts of their motoring, governments need to intervene to achieve efficient motoring outcomes.
Government policies to address the problems arising from motoring can include non-tax policies, including regulation and enforcement. For example, roadworthiness tests on imported cars are a good policy option to improve vehicle quality (UNEP, 2020), whilst taking steps to improve road safety and licensing are important to reduce road fatalities (WHO, 2018). However, in this report, we focus on the use of tax policy to appropriately price the externalities of motoring.
This report contributes to ongoing policy debates on motoring taxation in SSA by describing the principles of motoring taxation and key issues and policy options for the region. Where appropriate, we draw on case studies, including from the TaxDev programme’s four partner countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda and Uganda). Case studies are useful to understand particular design issues and challenges in more detail.
La croissance économique s’est redressée cette année, grâce au vigoureux soutien des pouvoirs publics, au déploiement de vaccins efficaces et au redémarrage de nombreuses activités économiques. Le PIB global devrait selon les projections augmenter de 5.7 % en 2021 et de 4.5 % en 2022. Dans les économies avancées, les perspectives de croissance seront dopées par un fort rebond en Europe, la probabilité d’un surcroît de soutien budgétaire aux États-Unis l’année prochaine et la diminution de l’épargne des ménages.
La reprise économique mondiale après la pandémie demeure forte, mais trop inégale. L’inégalité des progrès accroit les tensions économiques qui pourraient compromettre la reprise si elles ne sont pas bien gérées par les pouvoirs politiques. La hausse des prix de certains facteurs de production et des transports maritimes, ainsi que l’étirement des chaînes d’approvisionnement à mesure que les économies se rouvrent rapidement, font grimper l’inflation partout dans le monde, mais cela devrait être temporaire.
Ce rapport intermédiaire fournit des mises à jour des projections de l’édition de mai 2021 des Perspectives économiques de l’OCDE (numéro 109) pour l’économie mondiale et les pays du G20.
Au Royaume-Uni, l’Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) présentera ses prévisions actualisées le 27 octobre, et celles-ci sont susceptibles d’offrir au Chancelier une marge de manœuvre à court et à long terme, peut-être d’environ 25 milliards de livres par an. Les auteurs s’intéressent aux options qui s’offrent au gouvernement.
The Chancellor has not had a quiet introduction to national policy making: overseeing 17 major fiscal announcements in as many months. This summer provided the first lull, driven by the success of vaccines and the understandable focus on Afghanistan. But the quiet phase is coming to an end.
Alongside dealing with whatever new paths the pandemic itself takes, the months ahead will also see Rishi Sunak have to answer a range of questions that the existence of the pandemic has meant have been put-off, and face up to new challenges – not least on the net zero transition. This paper considers five of those major challenges facing the Chancellor this Autumn. Although the his fiscal room for manoeuvre in October’s likely Spending Review looks set to be boosted by the lower-than-expected government borrowing so far this year, none of these issues is simple, and they will do much to decide the size and shape of our post-pandemic state.
En Afrique du Sud, la croissance des groupes de revenus supérieurs et inférieurs a connu une divergence spectaculaire au cours des dernières décennies: entre 1993 et 2019, le revenu avant impôt des 1 % les plus riches a augmenté de 50 %, tandis que celui des 50 % les plus pauvres a diminué d’un tiers. En conséquence, l’Afrique du Sud est aujourd’hui l’un des pays les plus inégalitaires au monde : en 2019, les 10% les plus riches ont reçu environ deux tiers du revenu national, tandis que les 50% les plus pauvres en ont reçu moins de 5%.
In this paper, Aroop Chatterjee, Léo Czajka and Amory Gethin shed new light on the evolution of poverty and income inequality in South Africa since the end of the apartheid regime. The authors build a new database on the distribution of national income since 1993, which is fully consistent with macroeconomic growth figures and allocates the entirety of government revenue and expenditure to individuals. They find a dramatic rise in income disparities: between 1993 and 2019, the pretax income of the top 1% rose by 50%, while that of the poorest 50% fell by a third. However, the widening of pretax income gaps has been almost fully compensated by the growing size and progressivity of the tax-and-transfer system, effectively mirroring a “chase between rising inequality and enhanced redistribution.” The decline of racial inequalities between Black and White South Africans since the end of apartheid has been largely driven by the boom of top Black income groups and is only marginally reduced by taxes and transfers.
Équipe de rédaction
Recherche et sélection des articles :
- Équipe en formation
Coordination et édition :
- Tommy Gagné-Dubé