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QUÉBEC/CANADA

BUREAU DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ FINANCIÈRE DE L'ONTARIO

BRF, « [Le revenu en Ontario : Croissance, répartition, mobilité](#) », 31 janvier 2019, 56 p.

Il est de plus en plus difficile pour les Ontariens à faible revenu de grimper l'échelle de répartition du revenu.

Le présent rapport est un résumé des récentes tendances relatives au revenu des particuliers en Ontario, conformément au mandat du BRF qui est d'examiner les tendances de l'économie ontarienne pour les députés provinciaux et le public. Il est important d'évaluer les variations dans le revenu pour savoir dans quelle mesure s'améliore le niveau de vie sur le plan matériel des Ontariens. Comment les bénéfices de la croissance économique de la province ont-ils été répartis dans la population? Il importe également de se pencher sur le rôle du système d'impôts et de transferts, le revenu étant déterminé par le revenu du marché ainsi que les impôts et les transferts gouvernementaux. Sont examinées ici des données déjà connues sur la croissance et la répartition du revenu, mais on présente aussi de nouvelles données

sur l'évolution de la mobilité du revenu en Ontario. Comment les Ontariens se déplacent-ils sur l'échelle de revenu? Les inégalités sont-elles de plus en plus permanentes? Le rapport ne saurait offrir un examen exhaustif de chaque question; il ne fait que souligner certaines des grandes tendances relatives au revenu des particuliers. Notons aussi que ces tendances ont été influencées au fil du temps par une multitude de facteurs qu'il serait impossible de décrire ici en détail. Le BRF est ouvert aux commentaires sur le rapport ainsi qu'aux suggestions de travaux connexes.

CENTRE CANADIEN DE POLITIQUES ALTERNATIVES (CCPA)

D. MacDonald, « [Are Tax Loopholes Sexist?](#) », 7 mars 2019, 24 p.

Dans l'ensemble, les hommes profitent davantage des mesures fiscales.

This report assesses who benefits from federal tax breaks and finds that men are capturing the majority of benefits from tax deductions, credits and loopholes. The portion of benefits currently going to men compared to women from 45 federal tax expenditures (tax deductions, credits, breaks and loopholes), and finds that only eight (19%) pay out greater amounts to women than men. Introducing different priorities and programs could leverage the tax and transfer system to play an important role in enhancing after-tax gender equality.

In a nutshell, the report attempts to determine whether Canada's tax and transfer system is sexist. The results strongly suggest that it is: only eight of the 45 tax expenditures reviewed pay out greater amounts to women than men, while federal transfer programs are slightly more beneficial to women.

CHAIRE EN FISCALITÉ ET EN FINANCES PUBLIQUES (CFFP)

Collectif, « [Guide des mesures fiscales](#) », 8 mars 2019, 406 p.

Les fiches du guide des mesures fiscales contiennent maintenant, pour plusieurs d'entre elles, une section « bon à savoir et à retenir ».

La Chaire de recherche en fiscalité et en finances publiques présente son Guide des mesures fiscales. Cette publication s'inscrit dans le volet pédagogique ayant pour objectif de rendre les sujets touchant la fiscalité et les finances publiques les plus accessibles possible pour tous.

Le Guide présente les principales mesures fiscales visant les particuliers des gouvernements fédéral et du Québec sous forme de fiches descriptives. Cette deuxième mouture présente 70 fiches descriptives réparties en 13 sections thématiques. Il existe une panoplie d'endroits où les contribuables peuvent se renseigner sur les mesures fiscales qui peuvent les toucher, dont bien entendu les sites des agences fiscales gouvernementales. Les fiches du Guide se distinguent en ce que, en plus de décrire les paramètres des mesures et les facteurs d'admissibilité, chacune présente aussi l'objectif, le coût, des éléments « bon à savoir et à retenir », une illustration de la mesure, une courte section historique ainsi que les sources vers les sites officiels des gouvernements.

Ces fiches visent, entre autres, à aider les contribuables du Québec à remplir leur déclaration de revenus. Ainsi, les paramètres des mesures fiscales sont ceux de l'année d'imposition 2018. La Chaire mettra à jour ces paramètres annuellement. Évidemment, bien que les fiches descriptives renferment des informations sur les mesures, les informations officielles demeurent celles des agences des gouvernements.

Un outil est également mis à votre disposition pour vous permettre de consulter les fiches individuellement.

INSTITUT C.D. HOWE

P. Lortie, « [Entrepreneurial Finance and Economic Growth: A Canadian Overview](#) », 27 février 2019, 36 p.

Un plus grand exemption pour le gain en capital sur la vente d'actions stimulerait l'investissement et réduirait l'exode des entreprises à forte croissance.

The competitiveness of Canadian firms is being hampered by tax policies that discriminate against and penalize companies as they seek equity to fuel growth [...]. [A]uthor Pierre Lortie examines the dynamics of Canadian private and public equity capital markets, and their efficiency in providing access to financing for innovative, high-growth small and medium-sized enterprises.

“Given the complementary role played by both public and private equity markets,” says Lortie, “Governments need to consider policies that support both and do not create an impediment to growth when Canadian companies become public.”

The report notes in 2009-10, Canada ranked ninth on the Global Competitiveness Index; in 2018, it had fallen to twelfth place. This trend could be reversed with easier access to equity capital to fuel companies scaling up.

The report recommends:

- Adopting a tax measure similar to the U.S. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which provides for full exemption from federal taxation of capital gains realized on the sale of shares of certain small businesses.

- Reducing the capital gains tax on shares issued by qualified SMEs when they list on a Canadian stock exchange and are held by individual investors for a reasonable period of time

INSTITUT DES FINANCES PUBLIQUES ET DE LA DÉMOCRATIE (IFPD)

A. Atsin, « [Federal Deficit and Public Debt in Canada: Are We Aware of the Implications for the Medium-Term Outlook?](#) », 26 février 2019, 6 p.

Maintenir un déficit et le financer au moyen d'une dette publique croissante comporte des risques et l'expérience du début des années 90 devrait servir de boussole.

The 2018 Fall Economic Statement by the Federal Government projects budget deficits and continued increase in the public debt for the next five years. The question of public debt has always been the subject of much discussion, especially during the election year. In this brief, we assess the potential implications of rising public debt for Canada's medium-term outlook.

INSTITUT FRASER

R. P. Murphy, « [Carbon Pricing in Alberta](#) », 27 février 2019, 30 p.

La taxe sur le carbone de l'Alberta devrait entraîner des pertes d'emplois sans pour autant réduire de manière significative les émissions mondiales de carbone.

One of the most important tax policy debates in Canada and Alberta specifically concerns “carbon pricing”, that is, the government’s imposition of an extra cost on activities that release carbon dioxide. Two common mechanisms of carbon pricing are a cap-and-trade program (in which the government issues tradeable permits that allow for the emission of a certain amount of CO₂) or a straightforward carbon tax. Alberta has had carbon pricing in some form since 2007, when the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) framework required reductions in emissions intensity for all large emitters. In November 2015, the government of Alberta introduced the Climate Leadership Plan

(CLP), which broadened the scope of the provincial carbon tax, and contained specific objectives on emissions and electricity generation.

This study provides a review of the theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of carbon taxes on economic performance with the object of helping to inform policy development in Alberta on this critical issue. Besides the limitations of carbon pricing at the provincial level, the specific details of the CLP ignore some of the basic lessons in the economics literature. For example, the CLP combines a carbon tax with specific objectives, such as an annual cap (100 megatonnes) on oil-sands emissions, and the goal of phasing out coal-fired electrical generation by 2030. Such supplemental goals undercut the logic of carbon pricing, in which policy makers use a carbon tax to correct incentives and then allow the market to find the least-cost methods of reducing emissions.

INSTITUT FRASER

P. Bazel et J. M. Mintz, « [Effective Tax and Royalty Rates on New Investment in Oil and Gas after Canadian and American Tax Reform](#) », 5 mars 2019, 45 p.

La mise en place de l’incitatif à l’investissement accéléré a permis au Canada de rétablir son avantage fiscal concurrentiel sur les États-Unis dans la plupart des juridictions.

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In the wake of the January 1, 2018 US tax reform, multinational businesses with US operations are re-evaluating investment, financing, and other operating activities to determine their most profitable strategies. Policy makers in other countries are also reevaluating their business tax systems to determine the best course of action in response to sweeping US tax reform. On November 21, 2018, the Canadian federal government announced its response to the US reform by introducing accelerated cost recovery for capital expenditures.

This study provides an analysis of Canadian oil and gas tax competitiveness in the wake of US tax reform and the recent Canadian response. We estimate the impact of all taxes and resource levies on investment returns by estimating the marginal effective tax and royalty rate (METRR) on capital (costs related to other inputs such labour and en-

ergy are not included). This is a summary measure that accounts for corporate income taxes, sales taxes on capital purchases, capital taxes, transfer taxes, stamp duties, profit-based resource levies, and royalties as a share of the pre-tax rate of return on investments. The modelling is based on a “time-to-build” model that used two phases of production: (i) exploration and development to prepare reserves (capital building) and (ii) extraction from reserves (use of capital).

 **ÉTATS-UNIS**
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (CBPP)

S. Parrott, R. Kogan et R. Taylor, « [New Budget Deal Needed to Avert Cuts, Invest in National Priorities](#) », 1^{er} mars 2019, 16 p.

Malgré des progrès, un nouvelle accord sur le budget doit miser sur le financement de certains secteurs négligés et sur la conformité fiscale.

Unless Congress and the President reach a new budget agreement, both non-defense and defense discretionary program areas will face deep cuts in 2020 and 2021, forced by tight funding limits and additional cuts (known as “sequestration”) mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). The most recent bipartisan budget agreement, which covered fiscal years 2018 and 2019, provides a model for a new agreement; it eliminated the sequestration cuts on discretionary programs and provided additional resources for new investments in key priority areas.

Without an agreement, overall funding would revert to the BCA levels. Under the BCA, fiscal year 2020 funding for non-defense discretionary (NDD) programs — which include a wide variety

of areas such as education, scientific research, infrastructure, national parks and forests, environmental protection, law enforcement, public health, veterans’ health care, and homeland security — would be \$55 billion below the 2019 level before adjusting for inflation. NDD programs on average would have to be cut 11 percent in 2020 after adjusting for inflation. Defense would be cut deeply as well: \$71 billion below the 2019 level,

which after accounting for inflation would mean a 13 percent cut, on average, for defense programs.

CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (CBPP)

C. Huang, « [Fundamentally Flawed 2017 Tax Law Largely Leaves Low- and Moderate-Income Americans Behind](#) », 27 février 2019, 13 p.

Une réforme de la loi fiscale de 2017 est nécessaire pour favoriser les familles à faible revenu, augmenter les recettes et éliminer les possibilités d'évitement.

Chairman Yarmuth, Ranking Member Womack, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I will first outline the fundamental flaws of the 2017 tax law: 1) it ignores the stagnation of working-class wages and exacerbates inequality; 2) it weakens revenues when the nation needs to raise more; and 3) it encourages rampant tax avoidance and gaming that will undermine the integrity of tax code. I will then explain in more detail how the 2017 tax law largely left behind low- and moderate-income Americans — and in many ways hurts them. Finally, I explain how a restructuring of the law can fix these flaws.

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CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (CBPP)

J. Sullivan, « [Better State Budget, Policy Decisions Can Improve Health](#) », 21 février 2019, 23 p.

Les taux effectifs dégressifs ainsi que le manque de mesures promouvant l'équité désavantagent la population à faible revenu aux États-Unis.

States’ and localities’ decisions significantly affect their residents’ health. While this includes their decisions about Medicaid and the other important health care programs they administer, it also includes a wide array of budget and policy decisions that affect the “social determinants of health” — the conditions in which people live, work, learn, and play. States and localities can improve their

residents' health — as well as their own economies and opportunities for greater prosperity — by making smarter and deeper investments in health programs, education, the environment, infrastructure, transit, and other public services.

A broad body of research has documented the effects that social determinants of health have on health outcomes, like life expectancy, maternal and child health, and rates of chronic disease, and on disparities in the health of people across racial groups and income levels. But even as this understanding grows, most efforts to improve health remain focused on the health care delivery system. Much more can be done to improve how the health care delivery system connects people to services and supports known to improve health. But focusing exclusively on health care ignores the importance of a wide variety of state and local investments in promoting better health.

Even the ways states and localities raise revenue have implications for health outcomes, given the deep connections between poverty, inequality, and health. In nearly every state, state and local tax systems require the poorest residents to pay more in taxes as a share of their income than the richest residents, an upside-down system that makes it even harder for the residents facing the greatest barriers to live healthy lives.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH OFFICE

S. Lowry, « [Digital Services Taxes \(DSTs\): Policy and Economic Analysis](#) », 25 février 2019, 32 p.

Les nouvelles taxes appliquées sur les services numériques, en vigueur depuis 2019 en France et en Espagne et à partir de 2020 au Royaume-Uni, présenteront des défis administratifs importants pour les administrations publiques et les entreprises assujetties.

Several countries, primarily in Europe, and the European Commission have proposed or adopted taxes on revenue earned by multinational corporations (MNCs) in certain "digital economy" sectors from activities linked to the user-based activity of their residents. These proposals have generally been labeled as "digital services taxes"

(DSTs). In 2020, the UK plans to implement a 3% DST that would apply only to businesses whose revenues exceed £25 million per year and groups that generate global revenues from search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces in excess of £500 million annually.

The UK labels its DST as an "interim" solution until international tax rules are modified to allow countries to tax the profits of foreign MNCs if they have a substantial enough "digital presence" based on local users. The member states of the European Commission are also actively considering such a rule. These policies are being considered and enacted against a backdrop of ongoing, multilateral negotiations among members and non-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These negotiations, prompted by discussions of the digital economy, could result in significant changes for the international tax system.

This report traces the emergence of DSTs from multilateral tax negotiations in recent years, addresses various purported policy justifications of DSTs, provides an economic analysis of their effects, and raises several issues for Congress.

INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (IPPR)

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J. Emden, L. Murphy et H. Lloyd, « [Findings of the Income Crisis Taskforce: Establishing common principles for responses to income crisis](#) », 6 mars 2019, 20 p.

L'administration des prestations sociales peut être améliorée pour mieux répondre au problème de pauvreté au Royaume-Uni.

Income crisis is a worsening epidemic in the UK. Yet the government response has been at best inadequate, and in some cases counterproductive, for example the cuts to benefits and the roll out of universal credit.

In response, several short-term schemes and support services have been set-up, including by national and local government, third-sector organisations and private providers, to help those households in need. These services include provision for essentials such as fuel, food and travel.

The ‘Income Crisis’ Taskforce was formed to explore the extent to which measures to support those people in income crisis were providing effective assistance; whether any common principles could be identified that would drive better outcomes for those who might benefit from the schemes in future; and to suggest how this support could be standardised so that their needs are being properly met. This briefing provides a short summary of the taskforce’s findings. It finds that much of the support provided through the range of interventions is often inconsistent in meeting the needs of those households in income crisis.

LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFFICE (LAO)

G. Petek, « [The 2019-20 Budget: Governor's Proposals for Infants and Toddlers With Special Needs](#) », 28 février 2019, 10 p.

Les propositions du gouverneur répondent à certaines faiblesses du système d'intervention de la Californie.

In this report, we evaluate three Governor's budget proposals related to early intervention services for infants and toddlers with special needs. These include: (1) \$60 million ongoing (split between Proposition 56 tobacco tax revenues and federal Medicaid funding) to provide supplemental payments to physicians who screen children covered by Medi-Cal for developmental delays, (2) four new positions (at a cost of \$446,000 General Fund) to increase state oversight of Regional Center early intervention services, and (3) possible forthcoming trailer bill language to improve transitions for children aging out of early intervention services and into preschool special education. We recommend rejecting the proposed supplemental payments and approving the other two proposals and further recommend the Legislature consider broader reforms to address longstanding weaknesses in the state's early intervention system.

LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFFICE (LAO)

G. Petek, « [A Review of the State's Active Transportation Program](#) », 1^{er} mars 2019, 8 p.

Les lignes directrices du programme ne fournissent pas de données précises pour évaluer les résultats du projet et son efficacité globale.

The state's Active Transportation Program (ATP)—administered by the California Transportation Commission (CTC), in coordination with the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)—provides funding to infrastructure and non-infrastructure projects that facilitate travelers being physically active through biking and walking. Some of the primary goals of the program include increasing the number of walking and biking trips, increasing safety and mobility, and enhancing public health. In approving the 2018-19 budget package, the Legislature directed our office to review certain aspects of the program.

LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFFICE (LAO)

LAO, « [The 2019-20 Budget: The Governor's Proposed Supplemental Pension Payment to CalPERS](#) », 4 mars 2019, 7 p.

Un paiement supplémentaire aiderait à compenser l'inssufisance du régime de retraite de l'État.

This post evaluates the Governor's proposed supplemental pension payment to CalPERS and provides some alternative ways to structure the payment.

LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFFICE (LAO)

G. Petek, « [The 2019-20 Budget: Analysis of Proposed Earned Income Tax Credit Expansion](#) », 6 mars 2019, 16 p.

La proposition accroîtrait l'incitation à entrer sur le marché du travail, principalement pour les travailleurs avec un enfant à charge de moins de six ans.

The state adopted an EITC in 2015 and expanded it in 2017 and 2018. The Governor proposes another expansion starting in 2019 that would (1) extend the income eligibility range to \$30,000, (2) increase the credit amount for workers with dependents under age six, and (3) increase the credit amount for workers with earnings at the higher end of the current eligibility range. This report evaluates the Governor's proposal, discusses potential alternative approaches, and examines implementation issues and options for providing credits on a monthly basis.

TAX FOUNDATION

K. Pomerleau et H. Li, « [Analysis of the Cost-of-Living Refund Act of 2019](#) », Fiscal Fact n° 640, 6 mars 2019, 8 p.

Le « Cost-of-Living Refund Act », une proposition législative de membres de congrès Démocrates, aurait notamment pour effet d'élargir le « Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) ».

Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Representative Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ), and Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) recently reintroduced a bill to greatly expand the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) called the Cost-of-Living Refund Act of 2019. This bill would increase the size of the EITC and increase the number of tax filers eligible for the credit.

The Cost-of-Living Refund Act of 2019 would greatly increase the progressivity of the tax code by raising the after-tax incomes of the bottom 20 percent of taxpayers by 15.4 percent. Overall, taxpayer after-tax income would rise by 1.5 percent.

G. Quintane, « [Les rébellions fiscales des nouveaux privilégiés](#) », Revue française de finances publiques, n° 145, 1 février 2019, 11 p. [L'accès à cet article nécessite un abonnement]

Même si la progressivité a acquis un statut constitutionnel, plusieurs études montrent que le système fiscal français est devenu dégressif.

Le système fiscal français est de moins en moins mobilisé aux fins de réduire des inégalités primaires qui sont en forte progression. L'évolution qu'il a connue bénéficie à une infime partie de la population qui tend à constituer aujourd'hui une nouvelle classe de privilégiés.

BANQUE MONDIALE

K. Bornukova, N. Leshchenko et M. Matytsin, « [Fiscal Incidence in Ukraine: A Commitment to Equity Analysis](#) », Policy Research Working Paper 8765, 5 mars 2019, 49 p.

Les systèmes de prestations et de déductions fiscales sont favorables aux ménages pauvres; ce groupe diminue de 60 à 90% après les interventions liées aux avantages fiscaux.

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The paper employs the Commitment to Equity framework to present a first attempt at a comprehensive fiscal incidence analysis for Ukraine, encompassing the revenue and expenditures components of the fiscal system, including direct and indirect taxes, as well as direct, indirect, and in-kind transfers. The fiscal system in Ukraine has high redistribution effects, decreasing the Gini inequality index by 21 percentage points, and the official measure of poverty incidence by 27.6 percentage points (considering all fiscal interventions including in-kind transfers). As in many other countries in the region, pensions are the main contributor to the redistribution effect of fiscal policy. However, Ukraine stands out due to the relatively high equalizing effect of direct transfers. Fiscal policy in Ukraine is pro-poor, with the lowest income decile benefiting the most. Overall, 60 percent of the population of Ukraine are net recipients from the fiscal system, the main categories of



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recipients being households with two or more children, single-parent households, and retirees.

THE AUSTRALIA INSTITUTE

M. Grudnoff, « [The Art of Deduction](#) », 23 février 2019, 7 p.

Les particuliers avec des revenus bruts de plus de 1 M\$ dépensent de plus en plus d'argent auprès de conseillers fiscaux pour trouver des échappatoires fiscales.

New analysis from the Australia Institute shows a small minority of individuals are spending big on tax accountants to take advantage of unfair tax loopholes, such that individuals with a gross income over \$1 million can pay zero tax.

The issue of tax concessions and tax loopholes has grown in prominence in recent years. Growing inequality has put the focus on those who seek to avoid paying their fair share in our progressive taxation system. These tax loopholes include excess franking credits that see mainly wealthy retirees who have paid no tax get a tax refund from the government.

The tax statistics give us an insight into how a small minority of people are spending very large sums of money in order to find and take advantage of tax loopholes. When we look at people's income before it is reduced by tax deductions we see that some people are able to substantially reduce the amount of tax they pay. But this comes at a large cost.

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