La province a dépensé 119,9 milliards de dollars au cours des trois premiers trimestres de l’exercice 2021-2022, soit 5,5 milliards de dollars (4,4 %) de moins que prévu.
Consulter le document »

Le présent rapport fait le point sur le plan de dépenses de la province pour 2021-2022 et examine les dépenses non auditées du gouvernement au cours des trois premiers trimestres de l’exercice 2021-2022 (du 1^er avril au 31 décembre 2021).

La province a entrepris l’exercice 2021-2022 avec un plan de dépenses de 178,3 milliards de dollars1. À la fin du troisième trimestre, le 31 décembre 2021, le plan de dépenses avait été augmenté de 4,1 milliards de dollars, pour atteindre 182,4 milliards de dollars. Par secteur, la plus forte augmentation du plan de dépenses a été affectée aux autres programmes, soit 2 699 millions de dollars2, et les fonds non répartis de la province ont connu une hausse nette de 1 057 millions de dollars. Une hausse totale de 350 millions de dollars du plan de dépenses a été affectée aux autres secteurs : santé (138 millions de dollars), justice (100 millions de dollars), éducation (88 millions de dollars), éducation postsecondaire (12 millions de dollars) et services à l’enfance et services sociaux (11 millions de dollars). 

La Chaire de recherche sur les enjeux économiques intergénérationnels vulgarise la croissance structurelle des dépenses publique en santé au Québec dans cette note d’analyse.
Consulter le document »

Cette note d’analyse a pour objectif de décomposer les sources de la croissance des dépenses publiques de santé au Québec, grâce à des données administratives longitudinales couvrant la période allant de 2000 à 2016. Les résultats montrent que ces dépenses ont crû de 4,7 % par an en moyenne. Ce taux de croissance s’explique principalement par le vieillissement de la population (1,7 %) et l’augmentation des prix (3,1 %). L’effet prix des médecins représente 1,7 point de pourcentage de cette croissance. L’effet quantité est, quant à lui, très faible et négatif (-0,5 %). De plus, la quantité de médicaments prescrits aux personnes de 75 ans et plus a crû plus vite que pour le reste de la population. Ce phénomène pourrait donc renforcer dans les années à venir l’effet du vieillissement de la population sur les dépenses. La note met aussi en évidence la baisse du coût de la dernière année de vie dans l’ensemble des dépenses publiques de santé. Ce résultat laisse entendre que l’effet du vieillissement est davantage dû à l’évolution de la structure d’âge de la population qu’à l’augmentation du nombre de personnes en fin de vie.

Dans ce cahier de recherche, les auteurs précisent le portrait des déclarants de gain en capital, notamment par une analyse longitudinale visant à mesurer la fréquence de réalisation de ces gains. 
Consulter le document »

Le traitement préférentiel accordé aux gains en capital aux fins de l’impôt des particuliers est généralement associé aux contribuables à revenus élevés. Toutefois, puisque les statistiques fiscales traditionnelles incluent les gains en capital dans le revenu total des particuliers, certains d’entre eux voient leur revenu annuel artificiellement gonflé par la réalisation ponctuelle d’un gain en capital. Les données de la banque de données administratives longitudinales de Statistique Canada a été utilisée pour mieux identifier qui bénéficie réellement du traitement préférentiel des gains en capital au Québec et pour déterminer leur fréquence de réalisation. Plus précisément, l’analyse mesure le déplacement des contribuables entre cinq tranches de revenu selon la prise en compte ou non de leurs gains en capital dans leur revenu total. Si les contribuables plus fortunés bénéficient effectivement de façon disproportionnée du traitement préférentiel accordé aux gains en capital, l’exclusion de ceux-ci du revenu total atténue significativement cette disproportion. Les contribuables aux revenus plus modestes bénéficient plus qu’on ne le croirait du traitement préférentiel des gains en capital. D’autre part, les contribuables aux revenus plus élevés réalisent des gains en capital plus fréquemment que ceux aux revenus plus modestes. Cela dit, dès que les contribuables déclarent des gains en capital, peu importe leur tranche de revenus totaux, ils ont tendance à le faire relativement fréquemment. Les contribuables déclarant des gains en capital avec régularité demeurent malgré tout une minorité, bien qu’ils réalisent une part importante de la valeur totale des gains en capital.

Dans ce cahier de recherche, les auteurs précisent le portrait des bénéficiaires de l’exonération cumulative des gains en capital, notamment par une analyse longitudinale. 
Consulter le document »

Reprenant la méthodologie utilisée dans le cahier de recherche « La concentration réelle des gains en capital au Québec, une analyse longitudinale », cette étude vise à mieux cerner le portrait des contribuables qui utilisent l’exonération cumulative des gains en capital au Québec. Si les contribuables plus fortunés bénéficient de façon disproportionnée de l’exonération cumulative, la nouvelle classification utilisée dans l’étude atténue significativement cette disproportion. Les contribuables aux revenus plus élevés utilisent également plus fréquemment l’exonération cumulative des gains en capital que ceux aux revenus plus modestes.

Le DPB prévoit un déficit budgétaire de 139,8 milliards de dollars en 2021-2022 (5,6 % du PIB) et de 47,9 milliards de dollars en 2022-2023, soit 1,8 % du PIB. Le ratio de la dette fédérale au PIB devrait atteindre un sommet à 47,7 % du PIB en 2021-2022 avant de revenir progressivement à moyen terme à 42,3 %.
Consulter le document »

Ce rapport présente des prévisions de référence pour aider les parlementaires à évaluer les résultats économiques et budgétaires possibles en vertu des cadres d’action actuels.

Le ministère des Finances du Canada publie son rapport annuel sur les dépenses fiscales fédérales. Cette édition contient notamment des analyses spécifiques portant  sur la distribution des taux effectifs marginaux d’imposition des particuliers et une évaluation des programmes de subventions salariales.

Consulter le document »

Le ministère des Finances du Canada a publié [le 1e mars] ses estimations annuelles du coût des mesures fiscales fédérales dans l’édition de 2022 du Rapport sur les dépenses fiscales fédérales : Concepts, estimations et évaluations. En plus d’offrir de la transparence relativement au régime fiscal du Canada, le rapport de cette année renferme quatre documents d’analyse, notamment une évaluation économique des programmes de subvention salariale d’urgence du gouvernement, qui ont protégé plus de 5,3 millions d’emplois occupés par des Canadiens au plus fort de la pandémie.

La publication du rapport coïncide avec le dépôt du Budget principal des dépenses par la présidente du Conseil du Trésor à la Chambre des communes.

Cet article critique la manière de prélever la taxe sur les cigarettes électroniques au Canada, notamment le fait qu’elle soit basée sur la quantité de liquide électronique et mentionne que cette taxe devrait davantage être équitable, peu importe le format du produit afin d’atteindre l’objectif de dissuader les gens de consommer de tels produits.

Consulter le document »

The federal government introduced a vaping excise tax proposal for public discussion in its 2021 budget and said the tax would be implemented this year.

That proposal recognized that e-cigarettes are less hazardous than combustible cigarettes and suggested a much lower excise tax than on cigarettes. However, the proposal also treated different segments of a diverse vaping market inequitably.

Au Canada, les régimes de retraite à prestations cibles n’atteigne pas leur plein potentiel en raison d’une disparité entre la façon dont ils sont gérés et réglementés, la confusion que le contribuable en fait avec les régimes à prestation déterminées, une mauvaise compréhension des différences entre les provisions pour écarts défavorables et les métriques décisionnelles et une concentration trop grande sur les enjeux financiers aux dépens des enjeux quant à la gouvernance et la communication.

Consulter le document »

Target-Benefit Plans (TBPs) are being hampered by a disconnect between how they are regulated and how they are managed, states a new study from the C.D. Howe Institute.   

In “The Challenges Facing Target-Benefit Plans: Changes Are Needed to Provincial Pension Standards,” author Barry Gros details how effective and efficient management is key to these plans’ success, and where regulating the new pension plan option went wrong.

Although started with a great deal of promise, regulatory hurdles continue to stifle their ability to achieve maximum efficiency. TBPs’ regulatory standards were set with traditional DB templates in mind, but they require a different regulatory approach if they are to thrive. “Somehow, in this transition not enough time was taken to ask hard questions about how target-benefit plans actually work, about their inherent risk characteristics and how they should be regulated differently from traditional DB plans,” Gros explains.

Bien que la Covid-19 ait exacerbé le déficit du gouvernement canadien, ce déficit conjoncturel n’a fait qu’accroître le déficit structurel qui était déjà présent. En effet, depuis l’élection du gouvernement Trudeau, les dépenses dans les programmes fédéraux ont augmenté de 36,1% ce qui est supérieur tant à la hausse de l’inflation et de la croissance de la population ou à la hausse du PIB. Or, respecter ces ratios aurait engendré des surplus qui auraient permis au gouvernement de mieux faire face à la pandémie et de réduire la dette par rapport au PIB de 52,1% à environ 46%.

Consulter le document »

Federal finances heading into the COVID-19 pandemic were already weakened due to $160 billion in debt accumulation, above and beyond the debt that would have been incurred if the growth in spending had been restrained to the rate of economic growth, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.

“The COVID-19 pandemic has no doubt worsened Ottawa’s fiscal challenges, but it did not create them. Imprudent spending by the federal government in the years leading up to COVID added billions in debt before the pandemic struck,” said Jake Fuss, senior economist at the Fraser Institute and co-author of Ottawa’s Pattern of Excessive Spending and Persistent Deficits.

The study finds that between 2015/16 and 2019/20, the federal government ran five consecutive deficits, causing the federal debt to rise by $112.2 billion.

During the same period, growth in federal program spending exceeded the growth in revenues. In fact, the federal government increased program spending by 36.1 per cent, from $248.7 billion in 2014/15 to $338.5 billion in 2019/20.

Critically, had the growth in federal program spending been restrained to match inflation and population growth or nominal GDP growth, the federal government would have recorded surpluses nearly every year and avoided taking on $150 to 160 billion in debt before COVID.

Les auteurs en viennent à la conclusion que la Loi sur la responsabilité en matière de carboneutralité (Canada) est inutile, inefficace et potentiellement dommageable et, bien que se voulant transparente, n’illustre pas les coûts pour les contribuables découlant de la transition vers la carboneutralité.

Consulter le document »

Ottawa’s new “net-zero” law, the Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, doesn’t actually require emissions targets to be met, concludes a new analysis released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.

“There is a great deal of misunderstanding about what Ottawa’s signature emissions legislation does and doesn’t do,” said Andrew Roman, a retired litigation lawyer and author of Is Canada’s Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act a Parliamentary Placebo? The legal analysis finds that Canada’s Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act does not require Canada to reach the federal government’s net-zero target (the amount of carbon dioxide we add to the atmosphere minus the amount we remove should equal zero) because:

• Act is Not Legally Binding: While the new law sets what the federal government refers to as “legally-binding targets,” the actual wording of the law does not bind anyone, including the federal government, to meet those targets, and there are no penalties for failing to do so.
• No Costed Plan: The legislation fails to provide a clear plan with measurable actions to achieve the goal of net zero emissions. Moreover, the absence of a plan means there are no cost estimates allowing Canadians to weigh the benefits and costs.
• Not Necessary: Both the previous federal government and the current government have set emissions targets without using legislation, showing that this Act is unnecessary.
• Not Required for Transparency: Canada’s reporting under the Paris Agreement already requires transparency, creating accountability.

Zhe Li, « Social Security: The Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) and the Government Pension Offset (GPO) », 22 février 2022.

R. Corinne Blackford, « The U.S. DOT Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program », 25 février 2022.

Robert Jay Dilger et R. Corinne Blackford, « An Overview of Small Business Contracting » 25 février 2022.

Aux États-Unis, les auteurs estiment que la réponse politique vigoureuse a contribué à faire de la récession du COVID-19 la plus courte jamais enregistrée et à alimenter une reprise économique qui a ramené le taux de chômage à 4,0 %.

Consulter le document »

When COVID-19 began to rapidly spread across the United States in March 2020, the economy quickly shed more than 20 million jobs. Amid intense fear and hardship, federal policymakers responded, enacting five relief bills in 2020 that provided an estimated $3.3 trillion of relief and the American Rescue Plan in 2021, which added another $1.8 trillion. This robust policy response helped make the COVID-19 recession the shortest on record and helped fuel an economic recovery that has brought the unemployment rate, which peaked at 14.8 percent in April 2020, down to 4.0 percent. One measure of annual poverty declined by the most on record in 2020, in data back to 1967, and the number of uninsured people remained stable, rather than rising as typically happens with large-scale job loss. Various data indicate that in 2021, relief measures reduced poverty, helped people access health coverage, and reduced hardships like inability to afford food or meet other basic needs.

These positive results contrast with the Great Recession of 2007-2009, when the federal response was large compared to measures taken in other post-World War II recessions but less than one-third as large as the fiscal policy measures adopted in 2020-2021, when measured as a share of the economy. While decried by some at the time as too large, the relief measures enacted during the Great Recession were undersized and ended too soon. As a result, the economy remained weak for longer than was necessary — and families suffered avoidable hardship. Two years after the Great Recession began, unemployment was still 9.9 percent and food insecurity remained one-third above its pre-recession level. While some of that difference stems from differences in the trigger to the downturn, some is clearly due to the strength of the policy response.

Ce court texte invoque un possible lien entre les impôts élevés de la Californie et la migration des contribuables de cet État.

Consulter le document »

Headlines have announced that many wealthy individuals and businesses are fleeing California. Those with the highest profile have been Elon Musk with Tesla and Larry Ellison with Oracle. According to recent data, 2020 was the first year since 1900, when such information began to be collected, in which California’s population declined. Even so, the idea that the wealthy are leaving California has primarily relied on anecdotes rather than systematic evidence, and the actual costs to the state and its tax base of these departures has been unknown.

In a new paper, we use data directly from California state tax filings to study how migration has varied across tax brackets over the past two decades. Reports of overall population decline are cause for concern, but for the economy, it matters whether the outflow is in fact driven by higher-income or lower-income taxpayers. While an overall population loss is problematic, one where high-income citizens are leaving at a particularly high rate translates more quickly into reduced public resources and contracting economic activity, given the relatively large share of income earned by, and taxes paid by, high earners. Declines in population driven by high earners mean reduced tax revenues for Sacramento, and reduced job opportunities for middle- and lower-income Californians who are less mobile.

Les auteurs proposent d’aligner l’Internal Revenu Code avec les mesures décrites dans leur article, notamment la réduction des barrières à l’investissement et la simplification du Code, afin d’aider à la prospérité économique et au développement des entreprises et conférer une plus grande sécurité financière aux citoyens américains.

Consulter le document »

The waning pandemic and robust economic recovery have come with many benefits—plentiful jobs and fast-growing (nominal) incomes—but also serious challenges such as high and rising inflation.

Rather than pushing for more fiscal stimulus or leaving it to the Federal Reserve to handle inflation through higher interest rates, policymakers should focus on boosting the productive capacity of the economy by reforming the tax code to prioritize economic growth and opportunity.

In terms of business taxation, the tax code should be improved to encourage investment, innovation, dynamism, and competitiveness, leading to more and better jobs.

In terms of individual taxation, streamlining benefits, cleaning up complicated provisions, and eliminating tax penalties on saving would help families enjoy financial security and the returns to their work and saving.

L’auteur analyse la proposition d’un congé temporaire – de mars à décembre 2022 – de la taxe sur l’essence et conclut qu’il s’agirait d’une politique coûteuse et inutile. 

Consulter le document »

Rising inflation has become a dominant issue for policymakers in the past year, with the most recent report finding inflation has risen 7.5 percent over the past 12 months. Some lawmakers have proposed suspending the gas tax to reduce inflation. Rising gas prices are certainly one piece of the inflation puzzle—but suspending the gas tax is a uniquely ill-suited policy for addressing rising prices.

The federal gas tax has been set at 18.4 cents per gallon of gasoline since 1993, and it remains the primary funding source for highway construction. In the context of recent increases in gas prices (almost $1 per gallon in the past 12 months), the federal gas tax of 18.4 cents is relatively small. And in real terms, the gas tax has lost almost half its value since its last adjustment in 1993 because it is not indexed for inflation.

Despite its declining value, the gas tax makes particular sense as the source of highway funding because it conforms to the user-pays principle. People who drive are also broadly the people who benefit most from roads, making the tax an efficient funding source. The rise of electric vehicles (EVs) makes the arrangement slightly less efficient, but EVs are currently only a small share of automobiles on the road.

Cet article met en relief la façon dont l’impôt minimum global (pilier 2) affectera les revenus fiscaux du gouvernement américain, stipulant que le gouvernement américain devrait revoir son système fiscal international en ayant en tête qu’il soit compétitif, simple et durable.

Consulter le document »

The global minimum tax has upended many conversations about international tax policy, including in the United States. The goal of the policy is to set a worldwide 15 percent minimum effective tax rate on corporate profits and enforce it through a set of interconnected rules. If enough countries adopt those rules, then even those that do not will see profits of large multinational companies in their jurisdiction subjected to the 15 percent tax rate.

One important question for Congress is how much global minimum tax revenue might the United States raise?

The answer really depends on the minimum tax rules and how they get adopted. As of right now, it looks like proposed changes to U.S. international tax rules will raise less revenue than revealed in official estimates of the Build Back Better Act (BBB).

Cet article discute des paramètres et du moment d’entrée en vigueur du pilier 1 pour en venir à la conclusion que, bien que théoriquement souhaitable, il comporte des difficultés d’application en pratique en raison du faible nombre de compagnies visées, des difficultés occasionnelles à suivre les produits de la production à la vente finale au consommateur et, bien qu’il y ait une stratégie de proxy, de la conception déficiente de celle-ci.

Consulter le document »

One of the greatest challenges of lawmaking is recognizing when a beautiful theory must succumb to an ugly fact. The purity of conceptual policymaking must take the real world into account and acknowledge that things that work well “in theory” sometimes fail spectacularly to meet expectations “in practice.”

It would be wonderful if a policy met its intended goals 100 percent of the time and there were never any unintended consequences. Unfortunately, we live in a reality where complex tax policies that work well “in theory” can have a very hard time when the rubber meets the road.

One instance of this is the challenge that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has created for itself with the global tax deal, also fondly known as OECD Pillar 1 and OECD Pillar 2 (global minimum tax).

In the last month, model rules have been released on parts of Pillar 1 including how taxable profits will be allocated to different countries and how the tax base will be designed. The OECD is expecting those model rules to be agreed to and a multilateral convention (tax treaty) to be ready for signature by midyear.

However, the rush to finalize the rules is likely to sacrifice the work necessary to make Pillar 1 workable.

Les auteurs s’intéressent à l’écart fiscal aux États-Unis, soit la différence entre les impôts dus au gouvernement et les impôts effectivement perçus. Selon eux, il est important de souligner que l’écart fiscal n’est pas une mesure d’évasion fiscale, bien qu’il représente un des nombreux indicateurs de graves problèmes dans le système fiscal fédéral américain.

Consulter le document »

The “tax gap”—the difference between the amount of taxes owed and the amount of tax actually paid—has garnered widespread attention in recent months. Much of the commentary on the subject equates the tax gap with “tax evasion,” a term broadly understood to connote intentional (and potentially criminal) underreporting. This paper cautions against conflating the tax gap with tax evasion. The tax gap includes substantial gray areas where the law is ambiguous and the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) determination of true tax is debatable. The IRS’s methodology for measuring the tax gap also includes upward adjustments that are recommended by frontline examiners but reversed on administrative appeal or judicial review. Moreover, a substantial portion of the estimated tax gap is derived from a statistical technique called “detection controlled estimation” that potentially magnifies the impact of later-reversed recommendations on the ultimate tax gap measure. Weighing in the opposite direction, the IRS’s approach to measuring the tax gap excludes some amounts that clearly constitute tax evasion (most significantly, underreporting of tax on illegal-source income).

Les auteurs s’intéressent aux implications fiscales découlant du fait que la plupart des revenus économiques générés par des entreprises fermées, soit des entreprises autres que des sociétés, n’apparaît pas sur les formulaires fiscaux aux États-Unis. Selon eux, les données fournissent des informations incomplètes puisqu’ils sont déjà affectés par les règles fiscales, les stratégies d’évitement et la non-conformité.

Consulter le document »

In this policy brief, we explore the tax implications of the fact that most of the economic income generated by closely held businesses (that is, businesses other than corporations) in the United States does not show up on tax forms. Understanding the sources of this discrepancy—including tax laws, noncompliance, or differences in reporting of business losses—can have first-order implications for measuring and interpreting trends in the distribution of income and wealth. For example, determining the distribution of “missing” business income plays an important role in estimates of how top income shares have evolved over time (Auten and Splinter 2019; Kopczuk and Zwick 2020; Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 2018; Sabelhaus and Park 2020). Likewise, to the extent that the distribution of wealth is inferred by capitalizing income flows that appear on tax forms, the difference between economic income and tax-based income definitions could bias the results (Bricker et al. 2016; Saez and Zucman 2016; Smith, Zidar, and Zwick 2021). Using aggregate data and household survey information, we examine the difference between alternative measures of reported closely held business income and discuss the implications for the distribution of income, taxes, and wealth.

Les auteurs s’intéressent au projet pilote THRIVE à Washington, aux États-Unis, qui a fourni un aide d’urgence en espèce de 5 500$ à près de 600 ménages dans cet État. Selon les résultats de leur analyse, les paiements en espèces inconditionnels améliorent la santé mentale des adultes des ménages à faible revenu, en plus de réduire considérablement l’insécurité alimentaire.

Consulter le document »

Direct income supports (such as cash transfers) can stabilize households during crises and recoveries. They show special promise as an equitable means of assisting families of color with low incomes, who because of structural racism are disproportionately affected by health and economic hardships during times of crisis. This report documents findings and lessons learned from THRIVE East of the River, a guaranteed-income pilot that provided emergency cash relief of $5,500 to almost 600 Washington, DC, households during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.  THRIVE was launched by four community-based organizations and provided cash as well as other services to participants who were mostly Black, had low incomes, and lived in neighborhoods east of the Anacostia River where residents experienced disproportionately negative economic impacts of the pandemic.  THRIVE cash gifts and operations were privately funded by foundations, corporations, and individual donors. By the conclusion of the project, the partners had raised $4.43 million and distributed $3.19 million to families. The cash gift, which most participants received as a single payment, places THRIVE among the largest privately funded unconditional cash-relief efforts ever offered in the US.

La 5e section de ce rapport, portant sur la gouvernance fiscale en matière de bien public, fait part de l’interdépendance au niveau fiscal et économique des pays. Cette section conclut que le ratio de dette à 60% du PIB devrait être modifié pour tenir compte de l’incidence et de l’adaptation aux changements climatiques et de la Covid-19 et les mesures visant à prévenir les changements climatiques ou à accroître la vaccination ne devraient pas figurer dans la limite du déficit.

Consulter le document »

The COVID-19 pandemic devastated the European Union yet also spurred an unprecedented level of cooperation and joint decision making. The EU and its Member States rallied to meet the challenges of the global health threat with a jointly procured vaccine, a jointly funded economic recovery package and a jointly supported public borrowing programme. As a result, 2 years later the economy has begun to recover and the EU is ready to consider its next steps in crisis management and planning.

A triple transition of climate, digital and social change will dictate the EU’s overall strategy in coming years. Policymakers have an opportunity to set the Union on a path toward growth and prosperity, but if they are not careful they also could set the stage for entrenched inequality and disagreement. Continuing with longstanding policies also poses a danger, given the need for change to meet the challenges ahead.

The EU will have a chance to set a course along one of three main scenarios: Business as Usual, Fragmentation and Conflict, or a New Era. Under the first option, the EU does not adapt as needed to protect the environment or give its population the skills they need to survive in a digital world, and the EU falls further behind its international counterparts. In the second scenario, EU policies actively unravel the alliances and economic programmes that have taken so long to build, with corresponding threats to political and economic stability. But the EU also has a better option: pursuing policies that will lead to a New Era within the single market and around the world.

In this report, we explore the financial, political and environmental challenges ahead and put forward a series of recommendations to secure the best outcome for the EU in the future. We structure our recommendations in five areas: financing the triple transition; fair and effective taxation; moving towards a Health Union; strengthening Europe’s role in the world; and making the governance of the Union fit for purpose.

Cet article s’intéresse à l’impact que le paiement en ligne pourrait avoir sur les recettes fiscales liées à l’impôt sur le revenu dans les pays en développement.
Consulter le document »

Developing countries need to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance development. Revenue mobilization is often hampered by limited tax compliance, weak institutions, and technical problems with tax collection. One solution to these challenges is person-to-government (P2G) mobile phone payments, adopted in a number of developing countries since the early 2000s. This study assesses the causal effect of P2G adoption on tax revenue using propensity score matching. According to the matching estimates, countries that adopt P2G services experience a 1.2–1.3 percentage point boost in direct tax revenue as a share of GDP. P2G adoption increases revenue from both corporate and personal income taxes, with larger effects on the latter. The results remain robust to matching quality tests and alternative estimation methods, including function control, two-stage least squares, and system generalized method of moments. The average treatment effects are largest among lower-middle-income countries and countries characterized by limited tax compliance and corruption control, and by low levels of urbanization and domestic credit to the private sector. The findings suggest that developing countries, particularly those with poor institutions and low levels of financial inclusion, should promote the adoption and use of mobile money services for tax transactions.

Bien que l’ampleur moyenne de la réponse budgétaire au choc du COVID-19 dans les marchés émergents ait été substantielle, elle était encore sensiblement plus faible que dans les économies avancées, ce qui explique, en partie, pourquoi les marchés émergents ont connu une baisse de croissance plus importante.

Consulter le document »

This article documents recent developments in emerging markets in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, assesses their prospects and challenges, and discusses appropriate policy settings for the medium term. It argues that EM policymakers’ ability to grapple with an incomplete and uneven recovery will be constrained by high public debt and uncertain inflation prospects as well as external risks surrounding capital flows and exchange rate developments. The paper also discusses potential impact of a tightening in global financial conditions and appreciation of the US dollar that could be triggered by a general increase in risk aversion or a reassessment of the likely path of US monetary policy.

Les auteures s’intéressent aux obstacles juridiques dans les lois nationales de différents pays, qui empêchent les femmes d’accéder à leur pleine autonomie économique. Selon elles, certaines mesures de collecte de recette peuvent entraîner des pratiques fiscales discriminatoire à l’égard des femmes et conduisent à des distorsions qui se traduisent par des charges fiscales plus élevées pour elles.

Consulter le document »

It is well established that a wide range of legal impediments in countries’ domestic laws have prevented women from achieving full economic empowerment, which in turn has negative macroeconomic implications. In many countries, laws often reflect and perpetuate gender norms that limit women’s economic participation, and removal of these impediments through legal reform has been shown to be an effective method to catalyze greater participation of women in the economy—along with the related macroeconomic benefits. Once legal barriers are removed and provisions for more equal treatment under the law are embedded, the law can also be employed as a powerful tool to incentivize women to pursue equal opportunities, change mindsets regarding the role of women, and hold institutions and individuals accountable for achieving results. Accordingly, it is imperative for countries to focus on eliminating existing legal impediments and designing appropriate incentives to increase women’s participation in the economy. This paper goes beyond previous Fund work by categorizing the key sources of laws that impede women’s economic empowerment, as well as ways in which the law can be used as a tool to create behavioral changes and shifts in perceptions of women in the economy. Case studies of six countries (Iceland, Peru, Rwanda, The Philippines, Tunisia, and the United States) that rank high in gender equality in their respective regions demonstrate how legal reforms have been implemented in differing contexts to help achieve women’s economic empowerment. Given the relevance to the Fund’s mandate, the paper also notes the case for a stepped-up role for the IMF in advising on legal reforms that remove barriers to, and incentivize, women’s economic empowerment. Although this paper highlights dominant belief systems and cultural norms that have contributed to limiting the economic empowerment of women, it does not intend to render any judgment on these systems or norms.

Les auteurs s’intéressent à la manière dont les communications politiques portant sur les futurs objectifs fiscaux affectent les attentes ainsi que les croyances du marché quant à la conduite future de la politique budgétaire. Selon leur nouvelle approche, développée pour quantifier la crédibilité des budgets, les annonces d’objectifs budgétaires par les gouvernements peuvent effectivement aider à ancrer les prévisions.

Consulter le document »

How do policy communications on future f iscal targets af fect market expectations and beliefs about the future conduct of fiscal policy? In this paper, we develop indicators of f iscal credibility that quantify the degree to which policy announcements anchor expectations, based on the deviation of private expectations from official targets, for 41 countries. We find that policy announcements partly re-anchor expectations and that f iscal rules and strong fiscal institutions, as well as a good policy track record, contribute to magnifying this effect, thereby improving fiscal credibility. Conversely, empirical analysis suggests that markets reward credibility with more favorable sovereign financing conditions.

Les auteurs s’intéressent aux stratégies politiques qui pourraient faciliter la restructuration de la dette, la liquidation et la réorganisation des entreprises à travers le monde, étant donné l’impact significatif de la pandémie sur ces dernières. Selon eux, les programmes de soutien aux politiques nécessitent des objectifs clairs quant aux défaillances du marché qui doivent être corrigées.

Consulter le document »

This paper presents principles that could guide the design of more targeted policy support and facilitate the restructuring of firms adversely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, the paper takes stock of vulnerabilities and risks in the enterprise sector and assesses countries’ preparedness to handle a large-scale restructuring of businesses. Crisis preparedness of insolvency systems is measured according to a newly designed indicator that includes five dimensions of the insolvency and restructuring regime (out-of-court restructuring, hybrid restructuring, reorganization, liquidation, and the institutional framework). Vulnerabilities tend to be more pronounced in jurisdictions with shortcomings in crisis preparedness, and those countries need to step up efforts to improve their insolvency systems.

Les auteurs s’intéressent à la situation économique de la Bolivie, dont le déficit budgétaire en fonction du PIB (produit intérieur brut) a drastiquement augmenté ces dernières années. Selon eux, si la politique budgétaire est cohérente dans le temps et optimisée en fonction de la trajectoire de taux de change choisie, la transition sera considérée comme crédible par les acteurs du marché.

Consulter le document »

Bolivia has achieved noteworthy success over the past 15 years in raising incomes, reducing poverty, and maintaining macroeconomic stability by deploying commodity revenues to finance transfers, public investment, and state-led development, using an exchange rate peg as a policy anchor. However, with the end of the commodity boom in 2014, fiscal deficits have grown and reserves have fallen. One route to restoring long-run sustainability would be to combine fiscal consolidation with a switch to a floating exchange rate. However, a preference for maintaining the peg could be accommodated with adjustments elsewhere in the policy framework. Employing a detailed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Bolivian economy, this study assesses the long-run sustainability and relative benefits of alternative policy combinations, and calculates optimal adjustment paths for the transition from the present situation to the steady state. It concludes that continued adherence to a fixed-rate regime, while not optimal, is feasible, if supported by a larger fiscal effort.

En se basant sur des données britanniques, les auteurs concluent qu’un congé de paiement hypothécaire a permis aux ménages ayant des liquidités limitées de maintenir une croissance annuelle de la consommation plus élevée, par rapport à ceux qui n’étaient pas éligibles à une telle politique.

Consulter le document »

We use UK transaction-level data during the Covid-19 pandemic to study whether mortgage payment holidays (PH) can act as a mechanism for smoothing household consumption following negative aggregate shocks. Our results suggest that mortgage PH were accessed by both households with pre-existing financial vulnerabilities and by those with stronger balance sheets, including buy-to-let investors. We also find that the temporary liquidity relief provided by PH allowed liquidity-constrained households to maintain higher annual consumption growth compared to those non-eligible for the policy. Finally, we find that mortgage PH led to higher saving rates for more financially-stable households

Ce rapport fait état de la façon dont les ménages au Royaume-Uni seront affectés par la transition vers la carboneutralité dans la décennie à venir en termes de chauffage domestique, de transport, d’alimentation et de transport aérien. Pour chacun de ces quatre secteurs, le rapport fait état des mesures devant être prises et des incidences financières.

Consulter le document »

The 2020s are set to bring a step change in climate policy, with efforts to decarbonise the UK economy beginning to impact on household consumption to a greater extent than before. Different households will be exposed to these changes in different ways, but they will come in two flavours: upfront investment now to deliver savings in years to come and changing behaviours.

This report assesses how families will face up to these challenges, looking at 4 aspects of household consumption – home heating, surface transport, diets and flying – and evaluating where government policies are currently lacking and how policy makers should assess the challenges that come as net zero policy enters a new phase.

For home heating and surface transport, although much has been made of the need to invest in heat pumps and electric vehicles, we find that it is the complementary investments in building efficiency and the public charging network that are the key living standards issue for the 2020s. Without the government catalysing large amounts of both public and private capital, low-income households risk missing out on the benefits of cheaper motoring and lower energy bills. In areas where technology is unlikely to take us all the way to net zero, such as food and farming, measures to curb demand will be needed. The government appears to be banking on these changes taking place organically, but should the price incentive be needed it is vital to assess how households of different means will respond.

Cet article met l’emphase sur les révisions mises en place par les États et territoires en Australie afin d’améliorer leurs propres systèmes d’imposition. L’analyse conclut que les réformes ont été très limitées à ces niveaux, par rapport au fédéral, la plupart étant orientées vers une réduction de la base d’imposition afin que leur fiscalité soit compétitive.

Consulter le document »

The nature of Australia’s federation, including its Constitution, means the Commonwealth controls the principal revenue-raising instruments, but large expenditure responsibilities are left to the states, with the consequent imbalance dealt with by fiscal transfers between governments. The states still raise around half of their own revenue, though, through various tax and non-tax sources, many of which suffer from poor design and have been eroded by interstate competition. This paper focuses on reviews that states, and the territories, have undertaken to improve the quality of their tax systems.

Les auteurs concluent que le système fiscal de l’Italie n’est que légèrement progressif jusqu’au 95e percentile de revenu et régressif pour les 5 % les plus élevés. De plus, il est régressif sur l’ensemble de la distribution lorsque les individus sont classés par rapport à leur richesse nette.

Consulter le document »

This work reconstructs novel series on income distribution in Italy combining survey data, tax data and National Accounts both at the national and regional levels, and it analyzes the overall progressivity of the tax system. Our new Distributional National Accounts allow to correct for remarkable misreporting of capital income in surveys, to provide more accurate estimates of consumption, and to better account for the role of informal economy. Our fresh estimates show higher income concentration at the top 10%, 1% and 0.1% with respect to previous studies in order of 2 to 3 percentage points. Moreover, the share of national income of the richest top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1% has been steadily increasing after the 2008 crisis. Our results shed further light on the multifaceted nature of inequality in Italy: youngest individuals, women and inhabitants of Southern regions have been increasingly exposed to growing levels of inequality. Finally, the Italian tax system is only slightly progressive up to the 95th percentile of the income distribution, and regressive for the top 5%. Moreover, it is regressive throughout the whole distribution when individuals are ranked with respect to their net wealth. Simulation exercises show that radical measures, such as a wealth tax, are needed to eradicate the regressivity of the Italian tax system.